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Abstract
A number of assets on the ground typically require protection from aerial threats in a military
ground-based air defence environment. The problem of defending these assets is twofold: In-
coming aircraft first have to be identified and classified as friendly or hostile, and the level of
threat posed to defended assets by each hostile aircraft has to be assessed, after which available
ground-based weapon systems secondly have to be assigned to engage aerial threats with a view
to scare them away or to neutralise them. The latter problem is known in the military operations
research literature as the weapon assignment problem. A fire control officer is responsible for
solving both these sub-problems in real time, usually under very stressful conditions. The officer
therefore typically employs a computerised threat evaluation and weapon assignment decision
support system to aid him in this task.
An architecture is put forward in this dissertation for the weapon assignment part of such
a decision support system. The proposed architecture contains two subsystems, namely an
engagement quantisation subsystem and a weapon assignment subsystem. The purpose of the
engagement quantisation subsystem is to quantify single shot hit probabilities achievable by
weapon systems in conjunction with other information within the format required by the weapon
assignment subsystem. The working of the various components of the engagement quantisation
subsystem is illustrated by means of a series of small numerical examples.
The weapon assignment subsystem forms the heart of the proposed architecture and a weapon
assignment model classification is proposed for use in this subsystem. This classification con-
sists of four classes of weapon assignment models ranging in different levels of complexity. The
classes are single-objective static weapon assignment models, multi-objective static weapon as-
signment models, single-objective dynamic weapon assignment models and multi-objective dy-
namic weapon assignment models.
A model prototype is proposed for default inclusion in each of the aforementioned weapon
assignment model classes. The working of each of these models is illustrated by solving it in the
context of a hypothetical, but realistic, ground-based air defence environment. A conventional
genetic algorithm is used to solve the single-objective static weapon assignment model prototype,
while an extension of this algorithm, a nondominated sorting genetic algorithm (specifically
designed for solving multi-objective optimisation problems) is used to solve the multi-objective
static weapon assignment model prototype. The method of simulated annealing is used to
solve the single-objective dynamic weapon assignment model prototype, while a variant of the
aforementioned nondominated sorting genetic algorithm is used to solve the multi-objective
dynamic weapon assignment model prototype.
The results returned by the algorithms are discussed and validated by means of three methods,
including a subjective face validation, a random benchmark validation and a validation con-
sultation with two independent military experts. It is found that the results are plausible in
terms of realism and practical executability. The models also outperform solutions put forward
iii
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by the military experts when asked to solve the models by hand in the context of the same
ground-based air defence scenario.
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Uittreksel
’n Aantal bates op die grond word tipies in ’n militeˆre grond-gebaseerde lugafweer-omgewing teen
lugbedreigings beskerm. Hierdie bateverdedigingsprobleem is tweeledig: Inkomende vliegtuie
moet eerstens ge¨ıdentifiseer en as vriendelik of vyandig geklassifiseer word, en die mate van
bedreiging wat elke vyandige vliegtuig vir die grondbates inhou, moet afgeskat word, waarna
grond-gebaseerde wapenstelsels tweedens aan vliegtuie wat as vyandig geklassifiseer is, toegewys
moet word met die oog om hulle te verjaag of te neutraliseer. Die laasgenoemde probleem
staan in die militeˆre operasionele navorsingsliteratuur as die wapentoewysingsprobleem bekend.
’n Afvuurbeheer-offisier is verantwoordelik vir die intydse oplossing van die bogenoemde twee
deelprobleme, gewoonlik onder baie stresvolle omstandighede. Die offisier maak dus tipies van
’n gerekenariseerde besluitsteunstelsel vir bedreigingsafskatting en wapentoewysing vir hierdie
doel gebruik.
’n Argitektuur word vir die wapentoewysingsdeel van so´ ’n besluitsteunstelsel in hierdie proef-
skrif daargestel. Die voorgestelde argitektuur bevat twee hoofkomponente, naamlik ’n deelstelsel
vir toewysingskwantifisering en ’n deelstelsel vir wapentoewysing. Die doel van die eersgenoemde
deelstelsel is om enkelskoot-trefwaarskynlikhede wat deur wapenstelsels behaal kan word, saam
met ander inligting oor vyandelike vegvliegtuie in ’n formaat te kwantifiseer soos deur die laasge-
noemde deelstelsel vereis. Die werking van die onderskeie komponente van die deelstelsel vir
toewysingskwantifisering word aan die hand van ’n reeks klein, hipotetiese numeriese voorbeelde
ge¨ıllustreer.
Die wapentoewysingsdeelstelsel vorm die hart van die voorgestelde argitektuur en ’n wapen-
toewysingsmodelklassifikasie word vir gebruik in hierdie deelstelsel daargestel. Hierdie klassi-
fikasie bestaan uit vier klasse wapentoewysingsmodelle van verskillende vlakke van komplek-
siteit. Die klasse is enkeldoelige statiese wapentoewysingsmodelle, meerdoelige statiese wapen-
toewysingsmodelle, enkeldoelige dinamiese wapentoewysingsmodelle en meerdoelige dinamiese
wapentoewysingsmodelle.
’n Modelprototipe word vir versuiminsluiting in elkeen van die bogenoemde wapentoewysings-
modelklasse voorgestel. Die werking van elkeen van hierdie modelle word ge¨ıllustreer deur hul
in die konteks van ’n hipotetiese, maar realistiese, grond-gebaseerde lugafweerscenario op te
los. ’n Konvensionele genetiese algoritme word gebruik om die enkeldoelige statiese wapen-
toewysingsmodelprototipe op te los, terwyl ’n veralgemening van hierdie algoritme, naamlik ’n
nie-gedomineerde sorterings-genetiese algoritme (spesifiek ontwerp vir die oplos van meerdoelige
optimeringsprobleme) gebruik word om die meerdoelige statiese wapentoewysingsmodelpro-
totipe op te los. Die metode van gesimuleerde tempering word gebruik om die enkeldoelige
dinamiese wapentoewysingsmodelprototipe op te los, terwyl ’n variasie op die bogenoemde nie-
gedomineerde sorterings-genetiese algoritme gebruik word om die meerdoelige dinamiese wapen-
toewysingsmodelprototipe op te los.
v
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Die afvoer van hierdie algoritmes word bespreek en deur middel van drie tegnieke gevalideer,
insluitend subjektiewe sigvalidering, lukrake-maatstaf validering en validering deur twee on-
afhanklike militeˆre kenners. Daar word bevind dat die algoritmiese resultate geloofwaardig is in
terme van realisme en praktiese uitvoerbaarheid. Die modelle vaar ook beter as oplossings wat
deur die kenners vir dieselfde grond-gebaseerde lugafweerscenario voorgestel word.
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Apology
It is customary in the military training literature and in the military operations research liter-
ature to use acronyms abundantly. These literatures are, in fact, littered with acronyms to the
extent that military practitioners may often be unable to recall the original, full expansions of
certain acronyms due to their exclusive, widespread use instead of the phrases or concepts they
abbreviate. This convention may make it exceedingly difficult for the uninitiated reader to find
his or her way in technical military reports and academic papers within the military operations
research literature.
In order to render the exposition of this dissertation as credible, plausible and convincing as pos-
sible to the intended target audience, viz high-ranking military practitioners and commanders,
the convention is also adopted in this dissertation of employing acronyms that are well known
in the military domain instead of the full phrases they represent. An attempt has nevertheless
also been made to render the dissertation accessible to non-military readers by clearly defining
the meaning (in italics) of every acronym employed at its first occurrence and by providing a
detailed list of acronyms and their meanings, arranged in alphabetic order, in the preamble of
the dissertation.
The understanding of the reader is therefore requested in this respect, and the author un-
reservedly issues an apology in advance for any frustration that may be experienced by the
cumbersome action of having to look up the forgotten meanings of acronyms during the course
of reading this document.
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List of Reserved Symbols
Symbols in this dissertation conform to the following font conventions:
x Symbol denoting a vector (Bold font)
A Symbol denoting a set (Blackboard capitals)
The following symbols are reserved for exclusive use in the following contexts.
Symbol Meaning
A A set of na attack techniques that can be flown by the aircraft in V
E A set of ne weapons that may be carried by the aircraft in V
Lu A set of n` intensity levels associated with environmental condition u ∈ U
U A set of nu environmental conditions affecting the effectiveness of WSs
V A set of nv aircraft types available to the opposing force
W A set of nw GBAD WS types available to the own force
Symbol Meaning
Ai(τ) The number of ammunition units available to WS i during time stage τ
cij The cost of assigning WS i to threat j
di The setup time of WS i
eij The start of a temporal interval during which WS i can engage threat j
eijk The FTTF for WS i when engaging threat j during the pair’s k
th FW
Fij The number of feasible FTTF values for WS-threat pair (i, j)
fij The number of distinct FWs for WS-threat pair (i, j)
κ The maximum number of WSs that may be assigned to any aerial threat
Lmini The minimum pre-specified length of a FW for WS i
Lij The length of a FW for WS-threat pair (i, j)
`ij The end of a temporal interval during which WS i can engage threat j
`ijk The LTTF for WS i when engaging threat j during the pair’s k
th FW
M The number of objectives in a multi-objective optimisation problem
Mijk The set of consecutive time stages utilised in calculating the fixed-mean
priority-weighted survival probability of the kth FW for WS-threat pair (i, j)
m(τ) The number of ground-based WSs (at time stage τ)
µijk The fixed-mean priority-weighted survival probability calculated for WS-
threat pair (i, j)’s kth FW
n(τ) The number of aerial threats (at time stage τ)
pij The SSHP value of WS i when assigned to threat j
pijk The SSHP value of WS i when assigned to threat j during the WS-threat
pair’s kth FW
xvii
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xviii List of Reserved Symbols
qij The survival probability of threat j when engaged by WS i
qijk The survival probability of threat j when assigned by WS i during the pair’s
kth FW
sijk The engagement time duration of threat j by WS i during the pair’s k
th
FW
t The number of discrete time stages in the temporal period T
τ An indexing symbol for time stages
Vj The threat or elimination priority value of threat j
xij A binary decision variable taking the value 1 if WS i is assigned to threat
j, or the value of 0 otherwise
xijk A binary decision variable taking the value 1 if WS i is assigned to threat j
during the pair’s kth FW, or the value zero otherwise
yihj A binary decision variable taking the value 1 if threat h directly precedes
threat j in a sequence of engagements by WS i, or the value 0 otherwise
Symbol Meaning
Eτ (i, j, T`) The efficiency of WS i predicted at time stage τ for future time stage τ +T`
in respect of threat j
M τ (w, v, e, a) The SSHP matrix for time stage τ corresponding to a WS of type w ∈ W
for the following formative threat combination: an aircraft of type v ∈ V
carrying weapons of type e ∈ E and executing an attack technique a ∈ A
M˜
u`
τ (w, v, e, a) The efficiency matrix containing the discounted SSHP value entry at time
stage τ for environmental condition u ∈ U at intensity level u` ∈ Lu for a
WS of type w ∈ W and for the following threat combination: an aircraft
of type v ∈ V, carrying weapons of type e ∈ E and executing an attack
technique a ∈ A
M τ (w, v, e, a) The WSEM containing SSHP values discounted for environmental conditions
and terrain restrictions at time stage τ for a WS of type w ∈W and for the
following threat combination: an aircraft of type v ∈ V, carrying weapons
of type e ∈ E and executing an attack technique a ∈ A
M t+T`(w, v, e, a) the WSEM at time t + T` for a WS of type w ∈ W and for the following
threat combination: an aircraft of type v ∈ V carrying a weapon of type
e ∈ E and executing an attack technique of type a ∈ A
P t+T`(w, v, e, a) The PPM at time stage τ predicted for time stage τ + T`
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AD: Air Defence
ADC: Air Defence Control
AM: Attribute Management
C2: Command and Control
CIWS: Close-In Weapon System
DA: Defended Asset
DBMOSA: Dominance-Based Multi-Objective Simulated Annealing
DS: Decision Support
DSS: Decision Support System
EEM: Engagement Efficiency Matrix
EQ: Engagement Quantisation
EW: Electronic Warfare
FCO: Fire Control Officer
FNSA: Fast Nondominated Sorting Algorithm
FPP: Flight Path Prediction
FTTF: First-Time-To-Fire
FW: Fire Window
GBAD: Ground-Based Air Defence
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MCDA: Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis
MMI: Man-Machine Interface
MRSAM: Medium-Range Surface-to-Air Missiles
NCW: Network-Centric Warfare
NSGA II: Nondominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm II
OODA: Observe-Orientate-Decide-Act
OPTEMPO: OPerational TEMPO
P: Priority
PEF: Physical Element Filter
PFP: Predicted Flight Path
PPI: Plan Position Indicator
PPM: Predicted Position Matrix
R: Repairability
SA: Situation Awareness
SBAD: Surface-Based Air Defense
SHORADS: SHOrt-Range Air Defence System
SSHP: Single Shot Hit Probability
TADMUS: TActical Decision Making Under Stress
TCI: Type Classification/Identification
TE: Threat Evaluation
TEM: Threat Evaluation Model
TEFM: Threat Evaluation Fusion Model
TM: Track Management
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1.1 Background
The USS Vincennes (CG 49) is a United States Navy guided missile cruiser which was com-
missioned for service in 1985 [36]. It originally saw service in the Pacific Ocean before it was
dispatched to the Persian Gulf (in particular to the Straight of Hormuz1) in 1988 to support
Operation Earnest Will2 during the Iran-Iraq War which took place during the period 1980–1988
[75]. A picture of the USS Vincennes is shown in Figure 1.1(a). At the time, the USS Vincennes
was equipped with the United States’ then state-of-the-art naval combat information centre.
The heart of this centre was the well-known Aegis combat system3. It included advanced Com-
mand and Control (C2) and weapon control systems which were able to track and guide Weapon
Systems (WSs) in order to engage and destroy enemy targets [76]. Aegis was developed as a
fully integrated Decision Support System (DSS) boasting state-of-the-art radar and missile sys-
tems and display screens for depicting the surrounding air picture, making it the first integrated
system providing real-time Decision Support (DS) to operators on several fronts, including air,
surface and subsurface DS [81]. The Aegis display screens in the combat information centre
aboard the USS Vincennes are shown in Figure 1.1(b).
By 1984, the war between Iraq and Iran had evolved to include air attacks against oil tankers and
merchant shipping of neighbouring countries. On 17 May 1987, the Iraqi Air force attacked the
United States guided missile frigate, the USS Stark (FGG-31), which resulted in severe damage
1The Straight of Hormuz provides the only sea passage for sea vessels between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf
of Oman [181].
2Operation Earnest Will was launched on 24 July 1987 and lasted until 26 September 1988. It involved the
United States military protecting Kuwaiti-owned tankers from Iranian attacks during the period 1987–1988. This
operation was launched three years into the so-called Tanker War phase of the Iran-Iraq war [75].
3The word Aegis stems from Greek mythology and means protective shield [76].
1
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(a) (b)
Figure 1.1: (a) The USS Vincennes which shot down Iran Air flight 655 [36] and (b) the Aegis Combat
System information centre on board the USS Vincennes [76].
to the port side of the vessel and the death of thirty seven American sailors [183]. Furthermore,
United States naval forces also exchanged gunfire with Iranian gunboats late in 1987 and in April
1988 the United States guided missile frigate, the USS Samuel B. Roberts, struck an Iranian
sea mine which severely damaged the vessel, resulting in it being out of commission for several
months [183]. All these events exacerbated an already tense relationship between the United
States, Iraq and Iran in the Persian Gulf at the time.
Then, on 3 July 1988, a civilian jet airliner, Iran Air flight 655, carrying 290 passengers and
crew members was flying over the Persian Gulf. It was crossing the Straight of Hormuz en
route to Dubai in the United Arab Emirates on its usual flight path. On the morning of 3
July, however, the USS Vincennes received intelligence from one of its helicopters that it had
received small arms fire from Iranian gunboats operating within Iranian territorial limits [183].
The USS Vincennes then entered Iranian territorial waters to open fire on the Iranian gunboats.
While the USS Vincennes was retaliating against the gunboats, confusion reigned aboard the
vessel as the tracking of aircraft in the area had become muddled. Amidst the chaos, a USS
Vincennes operator spotted Iran Air flight 655 on the Aegis radar. The passenger aircraft was
climbing at the time and its Identification Friend or Foe4 (IFF) transponder was set to Mode
III civilian code rather than to the purely Mode II military code. The USS Vincennes tried
several times to make contact with the airliner, but the airliner failed to respond to any of the
communication attempts as recorded by the Aegis onboard combat system. The crew onboard
the USS Vincennes then mistakenly concluded that the airliner was a hostile F-14 Tomcat fighter
aircraft. It fired two radar-guided missiles at the airliner “in self-defence” and shot down the
airliner over Iranian airspace [183]. Only after the missiles had been launched did the crew realise
that they misclassified the airliner. The consequences of the crew’s decision were catastrophic,
resulting in the deaths of all 290 passengers and crew members on board the airliner.
The disaster prompted a number of formal investigations by the United States Navy and the In-
ternational Civil Aviation Organisation [126]. During these investigations it was concluded that
the misidentification of the aircraft may have been due to a phenomenon known as compression
of time5 in conjunction with the contemporaneous engagement with Iranian gunboats as well
4IFF communication systems are used to confirm the nature and intent of an aircraft, and to differentiate
between friendly and non-friendly aircraft [35].
5Compression of time is a phenomenon in which a person’s perceived duration of a time interval understates
its true duration [155].
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as emotional stress and a psychological phenomenon known as scenario fulfilment6. Prompted
by the findings of these investigations, the United States Office of Naval Research sponsored
research resulting in the establishment of a programme called Tactical Decision Making Under
Stress (TADMUS) [155].
The main focus of the TADMUS programme was to investigate the effect that stress has on the
decision making abilities of military operators, to use this information to improve the combat
performance of team operators under stress by means of enhanced training and to provide them
with suitable DSS during combat situations [30, 98, 81]. The focus in the design of the DSS
was on enhancing the performance of tactical operators who act as decision makers in combat
situations. The approach followed in the development of the DSS was to analyse the cognitive
tasks performed by operators in a ship’s combat information centre and then to develop a set
of display concepts which may be used in support of tasks performed by the operators based on
the underlying decision making process typically followed by these operators [93].
The results of the cognitive task analysis highlighted two higher-order tasks performed by oper-
ators — the assessment of the current situation and the selection of alternative courses of action.
In respect of the first higher-order task (i.e. information transactions associated with assessing
the current tactical situation), it was found that in 87% of the decisions made, operators tried to
match the observed events in the scenario to similar scenarios they had previously encountered,
while in 12% of the decisions made, operators developed novel hypothetical explanations in or-
der to make sense of the observed scenarios [81, 93]. When considering the second higher-order
task (i.e. selecting alternative courses of action), it was found that 94% of the operators based
their alternative courses of action solely on established rules of engagement, while the remaining
6% of the operators developed strategies extrapolated from previous encounters to base their
alternative courses of action upon. Furthermore, it was found that experienced operators were
not particularly well served by current DSSs in demanding missions and that operators typically
experienced periodic loss of Situation Awareness (SA) often due to limitations in human memory
and shared attention capacity.
Based on the aforementioned results of the cognitive task analysis, a prototype DSS was de-
veloped with the following three objectives in mind: (1) to minimise the mismatches between
cognitive processes and the data available in the combat information centre in order to facilitate
decision making, (2) to mitigate the shortcomings of current display sets in the combat informa-
tion centre when imposing high information processing demands and exceeding the limitations
of human memory, and (3) to transfer the data in the current combat information centre from
numeric to graphical representations wherever appropriate [81, 93]. The aim in designing the
improved DSS was to reduce errors, reduce workload on the operators and to improve adherence
to the rules of engagement. The integrated display of the set of display concepts deriving from
the TADMUS programme may be found in Figure 1.2.
The DSSs and human operators responsible for the detection of threats, evaluating these threats
and determining alternative courses of action in order to eliminate or deter such threats in
combat situations, typically have to make these important decisions within very small time
frames. Although most DSSs are fully automated, many commanding officers fail to entrust
the safety of their commands to a software program and end up rather trusting their own
intuition. The effect of this mistrust may be detrimental to the safety of own forces and the
protection of assets. One example of such an incident is the attack on the United States guided
missile frigate, the USS Stark, mentioned previously. An Iraqi fighter jet fired two French-built
6Scenario fulfilment occurs when operators work under stressful conditions, confusing a training scenario with
reality and responding accordingly [65]. Operators typically ignore sensory information which contradicts the
scenario. Roberts [156] describes scenario fulfilment as “you see what you expect.”
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
4 Chapter 1. Introduction
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
of action, command level decision makers relied almost
exclusively on recognition of applicable tactics based
on rules of engagement (94%), while much more rarely
developed a general selection strategy extrapolated
from previous experience (6% of actions selected).
.Baseline tests in representative littoral scenarios
corroborated these analyses (Hutchins & Kowalski,
1993; Hutchins, Morrison, & Kelly, 1996).  The com-
munications analysis indicated a predominance of fea-
ture matching strategies in assessing the situation typi-
cally followed by the selection among preplanned re-
sponse sets (tactics) that were considered to fit the
situation.  These tests also suggested that experienced
decision makers were not particularly well served by
current systems in demanding missions.  Teams exhib-
ited periodic losses of situation awareness, often linked
with limitations in human memory and shared attention
capacity.  Environmental stressors such as time com-
pression and highly ambiguous information increased
decision biases, e.g. confirmation bias, hypervigilance,
task fixation, etc.  Problems associated with short term
memory limitations included:  (a) mixing up track num-
bers (track being recalled as 7003 vs. 7033) and forget-
ting track numbers; (b) mixing up track kinematic data
(track recalled as descending vs. ascending in altitude,
closing vs. opening in range, etc.) and forgetting track
kinematic data; and (c) associating past track related
events/actions with the wrong track and associating
completed own-ship actions with the wrong track.
Problems related to decision biases included:  (a) car-
rying initial threat assessment throughout the scenario
regardless of new information (framing error) and (b)
assessing a track based on information other than that
associated with the track, e.g., old intelligence data,
assessments of similar tracks, outcomes of unrelated
events, past decision maker experiences, etc. (e.g. con-
firmation bias).
DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM DESIGN
In effect, the CO and TAO decision makers were
behaving in a manner consistent with those predicted by
“naturalistic” decision making theory (Klein, 1993).
Therefore, this theory became central to the design of a
human-computer interface to improve tactical decision
making.  A prototype DSS was developed with the ob-
jectives of:  (1) minimizing the mismatches between
cognitive processes and the data available in the CIC to
facilitate decision making; (2) mitigating the shortcom-
ings of current CIC displays in imposing high informa-
tion processing demands and exceeding the limitations
of human memory; and (3) transferring the data in the
current CIC from numeric to graphical representations
wherever appropriate.  It was determined that the DSS
should not filter or extensively process data; i.e., it
should support rather than aid (automate) decision
making and leave as much decision making with the
decision makers as possible.  The design goal of the
DSS was to take the data that are already available in
the system and present it as meaningful information
where, when, and in the form it was needed relative to
the decision making tasks being performed.
The DSS was designed expressly for the evaluation
of display elements to support feature matching, story
generation (viz., Explanation-Based Reasoning (EBR)),
and Recognition-Primed Decision making (RPD) with
the goal of reducing errors, reducing workload, and
improving adherence to rules of engagement.  The de-
sign was significantly influenced by inputs from subject
matter experts to ensure its validity and usefulness for
the operational community.  It is implemented on a per-
sonal computer which may operate independent of, syn-
chronized with, or linked to a scenario driver simula-
tion.
Figure 1. TADMUS DSS Integrated display.Figure 1.2: The integrated display of the et of display concepts developed in the TADMUS DSS [93].
Exocet anti-ship missiles at the USS Stark [183]. The Aegis system on board the USS Stark
automatically detected, classified and tracked the two missiles as hostile, but the commanding
officer did not trust the results proposed by the DSSs. This r sulted in the missiles hitting the
frigate unchallenged.
The disaster which emanated from t e erroneous decisions made on both the USS Vincennes
and USS Stark, as well as the research findings of the TADMUS programme des ribed earlier,
accentuate the importance of providing efficient DS to op rator when ey have to make tactical
decisions in combat situations. Furthermore, it is crucial that the DS provided by a DSS be
of such a nature that operators are able to trust the courses of action proposed — the idea is
that the r sults of the DSS conform to the judgement of the operators and that it should only
confirm the courses of act on that the operators would, in fact, have made unassisted if allowed
ample response time. It is also important that the output of the DSS conforms to the s andard
rules of engagement contained in military doctrine.
1.2 Informal problem description
In a military Ground-based Air D fense (GBAD) environment, a number of Defended Assets
(DAs) on the surface7, such as sea-faring vessels, air strips, main bridges or fuel depots, typically
require protection from enemy aerial vehicles entering the three-dimensional airspace surround-
ing these DAs, known as the defended airspace. A network of sensors is responsible for detecting
these aircraft when they enter the defended airspace and protection against these aircraft is
afforded by a number of pre-deployed ground-based WSs which are available for engagement in
the immediate tactical area.
The problem of defending DAs effectively is twofold. The first part of the problem is to identify
any aircraft which enter the defended airspace and to hen lassify them accordi g t force
(i.e. enemy or friendly) as well as according to type (e.g. as fixed wing aircraft or rotary wing
aircraft). After the ai craft have thus been classified, the next step is to investigate the perceived
level of threat that each of the enemy aircraft poses to the DAs and to assign a numerical value
to each of the enemy aircraft according to some appropriate measure which provides a good
indication of the level of threat the aircraft poses to DAs. The processes involved in detecting
7In the context of GBAD, the term surface refers to the surface of a portion of land, lake or ocean.
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aircraft, classifying them and estimating the perceived level of threat that they pose to DAs are
collectively known in the military literature as Threat Evaluation (TE).
The second part of the problem of defending DAs in a GBAD environment is to assign one or
more available surface-based WSs to engage those aircraft classified as threats in a bid to neu-
tralise or deter them. The process involved in assigning available WSs to threats is known in the
military literature as Weapon Assignment (WA) and the underlying combinatorial optimisation
problem of assigning available WS to threats so as to achieve the best effect is known in the
operations research literature as the Weapon Assignment Problem (WAP).
A human operator, called a Fire Control Officer (FCO), is responsible for performing TE and
solving the WAP in real-time under severely stressful conditions. The speeds at which enemy
aerial vehicles typically approach DAs leave very short time frames for analysis or delays in
reaction time. Not only does the FCO have to decide which WSs to assign to the threats, but he
also has to choose the number of WSs to assign to each individual threat as well as the timings
of these engagements. The assignment of multiple WSs to a threat at any point in time may
result in an increased probability of eliminating that specific threat, but may simultaneously
compromise the number of WSs available for assignment during future time intervals called time
stages.
After deciding which WSs to assign to a specific threat, the FCO also has to decide whether
he should assign any WS to engage an aerial threat during the current time stage, or whether
he should rather wait until a later time stage before initiating such an engagement when the
probability of eliminating the threat may be higher. Moreover, a WS achieving a longer range
typically involves a higher monetary cost of assignment than does a WS achieving a shorter range.
A longer-range WS may be assigned to aerial threats earlier, but at an increased assignment
cost.
When a large number of aircraft approach the defended airspace almost simultaneously from
various directions (an attack scenario typically employed by opposing forces in a bid to over-
whelm FCOs), TE and solution of the WAP become very complex and almost impossible for
the FCO to carry out effectively in real time. A computerised Threat Evaluation and Weapon
Assignment (TEWA) system may therefore be employed to perform TE and solve the WAP
in real time, and to provide the results obtained as DS to the FCO. By using such a DSS in
real time, overall system performance may be improved, and operator stress and workload may
be alleviated significantly. Using his own judgement, which is typically based on considerable
experience and training, in conjunction with the alternatives recommended by the TEWA DSS,
the FCO is expected to be able to make more effective assignment decisions with respect to
the engagement of aerial threats by WSs, and to make these assignment decisions with more
confidence.
Many TEWA DSSs exist in the military defence industry. Examples of such systems include
the Aegis system mentioned earlier in §1.1, the Battlefield Command Support System [163] and
Tactical Command and Control System [164], developed by SAAB, as well as the GENESIS
Ship Integrated Combat Management System, developed by the Turkish navy [191]. These “off-
the-shelf” systems are typically commercially available as “black box” systems in the defence
industry. The design rationales of such systems are usually not disclosed in the open literature,
which limits the possibility of refining the software systems and fully understanding the working
of these systems.
In 2007, Roux and Van Vuuren [161], reviewed the state of the art of such TEWA DSSs about
which information was available in the open literature at that stage. In 2008, they went further
by suggesting a design for a complete, generic TE subsystem for use in a GBAD context for
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the South African military [162]. Since then there has largely been a void in the design of a
fully-fledged TEWA DSS within the South African context, especially on the WA side of such a
larger TEWA DSS. The aim in this dissertation is therefore to build on the work of Roux and
Van Vuuren, by putting forward a design of a first-order generic WA subsystem as counterpart
to the TE subsystem already designed for inclusion in a larger TEWA DSS system. The purpose
of this subsystem is to provide real-time DS to FCOs with respect to high-quality WS-threat
assignment alternatives. The design follows the structured approach proposed by Roux and Van
Vuuren [161] in the context of TE and contains a refinement of the substructures contained in
such a subsystem.
1.3 Dissertation objectives
The following nine objectives are pursued in this dissertation:
I To conduct a comprehensive survey of the literature with respect to:
(a) the processes involved in TE and WA, as well as the interaction between these pro-
cesses in the context of a GBAD context,
(b) GBAD procedures and modelling approaches in general, with an emphasis on WA
DS,
(c) the physical, functional and cognitive elements encompassed within the WA subsys-
tem of a TEWA DSS, accentuating the requirements for the successful working of
such a subsystem,
(d) the current status of WA-related research in a GBAD environment within the South
African military domain,
(e) available single and multi-objective Weapon Assignment Models (WAMs) in the op-
erations research literature which may be adapted for inclusion in a WA subsystem so
as to facilitate recommendation of high-quality WS-threat assignment alternatives,
(f) the notion of Pareto optimality within the realm of multi-objective optimisation,
(g) available solution methodologies for solving the WAMs of Objective I(e) and the
requirements of each methodology for the successful implementation thereof within a
GBAD WA subsystem, and
(h) DSSs in general, with an emphasis on the design of DSSs in a military setting.
II To establish a suitable, novel framework design for a WA subsystem intended for use as
real-time DS within a larger TEWA system.
III To propose a classification scheme for WAMs, encompassing models of different levels of
complexity, for inclusion in the framework design of Objective II which are able to propose
high-quality WS-threat assignment pairs based on WAM configurations specified by the
FCO, and also to identify prototypes of WAMS from the literature for use in each of the
proposed classes.
IV To formulate a novel tri-objective dynamic WAM which aims to minimise the accumulated
survival probabilities of aerial threats (by incorporating their respective threat values), to
minimise the accumulated cost of the assignment proposed and to maximise the number of
times that the least re-engagable WS in the set of WSs can be used in future assignments,
after the current assignment WA window has elapsed. The dynamic element of the WAM
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should facilitate the scheduling of subsets of future time stages during which WS-threat
pair assignments are to occur. It is envisaged that this WAM may be taken as prototype
in the most complex class of WAMs proposed in the classification scheme of Objective III.
V To propose appropriate solution methodologies for the WAMs in each of the classes of the
classification scheme proposed in pursuit of Objective III, elucidating the input parameters
required for the timeous and successful solution implementation of each WAM.
VI To suggest appropriate approaches, procedures and methodologies that may be considered
during a practical implementation of the proposed WA subsystem of Objective II.
VII To illustrate the workability of each WAM prototype of Objective III by solving it in the
context of a simulated, realistic GBAD scenario according to the solution methodologies
of Objective V.
VIII To evaluate the success, significance and usefulness of the design framework of Objective II
in the context of the simulated GBAD scenario of Objective VII.
IX To suggest sensible ideas for possible further work related to the research conducted in
this dissertation.
1.4 Dissertation scope
The following delimitations of research focus are adopted in this dissertation. For the purposes
of this dissertation, it was decided to pursue the design of a WA subsystem as part of an Air
Defence Control (ADC) system within a GBAD environment specifically. This seemed to be the
natural choice based on access the author had to a number of military experts residing within the
South African National Defence Force who are GBAD experts in respect of the substructures of a
GBAD environment, including its physical, functional and cognitive elements. The mathematical
WA models considered in this dissertation also take as input the output of the TE subsystem
previously developed by Roux and Van Vuuren [162], therefore also making it natural to delimit
the scope of the work to the development of a WA subsystem within a GBAD environment.
In addition, the scope is delimited to consider only fixed wing aircraft as threats and also to
consider the elements in the deployment of the Air Defence (AD) as fixed (i.e. the positions
of the sensor systems, the DAs, the WSs and other AD physical elements are fixed during a
mission).
Furthermore, the objective in the development of the WA models in the dissertation is that
they should be of a generic, flexible and adaptive nature. This implies that the WA subsystem
architecture proposed should be able to accommodate temporal updates of data related to its
functional elements or additional functional elements (i.e. not restricting the type, number or
related attributes of physical, functional or cognitive elements considered during WA).
1.5 Research methodology
The execution of the research reported in this dissertation consists of five stages. The first
stage is mainly concerned with reviewing the literature on various topics related to the con-
tents of the dissertation. First, a typical GBAD environment and the elements that such an
environment encompasses are reviewed in order to establish a framework for understanding the
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context in which a GBAD TEWA system is expected to operate. Next, the typical working of
a TEWA system is reviewed in some detail within a GBAD environment, with an emphasis on
the processes involved in the TE and WA subsystems individually as well as how these processes
interact with one another. WA DS within the South African military domain is also reviewed
in order to establish the current state of the art of WA DS tools available to FCOs in a GBAD
environment. WAMs from the military operations research literature are reviewed next. The
literature review on WA DS contains descriptions of WAMs since the inception of the first WAM
during the 1950s up to the current state of the art of WAMs of the early 21st century.
Furthermore, a number of mathematical prerequisites are established, thereby paving the way
for the TEWA framework design. The literature review concludes with descriptions of solution
methodologies from the operations research literature which may be used to the solve the WAMs
found in the military decision support literature.
The next stage in the execution of the research of this dissertation involves the establishment of a
novel framework design for WA DS to FCOs as part of a larger TEWA system for use in a GBAD
environment. The architecture proposed includes four components which function in a sequential
manner to provide real-time DS to FCOs. The four components are described comprehensively
and examples are given of how these components may function both individually and together.
The interaction between these components, as well as the flow of information between the
components, are highlighted.
A novel WAM component is proposed as part of the aforementioned WA subsystem architec-
ture. This component contains four classes of WAMs which may be used to propose WS-threat
assignment pairs. These classes range over different levels of complexity in terms of the quality
and level of realism of the solutions that they are able to generate, as well as the difficulty
associated with implementing them. WAM prototypes for use in three of these classes are taken
from the literature and are discussed in detail. A novel tri-objective, dynamic WAM is finally
formulated and proposed for use in the final, most complex class of WAMs, thereby filling the
current void in this class of WAMs in the military operations research literature.
The next research stage involves illustrating the working of each of the WAM prototypes in the
context of a simulated, but realistic, GBAD scenario. This is achieved by adopting appropriate
solution methodologies from the operations research literature. Emphasis is placed on a study
of the input parameters required for the successful implementation of each WAM. The results
returned by the WAM prototypes (i.e. the assignments and/or engagement schedules proposed
by each WAM prototype) are tabulated numerically and also displayed graphically in the form
of a top-view of the scenario in which the WS-threat assignment pairs are illustrated.
The results obtained by each WAM prototype are then validated by means of three validation
techniques. The first technique involves a face validation in which the numerical and graphi-
cal results are analysed critically. The second validation involves a comparison of the results
returned by each of the WAM prototypes and those of a random benchmark of the problem in-
stance. More specifically, thirty feasible WS-threat assignment solutions are generated for each
WAM prototype and compared with the results returned by each WAM prototype. Finally, two
military experts are consulted in respect of the validation of the results returned by each WAM
prototype. The problem instance for each WAM is presented to the experts and they are asked
to solve the problem manually based on their intuition, knowledge and experience. Their results
are then compared with the results obtained by the WAM prototypes. The results obtained
by each of the WAM prototypes are finally also presented to the military experts to analyse
critically. They are then asked to voice their opinions on the quality, realism and usefulness of
the results returned by each of the WAM prototypes.
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The final stage in the execution of the research of this dissertation involves the identification of
voids in the proposed WA subsystem architecture and to propose suitable ideas for further work
that will lead to a refinement of the architecture proposed with a view to filling these voids.
1.6 Dissertation organisation
The nine chapters in the remainder of this dissertation are organised into four parts. Part I
contains two chapters pertaining to the open literature relevant to the context of the problem
considered in this dissertation. In Chapter 2, a theoretical, integrated framework for GBAD is
reviewed. This is achieved by providing detailed descriptions of the processes typically involved
in TE and WA, as well as the interaction between them, in fulfilment of Dissertation Objec-
tive I(a) of §1.3. An introduction to GBAD-related research in the literature is also provided in
fulfilment of Dissertation Objective I(b). The chapter further includes a discussion on available
AD artillery in the South African military domain as well as existing ADC measures employed.
WA DS is also discussed in a theoretical setting, in fulfilment of Dissertation Objective I(d).
Next, detailed discussions are provided on important practical concepts such as SA, C2 mea-
sures and network-centric warfare, which should be accommodated in the design of any modern
TEWA DSSs. The physical, functional and cognitive elements of a TEWA DSS are furthermore
elucidated in fulfilment of Dissertation Objective I(c). The physical elements (the hardware
systems) typically present within the tactical GBAD environment in which a TEWA DSS is
employed are discussed in some detail. These elements include DAs, sensor systems, aerial
threats to the system and GBAD WSs. Next, the functional elements (the software systems)
which should be considered in the design of a TEWA DSS are described. The current functional
elements in the South African ADC system are discussed and a functional high-level design of
an integrated TEWA DSS is presented. Testing and training measures, as well as maintenance
procedures which should be included in a TEWA DSS design are also discussed in Chapter 2. In
addition, the cognitive elements of a TEWA DSS are also discussed. This includes the cognitive
behaviour of FCOs and WS operators under various conditions of stress, how these operators
are expected to interact with the TEWA DSS and how they may react to the DS provided by
computerised DSSs. The chapter closes with a discussion on the design and implementation of
military DSSs that are described in the open literature.
An exposition on the evolution of WAMs since their inception during the 1950s up to the
current state of the art WAMs of the early 21st century is offered in Chapter 3, in fulfilment of
Dissertation Objective I(e). The chapter opens with a brief introduction to the notion of NP-
completeness since even the simplest WAMs in the literature are NP-complete. The remainder
of the chapter contains detailed descriptions of various WAMs available in the military operations
research literature.
Part II of the dissertation also contains two chapters and is concerned with establishing a
collection of mathematical prerequisites for the development of a TEWA framework design
put forward later in the dissertation. Chapter 4 is dedicated to a discussion on multi-objective
optimisation, in fulfilment of Dissertation Objective I(f), since multi-objective WAMs exist in the
literature. Moreover, a (strong) case may be made that the inherent nature of the WAP requires
complex trade-off decisions which necessitate a multi-objective WA modelling approach. Notions
from the literature on multi-objective optimisation covered in Chapter 4 include nonconvexity,
dominance, Pareto optimality and necessary conditions for Pareto optimality.
In Chapter 5, various solution methodologies are reviewed from the operations research liter-
ature, in fulfilment of Dissertation Objective I(g), which may be employed when solving the
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WAMs reviewed in pursuit of Dissertation Objective I(e). The chapter opens with a discussion
on exact model solution methodologies. This is followed by a discussion on various heuristic
model solution approaches and, finally, metaheuristic solution approaches.
Part III constitutes the main contribution of the dissertation and is dedicated to a novel, detailed
WA system framework design. This part contains three chapters. Chapter 6 is the heart of the
dissertation and opens with a discussion on the various approaches towards the design and
implementation of DSSs that are described in the open literature, in fulfilment of Dissertation
Objective I(h). Emphasis is placed on important aspects that have to be considered in the design
of DSSs intended for use in the military domain, especially in the context of GBAD. Next, a
generic WA subsystem architecture is put forward in fulfilment of Dissertation Objective II. This
chapter also includes descriptions of all the substructures contained in the proposed framework,
the flow of data between these substructures and how the proposed framework may fit into a
larger TEWA DSS. A WAM component, which forms the heart of the proposed WA subsystem
framework, is proposed and discussed in detail. Four classes of models are also proposed and a
desirable WAM prototype from the literature is described for implementation in each class of
the framework, in fulfilment of Dissertation Objective III. Furthermore, a novel tri-objective,
dynamic WAM is formulated which aims to achieve suitable trade-offs between the minimisation
of the accumulated survival probabilities of the threats, the minimisation of the accumulated
cost of the proposed assignment and the maximisation of the number of times that the least re-
engagable WS in the set of WS can be used for future assignments after the current assignments
have occurred, in fulfilment of Dissertation Objective IV. This is followed by a discussion on
various solution methodologies which may be employed in the proposed WA framework in order
to solve the WAMs of Dissertation Objectives III and IV within suitable time frames, in fulfilment
of Dissertation Objective V.
In Chapter 7, a number of important practical implementation suggestions are put forward in
respect of the implementation of the WA subsystem architecture proposed in pursuit of Disser-
tation Objective II, in fulfilment of Dissertation Objective VI. These suggestions include how
to avoid overwhelming the FCO with information when providing DS during combat situations
and to allow the FCO to configure the models for use in the WAM component during the pre-
deployment stages of a mission in order to avoid confusion when he has to make important WA
engagement decisions under considerable stress during the mission.
Part III closes in Chapter 8 where a simulated, but realistic, GBAD scenario is employed to
illustrate the working of the four model prototypes of Dissertation Objective III, solving them
according to various solution methodologies researched in pursuit of Dissertation Objective V,
in fulfilment of Dissertation Objective VII. The scenario is described in detail, and the numerical
results returned by each of the WAM prototypes are presented and interpreted. The chapter
closes with an evaluation and validation of the results obtained by each WAM, in fulfilment of
Dissertation Objective VIII.
The dissertation finally closes in Part IV, which contains the final two chapters. A brief summary
of the dissertation contents as well as an appraisal of the dissertation contributions may be found
in Chapter 9. This is followed in Chapter 10 by various suggestions for possible further work,
in fulfilment of Dissertation Objective IX.
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In this dissertation, WA is considered as part of the larger TEWA system in the context of a
GBAD environment. Although the focus in this dissertation is on WA, the processes involved
in WA are closely knit with the processes involved in TE — the mathematical models typically
employed in the WA process rely on the output received from the TE subsystem as input in
order to propose assignments of WSs to aerial threats. TE processes and the influence they have
on WA processes are therefore discussed in some detail in this chapter.
The aim in this chapter is to provide the reader with some insight into the complexity, rela-
tionships and contextual orientation of the TE and WA processes in GBAD and how modern
fundamental notions within the theory of warfare, including network centric warfare, C2 and
situation awareness, underlie these processes.
The chapter opens in §2.1 with a discussion aimed at contextualising the process of TE, the
process of WA and the integration of these two processes. Next, in §2.2, the notion of C2 is
discussed in some detail. This includes a specification of the facilities, equipment, communica-
tions, procedures and personnel that are considered essential for a commander to plan, direct
and control operations during a mission. The section also includes a detailed description of
the well-known Observe-Orientate-Decide-Act (OODA) loop (a very basic C2 model) due to
Boyd [20]. A discussion on extensions of this model by other authors is finally also provided.
In §2.3, the notion of SA is discussed. This concept has had a large impact on operators in
complex systems of warfare since its inception in the mid 1970s. In essence, SA may be thought
of as a thorough understanding of the state of the surrounding tactical environment. This
includes an understanding of the parameters relevant to a TEWA system.
13
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Next, in §2.4, the focus shifts to a discussion on one of the key concepts for future warfare,
known as network centric warfare (NCW). This notion aims to link GBAD physical elements
(such as sensors and WSs) and cognitive elements (such as decision makers) into an effective
and responsive control unit.
In §2.5, the focus shifts yet again to a discussion on the elements typically contained within a
GBAD system. These include functional elements, physical elements and cognitive elements.
The chapter finally closes in §2.6 with a brief summary of the chapter contents.
2.1 TEWA within a GBAD in context
The TE process should be seen as part of a larger process known as Intelligence Preparation of
the Battlefield (IPB) which is a systematic, continuous approach followed to assess and analyse
the environment and to quantify the various levels of threat in the specific geographical area
surrounding the battlefield — intelligence with respect to the effects that the environment has
on the own force’s ability to achieve its mission are collected, organised and analysed [192]. IPB
is a continuous process, implying that it is performed both prior to and during a mission in
order to ensure that the results of the IPB process remain complete and valid. It is defined as
a four-step process which includes defining the battlefield environment, describing the effects of
the battlefield, evaluating the levels of threat posed by the opposing force and determining an
appropriate course of action [192]. In the context of IPB, TE may be defined as the process
by which the own force applies its knowledge of the opposing force, obtained from its doctrine,
tactics and capabilities, so as to ascertain the nature and level of the threat to which the own
force is exposed.
Up to 2008, TE in the context of a GBAD TEWA system was a poorly defined process in
the academic literature due to the difficulty associated with capturing operator thought in real
time — it forms part of the cognitive domain and since each operator is unique, operator
thought attributes may be difficult to define. According to Paradis et al. [144], TE in the
defence domain may be defined as “the part of threat analysis concerned with the ongoing
process of determining if an entity intends to inflict evil, injury, or damage to the own force
and its interests, along with the ranking of such entities according to the level of threat they
pose.” TE as part of a GBAD TEWA DSS therefore depends largely on the situational picture,
which may include the states of enemy aircraft in the area of defence, the locations of DAs,
attributes of enemy aircraft platform types and attack techniques, available WSs and surveillance
systems, opposing force doctrine, intelligence reports gathered, terrain features of the tactical
environment, and knowledge pertaining to the opposing force’s recent behaviour within the
tactical environment [159].
Aerial threats are typically analysed according to their capability and intent [144]. The former
refers to the ability of a threat to inflict injury or damage to the DAs, whereas the latter refers
to a threat’s willingness or determination to inflict injury or damage to the DAs. The capability
of a threat is assessed by taking into account factors such as the size and aircraft composition
of a group of threats, its proximity to the DAs in question and attributes of its WSs carried, its
surveillance systems, and various attack techniques that may be utilised. The intent of a threat,
on the other hand, is generally more difficult to assess since intent is assessed based on subjective
measures. The intent of a threat is usually estimated by considering factors such as the speed,
acceleration and heading of the threat with respect to the DA(s), the detection of emissions from
its fire control radar and an estimation of its possible courses of action based on its observed
pattern of movement, and the events and activities in which it has previously participated.
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In 2008, Roux and Van Vuuren [162] put forward a generic design of a TE subsystem specifically
intended for use in the context of a GBAD environment to assist FCOs in quantifying the level of
threat that enemy aircraft may pose to DAs. They proposed use of three classes of TE models,
each containing a suite of mathematical models (including both qualitative and quantitative
models), ranging in different levels of complexity and sophistication, and operating in parallel
to produce results which are fused together in order to provide the desired DS to FCOs with
respect to the level of threat posed by enemy aircraft to DAs.
WA in a GBAD environment, on the other hand, entails the reactive assignment of available
WSs to threats in an attempt to engage or counter aerial threats identified in the defended
airspace [144]. It involves making decisions in real time that are aligned with own force mission
objectives and which are consistent with the rules of engagement, WS characteristics and con-
straints posed by the tactical environment [159]. According to Paradis et al. [144], the problem of
assigning WS to threats may be approached in two different ways. The first is a single-platform
approach in which a single platform protects itself from threats — the most suitable WS is cho-
sen for assignment to counter a threat. The second approach is a force-coordination approach
in which a C2 platform provides protection against third-party DAs — the most suitable armed
platform is identified to engage or counter the threats.
Furthermore, Paradis et al. [144] claimed that the assignment of WSs to threats may be executed
by following a threat-by-threat approach or a multi-threat approach. In the threat-by-threat
approach, WSs are assigned to threats in a sequential manner in such a manner that the best
WS is assigned to each threat (from the highest priority to the lowest priority) in turn — that
is, the best WS is assigned to the threat with the highest priority, followed by the second best
WS being assigned to the threat with the second highest priority, and so on. This approach
therefore involves an optimisation element, although it typically manifests itself in the form of
a greedy algorithm. When a multi-threat approach is adopted, however, the assignments of
available WSs to the current set of threats are made concurrently in such a manner that some
overarching set of objective functions is optimised. Paradis et al. [144] pointed out that it is
the optimisation of a set of objective functions which distinguishes the two approaches from one
another. In this dissertation, it is assumed that WA is approached from a force coordination
point of view — a number of DAs require joint protection against a number of aerial threats
evaluated by the TE subsystem and a number of WSs are available to engage or to counter
these threats. Furthermore, a multi-threat approach is adopted in this dissertation when WA
decisions are proposed.
The topic of WA is well documented in the operations research literature and a number of
researchers have contributed towards the topic since its inception in 1958 when Manne [125]
formulated the first documented weapon assignment model — a detailed description of con-
tributions by various authors towards the formulation of models for the WAP is provided in
the following chapter of this dissertation. Central to the successful implementation of a WA
subsystem, however, are a number of functional elements which are discussed in detail towards
the end of this chapter. At the core of these elements are three important notions, namely the
notions of C2, SA and NCW which form a basis for efficient TEWA DSS provided to FCOs.
These notions are discussed in some detail in the following sections.
2.2 Command and control
Providing effective TEWA DS to FCOs in a GBAD environment requires a thorough under-
standing of the underlying C2 processes followed. The term command (in a general sense) refers
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to “directing with authority” or to “giving order to,” while the term control (in a general sense)
refers to “exercising authoritative or dominating influence over.” The notion of C2 is very well
documented in the military operations research literature and hence, a number of formal defini-
tions for C2 exist. A widely adopted formal definition of C2 is the definition by the United States
Defense Technical Information Center [33] which defined C2 as “exercise authority and direct
by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment
of a mission.”
The earliest form of C2 measures (prior to the 19th century) typically involved a single com-
mander who executed all planning, direction and monitoring functions with the assistance of
a small number of aides and messengers [208]. Later (during the 19th century), the Prussian
Army developed a so-called staff system which involved a commander being assisted by a small
number of well-trained officers — the idea behind this approach to C2 was that these officers
could assist the commander by carrying out routine planning and monitoring functions in order
to leave the commander free to “concentrate on the bigger picture” [208].
The notion of C2 later evolved (during the 20th century) into a so-called C2 system. In this
context, the term command refers to an “authorative act of making decisions and ordering
action,” while the term control refers to an “act of monitoring and influencing this action” [159].
The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff [99] defined a C2 system as follows: “The facilities,
equipment, communications, procedures and personnel essential to a commander for planning,
directing and controlling operations.” According to Wilson [208], this definition accentuates the
importance of the cooperation required between human, doctrinal procedures and information
technology elements in order to ensure effective C2.
According to Krulak [110], C2 may be seen as the most important element in warfare since
it is here where the numerous activities that a military force must execute, gain purpose and
direction — effective C2 aids commanders in making the most of what they have (e.g. people,
information, material and time). Some variations of C2 are primarily of a procedural or technical
nature, such as the control of air traffic and air space, the coordination of supporting arms or the
fire control of a WS. Others are concerned with the overall conduct of military actions, such as
formulating concepts, deploying forces, allocating resources and supervising officers. It is clear
that the realm within which a TEWA system operates, falls within the range of both these two
variations of C2 [159]. It is therefore essential that a thorough understanding of the applicable
operational processes involved in C2 is required for the design of an efficient WA subsystem.
A very basic, well-known model of the C2 decision cycle is known as the OODA loop, introduced
by Boyd [19, 20]. The OODA loop is a widely accepted model of C2 and is recognised as a
decision cycle model that is applicable to all C2 systems — both friendly and adversary [110]. It
is acknowledged that other C2 models also exist, such as Lawson’s C2 process model [142], the
monitor-assess-plan-execute model [82], the input-process-output model [170] and the find-fix-
track-target-execute model [185]. The underlying functional elements of all these models are, in
essence, the same.
The OODA loop may be represented by a decision cycle containing four phases, i.e. to observe,
to orientate, to decide and to act, as illustrated graphically in Figure 2.1 [20]. These four phases
also constitute the naming of the OODA loop and are now discussed in further detail:
Observation. The first phase in the OODA loop is to observe, which entails gathering infor-
mation with respect to the current decision at hand in terms of own force status, the
surrounding area and the opposing force. Information may be collected from internal or
external sources [110, 159]. Internal sources typically yield information received from a
feedback loop within the decision-making entity, whereas external sources typically yield
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information gathered from sensors or information from sources outside the decision-making
entity.
DecideObserve
Orient
Act
Figure 2.1: The well-known C2 OODA decision loop of Boyd [20].
Orientation. After observing the situation, the decision-making entity should orientate itself
with respect to the current situation in order to ascertain certain estimates, the validity of
various assumptions, and the results of analyses and judgements in order to form a cohesive
picture of the situation at hand. Boyd [20] pointed out that a large portion of the cognitive
effort of the decision-making entity resides within the orientation phase. He further stated
that this phase consists of two subphases, i.e. destruction and creation. The destruction
subphase describes a decision-maker’s natural instinct to decompose a problem into smaller
subproblems until they are close to situations or problems for which the decision-making
entity has a solution. Familiarity with problems of this type is typically gained through
education, training, experience and instruction, and solutions to these problems are usually
a collection of doctrinal contingency plans. Once the decision maker has deconstructed the
problem it simply matches a solution to a problem which has already been encountered
(through thought, experience or instruction upon) to the problem currently faced — an
overall solution to a problem is therefore created by combining the contingency plans of
all the respective contingency plans of the subproblems.
Decision. The third phase in the OODA loop is to decide upon a feasible course of action which
is based on the solution obtained from the orientation phase. If a single plan is derived
in the orientation phase, the decision is simply whether or not to implement the decision.
If, however, multiple plans have been derived, then the decision becomes more complex
— one of the plans must be chosen for implementation. Such decisions may take longer
than when the decision is to simply implement the decision or not. If a number of good
plans are derived, the focus shifts to having to weigh the risk or cost involved in executing
the plans with their potential benefit, which may take time [185]. Similarly, having to
choose a decision from amongst a number of poor plans derived, the focus shifts to having
to choose the plan with the highest probability of success or choosing the plan with the
lowest risk of failure, which may also take time, thereby again rendering the decision phase
a complex one.
Action. The last phase in the OODA loop is to implement the decision that was made during
the decision phase. This decision may include the action of attacking a threat or issuing an
order by a commander or repositioning of sensor systems in order to obtain an improved
observation during the next loop of the cycle.
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From the descriptions above, it is clear that WA in a GBADS context resides within the orienta-
tion phase of the OODA loop of Figure 2.1. For complex problems, FCOs typically break down
the problem into a number of smaller subproblems and match solutions to similar problems
which they have encountered in the past so as to construct an overall solution to the current
problem they are facing.
A very common misconception of the OODA decision loop of Figure 2.1 is that it is sometimes
viewed as a single cycle of sequential events. The Joint Chiefs of Staff [99] rather described
the OODA decision loop as continuous, even implying that multiple concurrent OODA decision
loops are executed at any given time. Tighe et al. [185] went further to propose the OODA
decision process as an OODA cable, rather than an OODA loop. This cable approach contains
four seperate intertwined strands of cable (differing in size), spliced together at the OODA loop
phases of Figure 2.1. The rationale behind the OODA cable is that it is able to portray the
inherent need to filter and consolidate information moving through the OODA decision cycle —
thicker cables represent an increased ability to carry information.
Another contribution towards the OODA decision loop of Boyd [20] is the TEWA C2 system
proposed by Cramer [41], illustrated in Figure 2.2. Cramer [41] proposed a C2 system which in-
cludes “a sequence of activities that continually occur within an organisation’s C2 process”. The
process in Figure 2.2 is initiated by obtaining intelligence and fusing this intelligence together
with information from sensor systems in order to develop a sense of awareness of the situation
or context in which the decision has to be made. Next, threat lists are compiled and WS-threat
assignment pairs are proposed for engagement purposes. The loop closes with damage assess-
ment after which a new loop of the cycle commences with new intelligence and information from
sensors, creating a revised awareness picture of the situation. Cramer [41] explained that the
nodes in Figure 2.2 may be decomposed further into a number of smaller OODA loops which
may result in a further refinement of C2. The idea is that these OODA loops run in parallel
and that further, overarching OODA loops are formed on higher levels of decision making.
Intelligence
Control
Sensors and
Fusion
Target
Development
Weapon
Assignments
Damage
Assessment
Figure 2.2: An augmented OODA loop decision cycle for C2 [41].
A question that arises from the theory behind C2 is how C2 may be carried out effectively in
missions. According to the Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication [147], the antagonist who can
maintain a higher OPerational TEMPO (OPTEMPO) of actions in any situation of conflict (i.e.
to cycle through the OODA loop of decisions accurately and consistently at a faster tempo) will
gain an ever increasing advantage over the opposing force with each successive cycle completed.
The converse of this is also true — the slower antagonist will fall behind with each decision cycle
and become increasingly more unable to cope with the situation (i.e. C2 itself will deteriorate).
It is therefore evident that speed is a very important factor in executing C2 and the aim should
be to generate OPTEMPO in C2 (that is, executing the OODA decision loop faster and faster
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during each cycle). Boyd [20, 19] reinforced the importance of speed by stating that “in order
to win, we should operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than our adversaries — or better yet,
get inside (the) adversary’s OODA time cycle or loop.” He also added that a faster OPTEMPO
may cause confusion and disorder within the opposing force’s ranks and that the own force aim
should be to “collapse the adversary’s system into confusion and disorder by causing him/her
to over and under react to activity that appears simultaneously menacing as well as ambiguous,
chaotic or misleading.” The implication of increasing OPTEMPO is that a shorter time frame is
available to the own force for planning, making decisions, coordinating and communication. It
is here where the provision of effective WA DS may bring relief to the C2 operators. Ultimately,
the aim of a WA subsystem should be to aid in reducing operator uncertainty, achieving an
increased state of awareness of the battle situation which may result in increased OPTEMPO.
2.3 Situation awareness
The notion of SA is widely described as the perception of environmental elements surrounding a
particular situation and understanding these elements. In simple terms, SA may be described as
knowing what is going on in one’s vicinity and understanding how this information will impact
one’s goals, both immediately and in the near future. Although widespread adoption of the
term SA is relatively new, specialised use of this notion dates back to World War I and has
its roots in the domains of air traffic control, aircraft cockpit control, manufacturing process
control, military C2, and information warfare [171]. Today, the application of SA may be found
in many complex, dynamic areas of decision making, including aviation, air traffic control, ship
navigation, power plant operations, military C2 and emergency service applications (such as fire
fighting and policing).
In the context of GBAD, SA forms a foundation for the decision-making process (of the decision-
making phase in the OODA loop described earlier) as well as for performance of complex,
dynamic TEWA DSSs. A number of authors have contributed towards technical definitions
of SA. Dennehy and Deighton [54], for example, defined SA as “the ability to maintain the
‘big picture’ and think ahead,” while Dominquez et al. [58] defined SA as “the continuous
extraction of environmental information along with integration of this information with previous
knowledge to form a coherent mental picture, and the end use of that mental picture in directing
further perception and anticipating future need.” A number of other definitions of SA also exist
and although many authors have acknowledged the positive impact that good SA may have
on decisions in complex, dynamic systems, no single, universally accepted theory for SA has
emerged [166].
A popular and tractable definition of SA (which has been acknowledged by a number of authors,
such as Stanton et al. [176], Wallenius [204] and Wickens [206]) is the definition by Endsley [66],
who defined SA as “the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time
and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near
future.” Endsley [66] went further to provide a three-tiered hierarchy portraying various phases
(and primary components of each phase) within this definition of SA. The three tiers are:
Level 1: Perception of the elements in the environment. The first and lowest level of
achieving SA is to perceive the status, attributes and dynamics of relevant elements in the
environment within a volume of space and time. For example, an FCO requires accurate
data on the location, type, number, capabilities and dynamics of all opposing and own
force elements in the area of responsibility as well as their relationships with other points
of reference.
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Level 2: Comprehension of the current situation. The second level of achieving SA is
based on a synthesis of the disjointed elements contained in level 1 SA. Level 2 SA promotes
an accurate understanding of the significance of the level 1 elements in view of pertinent
operator goals. Level 2 SA enables the decision maker to form a holistic view of the
surrounding environment, discerning the significance of objects and events. For example,
an FCO must comprehend that the appearance of, say, three aircraft within close proximity
in a specific geographical area within the air picture indicates certain facts about their
objectives and motives.
Level 3: Projection of future status. The third and highest level of SA is the ability to
project the future actions of level 1 SA elements in the environment — at the very least
in the near future. This is typically achieved by obtaining knowledge of the status and
dynamics of the level 1 elements and a comprehension of the SA achieved in levels 1 and
2. For example, if an FCO knows that an aircraft is currently offensive while in a certain
geographical location, it allows the FCO to project that the aircraft is likely to attack in
a given manner and, hence, knowledge and time are afforded to the FCO to decide on the
most favourable course of action in order to reach some pre-specified mission objective.
In this dissertation, the assumption is made that SA is considered as a purely cognitive process
enhanced by DS and the fusion of data. The TEWA cognitive process is described later in this
chapter. Wallenius [204] provided a framework for complete SA specifically in the context of
C2. An adapted version of this framework is presented graphically in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: A framework containing three levels of complete SA for C2 (adapted from [204]).
Wallenius [204] proposed that complete SA comprises three levels of SA conforming to the three-
tiered SA hierarchy of Endsley [66]. At the lowest level is SA on physical elements which entails
assessing properties or states of physical elements, such as vehicles, soldiers, WSs and sensors,
and to convert this information into useable information through data fusion processes. This
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lowest level of SA is aimed at aiding the operator during the observation phase of the OODA
decision loop in Figure 2.1.
At the intermediate level of the framework, Wallenius [204] differentiated between SA of the
own force (as displayed on the left-hand side in Figure 2.3) and SA of the opposing force (as
displayed on the right-hand side of the figure). SA of the own force is typically provided by means
of DS and encompasses decisions on an organisational level pertaining to physical resources on
the lowest level and decisions on the intentional level which involve potential plans with goals
including the assessed consequences and potential benefits of these plans.
On the other hand, SA of opposing force environments (displayed on the right-hand side of
Figure 2.3), entails information in respect of what is known about the organisation and intention
of the hostile elements — these decisions are similar to SA of the own force (the left-hand side
of the figure), although such information for the opposing force may typically be unknown and
inferences with respect to such information may have to be made. A large degree of uncertainty
may therefore be present in these inferences due to the actual decisions of the hostile elements
being unknown. At the intermediate level of SA in Figure 2.3, the FCO is provided with
information that is capable of improving the orientation phase of the OODA decision loop of
Figure 2.1.
Finally, the most advanced level of SA proposed by Wallenius [204] is SA on game situation
where the assessment of hostile decisions depends on friendly decisions, and vice versa. Here,
the notion of game theory may typically be employed to contribute towards decision making, by
enabling the decision maker to exploit what-if scenarios.
From the discussion above, it is evident that the elements or processes involved in TE and WA
contribute towards SA to some extent. Although the availability of data may restrict the working
of the framework provided by Wallenius [204], an improvement in these processes through SA
will evidently improve the overall SA of the FCO and, in turn, improve the OPTEMPO of the
system.
2.4 Network centric warfare
NCW1 is a theory of warfare (developed by the United States Department of Defence) that
emerged during the 1990s. It involves the study of human and organisational behaviour based
on adopting a new method of thinking and applying it to operations within a military environ-
ment [5]. The focus in NCW operations is on generating combat power from the effective linking
and networking of own force elements. NCW is typically characterised according to the ability
of the geographical deployment (or dispersion) of own force elements of being able to achieve
a high level of collective battle space awareness. This may then be exploited by means of self-
synchronisation and operations within NCW to achieve favourable outcomes during a mission.
Recent advances in sensor technologies, the alarming rate at which data are distributed across
the globe, and the ever-increasing computational power of computer processors has led to what
is currently known as the information age [80]. This new age facilitates an increased ability to
generate, organise and distribute information by employing sophisticated modern sensor tech-
nologies and information structures. The underlying theory emerging from the information age
is that military forces may achieve improved SA by exploiting the benefits that this volume of
information has to offer. This has formed the stepping stone from which the concept of NCW
has emerged.
1NCW is sometimes also referred to in the literature as network centric operations or net centric warfare [207].
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NCW may be thought of as an inter-woven system (network) of sensors, WSs, decision makers
and information — an effective whole system so as to create a decisive war fighting advantage [18,
31]. This concept is based on the hypothesis that combat effectiveness may be improved greatly
when warfare is conducted in a networked environment rather than separately on a collection
of individual platforms [18]. Many definitions of NCW exist in the military operations research
literature. There is, however, no single, universally accepted definition for the concept of NCW.
Dahl [44] wrote as follows about the concept: “NCW may be broadly defined as deriving power
from the rapid and robust networking of well-informed, geographically dispersed military re-
sources. Thereby creating a supreme tempo and precise, agile form of manoeuvre warfare.
NCW focuses on operational and tactical warfare, but can even affect the strategic domain. It is
the dominating theory of war for the information age.” Raduege [148] added that “NCW is not
just about technology; it is an emerging theory of war and the next art and science of warfare
to be exploited.”
An important prerequisite for effectively incorporating NCW into military doctrine is a thorough
understanding of the interaction of the physical, information, social and cognitive domains of
warfare. These domains are now described in some detail.
The physical domain. In this domain, warfare operations, such as striking, protecting and
manoeuvring, are conducted within the tactical environment consisting of land, sea, air
and space. The physical elements (e.g. WSs and sensor systems) and the communication
infrastructure which connects them all reside within this domain. Therefore, the challenges
that arise from employing and exploiting the elements in this domain are a result of
the laws of physics. In comparison with the other domains, the performances of the
elements contained in the physical domain are the easiest to measure and comprehend.
Consequently, combat power has traditionally primarily been measured according to the
nature and number of the elements in this domain [31].
The information domain. In this domain, information is created, collected, stored and pro-
cessed within the network. It is also here where communication and information sharing
are facilitated among war fighters. The C2 of modern military forces are therefore commu-
nicated and the commander’s intent is also conveyed among war fighters in this domain [4,
18, 31, 32]. As a result of a recent increase in cyber-warfare, the information domain, in
particular, is becoming more vulnerable to hostile attacks [207]. It is therefore extremely
important to protect and defend the information domain so as to enable the generation of
combat power in the face of offensive actions by an adversary in order to ensure sustained
information superiority [31].
The cognitive domain. This domain constitutes the collective minds of the war fighters —
it is here where many battles, campaigns and wars are won or lost [18, 31]. Elements
within this domain include the intangibles of leadership, morale, unit cohesion, level of
training and experience, SA and public opinion. According to Cebrowski [31], it is also
in this domain where the commander’s intent, as well as doctrine, tactics, techniques and
procedures reside — decisive battle space concepts and tactics emerge in this domain. One
of the challenges associated with this domain is the difficulty of measuring the attributes
contained therein. It is for this reason that explicit treatment of this domain by means of
analytic models of warfare is rare [32]. Herman [84] has, however, proposed a methodology
that addresses key attributes and relationships between them in the context of entropy-
based warfare.
The social domain. In this domain, the necessary elements of any human enterprise are de-
scribed, including the ways in which humans interact, exchange information, form shared
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awareness and understanding, and make collaborative decisions. In addition, other ele-
ments, such as culture, the set of values, attitudes and beliefs held and conveyed by leaders
to society, whether military or civil, also reside within this domain. This domain overlaps
with the cognitive and information domains, although distinct differences between these
domains do exist. Naturally, cognitive activities are individualistic, implying that they
occur in the minds of individuals. On the other hand, the social domain is, in essence,
shared sense-making and involves the process of going from shared awareness to shared
understanding to making collaborative decisions. The social domain is concerned with
socio-economic activity since an individual’s cognitive-related activities are directly influ-
enced by the social nature of the exchange and vice versa [31].
Based on the individual discussions of each of the domains above, it is evident that these domains
interact and intersect with each other to form a universal concept of NCW. The four domains,
as well as their intersections and the interactions between them, are presented graphically in
Figure 2.4. According to Cebrowski [31], the intersections between these domains should be
considered important since they represent dynamic areas within which concept-focused experi-
mentation should be conducted.
Collaborative Decisions
NCW
Shared
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Operations
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Force
Cognitive Domain
Cognitive Advantage
Physical
Domain
Information
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Position
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Force
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Speed and Access
Plan, Organise, Deploy,
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Conveyed Commander's
Intent
Information
Domain
Social Domain
Figure 2.4: The physical, information, cognitive and social domains of NCW, as well as these intersec-
tions between the domains [31, 159].
Consider the intersection between the information and physical domains in Figure 2.4. This
intersection is referred to as the precision force and is vital to conducting successful joint opera-
tions. The intersection between the information and cognitive domains creates shared awareness
and tactical innovation. This is an important intersection since, as mentioned earlier, many bat-
tles are won or lost in the cognitive domain. Finally, the intersection between the cognitive
and physical domains creates compressed operations which include the phenomena of time com-
pression and “lock-out2.” It is in this intersection where tactics achieve operational (and even
2According to Alberts [4], lock-out refers to the situation in which an adversary’s strategic objectives have
been locked out, because it has no remaining viable courses of action — the opposing force is no longer able to
react coherently.
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strategic) effects as well as high rates of change — the ability to quickly change from one rapid
operation to another. At the centre of all four of the domains lies NCW as illustrated in Fig-
ure 2.4.
The four-domain NCW construct builds on an earlier model proposed by Fuller [71] in 1925. It
was later refined in 1999 in a paper by Booz [18] to the structure presented in Figure 2.4. The
importance of these four domains and their contributions towards NCW have been highlighted
by many authors in the military literature [5, 18, 32, 31]. When considering the TEWA process
described in §2.1, it is clear that this process extends over all four the domains of NCW. For
example, information from the sensor systems (part of the physical domain) is used to create and
share DS information (part of the information domain) which conforms to operator thought and
collaborative thought (part of the cognitive and social domains) [159]. Similarly, data emanating
from TE (part of the information domain) and WSs (part of the physical domain) are used
to create and share DS information (part of the information domain) which also conforms to
operator thought (part of the cognitive and social domains). Cebrowski [31] proposed a logical
framework for the notion of NCW and Roux [159] slightly adapted this framework. The adapted
framework is presented graphically in Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.5: A first-order, logical framework for NCW in the context of the TEWA process [31, 159].
The adapted framework features the network centric flow of information between sensor systems,
C2 (the FCO) and WSs. Three substructures are present in the framework:
(1) The information grid. This infrastructure facilitates receiving, processing, transporta-
tion, storage and protection of information of a joint force. The embedding capabilities
for information assurance prevent intrusive attacks and provide commanders with the
assurance that their information is valid and uncompromised [18, 158].
(2) The sensor grid. This infrastructure provides a high degree of awareness of the various
elements of the own force and opposing force, as well as the tactical environment across the
battlefield [18, 158]. Elements residing within this infrastructure include dedicated sensors,
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WS-based sensors, man portable sensors and logistics sensors which are embedded in the
air, land, surface, subsurface and space environments.
(3) The engagement grid. This infrastructure provides a means for war fighters to utilise
speed of command and achieve overwhelming effects at precise places and times [18, 158].
Elements residing within this infrastructure include air, land, surface, subsurface and space
WSs.
Lately, two distinct views have been formed in respect of the effects of NCW within the context
of modern warfare [6, 80]. The first view is considered conservative where NCW is simply seen
as the evolution that accompanies the digitisation of the process of conducting war, while the
second view is an extreme perspective in the sense that the information age is revolutionising
the nature of conflict in a fundamental manner.
The first view above implies that only small, incremental improvements towards modernising
current technologies are required to suit the information age. Alberts and Hayes [6], however,
argued that this perspective may result in NCW not reaching the full potential that it can add
to success on the battlefield. They suggested that a more introspective approach be followed
where a more intensive and intentional change is enforced. This disruptive transformation will
require that current concepts within C2 (lying very close to military operations) will have to be
reconsidered and redeveloped.
Smith [172] suggested three concurrent technologies which may be very beneficial to NCW, if
exploited. These technologies include advanced sensor technology, an increase in computing
power and more sophisticated WSs. Smith [172] further advocated that these technologies
should interact in conjunction with each other in such a way that they create novel emergent
properties in order to reach an efficient state of NCW. If this can be achieved, it may change
the characteristics of war altogether. The process of revolutionising military forces for the
information age is currently the prevailing idea in NCW [80, 172, 207].
From the arguments reviewed above, it would seem that NCW is a central focus in modern-
day improvements of combat capabilities. Moreover, the advancement in technology since the
turn of the 21st century provides a means to achieve the desired levels of NCW capabilities,
greater sharing of improved information (in real time) and overall improved SA [80]. It is
therefore extremely important that the developers of any military DSS, such as a TEWA system,
incorporate the concepts of NCW in their design.
2.5 Elements of a GBAD system
The elements of a GBAD TEWA system may be subdivided into three distinct groups i.e. the
physical elements, the functional elements and the cognitive elements. The physical elements
contain all the hardware elements of a TEWA system. According to Roux and Van Vuuren
[161], the physical elements may be identified by considering a typical AD scenario in which
an area of responsibility within a tactical environment is observed. Such an observation of the
tactical environment is typically facilitated by means of various types of sensors. An attack on
the own force typically constitutes an enemy pilot flying a specific aircraft (called a threat from
the own force perspective) with a view to execute a specific attack technique (also known as a
flight profile) in order to deliver a specific type of weapon in an attempt to damage or destroy
a specific asset on the ground. Furthermore, these orchestrated actions are typically executed
according to a pre-defined tactic by enemy commanders. In the case where a number of enemy
aircraft are present in the area of responsibility, specific flight formations are typically used.
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The functional elements, on the other hand, contain all the software elements of a TEWA system
which link the physical elements in some way and provide a means for providing improved DS
to FCOs. Roux [159] proposed consideration of a number of functional elements in a GBAD
TEWA system. These functional elements are also considered in this dissertation and include
operator DS, testing and training, effecting and sensing, Track Management (TM), maintenance
and testing, remote system processing, map processing, TEWA data management, Attribute
Management (AM), TE, Engagement Quantisation (EQ), and WA. The aforementioned physical,
functional and cognitive elements are discussed in some detail in this section.
2.5.1 Physical elements
The physical elements of the system comprise the actual hardware elements of the TEWA system
and include sensor systems, defended assets, aerial threats to the system, and ground-based WSs.
Although the tactical environment, attack techniques and flight formations of enemy aircraft do
not constitute actual physical elements, they have an effect on some of the physical elements
and hence are also discussed here.
The tactical environment
The natural spatial volume in which a GBADS operates is known as the tactical environment.
This is the space in which own forces combat opposing forces during battle. The tactical en-
vironment potentially consists of five subenvironments, namely space, air, land, surface and
subsurface, as observed by Roux [159]. These five subenvironments are illustrated graphically
in Figure 2.6.
Subsurface
Surface
Land
Air
Space
Figure 2.6: The five subenvironments of the tactical environment in which a GBADS operates [159].
The space environment refers to the three-dimensional space beyond the air environment which
contains satellites and affords spacecraft a substantial volume for manoeuverability. The space
environment is, however, primarily dominated by satellites which may be classified into three
broad categories, namely satellites explicitly and specifically employed for military use, satel-
lites officially recognised as dual-use satellites3 and satellites which are classified as civilian
3In the context of military operations, the term dual-use satellites refers to satellites employed for military
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satellites [152]. Satellites specifically dedicated for military use include early warning systems,
military communication satellites and technology demonstrators, while dual-use satellites in-
clude navigation and reconnaissance spacecraft4. Civilian satellites include navigational satellites
(which facilitate global position systems) and weather satellites, but according to the Yearbook
on Space Policy of 2008/2009 [152], this category of satellites is debatable since it is suspected
that a substantial portion of these satellites serve to achieve both civilian and military goals.
The use of space in a military context is limited to sensing [159], since international laws exist
which place limitations on the military use of space. One such law is the Outer Space Treaty
of 1967. This law contains an undertaking not to place in orbit around the earth, install
on the moon or any other celestial body, or otherwise station in outer space, nuclear or any
other weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, it limits the use of the moon and other
celestial bodies exclusively to peaceful purposes and expressly prohibits their use for establishing
military bases, installations or fortifications, testing weapons of any kind, or conducting military
manoeuvres5 [193].
The air environment also provides aerial vehicles with a three-dimensional space in which they
may operate. The nature and dimension of the air environment offers aerial vehicles a consider-
able amount of space for manoeuvreability. This environment is largely dominated by aircraft of
the opposing force in a GBADS context and may include electronic warfare (EW) platforms, un-
manned aircraft and manned aircraft such as fixed-wing or rotary wing aircraft. WSs operating
in the air environment consist mainly of missile systems [159]. The aforementioned aircraft and
WSs operating in the air environment are considered GBAD threats and are therefore considered
in more detail later in this chapter.
The land environment affords vehicles a two-dimensional space for operational purposes. This
environment contains a number of so-called terrain features which may restrict the manoeuvere-
ability of vehicles and WSs. Terrain features may also restrict the manoeuvereability of vehicles
and WSs operating in the air environment. The terrain features of the land environment is
usually categorised into five different geographical environments, namely mountains, jungles,
deserts, arctic areas and urbanised terrain [73].
The surface environment refers to the surfaces of dams, lakes, oceans and rivers, and also provides
vehicles with a two-dimensional space for operation. These vehicles consist mainly of watercraft,
including aircraft carriers, amphibious warfare craft, coastal defence craft, combat logistics craft,
mine warfare craft, mobile logistics craft, patrol combatant craft, service and support craft, and
surface combatant craft [131]. Watercraft may be classified into the different aforementioned
categories by means of a so-called hull classification symbol6 which represents the type of hull
these watercraft bear.
The subsurface environment refers to the space beneath the surface environment and offers a
three-dimensional submerged space to submarine craft. Submarines are watercraft capable of op-
erating independently when submersed and can be propelled forward by means of diesel-electric
propulsion, air-independent propulsion7 or nuclear power [182]. In a military environment, sub-
marines may be categorised into two major classes, namely attack submarines and ballistic
purposes as well as civilian purposes, whether proven or potential [7].
4Reconnaissance satellites, also known as spy satellites, refer to observation or communication satellites em-
ployed to obtain intelligence on the military activities of foreign countries [137]. The full capabilities of these
satellites are usually unknown, since countries which launch these satellites tend to keep any information with
respect to their reconnaissance satellites classified [136].
5The reader is referred to [94] for an extensive list of other laws on the limitation of the usage of space.
6The reader is referred to [131] for a full discussion on the various types of available hull classification symbols.
7Air-independent propulsion refers to the ability of a submarine to be propelled forward without the need for
atmospheric oxygen [182].
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missile submarines [37]. Another class of submarines exists, known as bathyscaphe submarines,
which is a classification of submarines having the ability to reach great depths.
A number of possible physical conditions, such as terrain and weather elements, reside within
the tactical environment which may have a significant effect on the physical elements within a
GBAD environment. Not only do these physical conditions affect operations and systems, but
also the personnel operating these systems [74]. Examples of weather elements include cloud
cover, electrical thunder storms, humidity, precipitation, temperature, visibility, wind direction
and wind speed [56]. According to the United States Army’s Field Manual FM34-81-1 [74],
weather tactical decision aids may be employed to assist commanders to make decisions with
respect to operations in different weather conditions. Weather tactical decision aids usually
consist of simple two-sided matrices or lookup tables, which may be used to assist in pairing a
specific weather condition with its related impact on the battlefield [74].
Although adverse weather conditions may have a critical impact on battlefield operations, it
may also be beneficial in, for example, aviation operations. The United States Army’s Field
Manual FM1-100 [73] gives examples of fallen snow, extreme cold weather or muddy terrain
which may restrict the manoeuvreability of ground personnel, while minimally affecting aviation
operations. Low cloud cover and ceilings may restrict high-performance aircraft operations, while
simultaneously enhancing aviation operations by providing low-level cover and concealment.
Furthermore, the environmental conditions affecting the tactical environment may be divided
into natural environmental conditions and induced environmental conditions. Natural environ-
mental conditions typically refer to the weather conditions described above, while induced en-
vironmental conditions refer to dust, smoke and debris on the battlefield, typically caused by
encounters with the opposing force. Induced environmental conditions are, therefore, much
harder to predict than natural environmental conditions [159]. Hence, induced environmental
conditions are omitted from all analyses in the remainder of this dissertation.
It is crucial to gather a substantial amount of weather intelligence by means of weather fore-
casts, weather observations, climatological data, and atmospheric and astronomical information
affecting radar and wireless communications [56] on a continual basis for use in all GBAD de-
ployment, planning and tactical operations. Ignoring the effects of weather conditions on the
tactical environment may lead to an inefficiency of battlefield operations [74], resulting in the
vulnerability of the own force.
Considering the above-mentioned discussions, it is evident that the tactical environment and
the physical conditions that prevail within this environment should be examined carefully and
thoroughly in the formulation of GBAD DS, since terrain types and weather conditions may have
a significant impact on the physical elements such as DAs, sensors, WSs and attack techniques
employed by enemy aircraft. Furthermore, the modelling of the tactical environment is extremely
important when investigating potential threats entering the defended airspace [159].
Defended assets
In any military tactical situation there are typically a number of assets which require protec-
tion from opposing forces. This gives rise to the notions of critical assets and DAs. According
to [189], critical assets may be defined as “all those assets identified for possible AD by the
supported force commander and his supporting staff during the planning/appreciation process
that is deemed/foreseen as critical in the achievement of the force’s desired end state.” Typical
examples of critical assets include main bridges on the main supply route of the own force,
a fuel depot or an electricity supply source. According to Oerlikon Military Products [139],
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critical assets may be divided into the following types: air bases (including runways, aircraft
protected by shelters, unprotected aircraft, fuel depots, hangars, buildings and ammunition de-
pots), oil refineries (including oil tanks and installations), railway installations (including railway
installations, trains, signal boxes and buildings), harbours (including ships and installations),
crossroads, main bridges, combat bridges, power plants, factories, field fortifications, command
posts, gun and troop emplacements, anti-aircraft defence, early warning and allocation radars,
soft skinned vehicle accumulations and armoured vehicle formations. Note that critical assets
are either fixed installations or moving objects.
Prior to a mission, a list of critical assets are typically compiled by the own force commander.
These assets are then prioritised by assigning a priority value to each. The idea behind pri-
oritising assets is that more important assets should be afforded better protection than lesser
important assets. Chastain [34] introduced the concept of asset prioritisation in a way that
identifies the general attributes to be addressed when prioritising assets.
Once the own force commander has compiled a list of critical assets, some subset of these assets
are selected to constitute the set of DAs requiring protection against opposing forces. The
rationale behind a reduction in the number of assets which should be considered for protection
is that it may result in a reduction in reaction time (which may lead to an improved OPTEMPO)
and more importantly, because there are typically a limited number of AD resources available
for the protection of assets [159]. According to the South African National Defence Force Field
Pamphlet Number 2 [189], the task of prioritising critical assets and identifying DAs is not
a trivial task. The task of prioritising threats is typically done manually and the own force
commander should take into account elements such as the mission objectives, the characteristics
of the opposing force, terrain features, IPB results, doctrinal rules, and guidelines for operations
to establish critical asset priority values. Priority values may, of course, also be obtained by
including certain underlying attributes of the assets themselves. From the prioritised list of
critical assets, the own force commander may then choose a subset of assets achieving the
highest priority values as the set of DAs.
According to Roux [159], own force commanders are typically involved in extensive planning pro-
cedures before assigning asset priorities to critical assets within the South African AD context.
These procedures involve reconnaissance, site visits to possible asset positions and an intensive
study of aerial photographs and maps of the area of responsibility. Only thereafter is a priority
value derived by taking the following three aspects into account, namely Vital Importance (VI),
Vulnerability (V), and Repairability (R):
Vital Importance (VI). The degree to which an asset is critical in terms of achieving mission
accomplishment. One way of measuring the VI of a DA is to estimate the impact that
damage to or destruction of the asset may have on the success of the mission — usually
the damage to or destruction of vitally important assets is of such significance that mission
objectives may not be achieved. Within the context of the South African AD, the following
classification scheme is used for assessing the VI of DAs [189]: (1) Not important = 0, (2)
Important = 2 and (3) Vitally important = 4.
Vulnerability (V). The degree to which an asset is susceptible in terms of surveillance and/or
attack or the degree to which damage may be inflicted to the DA should it be attacked. In
contrast with VI, damage or destruction of vulnerable assets will typically result in having
a detrimental effect on achieving mission objectives, but will not result in the mission
objectives being unaccomplishable. In determining the V of an asset it should be kept in
mind that certain assets may be deployed in hardened casings or may be hidden (resulting
in the asset being less vulnerable), while others are required to be in the open (resulting in
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the asset being exposed and therefore more vulnerable). Nevertheless, within the context
of the South African AD, the following classification scheme is used for assessing V of DAs
[189]: Not vulnerable = 0, Vulnerable = 1 and Very vulnerable = 2.
Repairability (R). The degree to which an asset can recover or be restored to a working
condition (i.e. to continue functioning properly during the mission) after damage has been
inflicted, in terms of time, available equipment and manpower required for such recovery.
Within the context of the South Africa AD the following classification scheme is used
for assessing the R of DAs [189]: Easily/Quickly repairable = 0, Difficult/Long time to
repair = 1 and No repair possible/Needs replacement = 2.
The Priority (P) of a critical asset may then be determined by
P = V I +R+ V. (2.1)
Although this formula seems to be sufficient for determining priority values for critical assets
within a South African AD context, the formula is not scientifically justifiable — the three
aspects are not measured in any specific units and it is not mathematically sound or justifiable
to add the values together or to subtract the values from each other [159]. Nevertheless, the
method is acknowledged by South African military experts and also considered sufficient for
prioritising critical assets [63]. It also provides some understanding of the problem of prioritising
assets and illustrates the complexity associated with developing a mathematically sound method
for quantifying the prioritisation of assets.
In 2005, du Toit [63] developed an alternative, novel method for prioritising assets in an attempt
to improve on the formula (2.1). His method was based on the formulation of a mathematical
performance index which is able to portray the success of a porftolio manager according to
personal characteristics, developed earlier by Wagenaar and Van Vuuren in 1999 [203]. Du Toit
[63] implemented his method in a pilot study (in conjunction with a number of military experts)
comprising three stages. The first stage involved identifying the preferences of a core group of
military experts with respect to similarities and differences between asset attributes in terms of
achieving mission success. This was achieved by conducting interviews with the military experts
and using the well-known Repertory Grid method8. The second stage involved the completion of
a questionnaire by a larger group of military experts. In this questionnaire, the military experts
were required to rate a number of assets with respect to the asset attributes identified during
the first stage. Finally, during the third stage, an index for asset prioritisation was derived.
This was achieved by including those asset attributes that were deemed statistically significant
from the output obtained during the second stage. When a new critical asset is therefore added
to the list of existing critical assets, a priority value may be determined for the asset by simply
using the established index.
Although the pilot study of Du Toit [63] seemed to yield plausible results (as stated by the
military experts), Roux [159] claimed that a proper execution of this prioritisation method is
required, implying that the method should be carefully calibrated and that the interviews should
be conducted with a sufficient number of military experts.
For the purpose of this dissertation, only fixed DAs are considered and it is assumed that the
own force commander has already compiled the critical asset list and that he has also selected a
8The Repertory Grid method is a method for eliciting personal constructs and was originally developed by
Kelly in 1955 for use in psychological analysis [178]. It has since been widely used in the study of consumer
preference. The method is based on the identification of elements and the comparison of attributes associated
with these elements by means of the formulation of bipolar constructs [203].
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number of these assets as DAs by prioritising them according to some preferred method — for
the purposes of this dissertation, it is therefore assumed that the DAs are given.
Sensor systems
The physical elements used to observe the tactical environment are sensor systems. The goal
of such observation is twofold, namely to detect any new aerial objects that are entering the
defended airspace and to monitor the objects that have already been detected in the defended
airspace. The sensor systems may be thought of as the “eyes” of the system and are able to
detect and monitor the altitude, direction, and speed of moving aircraft. Roux [159] goes as
far as to claim that the sensor systems form the core of the TE decision making process. The
accuracy and update rate (i.e. the quality and quantity) of sensor data may indeed have a vast
influence on the quality of the results provided by TE models, especially on the more complex
stochastic TE models [158].
In the context of NCW (discussed in §2.4), sensors are typically deployed in a network called a
sensor grid. The goal is to ensure that at least one of the sensors in the network covers every
significant portion of the defended airspace. The sensors employed in such a grid may include
thermal (e.g. infra-red sensor), electromagnetic (e.g. radar), mechanical (e.g. position sensor),
optical radiation (e.g. light sensor) and acoustic (e.g. sonar) sensor systems [87]. The sensors
employed in a GBADS typically consist of two-dimensional surveillance (search) radar systems
and the characteristics associated with such a system are given in Table 2.1.
Update rate Range Range accuracy Azimuth accuracy
Long range 10 seconds 200+ km 100–500 m 0.5–2 degrees
Medium range 2–4 seconds 50–200 km 20–100 m 0.1–0.5 degrees
Short range ≤ 1 0–50 km 5–20 m 0.1 degrees
Table 2.1: Characteristics associated with a two-dimensional surveillance (search) radar system [210].
It is important to acknowledge that in modern-day GBAD, the capabilities and characteristics of
sensor systems employed should be considered in detail. The information provided in Table 2.1
represent typical ranges for radar sensors from a global perspective. When considering these
ranges from a South African perspective, Oosthuizen [140] states that the update rate, range
accuracy and azimuth accuracy values are correct, but that the range values have to be adjusted.
He suggests that the range values should be lowered to 100+ km for long range radar sensors,
lowered to 20–100 km for medium range radar sensors and lowered to 5–20 km for short range
sensor systems. These suggested changes are in line with the capabilities of the sensors employed
within the South African AD and the three sensor classes of low-, medium- and short range
directly relate to the sensor classes of early warning, local warning and WS/target engagement
sensors, respectively [159].
The aforementioned three classes of sensors may be used as general sensor layers to provide a
comprehensive SA picture on the various levels of C2 which may, in turn, result in an increased
level of SA for various decision makers. According to the South African National Defence Force
Field Pamphlet Number 1 [188], “the SA picture consists of an in-time air picture and ADC
information, which is displayed to aid FCOs in operational and tactical level decision-making”
— the SA picture contains information with respect to the entire aerial picture (i.e. threats to
the system and own force aircraft) as well as the position and other attributes of other physical
elements (i.e. DAs, sensors and WSs). The systems responsible for obtaining the SA picture
may therefore be thought of as the “eyes” of the FCO and their results are typically displayed
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graphically to the FCO on an HMI [159]. For the purpose of this dissertation, it is assumed
that an all-encompassing SA picture is available to the FCO. This dissertation is therefore not
concerned with how this SA picture was obtained.
Four different sensor classes exist within the South African AD [190]. These classes are optic,
electro-optic, infra-red and radar sensors. Although it is important to include all these classes
of sensors within a NCW environment, only radar sensors are considered in this dissertation. A
number of different types of radar sensors exist. When having to choose between these sensors, a
trade-off between effective range, range accuracy and update rate typically has to be considered.
Surveillance sensors, which have a three-dimensional capability, brings the third dimension of
elevation data as input to the TE subsystem. Such sensors typically achieve elevation accuracy
between 0.1 and 5 degrees within elevation angles of 0–30 degrees. Elevation angles of 30–75
degrees are less common and only in exceptional cases are elevation angles larger that 75 degrees
achieved. In addition, short to medium range sensors are able to detect threats up to an altitude
of 2 000–3 500 metres, while longer range sensors are able to detect threats up to an altitude of
30 000 metres [210].
Two types of sensor systems typically used within a GBAD scenario are search and track radar
systems. Search radar systems act as early warning systems aimed at providing early warning of
enemy aircraft approaching as well as providing accurate initial positions of these threats for use
by track radar systems. Such sensor systems typically have slow refresh rates, since they have to
scan a wide area. Track radar systems, on the other hand, are dedicated to track only a single
object or a small number of objects at a time at relatively small effective ranges (typically 15–20
km). Furthermore, these systems are able to achieve high levels of accuracy (range accuracies
of up to 5 metres and azimuth accuracies of 1 up to milli-radian) as well as fast update rates
(up to once every 20 milli-seconds).
Apart from searching and tracking targets, the target radar signature may be employed to
aid in the hostility and platform type classification of aircraft. Techniques typically employed
to achieve this include non-cooperative target recognition techniques [42, 154] and jet engine
modulation9 based target identification techniques. It should be noted that these techniques
typically require short range surveillance or tracking radars and long target dwell times.
It is very important that high-quality data be used as input to a TEWA system. This quality
depends on the type of radar sensor used, but may deteriorate due to internal or external
interferences caused by unwanted signals. Internal interferences are typically caused by signal
noise, while external interferences are typically caused by clutter (e.g. actual radio frequency
echoes returned from other threats, multipath echoes from the related threat due to ground
reflection, atmospheric ducting or ionospheric reflection/refraction) [159].
In the context of the South African GBADS, the kinematic data that sensor systems are able to
obtain about aircraft are known as aircraft attributes. In the case where multiple radar sensors
are used, the values are typically fused together to obtain a single value for a specific attribute.
Roux [159] describes the notion of attributes as “the various factors or variables necessary for
effective evaluation of, and assignment of WSs to the threat.” He distinguishes between two
classes of attributes, namely measured and derived attributes.
Measured attributes are obtained from sensor systems; examples of these attributes include the
altitude, position, speed and course of aircraft. The values associated with these attributes are
typically measured with respect to some global reference point and are associated with two
parameters, namely the index or identification number of the aircraft in question, and a time
9The jet engine modulation phenomenon stems from radar returns caused by the rotating structure of jet
engines [13].
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stamp associated with the value measured [159]. For each aircraft, a so-called system track is
created which contains a series of measured attribute values associated with successive time
stamps for each aircraft which enters the defended airspace. This is achieved in the TM which
is described in more detail later in this chapter when the functional elements of a GBAD system
are considered.
Derived attributes are (as the name suggests) derived or computed from combinations of mea-
sured attributes for each DA; examples of these attributes include range to the DA or the bearing
with respect to the DA. These values are computed using the latest (real-time) value of a com-
bination of measured attributes at a specific time [159]. Derived attributes are associated with
four parameters, namely the index or identification number of the aircraft in question, an index
or identification number allocated to the DA, the time stamp related to the attribute and a
number of historical values of the derived attribute (if available).
Aerial threats to the system
Aerial threats to the system are those aircraft (of the opposing force) which enter the de-
fended airspace with the intent to inflict damage to own force DAs. These threats are highly
manoeuverable and their aerodynamic movement may typically be described by means of six-
degrees-of-freedom models which take into account the following six degrees of freedom of a rigid
body: (1) moving up or down (heaving), (2) moving left or right (swaying), (3) moving forward
and backward (surging), (4) tilting up or down (pitching), (5) turning left or right (yawing)
and (6) tilting side to side (rolling) [159]. Although the manoeuverability of an opposing force
aircraft depends strongly on the actual aircraft employed and the capabilities of the pilot, these
threatening manoeuvres are typically restricted by obstructions in the land environment and
weather conditions.
There are a vast number of aircraft available today which may be utilised to attack own force
DAs. These aircraft may be divided into the following categories: missiles, EW platforms, un-
manned aircraft and manned aircraft (which includes fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft). The
choice of which type of aerial threat to employ by the opposing force is not a trivial task since
the various categories of threats each embodies a variety of aircraft and weapon characteristics
including attack speed, attack density, effective range, typical missions (objectives) and targets,
weapons carried (ordnance and armament), associated attack tactics, radar signature and phys-
ical size, environmental constraints and economics [159]. In addition, a number of other factors
may influence the choice of craft, weapon or attack technique employed by the opposing force.
These factors include minimisation of the cost of a mission, maximisation of human survivability,
own force doctrine, similar previous encounters and personal preferences of the commanding of-
ficer. The manoeuvres executed by the aircraft of the opposing force and its doctrine are almost
impossible to ascertain. Furthermore, the results returned by the TE subsystem depend heav-
ily on the quality and availability of data pertaining to the aforementioned factors [175]. The
complexity involved in the analysis of system threat categories therefore necessitates considering
only a small subset of threats. The scope of the aerial threats considered in this dissertation
is therefore limited to include fixed wing aircraft only. Although delimiting the scope of the
dissertation to include only fixed wing aircraft, it is important to note that a WA subsystem
should be able to include all threat categories listed in this section. Therefore, the WA models
proposed later in this dissertation are formulated in such a way that they are generic and ver-
satile in order to ensure that no or minimum changes are required when other threat categories
are included.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
34 Chapter 2. Ground-based air defence
Fixed wing aircraft may be divided into three distinct groups: fighter (or bomber) aircraft,
reconnaissance aircraft and transport aircraft (or tankers):
Fighter/Bomber. This category of fixed wing aircraft is considered the main threat against
which DAs have to be protected. These types of fixed wing aircraft typically attack in
groups (also referred to as the attack density and are typically limited to six aircraft within
two minutes [212]), employ specific flight formations and execute specific attack techniques
to deliver their WSs. They are categorised by their speed, which may fall within the range
200–300 ms−1 (depending on the armament carried10), and their low-altitude approach
in order to avoid detection by radar sensors. In order to ensure effective neutralisation
of this kind of fixed wing aircraft, the TEWA system should facilitate neutralisation of
such an aircraft before it delivers its WSs. Examples of fighter (or bomber) fixed wing
aircraft include: F-14 Tomcat Standard Fleet Fighter Aircraft (USA), MiG-29 Fulcrum
High Performance Combat Aircraft (Russia), Mirage 2000 Multi-Role Combat Fighter
(France), B-1B Lancer Strategic Bomber (USA) and B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber (USA)
[159].
Reconnaissance. This category of fixed wing aircraft is typically used for reconnoitering impor-
tant areas and the surrounding defences. They are equipped with various camera systems
in order to obtain vertical, forward, sideways and panoramic photographs11. These fixed
wing aircraft are categorised by their ability to fly at high altitudes and at speeds within
the range 150–300 ms−1. Typical armament carried by these aircraft include guns and
cannons (although this is only for self protection). Examples of reconnaissance fixed wing
aircraft include: Nimrod MRA4 Maritime Reconnaissance Aircraft (UK), U-2 High Alti-
tude Reconnaissance Aircraft — Dragon Lady (USA) and E-2C Hawkeye Airborne Early
Warning Aircraft (USA).
Transporters/Tankers. This category of fixed wing aircraft is typically used to transport per-
sonnel and materials (or goods) into the combat zone. They are categorised by their large
size, low level of manoeuvrability and low speed which falls within the range 100–200 ms−1.
These characteristics make this type of fixed wing aircraft extremely vulnerable, especially
during landing and take-off. They also carry no WSs — protection is typically provided
by accompanying fighter aircraft or attack helicopters [159]. Examples of transporter (or
tanker) fixed wing aircraft include: AN-124 Condor Long Range Heavy Transport Aircraft
(Russia), C-130J Hercules Tactical Transport Aircraft (USA) and V-22 Osprey Medium-
Lift, Multi-mission, Tilt-Rotor Aircraft (USA).
The armament carried by opposing force fixed wing aircraft usually depends on the type and
size of the DA of the own force and may be divided into a number of categories [159]:
Guns/Cannons. These WSs are known for their ability to produce small dispersions of ammu-
nition and achieving high hit probabilities, and are typically used to attack soft DAs. Their
ammunition is categorised by high-explosive/incendiary or armour-piercing/incendiary,
high initial velocity and heavy impact energy, and a short delay fuse enabling the am-
munition to pass through the outer case of the DA [159]. Examples of guns and cannons
include: the 20 mm M-61 VULGAN Gun Vulgan (USA), the 23 mm GSh-23 Guns (USA)
and the 30 mm DEFA Cannon (France).
10The armament typically depends on the type of aircraft used.
11Modern equipment which may typically be found on reconnaissance fixed wing aircraft include infra-red,
forward-down and sideways-looking systems as well as sideways-looking radars used to detect moving targets at
night [159].
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Rockets. Rockets are typically fired in salvos from pods at a high rate of fire and are typi-
cally used to attack soft or hard DAs. Their ammunition is categorised by high explo-
sive/incendiary or armour piercing with hollow-charge warheads and smoke-markers for
designating DAs, and high-explosive warheads with a dense fragmentation effect. Exam-
ples of rockets include: the 68 mm SNEB Rocket (France) and 57 mm Rockets (Russia).
Guided missiles. Guided missiles are known as stand-off WSs which are able to achieve very
high hit probabilities. They are typically used to attack tactically important and well-
defended assets when certainty of success is important and cannot be guaranteed by ordi-
nary WSs. This is due to their warheads being relatively heavy with a penetration (hollow
charge), defration, blast and incendiary effect. Examples of guided missiles include: the
AGM-88 HARM (USA), the AGM-65 Maverick (USA) and the AS-7 Kerry (Russia) [9].
Guided ballistic bombs. These WSs are known for their high hit probabilities and are cat-
egorised by the following characteristics and effects: heavy blast (instantaneous fuse),
penetration, cratering (delay fuse), and deflagration (cluster submunition and instanta-
neous fuse) [159]. This type of WS is typically used to attack soft or hard DAs and
examples include: the AGM-62 Walleye II (USA), the Homing Bomb System (HOBOS)
guided bomb (USA) and the Paveway I/II bombs (USA).
Free falling bombs. This type of WS is typically released in ripple-series in order to achieve
a relatively wide dispersion. They may either be fitted with instantaneous fuses (in order
to obtain a heavy surface blast and fragmentation effect) or with delay fuses (in order to
achieve a penetration and cratering effect). If a time-delay fuse is fitted to these bombs,
typical delays may range from five seconds to twenty four hours. Examples of free falling
bombs include: the Mk 80-series of General Purpose Bombs and the UK 1000-lb bomb
(UK).
Container/Cluster bombs. These bombs comprise a number of bomblets which form a clus-
ter bomb falling nearly vertically onto the target and in large numbers. Such a bomb
is typically delivered at low altitude and at high speed in conjunction with simultaneous
attacks from several other aircraft. Examples of container/cluster bombs include: the
JP-233 Submunitions dispenser (USA), the MK-20 Rockeye bomb (USA) and the BL-755
Cluster bomb (UK) [139, 78].
Fire bombs. This type of bomb induces a chemical incendiary which is very effective against
inflammable materials and installations. They are especially effective against personnel
and combustible material by producing a heat and conflagration effect, although the area
they affect is relatively small. Examples of fire bombs include: the BLU-1 bomb (USA),
the Mark 77 (USA) and the BLU-76/B Pave Pat 1 (USA) [78].
A number of the WSs described above are equipped with weapon guidance systems. The aim
of such systems is to guide the WSs towards their targets for penetration or to bring the WSs
close enough to the targets for the warheads to detonate. Examples of guidance systems which
may be found on various WSs include: active radar homing, anti-radiation, command guidance,
guide by wire, infra-red homing, optical guidance, semi-active laser homing, semi-active radar
homing and smart guidance [159]. Although the use of weapon guidance systems may improve
the accuracy of WSs, the only way of effectively neutralising these WSs is to employ appropriate
counter measures which implies that such WSs should be considered as threats to the system in
their own right — this, however, falls outside the scope of this dissertation (recall that only fixed
wing aircraft are considered as threats). It is nevertheless important to have sufficient knowledge
about the properties and vulnerabilities of these systems since they may impose restrictions on
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certain aircraft attack techniques used by the opposing force when specific WSs are delivered to
DAs.
In order for the opposing force to deliver their WSs effectively, their aircraft have to fly a specific
profile called an attack technique. The form (or shape), constraints and number of stages of
such a technique is typically determined by various factors including: doctrinal rules, rules of
engagement, terrain features, weather conditions, DA characteristics and geometry [158]. Five
popular aircraft attack techniques are reviewed here. They are the pitch-and-dive technique,
the high level dive technique, the combat turn dive technique, the toss bombing technique and
the low level attack technique.
The pitch-and-dive attack technique, also known as the combat hump dive attack technique [162]
is typically used to attack static DAs. The technique consists of an aerial threat approaching
a DA at low altitude so as to attempt avoiding radar detection [162]. This approach phase
is followed by a manoeuvre phase during which the threat pulls up (pitches) at a distance of
approximately 3–9 km from the DA; small manoeuvres are possible during this stage. The
threat then turns in to the DA so as to point its nose directly at the DA. The threat now enters
the attack phase during which the aircraft is stabilised before aiming at the DA. The weapons
are released at a distance of approximately 800–2 500 m from the DA. Once the weapons have
been released, the threat pulls up from the dive to manoeuvre away from the DA as quickly as
possible. The pitch-and-dive flight path attack technique is illustrated graphically in Figure 2.7.
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Figure 2.7: Graphical illustration of the pitch-and-dive attack technique [162].
The high level dive attack technique is also employed to attack static DAs. The technique entails
an aerial threat approaching a DA at high altitude (more than 200 m above ground level). To
render this approach successful, cloud cover or high terrain is required in order to avoid long
range radar detection from own forces. The approach phase is followed by a manoeuvre phase
which is carried out at approximately the same altitude as the approach phase. The aircraft
then turns in towards the DA so as to point directly at the DA. The remainder of the attack
stages follow exactly as for the pitch-and-dive attack technique. The main advantage of adopting
this technique is that the aircraft is usually able to remain out of range of small-calibre guns as
well as hand-held missile systems. The success of this technique may be enhanced if executed
from behind terrain obstacles, clouds or out of the sun — a greater element of surprise is thus
created. The high level dive attack technique is illustrated graphically in Figure 2.8.
The toss bomb attack technique is typically used to attack heavily defended static DAs. The
technique consists of an aerial threat which approaches a DA at a low altitude, approximately
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60–150 m above the ground [162]. During the manoeuvre phase, the threat pulls up at an exact,
pre-determined position (typically 4.5–6 km from the DA) and starts aiming its weapon release
system at the DA. It releases its weapons at a slant distance of approximately 3.5–4.7 km from
the DA. After releasing its weapons, the threat pulls around in order to manoeuvre away from
the DA as quickly as possible. The toss bomb attack technique is illustrated graphically in
Figure 2.9.
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Figure 2.8: Graphical illustration of the high level dive attack technique [159].
The combat turn dive attack technique is usually employed to attack moving DAs and is typically
executed as a primary attack after an armed passing reconnaissance, as a secondary attack with
alternative WSs or against DAs of opportunity encountered by chance in passing flight. This
technique requires a flat terrain surface in order to ensure good visibility. The technique consists
of an aerial threat approaching a DA at high altitude, approximately 150–300 m above the
ground. After having detected the moving DA, the threat lowers its altitude to approximately
60 m above the ground. After approximately 5–10 seconds, the manoeuvre phase commences
during which the threat pulls up and turns in towards the DA to deliver its WSs. The remainder
of the attack stages follow exactly as for the combat hump dive attack technique. The combat
turn dive attack technique is illustrated graphically in Figure 2.10.
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Figure 2.9: Graphical illustration of the toss bomb flight path attack technique [162].
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
38 Chapter 2. Ground-based air defence
The low level attack attack technique is also employed to attack moving DAs. In this attack
technique, the aerial threat typically assumes a horizontal flight path, if possible, and aims to
execute the technique at an altitude as low as possible — the lower the altitude of the aircraft,
the smaller the chance of the aircraft being hit by the own force’s WSs. If the combat zone
falls within a hilly terrain area, a flat dive angle has to be adopted in order to ensure detection
of the DA. This technique is similar to the combat hump dive technique, except that the dive
angle is flatter [159]. Four variations in this technique exist, namely: a low level attack involving
the threat executing a shallow dive with a long WS release range, a low level attack involving
a threat executing a shallow dive with a short WS release range, a low level attack involving
the threat executing a horizontal attack with a high WS release altitude and a low level attack
involving the threat executing a horizontal attack with a low WS release altitude. The low
level attack technique involving the threat executing a shallow dive with a long WS release is
illustrated graphically in Figure 2.11.
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Figure 2.10: Graphical illustration of the combat turn dive flight path attack technique [159].
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Figure 2.11: Graphical illustration of the low level attack technique involving the threat executing a
shallow dive with a long WS release [159].
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Ground-based weapon systems
Ground-based WSs are used to afford protection of DAs against aerial threats. These WSs are
typically deployed in a strategic manner around the DAs so as to afford the maximum level of
protection against attacks from the opposing force. Efficient deployment of WSs naturally gives
rise to the notion of layered AD which is a well-documented topic in the military literature [22,
52, 100]. It is a theoretical construct which involves dividing the defended airspace surrounding
the DAs into a number of layers depending on the capabilities of the various types of WSs used
in the deployment [190]. Within the context of South African AD, there are four layers of AD
which are typically employed. These layers comprise an inner, middle, outer and in-depth layer,
as illustrated graphically in Figure 2.12. The figure illustrates a two-dimensional side view of the
four layers based on the ranges (both vertically and horizontally) of the WSs typically employed
in each layer.
8 Chapter 2. TEWA in a GBADS: A brief review
The forth and final layer, the in-depth layer, consists of long-range SAM (LRSAMs) and inter-
ceptor aircraft1. LRSAMs are known to have effective ranges of more than 80 000 metres. AD
coverage depends on the type of SAM used and the target to be engaged. The coverage provided
by an interceptor aircraft depends on the characteristics of the specific aircraft employed [43].
The current WSs artillery employed within a South African GBADS limits the layered AD to
only the inner and middle layers. Because of this limitation, only WSs residing within these
two layers are considered in this thesis.
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Figure 2.2: Different layers of AD in a GBADS environment [20].
2.4 Track Management
A central software system in a GBADS is the TM subsystem. Information obtained from the
sensor grid is used to form a system track for each of the observed aircraft in the TM subsystem.
Typical information used in the creation of a system track is aircraft attributes. These attributes
include the speed at which the aircraft is travelling, the altitude of the aircraft and the direction
in which the aircraft is travelling [40]. The entire set of individual aircraft tracks resides in a
TM subsystem and is accessible by both the TE and WA subsystems.
Apart from labeling aircraft, TM also consists of two processes called Type Classification/ Iden-
tification (TCI) and Hostility Classification/Identification (HCI). TCI involves distinguishing
between aircraft platform types, such as rotary wing, fixed wing, cargo, missile, unmanned
aerial vehicle, EW platform or unknown [40]. The results of the TCI process are usually based
on reports from Observation Posts (OPs), as the required information is usually unavailable
from the kinematic data of aircraft. HCI involves the classification of system tracks as either
friendly, hostile or unknown. The process of HCI utilises an electronic aircraft interrogation sys-
1Interceptor aircraft are specifically designed to prevent missions of enemy aircraft, and rely on high speed and
powerful armament to complete a mission. They are usually employed against enemy aircraft such as bombers
and reconnaissance aircraft [55].
Figure 2.12: Four layers of AD based on the ranges of WSs contained in each layer [159].
The first layer of AD, the inner layer, is typically afforded by Close-In Weapon Systems (CI-
WSs) and Very SHOrt Range Air Defence Systems (VSHORADSs). CIWSs usually constitute
guns (i.e. 35mm dual purpose guns) and are known for their short reaction times, high fire
rates, short effective ranges (less than 4 000 m), lengthy deployment procedures (due to allign-
ment procedures that have to be followed), all-weather operation and intensive maintenance
requirements [190]. VSHORADs are characterised by their light weight (which enables them to
be man portable), rapid deployment procedures and short effective ranges (less than 6 000 m).
Starstreak missile systems are an example of a VSHORADs.
The se ond layer of AD, the middle layer, is usually afforded by SHOrt Range A r Defence
Systems (SHORADSs) of which the South African Umkhonto missile system is an example.
SHORADSs are characterised by their ability to reach effective ranges of up to 20 000 m, possible
vertical launch and day/night as well as all-weather operation [159].
The third ayer of AD, the uter layer, typically consists of M dium-Range Surface to Air Missiles
(MRSAM) and are known for their ability to reach effective ranges up to 60 000 m and high
altitudes up to 18 000 m [159]. An example of an MRSAM is the Roy l Navy Seadart system.
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Finally, the fourth layer of AD is typically provided by Long-Range Surface to Air Missiles
(LRSAMs) and interceptor aircraft. LRSAMs are characterised by their effective ranges (larger
than 80 000 m) and large coverage (depending on the specific surface to air missile used and the
targets engaged) [159].
Currently, the available AD artillery within the South African GBADS is limited to include only
WSs from the inner and middle layers of AD [159]. The scope of this dissertation is therefore
limited to include only WSs from these two layers. These WSs are CIWSs and VSHORADSs.
It should be noted that a number of WS parameters affect the WA process [145]. These param-
eters include the ammunition available for each WS in the deployment, the velocity and cost
of the ammunition, the time that is required to reload WSs and the so-called Single Shot Hit
Probability12 (SSHP) of the WSs. The WA process is further complicated by the WS operators
who are governed by doctrinal rules, readiness and control measures [159].
2.5.2 Functional elements
In 2010, Roux [159] proposed a number of functional elements (or processes) that may be used
for AD decision support — in accordance with the existing South African GBAD functional
elements of that time. These functional elements, as well as the data flow between the processes,
are illustrated graphically in Figure 2.13 and are described in some detail in this section.
The first functional element in Figure 2.13 is operator decision support, which enables the FCO
to communicate with the physical elements in the system. It may also be referred to as the link
between man and machine, and is typically implemented by means of a so-called Human Machine
Interface (HMI)13 which provides the FCO with an interactive graphic user interface [143, 149].
The HMI displays the air picture on a screen, enables the FCO to view results generated by the
other functional elements (e.g. the TE and WA results), and performs decisions with respect
to the evaluation and prioritisation of threats as well as the assignment of WSs for engaging
aerial threats. A well-designed and lean user interface is essential since the FCO may easily be
overwhelmed by the amount of data displayed on the HMI. The HMI should be able to provide
the functionality that the FCO requires with the minimum amount of effort on the operator’s
part whilst improving his productivity [143]. The effectiveness of the HMI is therefore important.
The ISO 9241 standard defines the following three components of quality in the design of HMIs:
effectiveness (Does the product do what the users require? Does it do the right thing?), efficiency
(Can the users learn the HMI quickly? Can they carry out their tasks with minimum expended
effort, including a minimum of errors? Does it improve the productivity/effort ratio? Does it do
things right?) and satisfaction (Do users express satisfaction with the product? Does the new
product reduce stress?) [149].
In the context of a GBADS, an HMI is required to operate in various modes depending on the
authority that the operator has and the role he fulfils. The inputs and outputs of the HMI are
therefore customised and filtered accordingly when operators log in to perform different tasks.
Functionalities of the HMI include ADC health display, air picture management, sensor control,
diagnostics, error notification, fire control, training, and maintenance [159]. In addition, the
HMI should also be able to provide the operator with a Plan Position Indicator (PPI)14.
12The probability of hitting a target at a specific location relative to the WS with a single unit of ammunition.
13The HMI is sometimes also referred to as a man machine interface (MMI) [149].
14A PPI is a means of representing radar output which involves a display unit resembling a map with the radar
site at the centre of the display [8]. The physical elements of an ADC system is typically represented by means
of MIL-STD-2525B symbols [134] on the PPI.
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Figure 2.13: The flow of information between the internal-, external functional elements and the
database of a TEWA system. Adapted from Roux [159].
Military personnel have to be trained so that they are able to operate the functional elements
of a GBAD system effectively. This may be achieved by testing and training procedures that
are carried out during the pre-deployment stage of a mission, or at an earlier stage. The type
of training required depends on the various capacities in which military personnel are deployed.
Training procedures typically involve simulation functions that are responsible for imitating
diverse tactical GBAD scenarios in which operators have to operate [162]. A scenario generator
is typically employed to assist in the training of operators in the respective roles they fulfil within
an ADC system. The scenario generator is capable of creating, storing and playing back pre-
configured scenarios, including DAs and aircraft-WS delivery profiles [159]. It should be noted
that the scenario generator is typically only activated if the HMI is in training mode. During
these training procedures, actual software may therefore be disabled or disconnected. Testing
usually involves evaluating the success of the integration of the system as an entity. This may be
achieved by testing the performance of the system under controlled conditions while analysing
the results [90]. During these testing procedures, scenarios may be employed that are similar to
those generated for training purposes.
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The TE and WA functional elements are not necessarily directly connected to the effecting and
sensing functional element. Information (such as feedback messages) forms part of the sensor or
WS system tracks which are handled by the TM process and relayed via the data management
process. In some situations (e.g. certain TEWA modes or enhanced reaction modes), however,
time-critical feedback or response time may induce the use of direct links between these elements.
The effecting and sensing process provides this functionality.
Typical information received from the sensor systems are the measured (kinematic) attributes
of incoming aircraft e.g. the speed or altitude at which they are travelling. Recall (from the
discussion on sensor systems in §2.5.1) that the TM system uses this information to produce
a single system track for each aircraft which enters the defended airspace. This system track
should correctly indicate the current location and movement of each observed aircraft in the
defended airspace, is generated by fusing together various aircraft characteristics, and may be
of use when identifying and classifying the observed aircraft15 [194]. Functionalities provided
by the TM system include performing operations such as correlation, fusion, Hostility Classi-
fication/Identification (HCI), triangulation and Type Classification/Identification (TCI) [159].
The HCI operation involves the classification of observed aircraft as hostile or friendly, which
is supported by means of intelligence reports, IFF interrogations and other specialised systems.
The TCI operation involves the classification of all observed aircraft (e.g. fixed wing or rotary)
and is also supported by intelligence reports. Only those aircraft that are classified as hostile
are considered for further evaluation with respect to the level of threat they pose to DAs. It
is evident that the TM system relies heavily on information from the sensors. It can therefore
only produce system tracks at the same rate at which aircraft kinematic information is received
from sensor systems.
Apart from creating system tracks and classifying aircraft, the TM system also includes a so-
called Flight Path Prediction (FPP) module. The function of this module is to predict the
flight paths of observed threats over a pre-specified number of future time stages [194]. This is
achieved by employing prediction models which utilise system track information from the TM.
The output of the FPP module is an array of predicted flight paths for each threat combined
with a probability distribution for each of these paths, which is usually fused into a single,
expected flight path for each threat. This single expected flight path is stored as part of the
system track of each threat in the TEWA database, is updated at the same rate at which the
system tracks are updated and serves as input to the TE and WA subsystems [146, 197]. The
number of future time stages over which flight paths are predicted should be chosen carefully,
since the statistical confidence associated with a predicted flight path diminishes as the number
of future time stages increases.
During the pre-deployment stages of a mission, the various models residing in the TE and
WA processes require certain initialisation parameters based on intelligence with respect to the
aircraft types, modes of armament, and attack profiles typically employed by the opposing force,
as well as various WS parameter threshold values. A set of initialisation parameters may be
required for each TE model and each WA model, and these parameters may be updated during
the mission by means of carefully established maintenance and testing procedures.
A number of sensor, WS and DA attributes are typically determined during the deployment
of a mission and are also stored in the TEWA database. The attributes may be received from
remote system processes. The attributes are stored as system tracks and should be updated in
real time (e.g. if the position of a mobile WS changes), similar to the system tracks of aerial
threats [159]. Remote system processes may increase the flexibility of the system, but may result
15Tadil [180] defines a track as “a collated set of data associated with a track number for the purposes of
representing the position and/or characteristics of a specific object, point or bearing.”
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in an increase in the processing power required by the TEWA system.
A map processing server, as part of an ADC system, contains information with respect to all
functionality and data pertaining to geographical maps. In the context of a GBADS, the MAP
server functionality may typically include a component responsible for line-of-sight computa-
tions, a display component for map planning and orientation processes, and the ability to toggle
map features (e.g. national and regional boundaries, coastlines, contours, roads, rivers and
cities) [159]. Furthermore, the map server may include a local database for storing information
regarding maps and a display component for planning and prioritisation.
A central functional element of an ADC system is the data manager. It serves the purpose of
communicator between interfaces of other systems contained in the ADC system, resulting in the
continuous relay of data between the interfaces of these systems. These system interfaces may be
subdivided into internal interfaces and external interfaces. The TEWA interface is an example
of an internal interface, whereas WS and sensor interfaces are examples of external interfaces.
The data manager is also able to provide functionalities such as configuration functionality,
diagnostic and system health monitoring, the processing of sensor and system track data, the
storage of data in a central repository, and recording and playback functionality [159].
The measured attributes of aircraft obtained from the sensor systems are used by an AM system
to compute further derived attributes (as mentioned earlier) associated with each system track
(i.e. each threat) [162]. An example of such an attribute is the acceleration of an aircraft. Once
the derived attributes have been calculated, they are stored in real time as part of the system
track of each threat in the TEWA database. The derived attributes are employed in the TE
functional element.
The TE subsystem proposed by Roux and Van Vuuren [162] comprises two substructures, known
as the Threat Evaluation Model (TEM) component and the Threat Evaluation Fusion Model
(TEFM) component. The former component employs the measured attributes obtained from
the sensors, the derived attributes retrieved from the AM system, as well as pre-deployment
data and initialisation parameters to estimate the level of threat that each of the hostile aircraft
in the defended airspace poses to the DAs. This may be achieved by means of the suite of
mathematical threat evaluation models functioning concurrently.
The TEM component proposed by Roux and Van Vuuren [162], in fact, comprises three classes
of TE models which are distinguished from one another by the level of complexity and sophisti-
cation of the models contained in each class. The three classes of models are, in increasing order
of complexity, flagging models, deterministic models, and stochastic models:
1. Flagging models are a suite of binary output TE models. These models are qualitative
in nature and simply alert the operator by flagging an aircraft if sudden changes in the
kinematic behaviour of the aircraft are observed or if the aircraft seems to be engaging in
some kind of hostile behaviour. Hence, flagging models are not able to distinguish between
different levels of threat posed by aircraft.
2. Deterministic models, on the other hand, are quantitative models, each based on some
measure of threat, such as the expected travel time to a DA or some course/bearing-related
measure. Each model in this class takes the observed kinematic data of aircraft, as well
as the DA deployment data, as input and generates as output a normalised, deterministic
threat value for each aircraft.
3. The TE models exhibiting the highest level of sophistication are the class of quantitative,
stochastic models. Such a model takes the observed kinematic data of aircraft, DA deploy-
ment data, enemy arsenal intelligence, and doctrine as input and also generates as output
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a single threat value for each aircraft-DA pair. This output value is, however, probability-
based and is typically an estimate of the probability that an aircraft will attack and/or
kill a specific DA.
The results generated by the TEM component are fused together by the TEFM component to
obtain a single threat value for each threat so as to arrive at a single prioritised list of threats
(i.e. a list containing a threat value for each threat) with respect to the entire collection of
DAs. This may be achieved by means of some Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) value
function method. The single threat list is presented to the FCO as DS in real time.
The remaining functional elements are the EQ subsystem and the WA subsystem. Since EQ
entails the quantisation of the effectiveness of an engagement of an aerial threat by a WS, the
EQ subsystem is considered a WA-related component. These two components form the main
contribution of this dissertation and are hence described in detail later in this dissertation.
2.5.3 Cognitive elements
The third important element to consider in the design of a TEWA DSS is the cognitive element.
Recall from §2.4 that the cognitive domain constitutes the collective minds of the war fighters
and hence the cognitive element refers to how these war fighters (or operators) perceive attacks
in a mission, how they interpret DS results provided to them by a TEWA DSS and the decisions
they make based on these results. Recall from §2.2 that the individual which is central to C2 is
the commander. Roux [159] argues that the entire OODA loop (see Figure 2.1) of the operator
may be seen as a cognitive process. In the context of an ADC domain, information such as raw
data on physical elements and TEWA DS results are presented to the operator in real time. The
human mind then has to perceive this information, process it (which typically differs for each
individual) and decide on a specific course of action to take, given the current tactical situation.
In order to understand this process thoroughly, Roux [159] combined an information hierarchy
developed in the Australian Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication [147] and a cognitive hierarchy
developed by Roodt et al. [157] to arrive at a so-called information-to-action hierarchy via the
cognitive domain. This hierarchy is presented graphically in Figure 2.14.
The hierarchy in Figure 2.14 constitutes three main levels, namely information, intelligence and
command. At the lowest level (i.e. information), data are processed and converted into infor-
mation by including it in a situational context. This information (or processed data) includes
all the relevant data on TEWA results presented to the operator. It therefore includes all raw
data on sensing, tracking, TM, TE and WA results. This lower level of the hierarchy therefore
intends to provide all the information to the operator which may aid him to enhance his SA.
Information may typically be provided in two ways, namely in a supply-push manner or a
demand-pull manner [96]. In a supply-push system, information is typically pushed from the
source to the user either as the information becomes available or according to a pre-determined
schedule. In a demand-pull system, on the other hand, information is typically demanded by
the user and therefore does not rely on the ability to anticipate information needs. Furthermore,
information may also be transmitted by either broadcast or point-to-point transmission [147].
Broadcasting entails transmitting information to a broad audience which proves to be very ef-
fective, although information cannot be tailored for a specific user. Point-to-point broadcasting,
on the other hand, entails information being sent to a specific user or users — appropriate
information is therefore transmitted sequentially from one user to the next.
The middle level of the hierarchy in Figure 2.14 constitutes intelligence. At this level in the hi-
erarchy, information from the lower information level has reached the operator. The intelligence
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Figure 2.14: Information-to-action by means of the cognitive domain [159].
level involves processing (by means of cognition) the information from the information level into
knowledge.
Von Clausewitz [201] defines the term coup d’oeil16 as the ability of a commander to intuitively
grasp what is happening on the battle field. A higher level of C2 typically requires that the
operator (or commander) relies more on information from others and less on own observations.
Roux [159] states that when observing a situation directly, an intuitive appreciation of the level
of uncertainty may be achieved — this sense is typically lost when “second hand” information
is received. In addition, information may become distorted as it progresses through every node
in the hierarchy before it reaches the operator. A time-delay to the information due to the
point-to-point transmission described above may also be experienced [147]. This problem may,
however, be overcome by providing data of certain critical events to the operator directly.
When considering the hierarchy in Figure 2.14, it is observed that the cognitive process of
the operator starts with knowledge and involves the operator receiving information from the
information tier and observing this information. This aids the operator in reaching a certain
level of SA which directs the cognitive process to the next level in the hierarchy, namely the
awareness level.
The awareness level is therefore reached by the operator interpreting the knowledge obtained
from the information level. Here, the cognitive process of information employs observation
information, orientation information, experience and training in order to reach a level of SA.
Note that the level of SA reached on this level corresponds to the intermediate levels of SA of
Figure 2.3 — the assessment of the intent and organisation of the opposing force.
16The term coup d’oeil literally translates to “stroke of the eye.”
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The next level in the operator cognitive process hierarchy is understanding. In order to reach this
level of the cognitive process, operator judgement is required with respect to what-if scenarios
which takes into consideration the organisation and intention of the own force and opposing force.
Such judgement typically depends on operator experience, SA, doctrinal rules, and orientation
information.
At this level in the hierarchy, the operator has observed the tactical environment and has
oriented himself with respect to the tactical situation. The next steps in the OODA loop is
therefore for the operator to decide and act accordingly. Decisions typically involve some level
of uncertainty and although such uncertainty may be reduced with the help of information, the
corresponding reduction usually comes at the expense of time [147]. Klein [106, 105] describes
two basic approaches which may be followed when making decisions. These approaches are an
analytical approach and an intuitive approach.
The analytical approach involves generating a number of different alternatives, comparing these
alternatives according to a given set of criteria and choosing the best alternative. This approach
tends to be methodological (analytical) and very time consuming since reasoning power matters
more than experience.
An intuitive approach, on the other hand, involves no computational effort whatsoever and
rather relies on the intuition of an experienced operator to identify important aspects of a
specific problem so as to arrive at a suitable solution (decision). In this approach, the focus is
to find the first solution that will solve the problem satisfactorily rather than finding an optimal
solution [169]. In order to promote this approach, Patton [23] suggested that: “A good plan
violently executed now is better than a perfect plan next week.”
It is therefore evident that the correct decision making approach to be adopted in an ADC
scenario should be based on the current tactical situation at hand, the time available for the
decision, and the knowledge (experience) and level of SA of the operator. Roux [159] suggests
that for an efficient decision making process, a combination of these approaches should be used.
Furthermore, he claims that the goal of TEWA DSS should be to automate certain elements of
the system (if possible) which may streamline the decision making process, ultimately leading to
a reduction in the time required to make the decision. Such automated procedures are especially
applicable to analytical decision processes which are fairly easy to automate and are aimed at
producing alternatives (or an optimal alternative), depending on operator preference. This
provides the operator with ample time to consider the result(s) and to act accordingly based
on his judgement (experience and knowledge). The final level in the operator cognitive process
hierarchy of Figure 2.14 is then to take action by issuing some form of command.
In order to understand the role and responsibilities of the FCO, it is also necessary to understand
the role of the commander. According to Roux [159] the training of a commander and that of an
FCO are similar in terms of courses completed and practical experience gained. The difference
between the commander and the FCO, however, is that the commander is trained to command
an entire mission and to also interact with other ADA functions. The roles of the commander
and the FCO are nevertheless very intertwined and they work together to command an ADC
deployment during a mission.
The commander typically utilises the intelligence (information) which he has received and de-
velops a so-called ADA battle plan for a particular mission [115]. In order to develop an efficient
battle plan, the commander orientates himself with respect to the current situation and he con-
ceptualises the options available to the own force as well as the opposing force within the context
of the terrain, the civil population, meteorological conditions and the current air situation [112,
113, 114]. The commander then finally chooses the most probable and most dangerous enemy
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courses of action from an own force perspective. He then sends a request for the deployment of
the physical elements in such a way so as to counter these enemy courses of action as efficiently
as possible.
Roux [159] states that it is important for the commander and the FCO to work closely together.
The FCO has to be part of the planning process described above since he is the one who
will ultimately fight the battle. The FCO should therefore support the commander in the
planning phase during the pre-deployment stages of a mission — the FCO should ensure that
the communication channels between himself and the physical elements are set up correctly.
Furthermore, the FCO should also use the appropriate intelligence available, as well as the
conclusions and assumptions made by the commander, to set up the TEWA system. Once
the physical elements have been deployed, all functional elements are operational, all required
communications have been established and all cognitive elements are in position, the commander
declares the deployment as ‘Ready for Action.’
At this stage of the mission, the responsibility of the successful completion of the mission shifts
completely to the FCO. The commander may typically still be involved, but only on a high level
(for example, observing and monitoring the ADC activities). The commander usually starts with
planning for future missions at this stage. Apart from supporting the commander during the
planning phases of a mission, the responsibilities of the FCO may be divided into the following
three distinct time frames [159]:
Early Warning. During this period, early warning reports are received, indicating that possi-
ble aerial threats are entering the defended airspace and heading towards the DAs. The
FCO then reacts to these early warning reports by orientating himself with respect to
the possible threat(s) and the various courses of action that he can take according to the
ADA battle plan previously established by the commander together with the FCO. The
FCO may also warn and alert the various physical elements in order for them to ready
themselves for possible courses of action.
Local Warning. During this period, local warning reports are received from sensor systems.
The FCO then typically sends local warning reports containing additional information
about the approaching threat(s) to ADC elements (e.g. WSs) so as to alert them to track
the threats when they come within range of their tracking sensors.
Fire Control. The fire control period commences once the FCO sends the first engagement
order. Such an engagement order may be sent to one WS or a number of WSs at a time
and is typically monitored by the FCO on an ad hoc basis. Automated feedback of the
engagement orders are relayed continuously from the WSs to the TEWA system. In the
event of communication between certain functional elements failing, the FCO is required
to obtain voice feedback from the WSs. In return, he will then provide manual feedback
via the HMI to the TEWA system.
2.6 Chapter summary
This chapter was dedicated to a discussion on general GBAD. The chapter opened in §2.1 with
a brief review of TEWA DS within a GBAD context. The section included a description of IPB,
which is central to the TE process, a coherent definition of TE as well as approaches that aerial
threats may follow to attack the own force. The different platforms from which the process of
WA may be approached was also discussed in some detail.
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The remainder of the chapter focussed on three important fundamental theories of warfare, as
well as the physical, functional and cognitive elements which form a central part of an effective
TEWA DSS. In §2.2, a description was given of C2 (which included a description of the well-
known C2 model of Boyd [20]). Variations on this model by other authors were also touched
upon. The importance of speed in terms of increasing the OPTEMPO of C2 was also briefly
mentioned.
In §2.3, the focus shifted to a discussion on SA. The importance thereof in military missions was
highlighted and a three-tiered hierarchy for achieving SA due to Endsley [66] was also discussed.
Furthermore, a framework (also containing three levels of SA) for achieving complete SA in the
context of C2 was also described. This framework was proposed by Wallenius [204].
In §2.4, the notion of NCW was considered. The importance thereof between sensors, WSs,
decision makers and information was briefly discussed, and this was followed by a detailed
discussion on the social, cognitive, information and physical domains which surround NCW. The
interactions between the four domains were also highlighted. The section closed with a discussion
on a logical framework for NCW between sensors, C2 and WSs proposed by Cebrowski [31].
In §2.5, the physical-, functional- and cognitive elements of a TEWA DSS were highlighted. The
section opened with a discussion on the physical (hardware) elements, including DAs and how
they may be prioritised, sensor systems and their various capabilities with respect to detecting
and tracking aerial threats, various aircraft and their manoeuvring capabilities (including pos-
sible WS armament carried by them and attack profiles that they may execute) when attacking
DAs and ground-based WSs that the own force may employ to counter aerial threats.
The focus next shifted to a discussion on the functional (software) elements of an effective TEWA
DSS. This discussion highlighted functional elements pertaining to operator DS, testing and
training, effecting and sensing, TM, data management, maintenance and testing, remote system
processing, map processing, AM, and TE. The chapter finally closed with a discussion on the
cognitive elements of a TEWA system. The discussion focussed on the roles and responsibilities
of the commander and FCO.
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Ever since aerial vehicles have proven a threat to defended assets on the battlefield during the
Second World War, high-quality assignments of available WS have been sought to deter or
eliminate these aircraft in ground-based air defence scenarios. The notion of WA has since been
researched extensively by a number of research institutions over the world and various authors
have contributed significantly to the topic. This chapter is devoted to a detailed discussion
on the evolution of WA modelling over time since its inception in 1952. The chapter opens in
§3.1 with a brief introduction to the notion of NP-completeness, because the decision problems
associated with even the simplest WAMs are NP-complete. Next, a detailed description follows
in §3.2 of the origin of the first formulation of a WAM by Manne [125] in 1957. The three
sections that follow contain similarly detailed descriptions of various contributions towards WA
modelling since the 1950s up to the current state of the art WAMs available in the military
operations research literature. In §3.3, a number of WAM contributions from the early 1960s to
the mid 1980s are reviewed in some detail. A major breakthrough in the development of WA
modelling was the formulation of the first dynamic WAM by Hosein et al. [89] in 1989. This
model, as well as various extensions to and generalisations of the model up to the late 1990s,
are discussed in §3.4. In §3.5, the focus shifts to a discussion on the current state of the art
of WAMs which have been contributed to the military operations research literature during the
21st century. The chapter finally closes in §3.6 with a brief summary of the chapter contents.
3.1 The notion of NP-completeness
Complexity theory underlies the study of the intrinsic complexity of computational tasks. One
of the main goals of complexity theory is to establish means for classifying computational tasks
49
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according to the resources required to solve them [128]. Examples of such resources include
time, storage space, random bits or number of processors, but the focus is typically on time and
space.
An algorithm is an ordered sequence of procedural operations that may be used to solve a
problem within a finite number of steps [83]. Algorithms are widely used to solve different kinds
of computational problems and in most cases it is important to analyse the efficiency of an
algorithm in terms of its speed and the amount of computer memory required to execute the
algorithm. The reason for this is to ensure that for a computational problem of a given size, the
algorithm will be able to solve the problem within a realistic time frame on a computer with a
realistic memory capacity.
Algorithmic complexity is typically measured by means of two variables: the time complexity
Tc(n) and the space complexity Sc(n) of the algorithm, where n refers to the size of the input to
the algorithm [83]. The time complexity of an algorithm represents the amount of time required
by a computer to execute an algorithm, while the space complexity represents the amount of
space (i.e. memory) required by a computer to execute an algorithm. The worst-case complexity
of an algorithm is the largest values that Tc(n) and Sc(n) may assume for an algorithm with
input size n. It is often difficult to determine exact counts of the resources required to execute
an algorithm and in such cases so-called asymptotic upper bounds on the functions Tc(n) and
Sc(n) are usually estimated rather than seeking exact upper bounds — these asymptotic bounds
describe how Tc(n) and Sc(n) increase as n→∞. For two functions f(n) and g(n), the notion
f(n) = O(g(n)) means that there exist constants c ∈ R+ and n0 ∈ N such that 0 ≤ f(n) ≤ cg(n)
for all n ≥ n0 [128]. In such a case, the function g(n) is an asymptotic upper bound for the
function f(n) as n→∞ and it is said that the function f(n) is of the order of the function g(n).
P co-NPNP
Figure 3.1: The complexity classes NP, P and co-NP of decision problems [47].
A polynomial-time algorithm is an algorithm having time complexity O(nk), where n is the size
of the input instance to the algorithm and k ∈ R+. Decision theory is that part of complexity
theory that focusses on binary output to problems to which the answer may be interpreted as
a boolean value true or false [47, 83]. The class of decision problems which may be solved
by polynomial-time algorithms is denoted by P (an abbreviation for Polynomial). Furthermore,
the class of NP (an abbreviation for Non-deterministic Polynomial) problems contains all those
decision problems for which the answer true may be verified by a polynomial-time algorithm,
given additional information related to the problem instance (known as a certificate). The class
of co-NP problems, on the other hand, contains all the decision problems for which the answer
false may be verified by a polynomial-time algorithm, given additional information related
to the problem instance (again called a certificate) [128]. Although a certificate may exist for
decision problems in the classes NP or co-NP, it may sometimes be difficult to find such
certificates. The various complexity classes of decision problems discussed above are illustrated
graphically in Figure 3.1.
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The notion of reducibility may be used to determine whether one decision problem is at least as
hard to solve as another. Let D1 and D2 denote two decision problems. The decision problem
D1 is then polynomial-time reducible to the decision problem D2 if an algorithm A1 exists which
can solve all instances of D1 and also contains as subroutine an algorithm A2 which can solve
all instances of D2 in such a way that A1 is a polynomial time algorithm if A2 is a polynomial
time algorithm [83, 128].
A decision problem D may be classified as NP-hard if D1 is polynomial-time reducible to D
for all D1 ∈ NP. Moreover, a decision problem D may be classified as NP-complete if D ∈
NP and if D is NP-hard [47, 83, 128]. An updated classification scheme of decision problems
described so far in this section is illustrated graphically in Figure 3.2. The class of NP-complete
problems may therefore be considered the most restrictive class of decision problems since this
class is a subset of the class of NP problems. NP-complete problems are also considered the
most difficult class of decision problems in Figure 3.2 since they are computationally at least as
hard to solve as any other decision problem in NP.
P co-NP
NP
NP-hard NP-complete
Figure 3.2: The decision problem complexity classes P, NP, co-NP, NP-hard and NP-complete [47].
Computational problems are problems having a real number (or a collection of real numbers)
as solution rather than a binary value. Decision problems may therefore be considered as
special cases of computational problems. Computational problems may often be solved efficiently
in terms of algorithmic procedures by repeatedly solving their associated decision problems.
For this reason, the notion of reducibility may also be employed to determine whether one
computational problem is at least as hard to solve as another.
Let C1 and C2 denote two computational problems. The computational problem C1 is then
polynomial time reducible to the computational problem C2 if an Algorithm A3 exists which
can solve C1 and uses, as a subroutine, an algorithm A4 to solve computational problem C2,
and which runs in polynomial time if the algorithm for computational problem C2 does [128].
Therefore, if the computational problem C1 is polynomial time reducible to the computational
problem C2, then C2 is computationally at least as difficult as C1 (that is, the computational
problem C1 is no harder than the computational problem C2). The complexity classes of de-
cision problems in Figure 3.2, the notions of polynomial-time reducibility and the notion of
NP-hardness may also be generalised to accommodate computational problems in the obvious
manner [83].
3.2 The inception of weapon assignment modelling
The art of WA modelling has its roots in the classical assignment problem of Votaw and Or-
den [202] dating back to 1952. This problem entails finding an assignment of n agents to n tasks
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which minimises the overall cost of the assignment of agents to tasks, where the assignment of
each agent to a task is associated with a cost depending on the specific agent and the specific
task. Denote the cost of assigning agent i to task j by cij and consider a binary decision variable
xij which takes the value 1 if agent i is assigned to task j, or 0 otherwise. Then the objective
in the classical assignment problem is to
minimise
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
cijxij (3.1)
subject to the constraints
n∑
i=1
xij = 1, j = 1, . . . , n, (3.2)
n∑
j=1
xij = 1, i = 1, . . . , n, (3.3)
xij ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, . . . , n, (3.4)
j = 1, . . . , n.
Constraint set (3.2) ensures that each of the n tasks is assigned to exactly one agent, while
constraint set (3.3) ensures that each of the n agents is assigned to exactly one task. Note that
in the classical assignment problem, the strong assumption is made that the number of agents
and the number of tasks are equal1. Furthermore, it is assumed that the cost of assigning an
agent to a task is independent of which tasks are assigned to the other agents.
The classical assignment formulation (3.1)–(3.4) served as a stepping stone for many WAMs
that exist in the military operations research literature today. The first incarnation of a WAM
was introduced informally by Flood [69] in 1957, but was only formulated mathematically as the
so-called weapon-target assignment (WTA) model by Manne [125] in 1958. The model is based
on the classical assignment problem (3.1)–(3.4) in which the agents are replaced by m WSs and
the tasks are replaced by n targets (or threats). The objective in this model is to ascertain a
set of WS-threat assignment pairs which minimises the overall expected survival probabilities of
the threats. Let Vj denote the importance of eliminating threat j, let pij denote the probability
that WS i will hit threat j with a single shot and finally, let Xij denote the probability with
which WS i is assigned to threat j. Then the objective in the WAM formulation of Manne [125]
is to
minimise
n∑
j=1
Vj
m∏
i=1
(1− pijXij) (3.5)
subject to the constraints
n∑
j=1
Xij = 1, i = 1, . . . ,m, (3.6)
Xij ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . ,m, (3.7)
j = 1, . . . , n.
Constraint set (3.6) ensures that the probabilities of assigning each WS accumulates to the value
one over all the threats, while constraint set (3.7) ensures that the individual probability values
1This assumption may be relaxed in the case of m agents and n tasks, where n 6= m. If n > m, then an agent
may be assigned to more than one task. Similarly, if m > n, then dummy tasks may be created which results in
certain agents being unassigned.
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of assigning WS i to threat j is greater than or equal to zero. Note that it is assumed in the
objective function (3.5) that the events of hitting a threat by the various WSs are independent
of one another — similar to the independence assumption of the costs in the classical assignment
problem (3.1)–(3.4). Note also that whereas the classical assignment problem (3.1)–(3.4) is a
combinatorial optimisation problem2 (its decision variables xij are required to assume binary
values), this is not the case in the WTA model (3.5)–(3.7) of Manne [125] (where the decision
variables Xij are allowed to assume continuous, nonnegative values). It should be noted here
that this early WAM of Manne [125] is known to be NP-complete [135].
In his paper [125], Manne acknowledged that the minimand in (3.5)–(3.7) is nonlinear. In order
to simplify the problem he suggested that the assumption be made that only uniform WSs are
used in the WAM formulation. From a practical point of view, this assumption implies that
WSs of the same type are used in the deployment and that they are grouped closely together in
such a way that each WS in the deployment achieves the same hit probability pj with respect to
a given threat j. The formulation in which uniform WSs are assumed is known in the military
operations research literature as the WTA problem with uniform WSs. This model formulation
is similar to the WAM (3.5)–(3.7), except for the objective function which rather aims to
minimise
n∑
j=1
Vj
m∏
i=1
(1− pjyj). (3.8)
Note that unlike the case in (3.5)–(3.7), integer decision variables y1, . . . , ym are adopted in the
WTA problem with uniform WSs, where yj represents the number of WSs assigned to threat j.
Manne noted in [125] that although the objective function (3.8) is still nonlinear, it is similar to
the objective function of the well-known transportation problem3 which may be solved by linear
programming solution techniques.
The research conducted by Manne on the WAP was considered a significant breakthrough in the
military defence realm and the WTA problem with uniform WSs has since been used extensively
in the strategic planning of defence strategies on the battlefield [125]. Many authors have sub-
sequently extended and improved Manne’s original model. These extensions and contributions
are described in the following sections.
3.3 WAM contributions from the early 1960s to the mid 1980s
In 1959, Den Broeder et al. [53] formulated a WAM in which the aim is to find the number of
WSs to assign to a particular threat at a time, which maximises the expected value of destroying
at least a given number of threats. Two assumptions are made in the model. First, it is assumed
that the probability pj of hitting threat j with a single shot from a WS is independent of the
WS selected and secondly it is assumed, if yj WSs are assigned to a threat j, that its survival
probability is q
mj
j , where qj = 1− pj (in other words the events of hitting the threat by various
2It is, however, acknowledged that the combinatorial optimisation problem (3.1)–(3.4) is very easy to solve in
the sense that its linear programming relaxation yields an optimal solution in which all variable values are already
binary [202]. There also exist efficient solution techniques tailor-designed for the model, such as the celebrated
Hungarian method [209].
3The transportation problem is a type of linear programming problem in which the aim is to find the optimal
path of distribution of goods from several points of origin (called supply points) to several different destinations
(called demand points) so as to minimise the cost involved in shipping the goods [209].
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WSs are independent). Let ad denote the probability of destroying exactly d threats where
ad =
d∏
j=1
q
mj
j
and let
Pd =
n∑
j=d
ad
denote the probability of destroying d or more threats. Furthermore, let Vd denote the priority
value associated with eliminating exactly d threats. Then the objective in the WAM of Den
Broeder et al. [53] is to
maximise
n∑
d=1
Vdad (3.9)
subject to the constraints
n∑
j=1
mj = m, (3.10)
mj ∈ N0, j = 1, . . . , n, (3.11)
where constraint (3.10) ensures that exactly m WSs are assigned to the combined set of threats,
while constraint set (3.11) ensures that the number of WSs assigned to threat j assumes a
nonnegative integer value.
In 1961, Bradford [21] formulated the WAP as a dynamic program. In his model, the assumption
is made that a single type of WS is used, but that the targets are not necessarily of the same
type. Suppose there are m WSs available for assignment to n threats. Let Ej(mj) denote the
so-called effective function (or payoff function) representing the effectiveness value for assigning
mj WSs to threat j. Then the objective in the WAM of Bradford [21] is to
maximise
n∑
j=1
Ej(mj) (3.12)
subject to the constraints
n∑
j=1
mj = m, (3.13)
mj ∈ N0, j = 1, . . . , n. (3.14)
Constraint set (3.13) ensures that all the WSs are assigned to the threats in the system, while
constraint set (3.14) ensures that the number of WSs assigned to threat j assumes a nonnegative
integer value.
In 1966, Day [46] also contributed to the WAP by introducing a three-stage method for assigning
WSs to threats. In this model, the aerial threats in the system are partitioned into a number
of so-called threat complexes. Each of these threat complexes contains a subset of threats that
are located within close geographical proximity of one another in such a way that if a WS
were to be assigned to one threat within the complex, it is expected to cause some damage
to other threats in the same complex but would, however, cause negligible damage to threats
in any other complex. The method therefore decomposes the general WAP into two phases:
(1) a set of smaller WS-threat assignment problems (i.e. a WS-threat assignment problem for
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each threat complex) are solved during the first phase and (2) a larger WS-threat assignment
problem, which combines the results of the smaller problems, is solved during the second phase.
The smaller WS-threat complex assignment problems are solved sequentially and the results
thus obtained are used to solve the WAP in the larger nonlinear form — the larger WAP is a
nonlinear combination of the smaller WA-threat complex problems. Suppose there are ni WSs of
type i available for assignment to q threat complexes in the system. Let Dj denote the expected
proportion of total weighted damage to threat complex j and let mij denote the number of WSs
of type i that are assigned to threat complex j. Furthermore, let pij denote the hit probability
of threat complex j if a WS of type i is assigned to it and let Wj denote the weighted damage
achievable in threat complex j. Furthermore, let qij denote the survival probability of threat
complex j if a WS of type i is assigned to it, where qij = 1 − pij . Then the objective in the
nonlinear formulation of Day [46] is to
maximise
q∑
j=1
Wj(q
m1j
1j , q
m2j
2j , . . . , q
mij
mj ), (3.15)
subject to the constraints
q∑
j=1
mij = ni, i = 1, . . . ,m, (3.16)
1−
ni∏
i=1
p
mij
ij ≥ Rj , j = 1, . . . , n, (3.17)
ni∑
i=1
mij ≥ Nj , j = 1, . . . , n, (3.18)
where Rj is the minimum proportionate damage to complex j desired by the operator and Nj
is the minimum number of WSs that have to be assigned to threat complex j.
The 1970s and early 1980s proved to be a seemingly uneventful period in the evolution of WAMs
in the sense that no significant contribution was made in respect of developing new WAMs.
3.4 WAM contributions from the late 1980s to the late 1990s
The next major contribution towards WA modelling was the introduction of the first so-called
dynamic WAP formulation by Hosein and Athans [89] in 1989. The class of dynamic WAPs,
also known as multi-stage problems, involve the introduction of a temporal period T in the
problem formulation. This temporal period is typically partitioned into τ ∈ {0, . . . , t} shorter
discrete time stages of equal duration. The aim is then to find an assignment of WS-threat pairs
during each of the t + 1 discrete time stages which maximises some aspiration criterion at the
end of the temporal period T under consideration. This temporal aspect of the formulation is
the main difference between the static WAPs (discussed in §3.2 and §3.3) and dynamic WAPs.
Furthermore, WS-threat assignment pairs are made sequentially in dynamic WAPs and not
simultaneously as in static WAPs. WAMs in the dynamic class are therefore able to reserve a
WS-threat assignment pair for a later time stage during which the WS may achieve a higher
efficiency value with respect to the threat than during the current time stage. Dynamic WAPs
are formulated in two fundamentally different ways in the literature: (1) by assuming that the
number and locations of the threats are known in advance for each time stage, and (2) by
assuming that not all the threats are known at the start of the temporal period (i.e. the number
and the locations of the threats are known only stochastically).
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The dynamic WAM formulation of Hosein and Athans [89] is known in the military operations
research literature as the shoot-look-shoot WAM. As the name indicates, the model is based on
a shoot-look-shoot strategy in which the outcomes of WS-threat assignment pairs are observed
(perfectly) during every time stage, before WS-threat assignment pairs are proposed for the next
time stage. The WAP is therefore restated during every time stage in the time continuum under
consideration. The first stage in the dynamic WAM entails finding a subset of the available WSs
and assigning them to the observed threats in the system. These WSs are all assigned to engage
the threats simultaneously during the first time stage. The next step involves assessing the
outcome of the engagements during the first time stage, ascertaining the subset of remaining
threats (if any threat(s) were eliminated during the first time stage) and selecting a subset
of available WSs at the beginning of the second time stage to assign to the remaining subset
of threats during the second time stage. This process is repeated for each successive time
stage τ in the time continuum under consideration. The aim of the model is to minimise
the accumulated survival probabilities of the threats, weighted by their respective estimated
threat priority values, at the end of the temporal period T under consideration. The only
information therefore required by the model during every time stage are the available number of
WSs, the remaining subset of threats (together with their updated positions) and the remaining
time stages in the time continuum — this implies that the shoot-look-shoot WAM may be
implemented as a dynamic programming model4. This methodology yields an optimal solution
in terms of WS-threat assignment pairs for the first time stage although assignments over the
entire temporal period T have to be taken into account. The methodology is reinstated during
every time stage and solved for the remainder of the time stages — hence, each of the remaining
time stages (iteratively taken as the initial interval) will yield an optimal solution over the
remainder of the entire time continuum.
The model functions under a number of assumptions. The first assumption is that the number
of threats, as well as their locations, are known in advance. Next, it is assumed that the
outcomes of the WS-threat pair assignments during each time stage (i.e. hits or misses) are
observed (perfectly) before WS-threat assignment pairs for the next time stage are considered.
Consequently, it is assumed that the duration of each time stage is long enough in order for each
WS to engage the threat to which it has been assigned and to observe (perfectly) the outcomes
of these WS-threat assignment pair engagements. Furthermore, it is assumed that a WS may
only be used once during the entire temporal period T . The WAM therefore returns an optimal
solution of WS-threat pairs for the entire temporal period T under consideration in which each
WS is utilised during at most one stage τ .
Let pij(τ) denote the probability that WS i will hit threat j with a single shot if WS i is
assigned to threat j during time stage τ and let the corresponding survival probability be
qij(τ) = 1 − pij(τ). Consider a binary decision variable xij(τ) which takes the value 1 if WS i
is assigned to threat j during time stage τ , or zero otherwise. Define the threat state, denoted
by an n-dimensional binary vector u ∈ {0, 1}n with unit entries corresponding to the set of
surviving threats, and the weapon state, denoted by an m-dimensional vector w ∈ {0, 1}m with
unit entries corresponding to the set of WSs available for assignment after the previous time
stage, τ−1. Here again, n denotes the number of threats and m denotes the number of available
WSs to assign to the threats. Therefore, uj is 1 if threat j survives the previous stage, or 0
4Dynamic programming is an algorithmic paradigm in which a large unwieldy problem is partitioned into a
number of so-called temporal stages where a decision is required during each stage — during each temporal stage,
a small part of the problem is therefore solved optimally and this solution is stored. The solution to the problem
is obtained by starting at the last stage and working backwards iteratively until an optimal solution is found.
During each iteration of the program, the problem is enlarged slightly by adding a stage (one-at-a-time) and
solving the problem optimally by using the optimal solutions from the previous stage. The program is iterated in
this fashion until all the stages are included in the problem — this should represent the original large problem.
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otherwise, and similarly wi is 1 if WS i has not been assigned up to the end of the previous
stage, or 0 otherwise. Since the probability distribution of uj depends on the probability that
WS i will hit threat j during the first time stage, the probability that threat j survives or does
not survive time stage τ − 1 is given by
P (uj = kj) = kj
m∏
i=1
[qij(τ − 1)]xij(τ) + (1− kj)
(
1−
m∏
i=1
[qij(τ)(τ − 1)]xij(τ)
)
, (3.19)
where kj ∈ {0, 1}. Let k = [k1, . . . , km]. Then the probability of observing the state vector k is
given by
P (u = k) =
n∏
j=1
P (uj = kj), (3.20)
where the assumption is made that the state vector entries are independent. The objective
during time stage τ ∈ {1, . . . , t} of the dynamic shoot-look-shoot WAM of Hosein and Athans
[89] is to
minimise
∑
k∈{0,1}n
P (u = k)F ∗τ (k,w) (3.21)
subject to the constraints
n∑
j=1
xij(τ) = 1− wi, i = 1, . . . ,m, (3.22)
xij(τ) ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, . . . ,m, (3.23)
j = 1, . . . , n,
where F ∗τ (k,w) denotes the optimal assignment cost for a (τ−1)-interval problem with an initial
threat state k and initial weapon state w. When τ = t, the final-stage expected cost
F ∗T (k,w) =
n∑
j=1
Vjuj (3.24)
is the accumulated threat priority values of the threats that survived to the final stage.
Furthermore, constraint set (3.22) ensures that a WS is assigned only once during the temporal
period T , while constraint set (3.23) ensures the binary nature of the decision variables. It
should be noted here that the dynamic shoot-look-shoot WAM (3.21)–(3.23) is computationally
expensive to solve since it is essentially required that a static WAM be solved during every time
stage in the time continuum under consideration.
Although the above formulation is generaly considered to be a dynamic WAM, Huaiping et al.
[91] rightly criticised the model by pointing out that it merely involves solving a static WAM
repeatedly. It is therefore not able to take the entire time continuum into consideration by
looking ahead and taking a number of future time stages into account during which WS-threat
pair assignments are proposed.
3.5 WAM contributions from the early 21st century
In 2000, Murphey [135] also made a substantial contribution to the class of dynamic WAMs by
formulating the so-called stochastic demand dynamic WAM. It differs from the dynamic WAM
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(3.21)–(3.23) of Hosein and Athans [89] in the sense that the number of threats in the system
and their positions are unknown in advance — only a subset of the threats and their positions
are known during each time stage in a discretisation of the temporal period under consideration.
The model is formulated in such a way that an assignment of available WSs may be made to one
of the known threats, or the assignment may be postponed to occur at a later stage in favour
of a threat that is yet unknown, but which may be detected in the future. Cost coefficients
which are monotonically increasing functions of time are incorporated in the objective function,
penalising the prolonged assignment of WSs. In essence, the model aims to find a balance
between proposing WS assignments to currently known threats immediately or rather reserving
WS ammunition for as yet, undetermined future threats.
Suppose n(τ) threats and their positions are known during time stage τ . Let c(τ) denote a
monotonically increasing cost function which aims to penalise the postponement of the assign-
ment of a WS. Following the same notation as in the previous WAMs discussed, the objective
in the stochastic demand dynamic WAM is to
minimise
t∑
τ=1
c(τ)
n(τ)∑
j=1
Vj
m∏
i=1
qij(τ)
xij(τ) (3.25)
subject to the constraints
t∑
τ=1
n(τ)∑
j=1
xij(τ) = 1, i = 1, . . . ,m, (3.26)
xij(τ) ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, . . . ,m, (3.27)
j = 1, . . . , n,
τ = 1, . . . , t,
where constraint set (3.26) ensures that each WS is assigned exactly once during the entire
time continuum under consideration and constraint set (3.27) ensures the binary nature of the
decision variables.
In [135], Murphey also suggested that the stochastic demand dynamic WAM (3.25)–(3.27) may
be simplified by assuming the use of uniform WSs. This change results in the simplified decision
variable yj(τ) denoting the number of WSs which are assigned to threat j during time stage τ .
This variable may therefore assume any integer value in the range [0,m]. Furthermore, let qj(τ)
denote the survival probability of threat j during time stage τ . Adopting the same notation as
in the stochastic demand dynamic WAM (3.25)–(3.27), the objective when using uniform WSs
is to
minimise
t∑
τ=1
c(τ)
n(τ)∑
j=1
Vjqj(τ)
yj(τ) (3.28)
subject to the constraints
t∑
τ=1
n(τ)∑
j=1
yj(τ) ≤ m, i = 1, . . . ,m, (3.29)
yj(τ) ∈ N0, j = 1, . . . , n, (3.30)
τ = 1, . . . , t,
where constraint set (3.29) ensures that no more than m WSs are assigned to the threats during
the time continuum under consideration and constraint set (3.30) ensures that the decision
variables assume nonnegative, integer values.
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In 2003, Ahuja et al. [3] contributed to the class of static WAMs by adapting the WAM (3.5)–
(3.7) of Manne [125] to make provision for the use of different types of WSs. Let Wi denote
the number of WSs of type i available for assignment. Following the same notation as in the
previous models, the objective in the WAM of Ahuja et al. [3] is to
minimise
n∑
j=1
Vj
m∏
i=1
q
xij
ij (3.31)
subject to the constraints
n∑
j=1
xij ≤ Wi, i = 1, . . . ,m, (3.32)
xij ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, . . . ,m, (3.33)
j = 1, . . . , n,
where constraint set (3.32) ensures that no more than the available number of WSs of type i is
assigned to threats and constraint set (3.33) ensures that the decision variables assume binary
values.
In 2006, Du Toit [63] contributed to the class of dynamic WAMs by formulating the so-called WA
Scheduling Problem (WASP). This model formulation is based on the stochastic demand model
of Murphey [135], but it is assumed that the SSHP values achieved by the WSs with respect
to the threats are independent of one another and hence the cost coefficients may be omitted,
resulting in a simpler objective function than the one in Murphey’s formulation. The WASP
formulation of Du Toit [63] is therefore the same as the stochastic demand model (3.25)–(3.27)
except for the objective function. Adopting the same notation as before, the survival probability
of threat j over the time interval [1, τ¯ ] is
τ¯∏
τ=1
m∏
i=1
qij(τ)
xij(τ), (3.34)
so that the objective function aims to
minimise
t∑
τ=1
n(τ)∑
j=1
Vj
τ¯∏
τ=1
m∏
i=1
qij(τ)
xij(τ). (3.35)
The constraint sets of the model (3.35) are the same as constraint sets (3.26)–(3.27).
In 2008, Potgieter [145] further extended the static model of Manne to formulate the so-called
κ-WA problem in which the original model is constrained to allow for a maximum of κ WSs to
be assigned to any threat. Following the same notation as in the original WAM formulation
(3.5)–(3.7) of Manne [125], the objective function in the κ-WA problem is to
minimise
n∑
j=1
Vj
m∏
i=1
q
xij
ij (3.36)
subject to the constraints
n∑
j=1
xij ≤ 1, i = 1, . . . ,m (3.37)
m∑
i=1
xij ≤ κ, j = 1, . . . , n, (3.38)
xij ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, . . . ,m, (3.39)
j = 1, . . . , n,
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where constraint set (3.37) ensures that each WS may be assigned at most once, constraint set
(3.38) ensures that no more than κ WS are assigned to any threat in the defended airspace and
constraint set (3.7) ensures the binary nature of the decision variables.
Potgieter [145], also adjusted the WASP formulation of Du Toit in order to make provision for
the inclusion of non-renewable WSs and to allow for a maximum of κ WSs to be assigned to any
given threat (similar to the extension in the κ-WA WAM (3.36)–(3.39)) over the entire temporal
period under consideration. He also contributed a so-called multi-period WAP formulation which
is an extension of the k-WAP, and is based on the same fundamental approach as that of the
shoot-look-shoot model of Hosein and Athans [89].
Another single-objective, dynamic formulation of the WAP is due to Du Toit [64], who, in 2009,
formulated the so-called expected threat priority accumulation dynamic weapon target assignment
model. This model follows the same fundamental approach as the shoot-look-shoot model of
Hosein and Athans [89], but with the difference that earlier engagements by WSs are encouraged
by assigning higher priorities to these assignments during the evaluation of the expected survival
probabilities of the threats within each time stage, rather than only during the final time stage
of the temporal period under consideration, as is the case in the original shoot-look-shoot model.
Let τα and τω denote the first and last of the discretised time stages, respectively, in the time
continuum under consideration. Furthermore, let n(τα) denote the number of threats considered
during the first time stage, let m(τα) denote the number of WSs available for assignment during
the first time stage and let φ¯i denote the number of initial time stages during which WS i is not
available for assignment as a result of an assignment prior to time stage τα. If WS i is assigned
to engage a threat, let ωi denote the number of time stages (that follow after the assignment)
during which WS i cannot engage another threat. The objective in the expected threat priority
accumulation WAM is then to
minimise
τω∑
τ¯=τα
n(τα)∑
j=1
Vj(τ¯)
τ¯∏
τ¯=τα
m(τα)∏
i=1
qij(τ)
xij(τ) (3.40)
subject to the constraints
n(τα)∑
j=1
τα−1+φ¯i∑
τ=τα
xij(τ) = 0, i = 1, . . . ,m(τα) (3.41)
τ = τα, . . . , τω,
n(τα)∑
j=1
τω∑
τ=τα+φ¯i
xij(τ) ≤ 1, i = 1, . . . ,m(τα) (3.42)
τ = τα, . . . , τω,
xij(τ) ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, . . . ,m(τα), (3.43)
j = 1, . . . , n(τα),
τ = τα, . . . , τω.
Constraint set (3.41) ensures that WS i is not assigned for engagement during the first φ¯i time
stages, while constraint set (3.42) ensures that WS i is not considered for assignment more than
once during the remaining time intervals in the time continuum under consideration. Constraint
set (3.43) finally ensures the binary nature of the decision variables.
In 2013, Lo¨tter et al. [120] added a new dimension to the WAP in which they modelled the
WAP as a bi-objective decision problem, hence contributing towards the class of multi-objective
WAMs. They consulted six military experts from the South African National Defence Force in
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No Objective Possible constraints
1 Minimise aggregated survivability of Maximum number of WSs that may
observed aerial threats as a result be assigned
of assignments, weighted by the
priorities of eliminating the threats
2 Minimise aggregated cost of assignments Budget threshold on accumulated assign-
ment cost
3 Minimise the maximum engagement Maximum length threshold for fire windows
time in the assignment or minimum SSHP threshold within fire
windows
4 Maximise minimum number of times a Number of available ammunition rounds
WA can re-engage after the assignment at WSs
Table 3.1: A list of possible objectives and constraints from which to populate WAMs [120]
a bid to identify possible objectives deemed important when proposing WS-threat assignment
pairs. During the consultation process, the military experts were requested to complete an
electronic questionnaire consisting of a set of questions relating to various possible factors which
may influence the choice of WSs to assign to threats. After carefully analysing the results from
these questionnaires, a number of possible objectives were derived for use in the formulation
of WAMs. A subset of these objectives, as well as possible constraints related to each of these
objectives, is listed in Table 3.1. Lo¨tter et al. [120] selected two objectives from this list in
order to formulate a static, bi-objective WAM in which the aim is to minimise the accumulated
survival probabilities of the threats as well as to minimise the cost of the ammunition of the WSs
used in the assignments. Let cij denote the cost of assigning WS i to threat j. Then, following
the same notation as in the previous WAMs, the objective in the bi-objective WAM is to
minimise
n∑
j=1
Vj
m∏
i=1
q
xij
ij (3.44)
and
minimise
m∑
i=1
cij
n∑
j=1
xij (3.45)
subject to the constraints
n∑
j=1
xij ≤ 1, i = 1, . . . ,m (3.46)
m∑
i=1
xij ≤ κ, j = 1, . . . , n, (3.47)
xij ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, . . . ,m, (3.48)
j = 1, . . . , n.
Constraint sets (3.46)–(3.48) may be interpreted in the same way as constraint sets (3.37)–(3.39).
In 2014, Van der Merwe [195] put forward a single-objective, dynamic WAM which is able to
schedule a subset of consecutive future time stages (i.e. time windows) during which WS-threat
assignments should occur. This model characteristic distinguishes it from the dynamic WAMs
preceding it in the sense that the model is able to look ahead in time and consider subsets of
future time stages during which assignments may occur in answer to the criticism by Huaiping
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et al. [91] directed at the shoot-look-shoot model of Hosein and Athens [89]. The model formula-
tion is based on the fundamentals of the classical Vehicle Routing Problem with Time Windows
(VRPTW) in which the WSs are modelled as virtual vehicles which deliver commodities (am-
munition) to customers (threats) within specific pre-specified time windows (fire windows). The
aim in Van der Merwe’s model is to minimise the total accumulated “dissatisfaction” associated
with delivering the ammunition to the threats (measured in terms of the survival probabilities of
the threats). The model therefore not only brings a dynamic element to the WAP by consider-
ing when in the future WS-threat assignment pairs should occur, but also a scheduling element
indicating the subset of consecutive future time stages during which a specific WS-threat pair
assignment should ideally occur.
As mentioned, the model has its roots in the celebrated classical VRPTW, which is a well-
known combinatorial optimisation problem and has been researched extensively in the operations
research literature [186]. It involves finding an optimal composition of a fleet of heterogeneous
vehicles, as well as a specific set of routes along which each of these vehicles should travel,
in order to serve a set of customers with known demands, simultaneously [186]. A typical
objective adopted in vehicle routing problems is to minimise the accumulated service cost of
delivering commodities to customers. This service cost is typically calculated as the total travel
cost incurred by all the vehicles [38]. In the VRTPW, each customer is associated with a so-
called service time frame or time window which is a subset of feasible consecutive time stages
in the time continuum under consideration during which the customer has to be served [174].
In addition, each customer is also associated with a service time duration which is the total
number of time stages that the customer requires to be served. Furthermore, a central depot
is also included in the problem which acts as a base from which each vehicle route is required
to depart and return to. The depot is associated with a so-called scheduling horizon (similar
to the time window associated with each customer) during which all customers are allowed to
be served. Furthermore, a vehicle is allowed to serve more than one customer along a specific
route, but a time constraint ensures that the time stage during which service at a particular
customer ends plus the number of time stages which is required by a vehicle to travel to the
next customer on the route should neither precede the earliest time stage nor exceed the latest
time stage during which service may start at the next customer. This constraint ensures that
the service windows of customers served consecutively along the same route by some vehicle do
not overlap in time. Finally, the commodity carrying capacity of a vehicle assigned to a route
should equal or exceed the demand of the customers on that route.
In the context of a GBAD system, Van der Merwe [195] modelled the WSs as vehicles having to
deliver ammunition (commodities) to the threats (customers) in order to conform to the classical
VRPTW modelling approach. Her approach towards the scheduling of successive engagements
of threats by WSs over time may be interpreted as the scheduling of virtual vehicles (the WSs)
delivering real commodities (the ammunition) to real customers (the aerial threats) as in the
VRPTW. In the VRPTW, the vehicles move between the customers to deliver the commodities
requested by the customers, but in the WAP within a GBAD context, the WSs are stationary.
Therefore, the WSs may be thought of as virtual vehicles which have to service threats by
delivering WS ammunition to the threats.
Furthermore, the assumption is made that a WS delivers a single unit of ammunition to a threat if
it is utilised to service a threat. This single unit of ammunition represents the number of rounds5
of ammunition fired at a threat. In addition, the WAP involves a time delay which represents
5The number of rounds depends on the specific type of WS used. In the case of an Umkhonto missile, for
example, this number is typically one unit, whereas in the case of automated WSs, such as 35 mm cannons, this
number entails a pre-determined quantity due to these systems being able to fire in a setting known as burst
mode.
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the number of (consecutive) time stages from when an engagement order is sent until the time
stage during which the shot is fired at the threat. This time delay is known as the weapon setup
time (analogous to the time is takes for a vehicle to travel between customers in the classical
VRPTW) and includes the number of time stages it takes for the FCO to send the engagement
order, for the WS operator to respond to the engagement order and for him to load the WS
with ammunition, to turn the muzzle of the WS and to track the threat before the engagement
occurs. In the single-objective, dynamic WA scheduling model of Van der Merwe [195], it is
assumed that the travel time (i.e. the weapon setup time) is fixed at a pre-determined number
of time stages.
The main difference between the single objective, dynamic WA scheduling model formulation and
the classical VRPTW formulation is the way in which the objective functions are constructed. In
the original VRPTW formulation, the objective function aims to minimise the accumulated cost
of the vehicles used, which is typically associated with the combined distance that the vehicles
have to travel. The model therefore requires a distance matrix containing the distances between
all the customers in order to assign these vehicles to routes which minimise the overall distance
covered by the vehicles. In the WAM formulation, however, the WSs are stationary and the
distance over which a WS needs to travel is not considered in the objective function. Instead,
an Engagement Efficiency Matrix (EEM) is employed which contains the probability values that
the threats will be hit when WSs are assigned to them during the various time stages. Finally,
the capacity of each vehicle in the WAP is taken as the number of units of ammunition available
for use by each WS.
Each threat in the WAP is associated with a number of so-called engagement fire windows (FWs)
analogous to the single time window of a customer in the VRPTW. Each FW is delimited by
an earliest time stage, known as the first-time-to-fire (FTTF), during which a WS may start to
engage a threat as well as a latest time stage, known as the last-time-to-fire (LTTF), after which
a WS is no longer allowed to engage the threat. The number of time stages from the FTTF to
the LTTF is known as the length of the FW. A WS is allowed to engage a threat during any time
stage within the FW (including the FTTF and LTTF). A WS is, however, required to achieve
a positive SSHP value during each time stage within the FW of the threat under consideration.
It is therefore presumed that the set of FWs associated with a WS-threat pair is induced by a
combination of terrain surface masking, meteorological conditions, the position of the WS and
the predicted flight path of the threat.
Furthermore, if a WS is assigned to engage more than one threat during the scheduling horizon,
the FWs of these threats are not allowed to overlap. The WS setup time should also be taken
into account when considering a WS for assignment in a particular threat’s FW by ensuring
that the number of time stages preceding the FW of the WS-threat pair is equal to or exceeds
the WS setup time of that WS. Consider the following example in which the notion of a FW is
illustrated for a single WS-threat pair.
Example 3.1 Consider the assignment of a single WS to a particular aerial threat. Suppose
the scheduling horizon comprises eleven time stages with SSHP values as shown in Figure 3.3,
that the minimum length of any FW in the scheduling horizon is three time stages and that the
WS setup time is three time stages. Note that the smallest possible value for the FTTF in the
example is time stage 5, due to the weapon setup time (i.e. three time stages). One example of
a FW has a FTTF at time stage 5 and a LTTF at time stage 10, which results in a FW length
of six time stages, as illustrated graphically by means of a dashed arrow at the top of Figure 3.3.
This example also allows for nine other possible FWs with (FTTF, LTTF)-pair values given by
(5,7), (6,8), (7,9), (8,10), (5,8), (6,9), (7,10), (5,9) and (6,10), respectively, as indicated in the
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figure. Note that the lengths of the FWs are always at least the specified minimum length of a
FW, namely three time stages. 
0.7 0.8 0.8
Single shot hit
probability
WS setup
time
00 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.50.6
Time stage 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
eij ℓij
eˆ1 eˆ2 eˆ3 eˆ4
Possible FWs
Figure 3.3: A number of different FWs for a single WS-threat pair.
It is clear from Example 3.1 and Figure 3.3 that there are various combinations of FWs for
each WS-threat pair. Define, for each WS-threat pair, a time interval [eij , `ij ]
6, starting at
the beginning of stage eij and ending at the end of stage `ij . During this interval, a number
of possible FWs have various FTTFs and LTTFs (as illustrated in Example 3.1) for the pair
during which engagement of threat j by WS i may commence and end. Let Lmini denote the
minimum pre-specified length of a FW for WS i and let Lij = `ij − eij + 1. Then, for each WS-
threat pair (i, j), there are Fij = Lij − Lmini + 1 different feasible FTTF stages eˆ1, eˆ2, . . . , eˆFij
having values eij , eij + 1, . . . , `ij − Lmini + 1, respectively, and for each different FTTF z there
are `ij + 1− eˆz − (Lmini − 1) different LTTF stages. It may therefore be deduced that there are
fij =
Fij∑
z=1
(`ij + 1− eˆz − (Lmini − 1)) (3.49)
distinct possible FWs for each WS-threat pair (i, j) [196].
As in the VRPTW, a virtual depot is included in the WAM which may be seen as an artificial
construct representing an idle state during which no WS engages any threats. Let the virtual
depot be indexed by both threat 0 and threat n + 1, where n is the number of threats in the
system. The depot has a demand of zero and the system is required to start from this state and
to return to it again after all WS-threat pair engagements have been carried out. Let di denote
the WS setup time of WS i. Define a FTTF eijk and a LTTF `ijk for WS i when engaging threat
j during the pair’s kth FW. Let sijk denote the engagement time duration
7 of threat j by WS i
during the pair’s kth FW, where sijk = `ijk− eijk + 1, and let fij be the number of distinct FWs
6The value for eij is typically taken as the first possible stage during which a WS-threat pair may be assigned
(e.g. time stage 5 in Example 3.1) and the value for `ij is typically taken as the last possible stage during which
a WS-threat pair may be assigned (e.g. time stage 10 in Example 3.1).
7The engagement time duration refers to the number of time stages required by a WS to guide its ammunition
in the direction of the threat from the time stage during which the ammunition is launched (the time stage
during which the trigger is pulled) until the time stage during which the ammunition hits the threat. This is only
applicable to WSs which require operator guidance, such as cannons which are able to fire multiple bursts with
the pull of the trigger, but require manual WS operator assistance to guide the ammunition in the direction of the
threat. In some instances, WSs have on-board guidance systems, such as certain missiles, and hence require no
guidance from the WS operator, in which case the value sijk is assumed to be zero. The value sijk is nevertheless
included in the model formulation for the sake of flexibility.
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for WS-threat pair ij. Furthermore, let pijk denote the SSHP value associated with threat j if
engaged by WS i during the pair’s kth FW, and let qijk = 1− pijk.
A binary decision variable xijk is adopted in the formulation which takes the value 1 if WS i
engages threat j during the kth FW associated with the WS-threat pair, or a value of 0 otherwise.
A binary auxilliary variable yihj is also incorporated, which may be interpreted as a vehicle flow
variable, and takes a value of 1 if threat h directly precedes threat j in a sequence of engagements
by WS i, or a value of 0 otherwise. Adopting the same notation as used in the previous WAMs
discussed in this section, the objective in the single-objective, dynamic WAM is to
minimise
n∑
j=1
Vj
m∏
i=1
fij∏
k=1
(qijk)
xijk (3.50)
subject to the constraints
m∑
i=1
n+1∑
h=0
yihj ≤ κ, j = 1, . . . , n, (3.51)
n+1∑
h=1
yi0h = 1, i = 1, . . . ,m, (3.52)
n+1∑
h=1
yi,h,n+1 = 1, i = 1, . . . ,m, (3.53)
n+1∑
h=0
yihj −
n+1∑
h=0
yijh = 0, i = 1, . . . ,m,
j = 0, . . . , n+ 1, (3.54)
fij∑
k=1
xijk =
n+1∑
h=1
h6=j
yihj , i = 1, . . . ,m,
j = 1, . . . , n, (3.55)
fih∑
k=1
(eihk + sihk)xihk −
fij∑
k=1
eijkxijk + di < (1− yihj)L, i = 1, . . . ,m,
j = 1, . . . , n, (3.56)
h = 1, . . . , n,
n∑
j=1
fij∑
k=1
xijk ≤ Ai, i = 1, . . . ,m, (3.57)
yihj ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, . . . ,m,
j = 0, . . . , n+ 1, (3.58)
h = 0, . . . , n+ 1,
xijk ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, . . . ,m,
j = 0, . . . , n+ 1, (3.59)
k = 1, . . . , fij .
Constraint set (3.51) ensures that at most κ WSs are assigned to engage any threat over the
scheduling horizon. Constraint set (3.52) ensures that WS i “leaves the depot” (idle state)
exactly once, if it is assigned to engage threats at all, while constraint set (3.53) ensures that
WS i “returns to the depot” exactly once after being used to engage threats. Constraint set
(3.54) ensures, if a threat is serviced by WS i, that the WS “leaves the threat” again in order
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to “move on” to engage the next threat assigned to it. Constraint set (3.55) ensures, if threat h
precedes threat j for engagement by WS i, that threat h is engaged during exactly one stage. If
threat h is engaged by WS i directly before threat j, constraint set (3.56) ensures that the time
stage during which the engagement of threat h starts plus the time it takes to engage threat h
plus the time it takes for WS i to “travel” from threat h to threat j does not exceed the time
stage during which engagement of threat j starts, where L is a large number. Furthermore,
constraint set (3.56) also ensures that the stage during which WS i engages threat j is within
a FW associated with the (WS, threat)-pair. Constraint set (3.57) ensures that the capacity of
WS i is not exceeded and finally, constraint sets (3.58)–(3.59) ensure the binary nature of the
decision and auxilliary variables.
3.6 Chapter summary
The aim in this chapter was to present a review of the existing WAMs in the military opera-
tions research literature since the inception of WA modelling during the early 1950s until the
current state of the art of WAMs during the early 21st century. These WAMs were presented in
chronological order.
The chapter opened in §3.1, with a brief introduction to the notion of NP-completeness since
even the simplest WAMs presented in this chapter are NP-complete. Section §3.2 opened with a
description of the classical assignment problem of Votaw and Orden [202] which was formulated
in 1952. The formulation of the assignment problem formed the cornerstone for Manne [125]
on which he formulated the first WAM in 1958. A detailed description of this formulation
followed. The WAM formulation of Manne [125] paved the way for many authors to contribute
towards the formulation of WAMs in many different incarnations. The remainder of the chapter
was partitioned into three sections and each of these sections contained similar descriptions
of WAMs put forward from the late 1950s up to the current state of WAMs in the military
operations research literature.
In §3.3, a number of WAM contributions from the early 1960s to the mid 1980s were described
in some detail. Hosein et al. [89] made a substantial contribution to the existing WAM literature
in 1989 by formulating the first dynamic WAM. This formulation, as well as dynamic WAMs
contributed by other authors from 1989 up to the late 1990s, were reviewed in §3.4. In §3.5, the
focus shifted to brief descriptions of WAM contributions during the early 21st century.
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Multi-objective optimisation
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This chapter is devoted to a literature review on fundamental concepts related to multi-objective
optimisation. First, the notion of multi-objective optimisation is described in general in §4.1
and a general mathematical formulation of a multi-objective optimisation problem is given.
Two search spaces associated with multi-objective optimisation problems are also discussed
in this section. The focus in the remainder of the chapter is on various important principles
involved in multi-objective optimisation and broadly follows the general exposition in the opening
chapters of Deb’s influential text Multi-objective optimisation using evolutionary algorithms [50],
supplemented by discussions on the contributions of other authors.
In §4.2, the importance of the requirement of convexity of multi-objective optimisation problems
is discussed since such convexity plays an important role in the computational effort expended
in solving multi-objective optimisation problems effectively. In §4.3, the notion of solution
dominance is introduced and the properties of the dominance relation are discussed briefly. The
notion of Pareto optimality is also reviewed in this section.
In §4.4, the focus shifts to a discussion on the notion hypervolume in objective space as a measure
of nondominated front quality. This is followed, in §4.5, by a description of sufficient conditions
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for a solution to a multi-objective optimisation problem to be Pareto optimal and a description
of necessary conditions for a solution to be Pareto optimal.
Descriptions of three methods, ranging in different levels of complexity, for computing nondom-
inated sets of solutions to multi-objective optimisation problems may be found in §4.6. This is
followed in §4.7 by a discussion on the well-known fast nondominated sorting algorithm which
may be used to partition a finite set of candidate solutions to a multi-objective optimisation prob-
lem into different classes according to their degree of dominance. A number of multi-objective
optimisation techniques from the operations research literature require such a partition of the
set of solutions.
Section 4.8 contains a discussion on problems that may arise in the classical approach of weight-
ing each of the objectives in a multi-objective optimisation problem so as to scalarise the op-
timisation problem. The chapter finally closes in §4.9 with a brief summary of the chapter
contents.
4.1 Multi-objective problem formulation
An optimisation problem is one in which feasible solutions corresponding to extremal values of
one or more objectives are sought [50]. When there is only one objective function in such a prob-
lem, the problem is known as a single-objective optimisation problem. When multiple objectives
are, however, present, the problem is known as a multi-objective optimisation problem [39, 48].
Multi-objective optimisation problems typically involve a number of conflicting objectives that
have to be optimised simultaneously. The notion of multi-objective optimisation is evident in
many practical decision making problems — e.g. an individual who is in the market for a new
vehicle and has the following two conflicting objectives: to minimise the purchase price of the
new vehicle and to maximise the reliability of the new vehicle. In contrast with a single-objective
optimisation problem, where the aim is to find a single, globally optimal solution to the prob-
lem, a single solution which simultaneously optimises all of the objectives in a multi-objective
problem typically does not exist if the objectives are conflicting [116]. Instead, the aim is to
find a set of high-quality solutions which achieve acceptable compromises between the objective
function values.
Denote a solution to a multi-objective optimisation problem by x = [x1, . . . , xn], where n rep-
resents the number of decision variables. Moreover, let D denote the set of all such solutions to
the multi-objective optimisation problem, called the decision space of the problem. Suppose M
objective functions are considered in the multi-objective optimisation problem and that there
are two types of constraints: J inequality constraints and K equality constraints. Then the
general form of such a multi-objective optimisation problem is to
minimise/maximise zm = fm(x), m = 1, . . . ,M, (4.1)
subject to the constraints gj(x) ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , J, (4.2)
hk(x) = 0, k = 1, . . . ,K, (4.3)
x
(L)
i ≤ xi ≤ x(U)i , i = 1, . . . , n, (4.4)
where x
(L)
i and x
(U)
i are constant lower and upper bounds on the decision variable xi, respectively,
for all i = 1, . . . , n [50]. Constraint set (4.2) contains the inequality constraints, while constraint
set (4.3) contains the equality constraints. If a solution x satisfies all the constraints in (4.2)–
(4.4), the solution is said to be feasible. If, however, at least one of the constraints in (4.2)–(4.4)
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is violated by a vector x, the vector is said to be infeasible1. The set of all feasible solutions to
the multi-objective optimisation problem is known as the feasible region S or the decision space
of the problem. Therefore, S ⊆ D.
The objective functions encapsulated in vector form by f (x) = [f1(x), . . . , fm(x)] each either has
to be maximised or minimised [50]. Many multi-objective optimisation solution methodologies
require that the problem involves either only maximisation objectives or only minimisation
objectives. When an optimisation problem contains some objective functions that have to be
minimised and others that have to be maximised, the principle of duality2 may be used to
transform all maximisation objective functions into minimisation objective functions or vice
versa in order to arrive at a formulation containing only minimisation objective functions or
only maximisation objective functions.
In addition to the usual decision variable space D, which is also present in a single-objective
optimisation problem, a multi-objective optimisation problem with M objectives is equipped
with an M -dimensional space called the objective space Z [50]. For each solution x ∈ D there
exists a point f (x) = z = [z1, . . . , zm] in objective space. An n-dimensional solution vector x in
decision space is therefore mapped to an M -dimensional objective vector z in objective space
by the optimisation problem (4.1)–(4.4). This mapping is illustrated graphically for n = 3 and
M = 2 in Figure 4.1.
x1
x2
x3
f2
f1
x
z
(a) Decision space (b) Objective space
Figure 4.1: The three-dimensional decision space of a bi-objective problem containing three decision
variables illustrated in (a), and its corresponding two-dimensional objective space is illustrated in (b).
The mapping of a solution x in decision space to a point z in objective space is also shown [50].
4.2 Nonconvexity in multi-objective optimisation problems
A set of points B ⊆ Rn is said to be convex if the line segment joining any pair of points in B
is wholly contained in B [209]. A function f : Rn 7→ R is furthermore convex if, for any pair of
1It should be noted that the entire decision space D need not be feasible.
2The principle of duality in an optimisation context implies that a minimisation problem may be converted to
a maximisation problem by multiplying the objective function by −1 [150, 153]. A maximisation problem may
similarly be converted to a minimisation problem by multiplying the objective function by −1.
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vectors x(1),x(2) ∈ Rn, the inequality
f
(
λx(1) + (1− λ)x(2)) ≤ λx(1) + (1− λ)x(2) (4.5)
holds for all 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 [209]. Conversely, if the inequality sign ≤ is replaced with the inequality
sign > in (4.5), the function f is said to be nonconvex [209]. Note, therefore, that a function
may be neither convex nor nonconvex. The notion of a convex function is illustrated graphically
for n = 1 in Figure 4.2.
f(x)
x
x(1) x(2)λx(1) + (1− λ)x(2)
f(x(2))
λf(x(1)) + (1− λ)f(x(2))
f(λx(1) + (1− λ)x(2))
f(x(1))
Figure 4.2: A convex function (adapted from [50]).
A convex function f(x) has the following properties [50]: (1) a linear approximation of f(x) at
any point along the straight line in Rn joining x(1) and x(2) underestimates the value of f(x),
(2) the Hessian3 of f(x) is positive definite4 for all x ∈ Rn and (3) any local minimum of f(x)
is also a global minimum of f(x).
In order to test whether a function is convex within a given region, the Hessian, denoted by
O2f(x), may be calculated and tested for positive definiteness for all x in the region [50]. If
all the principal minors5 of the Hessian are nonnegative for all x, then the function f(x) is
convex [209]. This may, of course, also be achieved by calculating the eigenvalues of the Hessian
and verifying that they are all positive [50]. Similarly, if all the principal minors of the negation
of the Hessian matrix −O2f(x) are nonnegative for all x in a region, then the function f(x) is
nonconvex in that region [209]. If a function f(x) is nonconvex on Rn, it may be shown that
all vectors x ∈ Rn satisfying f(x) ≥ 0 collectively form a convex set in Rn [50]. If the feasible
region of a multi-objective optimisation problem is formed by a set of nonconvex constraints, it
follows that the feasible region will enclose a convex space.
A multi-objective optimisation problem is therefore convex if all the objective functions in (4.1)
are convex and if the set of feasible solutions (i.e. the feasible regions) to the problem is con-
vex (i.e. all the functions gj(x) in (4.2) are nonconvex and all the functions hk(x) in (4.3) are
3The Hessian of a function is a square matrix of all the second order partial derivatives of the function, which
describes its curvature [209].
4A positive definite matrix is a symmetric matrix which has the property that all its eigenvalues are positive.
5An ith principal minor of an n × n matrix is the determinant of any i × i matrix obtained by deleting any
n− i rows and corresponding columns of the matrix [209].
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linear). The notion of convexity of multi-objective optimisation problems is important since
many multi-objective optimisation methodologies are able to solve convex multi-objective opti-
misation problems easily, but are ineffective in solving nonconvex multi-objective optimisation
problems [50].
4.3 The notion of solution dominance
The concept of multi-objective optimisation naturally gives rise to the notion of dominance
when comparing candidate solutions in objective space with one another in order to uncover a
set of solutions in decision space which are superior to the remaining solutions in terms of all
the objective functions of a given multi-objective optimisation problem. Such a set of solutions
is known as a nondominated set of solutions. The notion of dominance may be defined more
formally as follows. A solution x(1) to (4.1)–(4.4) is said to dominate another solution x(2) to
the problem, denoted by x(1)  x(2), if the following two conditions hold: (1) solution x(1) is
no worse than solution x(2) in all the objective functions and (2) solution x(1) is strictly better
than solution x(2) in at least one objective function [39, 50, 48]. The relation  is known as
the dominance relation between solutions. If any one of the two conditions for dominance is
violated, the solution x(1) does not dominate the solution x(2).
To illustrate the notion of dominance in a practical sense, consider a bi-objective optimisation
problem in which an objective function f1 has to be maximised and another objective function
f2 has to be minimised. Consider five candidate solutions to the problem with objective function
values as illustrated in Figure 4.3.
f2
5
4
3
2
1
f12 6 10 14 18
2
1
3
4
5
Figure 4.3: A set of five candidate solutions in the objective space of a bi-objective optimisation problem
with objective functions f1 and f2 illustrating the notion of dominance [50]. Objective function f1 is to
be maximised, while f2 is to be minimised.
When considering the solutions in the figure, it is difficult to find a solution which is best with
respect to both objective functions. The definition of dominance may therefore be used to decide
which solution is better between any pair of solutions in objective space. Consider, for example,
solutions 1 and 2. Solution 1 achieves a value of 9 in objective function f1 and a value of 2 in
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objective function f2, while solution 2 achieves a value of 8 in objective function f1 and a value
of 5 in objective function f2. Solution 1 is therefore better than solution 2 in objective function
f1 and also better than solution 1 in objective function f2. Both the conditions for dominance
are thus satisfied and it may be concluded that solution 1 dominates solution 2 (i.e. solution 1
 solution 2) — in other words, solution 1 is superior to solution 2. In a more general sense, if
x(1)  x(2), then solution x(1) is considered superior to x(2).
Now consider solutions 3 and 5. Solution 3 achieves a value of 12 in objective function f1 and a
value of 1 in objective function f2, while solution 5 achieves a value of 16 in objective function
f1 and a value of 2 in objective function f2. Solution 3 is therefore better than solution 5 in
objective function f2, but solution 5 is better than solution 3 in objective function f1. Neither
of the conditions for dominance are therefore satisfied, and it may be concluded that solutions 3
and 5 do not dominate each other — in other words, neither of the solutions 3 and 5 is superior
to the other.
The concept of dominance provides an intuitive way of comparing solutions in the objective
space of a multi-objective optimisation problem. It is therefore employed within a number
of multi-objective optimisation solution methodologies to find nondominated solutions in the
objective space [39, 50, 48].
4.3.1 Properties of the dominance relation
The notion of dominance allows for three possible outcomes when a solution x(1) is compared
with a solution x(2) [50]. These outcomes are (1) x(1)  x(2), (2) x(2)  x(1) or (3) neither of the
solutions x(1) and x(2) dominates the other. These outcomes lead to three distinct dominance
relation properties. These properties are:
Non-reflexivity. According to the definition of dominance, a solution x(1) cannot dominate
itself. Therefore x(1)  x(1) and hence the dominance relation is non-reflexive.
Asymmetry. If x(1)  x(2), then x(2)  x(1) (i.e. if x(1) dominates x(2), then x(2) cannot
dominate x(1)). Therefore, the dominance relation is asymmetric.
Transivity. If x(1)  x(2) and x(2)  x(3), then x(1)  x(3). Hence, the dominance relation is
transitive.
It is stressed that if a solution x(1) does not dominate a solution x(2) (i.e. x(1)  x(2)), it does
not necessarily imply that x(2) dominates x(1) (i.e. that x(2)  x(1)).
4.3.2 The notion of Pareto optimality
Consider again the candidate solutions in objective space of Figure 4.3. When continuing with
the comparison of the solutions in a pairwise manner, it is easy to see that solution 5 dominates
solutions 1, 2 and 4. Furthermore, solution 3 also dominates solutions 1, 2 and 4. Recall,
however, that neither of the solutions 3 or 5 dominates the other.
If all the solutions in a finite set of candidate solutions to a multi-objective optimisation problem
are compared in a pairwise manner, a set of solutions is obtained in which no solution dominates
another. Furthermore, this set of solutions dominates all other candidate solutions. This set of
solutions is called the nondominated set of solutions to the multi-objective optimisation problem.
The nondominated set of solutions is therefore superior to the remaining candidate solutions
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and no solution in the nondominated set is superior (or inferior) to any other solution in the
nondominated set [39, 50]. Such a nondominated set of solutions may formally be defined
as follows. Among a finite set P of solutions to a multi-objective optimisation problem, the
nondominated solutions P ′ ⊆ P are those that are not dominated by any member of P. In
Figure 4.3, solutions 3 and 5 are the nondominated set of solutions among the five solutions.
When the above set P is the entire set of feasible solutions to a multi-objective optimisation
problem, the resulting set P ′ of nondominated solutions are, together, called the Pareto optimal
solutions and form a so-called Pareto front in objective space. This front typically comprises
a set of solutions on a hyper-edge of the feasible region, oriented depending on the type of
objective functions (i.e. to maximise or minimise). The nondominated set of solutions of the
entire feasible region of the multi-objective optimisation problem is called the globally Pareto
optimal set of solutions to the problem.
Figure 4.4 contains illustrations of sets of globally Pareto fronts for four different scenarios. In
Figure 4.4(a), a Pareto front of a bi-objective problem is portrayed in which both objective
functions f1 and f2 are to be minimised. The shaded area represents the feasible region in
objective space and the solid dark curve represents the Pareto front. If, however, the objective
function f1 is to be minimised and the objective function f2 is to be maximised for the same
feasible region, the Pareto front illustrated in Figure 4.4(b) is obtained. Note that the Pareto
front in this scenario is a union of two disconnected Pareto fronts. If the objective function f1 is
to be maximised and the objective function f2 is to be minimised for the same feasible region,
the Pareto front in Figure 4.4(c) is obtained. Finally, if both objective functions f1 and f2 are
to be maximised, the Pareto front shown in Figure 4.4(d) is obtained.
As is the case with single-objective optimisation, multi-objective problems may, however, also
exhibit locally Pareto optimal solutions. Locally Pareto optimal solutions may be defined as
follows. If, for any member x ∈ P, there exists no solution y to a multi-objective optimisation
problem in the neighbourhood ||x − y|| < , where || · || is a norm and  is a small, positive
real number, then the solutions in P form a locally Pareto optimal set of solutions to the multi-
objective optimisation problem [49, 130]. By this definition it may be concluded that a globally
Pareto optimal set of solutions is also a locally Pareto optimal set, but the converse is not
necessarily true. An example of a globally Pareto front (represented by a dark solid curve) and
two locally Pareto fronts (represented by dark dotted curves) are illustrated in Figure 4.5(a).
When any solution in a set of locally Pareto optimal set of solutions is perturbed locally in
the solution space, no solution can be found which dominates any member of this set. This
phenomenon is illustrated by solution B in Figure 4.5(b).
4.3.3 Strong dominance and weak Pareto optimality
The notion of dominance described earlier in this section is often referred to as a weak dominance
relation. The definition may, however, be strengthened as follows to obtain a relation with
stronger dominating properties. A solution x(1) strongly dominates a solution x(2) if x(1) is
strictly better than x(2) in all M objectives of (4.1)–(4.4) [39, 48].
Consider again the example in Figure 4.3. It was shown earlier that solution 5 weakly dominates
solution 1. According to the above definition of strong dominance it is, however, clear that
solution 5 does not strongly dominate solution 1. From the figure, it is also clear that solution 3
strongly dominates solution 1 since it achieves superior values in both objective functions. It
may therefore be concluded that if a solution x(1) strongly dominates a solution x(2), then x(1)
also dominates x(2) weakly, but not vica versa.
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f2
f1(a)
f2
f1(b)
f2
f1(c)
f2
f1(d)
Figure 4.4: Continuous sets of globally Pareto optimal curves for four scenarios containing different
Pareto optimal sets. In (a), objective functions f1 and f2 are minimised, in (b), objective function f1
is minimised while objective function f2 is maximised, in (c), objective function f1 is maximised and
objective function f2 is minimised and in (d), objective functions f1 and f2 have to be maximised.
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f2
f1
x2
x1
B
B
(a) Objective space (b) Decision space
Figure 4.5: A globally Pareto front denoted by the dark solid curve and two locally Pareto fronts
denoted by the dark, dotted curves, for a bi-objective optimisation problem in which both objective
functions f1 and f2 are to be minimised [50].
The strong dominance relation may also be used to define the notion of a weakly nondominated
set. A weakly nondominated set of solutions P ′ in a set of solutions P are those that are not
strongly dominated by any other member in the set of solutions P [39, 50]. The set of weakly
nondominated solutions therefore contains all the members of the nondominated set of solutions,
as defined earlier in this chapter. The cardinality of the set of weakly nondominated solutions
of a multi-objective optimisation problem is therefore equal to or greater than the cardinality
of the set of solutions obtained by the dominance relation defined here.
A Pareto optimal set of a multi-objective optimisation problem always comprises a nondom-
inated set of solutions to the problem. It is, however, possible that nondominated sets may
contain some Pareto optimal solutions and some non-Pareto optimal solutions. Furthermore,
the nondominated set of solutions obtained by approximate multi-objective solution techniques
do not necessarily represent the true Pareto optimal set of solutions. The nondominated set of
solutions obtained by these algorithms are therefore typically referred to as approximately Pareto
optimal solutions in decision space forming an approximate Pareto front in objective space.
4.4 Hypervolume as a measure of nondominated front quality
The aim in multi-objective optimisation techniques is usually to approximate Pareto optimal
solutions to a problem instance as closely as possible. Thiele et al. [184] state that multi-
objective search techniques should, in fact, aim to achieve the following three objectives: (1) the
nondominated front attained by the multi-objective solution technique should be as close as
possible to the true Pareto front in objective space — the nondominated front should, in fact,
ideally be a subset of the true Pareto front, (2) the set of nondominated solutions should be
uniformly distributed and diverse along the Pareto front in all the objective functions — the aim
is to provide the decision maker with a comprehensive view of trade-off decisions in objective
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space, and (3) the nondominated front should be such that it includes solutions which cover the
full spectrum of values along the true Pareto front in all the objective functions. It is, however,
typically difficult to obtain a close approximation of the entire Pareto front in a single run
of a multi-objective optimisation technique, especially for complex multi-obective optimisation
problem instances.
A very well-known indicator measure often used to evaluate the quality of Pareto front estimates
is the hypervolume indicator (also known as the S-metric or Lebesgue measure) [12]. This indi-
cator was originally introduced by Thiele and Zitzler [184], and belongs to the class of unary
quality indicators6 which involves mapping a nondominated set of solutions to the set of positive
real numbers. The aim in the hypervolume measure is to determine the portion of objective
space which is dominated by the set of solutions in the Pareto front estimate with respect to
some pre-defined reference solution vector in objective space [24]. This solution vector is known
as a reference point and is typically chosen in such a way that it bounds the nondominated
objective space. The aim is to maximise the hypervolume measure when estimating the true
Pareto front. Note that such a maximum is achieved if and only if the nondominated front is
equal to the true Pareto front.
Define Sx= {x1, . . . ,xN} to be the set of nondominated solutions to a multi-objective optimisa-
tion problem with corresponding objective function vectors Sz= {z1, . . . , zN} in objective space.
The hypervolume of the set Sx may then be defined as the region dominated by Sz in objective
space from a specific reference point z¯ which satisfies z`  z¯ for all ` ∈ {1, . . . , N}. The hyper-
volume metric is illustrated graphically in Figure 4.6 for a bi-objective optimisation problem in
which both objectives are to be minimised.
f1
z1
f2
z5
z4
z3
z2
Approximated nondominated solution
Hypervolume
Hypervolume reference solution
z¯
Figure 4.6: The hypervolume (indicated by the shaded region) of a set Sz= {z1, . . . , z5} of nondomi-
nated solutions for a bi-objective optimisation problem in which both objective functions f1 and f2 are
to be minimised, with reference point z¯ .
The main advantage of adopting the hypervolume measure is that it is able to encapsulate in a
single measure the closeness of nondominated solutions to the true Pareto front (if it is known),
6Unary quality indicators take a single nondominated set of solutions, and returns a scalar evaluation of its
quality [117].
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evenness in the spread of nondominated solutions along the Pareto front as well as the diversity of
these solutions in objective space, simultaneously [25]. Although the hypervolume measure seems
to achieve these goals effectively, the method has three major drawbacks. The first drawback
is that the computational complexity associated with the hypervolume is relatively high — it
has been shown that the calculation of the hypervolume is classified as NP-hard [11]. The
second drawback associated with the hypervolume measure is that it requires the nondominated
set of solutions to be normalised so as to ensure that the objectives contribute towards the
hypervolume calculations in equal proportions. This, in turn, requires that approximate bounds
on the objective functions across the Pareto front be known a priori. While et al. [12], however,
suggested that if the maximum or minimum in all the objectives of the true Pareto optimal
solutions are not known, then it is acceptable to take, for each objective, the best or worse value
amongst all the nondominated solutions being compared. The last major drawback associated
with the hypervolume is related to the choice of an appropriate reference point z¯ (described
earlier). Caution should be taken so as not to choose z¯ in such a way that it allows certain
objectives to contribute more towards the hypervolume value than others. Various “rules of
thumb” exist for selecting z¯ [11, 12]. A popular method entails taking z¯ as a fixed percentage
above or below bounds on the objective function values.
4.5 Necessary and sufficient conditions for Pareto optimality
Now that the notions of dominance and Pareto optimality in multi-objective optimisation prob-
lems have been discussed, theoretical conditions for Pareto optimality in a multi-objective op-
timisation problem such as (4.1)–(4.4) may be described. Two such conditions are reviewed in
this section. The first condition is a necessary condition for a solution to be Pareto optimal and
the second condition is a sufficient condition for a solution to be Pareto optimal. The underlying
assumption of both these conditions is that all the objective functions in (4.1) and constraint
functions in (4.2)–(4.3) are continuously differentiable.
The first-order necessary conditions for Pareto optimality described here are known as the Fritz-
John necessary conditions [43, 50]. Necessary conditions for x∗ to be a Pareto optimal solution
to the multi-objective optimisation problem (4.1)–(4.4) is that there should exist non-negative
vectors λ = [λ1, . . . , λM ] and u = [u1, . . . , uJ ] (both not identically zero) so that
1.
∑M
m=1 λmOfm(x∗)−
∑J
j=1 ujOgj(x∗) = 0 and
2. ujgj(x
∗) = 0 for all j = 1, . . . , J .
For unconstrained multi-objective optimisation problems (i.e. if J = K = 0), the above condi-
tions reduce to the single condition
M∑
m=1
λmOfm(x∗) = 0. (4.6)
If the Fritz-John conditions are not satisfied for a solution corresponding to the vector λ, it may
be concluded that the solution is not a Pareto optimal solution to (4.1)–(4.4). If, however, a
solution does satisfy the Fritz-John conditions, it does not necessarily hold that the solution is
a Pareto optimal solution to (4.1)–(4.4). A further sufficient condition for Pareto optimality is
required to verify this.
The second-order sufficient conditions for Pareto optimality described here are the well-known
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker sufficient conditions for Pareto optimality [50, 130]. Suppose the objective
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functions f1, . . . , fM of the multi-objective optimisation problem (4.1)–(4.4) are convex, that
the inequality constraint functions g1, . . . , gJ are all non-convex, that the equality constraint
functions h1, . . . , hK are all linear and that all of these functions are continuously differentiable
at a feasible solution x∗ to (4.1)–(4.4). Then x∗ is a Pareto optimal solution if there exist a
positive real vector λ = [λ1, . . . , λM ] and a non-negative real vector u = [u1, . . . , uJ ] such that
1.
∑M
m=1 λmOfm(x∗)−
∑J
j=1 ujOgj(x∗) = 0 and
2. ujgj(x
∗) = 0 for all j = 1, . . . , J .
It should, however, be noted that the above second-order conditions are not sufficient if the multi-
objective optimisation problem is not convex (i.e. if the multi-objective optimisation problem
(4.1)–(4.4) is not convex, then the above second-order conditions are not sufficient to conclude
that x∗ is Pareto optimal).
4.6 Methods for calculating nondominated sets
An important quest in multi-objective optimisation is to find computationally efficient methods
for computing high-quality sets of nondominated solutions lying as close as possible to the true
Pareto optimal set of solutions. Many such methods, ranging in different levels of complexity,
exist in the literature. In this section, three well-known methods ranging from a slow and
naive approach to a more complex, efficient method are described for identifying the set of
nondominated solutions from a given finite set of candidate solutions to (4.1)–(4.4).
4.6.1 A naive and slow approach
The first method for identifying a nondominated set of solutions among a given, finite set of
solutions to (4.1)–(4.4) is the so-called naive and slow method. The method works in such a way
that each solution i in the set of given candidate solutions within the feasible region of (4.1)–(4.4)
is compared, based on the dominance relation described in §4.3, with every other solution j in
the set. If no solution j is found which dominates solution i, then solution i is added to the set
of nondominated solutions. If, however, any solution j is found which dominates solution i, then
solution i cannot form part of the set of nondominated solutions. Solution i is then flagged to
indicate that it cannot belong to the nondominated set. A pseudocode description of the naive
and slow method is given as Algorithm 4.1.
The working of the naive and slow approach is elucidated in the following example.
Example 4.1 (Naive and slow method) Consider the set of solutions P = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} in
Figure 4.3. Set i = 0 and P ′ = ∅. Solution 1 is compared with all the other solutions in the set P,
starting with solution 2. Solution 2 does not dominate solution 1. Next, solution 1 is compared
with solution 3 and it is found that solution 3 dominates solution 1. Solution 1 therefore cannot
belong to the nondominated set P ′. Hence, i is incremented to 2.
Solution 2 is compared with all the solutions in the set P, starting with solution 1. It is found
that solution 1 dominates solution 2, implying that solution 2 cannot belong to the nondominated
set P ′, and so i is incremented to 3.
Solution 3 is next compared with all solutions in the set P, starting with solution 1. It is found
that no solution in the set P dominates solution 3 and solution 3 is therefore included in the
nondominated set to obtain P ′ = {3}.
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Algorithm 4.1: Nondominated set: Naive and slow method [50]
Input : A set P of candidate solutions to (4.1)–(4.4).
Output: The nondominated solutions P ′ ⊆ P.
i← 0;1
P ′ ← ∅;2
while i ≤ |P| do3
j ← 0;4
while j ≤ |P| do5
if j 6= i then6
if xj  xi then7
Continue;8
else9
j ← j + 1;10
if j = |P| then11
P ′ ← P ′ ∪ {i};12
i← i+ 1;13
return [P ′];14
Next, i is incremented to 4 and solution 4 is compared with all the solutions in the set P. It
is found that solution 5 dominates solution 4, implying that solution 4 cannot belong to the
nondominated set P ′ and so i is incremented to 5.
Solution 5 is finally compared with all the other solutions in the set P. It is found that no
solution in the set P dominates solution 5 and so solution 5 is included in the nondominated set
to obtain P ′ = {3, 5}.
Since all the solutions in the set P have been considered, the algorithm terminates. The non-
dominated set P ′ = {3, 5} is returned as output. 
Testing for domination requires O(|P|) comparisons, while each comparison for domination
requires M objective function comparisons. The complexity of testing for domination is therefore
O(M |P|). The algorithm performs at most O(M |P|2) computations.
4.6.2 A continuously updating approach
Another approach towards identifying a nondominated set of solutions among a given, finite set of
solutions to (4.1)–(4.4) is the so-called continuously updating method which is based on the naive
and slow method, but is able to find nondominated solutions much quicker. According to the
continuously updating approach, every solution in the given, finite set of solutions is compared,
based on the dominance relation in §4.3, with a smaller and smaller subset of solutions as the
algorithm progresses. The method is initiated by choosing a solution randomly from the given
set P of candidate solutions to (4.1)–(4.4), inserting it into an empty set P ′ and removing it
from P. Each solution i in P is then compared with each member in the set P ′, one-by-one. If a
solution i ∈ P dominates any member of P ′, then the solution dominated by i is removed from
the set P ′. If, however, a solution i ∈ P is dominated by any solution in the set P ′, then i is
ignored. Finally, if solution i is not dominated by any solution in P ′, then solution i is included
in the set P ′. The algorithm terminates once all the solutions in P have been compared with
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each solution in the set P ′. The members of the set P ′ then constitute the set of nondominated
solutions of P. A pseudocode description of the continuous method is given in Algorithm 4.2.
Algorithm 4.2: Nondominated set: Continuously updating method [50]
Input : A set P of candidate solutions to (4.1)–(4.4).
Output: The nondominated solutions P ′ ⊆ P.
i← 2;1
P ′ ← {1};2
while i ≤ |P| do3
j ← 1;4
while j ≤ |P ′| do5
if xi  xj then6
P ′ ← P ′\{j};7
else if xj  xi then8
Continue;9
j ← j + 1;10
if j = |P| then11
P ′ ← P ′ ∪ {i};12
i← i+ 1;13
return [P ′];14
The working of the continuously updating approach is illustrated in the following example.
Example 4.2 (Continuously updating method) Consider again the set of solutions P =
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5} in Figure 4.3. Suppose solution 1 is initially included in the nondominated set to
obtain P ′ = {1}, when i = 2. Solution 2 is now compared to the member of P ′ (i.e. solution
1) for dominance. It is found that solution 1 dominates solution 2. Since solution 1 dominates
solution 2, i is incremented to 3 and solution 3 is compared with solution 1 (solution 2 cannot
belong to the nondominated set P ′). Note that still P ′ = {1}.
When comparing solution 3 with solution 1, it is found that solution 3 dominates solution 1.
Solution 1 is therefore removed from the nondominated set to yield P ′ = ∅. This implies that
|P ′| = 0.
Next, solution 3 is included in the nondominated set to yield P ′ = {3}. Since i ≤ 5, i is
incremented to 4 and solution 4 is compared with the solution in P ′. It is found that solution 3
dominates solution 4, and so i is incremented to 5. Note that still P ′ = {3}.
Solution 5 is finally compared with solution 3 and it is found that neither of them dominates
each other. Solution 5 is therefore inserted in the nondominated set to obtain P ′ = {3, 5}. Since
i = 5, the algorithm terminates to yield the nondominated set P ′ = {3, 5}. 
When considering the complexity of the method described above, it is clear that when the
algorithm is initiated, a solution is compared with one solution in the set P ′, then the next
solution is compared with at most two solutions in the set P ′, and so on. Therefore, a total of at
most 1 + 2 + · · ·+ |P|− 1 or |P|(|P|− 1)/2 dominance comparisons are required. This results in
a complexity of O(M |P|2). Although this is the same complexity as that of the naive and slow
approach, the actual number of comparisons in the continuous method is usually much smaller
than in the naive and slow approach — this is estimated to be approximately half the number
of computations performed according to the naive and slow approach [50].
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4.6.3 Kung et al.’s efficient method
The final method for identifying a nondominated set of solutions from among a given, finite
set P of solutions to (4.1)–(4.4) considered here is Kung et al.’s efficient method [111], which
is computationally faster than the naive and slow method as well as the continuously updated
method. The method sorts the entire set of solutions P in non-improving order with respect
to their first objective function values. The sorted set is then recursively halved to obtain a
top subset of solutions, denoted by T , and a bottom subset of solutions, denoted by B — the
subset T therefore contains the better solutions with respect to the first objective function.
Each solution i in the subset B is then compared, based on the dominance relation of §4.3, with
each solution j in the subset T . The solutions in the subset B which are not dominated by any
solution in T , are then included in T to form a merged set S. The process is repeated recursively
in respect of the set S until no solution in the subset B is dominated by any solution in the
subset T , in which case the subset T contains the set of nondominated solutions. Algorithm 4.3
contains a pseudocode description of the working of the efficient method of Kung et al. [111].
Algorithm 4.3: Front (P)
Input : A set P of candidate solutions to (4.1)–(4.4).
Output: The nondominated solutions P ′ ⊆ P.
Sort(P);1
if |P| = 1 then2
return [P];3
else4
T ← Front([P1, . . . ,Pb|P|/2c]);5
B ← Front([Pb|P|/2c+1], . . . ,P|P|]);6
i← 1;7
S ← ∅;8
while i ≤ |B| do9
j ← 1;10
while j ≤ |T | do11
if xj 6 xi then12
j ← j + 1;13
else14
Continue;15
if j = |T | then16
S ← S ∪ {i};17
i← i+ 1;18
The working of the efficient method of Kung et al. is illustrated in the following example.
Example 4.3 (Kung et al.’s efficient method) Consider again the set of solutions P = {1, 2,
3, 4, 5} in Figure 4.3. Since the first objective is to maximise the function f1, the solutions in
P are sorted in decreasing order of magnitude for the first objective. This yields the ordered
set P = {5, 3, 4, 1, 2}. Since the size of P is five (and not one as required for termination of
the algorithm), P is partitioned into two sets T = Front({5, 3}) and B = Front({4, 1, 2}) as
illustrated graphically in the top-most branch of Figure 4.7.
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Recursively, the set {5, 3} in Front({5, 3}) is partitioned, in turn, to yield the sets T = Front({5}),
achieving the output {5}, and B = Front({3}), achieving output {3}, as the next inner set of
fronts. Since both of these inner sets have a size of one, they are returned as output to the
previous Front({5, 3}). The inner sets T = {5} and B = {3} may now be tested for dominance.
It is found that solution 3 is not dominated by solution 5 and so a merged set S = {5, 3} is
populated. The outcome of Front({5, 3}) is therefore the nondominated set S = {5, 3}, which is
returned to Front({5, 3, 4, 1, 2}) as output.
In a similar fashion, the set {4, 1, 2} in Front({4, 1, 2}) is partitioned into the inner sets T =
Front({4}), achieving the output {4}, and B = Front({1, 2}). Since T = Front({4}) has a size of
one, the output {4} is returned to the previous front, Front({4, 1, 2}).
Since B = Front({1, 2}) has a size of two, it is partitioned to yield the sets T = Front({1}),
achieving the output {1}, and B = Front({2}), achieving the output {2}. Next, solution 2 is
compared with solution 1 in order test whether solution 2 is dominated by solution 1. It is
found that solution 2 is indeed dominated by solution 1 and so solution 1 is included in the
nondominated set S = {1} which serves as the output of Front({1, 2}). Next, solution 4 is
compared with solution 1 to test whether solution 1 is dominated by solution 4. Since solution
4 does not, however, dominate solution 1, the merged set S = {4, 1} is formed. The output
of Front({4, 1, 2}) is therefore the nondominated set S = {4, 1}, which is returned to the call
Front({5, 3, 4, 1, 2}).
Finally, the sets T = {5, 3} and B = {4, 1} are compared for dominance by testing whether
the nondominated solution in the set B (i.e. solution 1) is dominated (in terms of the second
objective) by the nondominated solution in the set T (i.e. solution 3). It is found that solution 3
dominates solution 1 with respect to the second objective, and the output of Front({5, 3, 4, 1, 2})
is therefore the nondominated set {5, 3}. 
Kung et al. [111] showed that for M = 2 or 3, the complexity of their method is O(|P| log |P|)
and for M ≥ 4, the complexity is O(|P|(log |P|)M−2).
4.7 Nondominated sorting of a set of solutions
Multi-objective optimisation techniques generally aim to find high-quality sets of nondominated
solutions within the feasible region of a problem instance. These techniques therefore typically
partition candidate solutions into two sets, namely the nondominated set and the remaining set
of dominated solutions. Although interest naturally lies in the set of nondominated solutions,
there are, however, algorithms which require that the set of candidate solutions be partitioned
into different classes based on their relative degrees of dominance. This may be achieved by
means of a nondominated sorting algorithm, such as the fast nondominated sorting algorithm
developed by Deb [51], which is discussed in some detail in this section.
The algorithm identifies the nondominated set of solutions among a finite set P of candidate
solutions to (4.1)–(4.4) by using any one of the methods described in §4.6. This set is called
the front 1 nondominated solutions, denoted by F1. The solutions in F1 are then temporarily
removed from the set P and the nondominated solutions of the new (smaller) set is calculated.
These nondominated solutions within the smaller set of candidate solutions are called the front 2
nondominated solutions, collectively denoted by F2. The nondominated solutions of fronts 1 and
2 are then temporarily removed from P and the front 3 nondominated solutions, denoted by
F3, are calculated similarly. This process is repeated in iterated fashion until the entire set of
candidate solutions is classified into fronts. For each solution i, a dominance count dci (i.e. the
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Figure 4.7: Kung et al.’s efficient method illustrated in the context of finding the set of nondominated
solutions for the set P = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} of solutions in Figure 4.3.
number of solutions that dominate i), and a set of solutions Si dominated by i, are computed.
The dominance count of a solution depends on the nondominated front into which it is classified.
More specifically, if a solution i is a member of the set Fj computed as described above, then
dcj−1 = j−1. The entire process requires O(M |P|2) comparisons, where M denotes the number
of objectives in objective space and |P| denotes the number of decision variables in decision space
as before. A pseudocode description of the working of the fast nondominated sorting algorithm
is provided in Algorithm 4.4 and the working of the algorithm is illustrated in the following
example.
Example 4.4 (Fast nondominated sorting algorithm) Consider again the set of solutions
P = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} in Figure 4.3. From the results obtained in Examples 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 it is
found that solutions 3 and 5 form the nondominated set of solutions of the set P. These solutions
therefore belong to the front F1.
Solutions 3 and 5 are then temporarily removed from the set P and, again, the nondominated
solutions are sought using any one of the three methods discussed in §4.6. When comparing
the solutions in the reduced set {1, 2, 4} with one another it is found that solutions 2 and 4
dominate solution 1, but solutions 2 and 4 do not dominate each other. The set of solutions {2,
4} therefore form the set of nondominated solutions of the set {1, 2, 4} of solutions. Hence,
these solutions are contained in the second front F2 of nondominated solutions.
Next, solutions 2 and 4 are temporarily removed from the reduced set {1, 2, 4} leaving only solu-
tion 1 in the set. Since solution 1 is the only solution left, it forms the front F3 of nondominated
solutions on its own. Each candidate solution in P now belongs to a front and the algorithm
terminates. The three fronts of nondominated solutions F1, F2 and F3 are illustrated graphically
in Figure 4.8. 
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Algorithm 4.4: Fast Nondominated Sorting Algorithm [51].
Input : A finite set P of candidate solutions to a multi-objective optimisation problem
of the form (4.1)–(4.4).
Output: The set of nondominated fronts F1, F2, F3, . . .
F1 ← ∅1
for i ∈ P do2
Si ← ∅3
dci = 04
for j ∈ P do5
if i ≺ j then6
Si ← Si ∪ {j}7
else if j ≺ i then8
dci ← dci + 19
if dci = 0 then10
irank ← 111
F1 ← F1 ∪ {i}12
m← 113
while Fm 6= ∅ do14
A ← ∅15
for i ∈ Fm do16
for j ∈ Si do17
dcj ← dcj − 118
if dcj = 0 then19
jrank ← m+ 120
A ← A∪ {j}21
m← m+ 122
Fm ← A23
4.8 Weighted sums of objectives
One of the classical multi-objective optimisation techniques is the so-called weighted-sum method.
It is considered the simplest multi-objective optimisation approach and is widely used to solve
multi-objective optimisation problems [50]. The method requires a user-specified weight for each
of the objective functions in (4.1) and involves scalarisation of the set of objective functions into
a single objective which is to be optimised. Let wm ∈ [0, 1] denote the weight of objective
m ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, where ∑Mm=1wm = 1. Then the problem (4.1)–(4.4) may be scalarised
minimising F (x) =
M∑
m=1
wmfm(x) (4.7)
subject to the constraints gj(x) ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , J, (4.8)
hk(x) = 0, k = 1, . . . ,K, (4.9)
x
(L)
i ≤ xi ≤ x(U)i , i = 1, . . . , n. (4.10)
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The problem (4.7)–(4.10) is now a single-objective optimisation problem. In order to ensure
that the objectives are of the same order of magnitude, they are typically normalised before
including them in the objective function (4.7).
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Figure 4.8: Three nondominated fronts F1, F2 and F3 of solutions of Figure 4.3 obtained by means
of the fast nondominated sorting algorithm (Algorithm 4.4). Objective function f1 is maximised, while
objective function f2 if minimised.
Miettinen [130] showed that if the weights w1, . . . , wM in (4.7) are all positive, then any optimal
solution to (4.7)–(4.10) is a Pareto optimal solution to (4.1)–(4.4). Miettinen [130] went on to
show that the converse of this result is also true if (4.1)–(4.4) is a convex problem. More specifi-
cally, he showed that if x∗ is a Pareto optimal solution to a convex multi-objective optimisation
problem of the form (4.1)–(4.4), then there exists a positive weight vector w∗ = [w∗1, . . . , w∗M ]
such that x∗ is an optimal solution to (4.7)–(4.10). This does not, however, suggest that any
Pareto optimal solution to (4.1)–(4.4) can be obtained by solving an approximately weighted
version of (4.7)–(4.10). More specifically, if (4.7)–(4.10) is not convex, then Pareto optimal so-
lutions to (4.1)–(4.4) exist which do not correspond to optimal solutions to (4.7)–(4.10) for any
positive choice of weight vector w.
In order to illustrate how a nondominated set of solutions may be obtained by solving differently
weighted versions of (4.7)–(4.10), consider Figure 4.9 which contains an illustration of the fea-
sible region (in objective space) of a bi-objective optimisation problem in which both objective
functions f1 and f2 have to be minimised. The feasible region is denoted by the shaded region
and the Pareto front is indicated by means of the dark black curve. Suppose objective function
f1 is assigned a weight of w1 and that objective function f2 is assigned a weight of w2 in (4.7),
with w1 +w2 = 1. Then the objective function (4.7) is a convex combination of the functions f1
and f2 (where M = 2). The contour surfaces of the function F may therefore be represented by
straight lines of slope −w1/w2 in objective space. Examples of such lines are the lines denoted
a, b, c and d in Figure 4.9. The location of a contour line depends on the value of the objective
function F . Since F is to be minimised, the aim is to find the contour line corresponding to
the smallest value of F . This occurs when the contour line is tangential to the feasible region
(the point A in Figure 4.9). This point corresponds to a Pareto optimal solution of (4.1)–(4.4)
associated with the weight vector w = [w1, w2]. Using a different set of weights will result in the
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contour line having a different slope and consequently another Pareto optimal solution will be
uncovered. If (4.1)–(4.4) is convex, then multiple Pareto optimal solutions to this problem may
therefore be found by solving (4.7)–(4.10) for various sets of positive weight vectors, one at a
time.
f2
f1
a
b
c
A
dw2
w1
Figure 4.9: Uncovering Pareto optimal solutions by means of the weighted-sum approach for a bi-
objective optimisation problem (in which both objective functions f1 and f2 are to be minimised) [50].
The same procedure described above may also be followed to find certain Pareto optimal solu-
tions to (4.1)–(4.4) even if the problem is not convex. The problem, however, is that some Pareto
optimal solutions are not thus discoverable if (4.1)–(4.4) is not convex. Consider, for example,
Figure 4.10 which relates to a bi-objective optimisation problem in which the objective functions
f1 and f2 again have to be minimised and which has a feasible region that is not convex. If a
weight vector w is chosen which results in consideration of the contour lines a or b, then the
Pareto optimal solutions A, B and C are discoverable. When considering the line segment BC,
it is clear that no contour line will produce a tangential point in the feasible region BC. The
reason for this is that before a contour line becomes tangent to any point on the line segment
BC, it will also become tangent to another (improved) point in the feasible region. Therefore
no Pareto optimal solution along the curve BC is computable via the weighted-sum method.
The weighted-sum method described above should therefore be implemented with great caution
[177], and should be avoided altogether in the case of nonconvex problems [50]. For these reasons
the weighted-sum method is not adopted in this dissertation.
4.9 Chapter summary
This chapter was dedicated to a discussion on the basic principles involved in multi-objective op-
timisation. The chapter opened in §4.1 with an introduction to multi-objective optimisation and
a mathematical formulation of the general form of a multi-objective optimisation problem. The
section also familiarised the reader with the notions of decision and objective spaces. In §4.2, the
importance of the notion of convexity in multi-optimisation problems was discussed and it was
pointed out that nonconvex multi-objective problems are harder to solve than convex problems.
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Figure 4.10: Failure of the weighted-sum approach to uncover Pareto optimal solutions for a bi-objective
optimisation problem involving a nonconvex feasible region (in which both the objective functions f1 and
f2 are to be minimised) [50].
In §4.3, the focus shifted to the notion of solution dominance. The section contained a description
of the dominance relation and brief discussions on the properties of this relation as well as the
notion of Pareto optimality.
The notion of hypervolume was next elucidated in §4.4 as a performance measure capable of
measuring the quality of a nondominated set of solutions as an estimate of the true Pareto front
of a multi-objective problem.
In §4.5, two sets of theoretical conditions for Pareto optimality were reviewed. The first was a
set of necessary conditions for a solution to (4.1)–(4.4) to be Pareto optimal and the second was
a set of sufficient conditions for a solution to (4.1)–(4.4) to be Pareto optimal.
Three methods, ranging in different levels of complexity, were described in §4.6 for identifying
a nondominated set of solutions from among a given, finite set of candidate solutions to (4.1)–
(4.4). These methods included a naive and slow approach, a continuously updating approach
and a more robust method developed by Kung et al. [111].
Many multi-objective optimisation techniques in the operations research literature require that
candidate solutions to (4.1)–(4.4) be sorted into different classes based on their respective degrees
of dominance. In §4.7, a description was given of the well-known fast nondominated sorting
algorithm developed by Deb [51] for this purpose.
The chapter finally closed, in §4.8, with a discussion on problems which arise when adopting
the classical multi-objective optimisation method of weighting objective functions into a single
objective when (4.1)–(4.4) is transformed into a single-objective optimisation problem of the
form (4.7)–(4.10).
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Solution methodologies for solving WAMs
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A number of solution approaches are available in the operations research literature for solving
various types of optimisation problems. These approaches may be partitioned into different
classes (depending on the particular problem at hand) and include exact solution approaches,
heuristic solution approaches and metaheuristic solution approaches. The approaches in each
of these classes may furthermore be tailored to solve single-objective optimisation problems
or multi-objective optimisation problems. In this chapter, a number of solution approaches are
discussed with a specific focus on those solution approaches that are used later in this dissertation
to solve WAMs (i.e. problems emanating from the realm of assignment problems). The solution
approaches discussed here may therefore be incorporated into a WA subsystem.
The chapter opens in §5.1 with a discussion on two exact solution approaches that are applicable
to certain types of WAMs: the method of total enumeration and the well-known branch-and-
bound method. Although such exact solution approaches are able to provide optimal solutions
to optimisation problems, these approaches are computationally expensive when the dimensions
of these optimisation problems become large. These solution approaches are therefore typically
abandoned in favour of heuristic or metaheuristic solution approaches which are often able to
provide near-optimal solutions in much shorter computational times than those required by
exact solution approaches.
Next, heuristic optimisation approaches are touched upon briefly in §5.2 and a number of heuris-
tics designed specifically for use in the context of WA are reviewed. This is followed in §5.3 by a
discussion on metaheuristic optimisation approaches. This class of optimisation techniques may
be classified into trajectory-based approaches and population-based approaches. Examples of
methods in each class are mentioned briefly, after which the working of two metaheuristics that
91
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are actually applied later in this dissertation to solve WAMs (approximately) are described in
some detail. The first of these metaheuristics is the method of simulated annealing (a trajectory-
based approach) and the second is a genetic algorithm (a population-based approach). The
methods are first described in §5.3 within the context of single-optimisation and the extensions
to the algorithms required in order to render them applicable to the case of multi-objective
optimisation are then discussed in §5.4.
5.1 Exact solution approaches
An exact solution approach aims to find a globally optimal solution to an optimisation problem
by executing an exhaustive search through a very problem-specific search space — this is achieved
either implicitly or explicitly. The advantage of adopting an exact approach to solving an
optimisation problem is that it returns an exact solution to the problem (if the dimensions of
the problem allow for this), but this boon typically comes at a high computational expense.
Two exact optimisation approaches are discussed briefly in this section, namely the (explicit)
method of total enumeration and the (implicit) branch-and-bound search algorithm.
One of the simplest exact solution approaches for combinatorial optimisation problems is the
method of total enumeration. As the name suggests, the method involves carrying out a complete
enumeration of all the solution possibilities in an iterative fashion, keeping track of those alter-
natives that score best in terms of the objective function [151]. Due to the high computational
complexity involved in this method for large problem instances, it is typically only employed in
the context of small problems.
For larger problems, an exact method that is computationally less expensive is rather recom-
mended. One such an exact method is the celebrated branch-and-bound method, developed by
Doig and Land [57] in 1960. This well-known algorithm is a design paradigm for solving com-
binatorial optimisation problems. The method systematically, but implicitly, enumerates a set
of candidate solutions to an optimisation problem by discarding subsets of unsuccessful candi-
dates [151, 168]. This feature of the method often renders it substantially less computationally
expensive than the total enumeration method.
Suppose a single-objective optimisation problem has the objective function f(x) which is to be
maximised, where x is a vector of discrete decision variables. Let S denote the set of candidate
solutions (also called the search space) of an optimisation problem over which the decision vari-
able vector x ranges [168]. As the name suggests, the branch-and-bound algorithm employs two
user-specified procedures, namely a branching procedure and a bounding procedure. According
to the branching procedure, two or more (smaller) sets S′1,S′2, . . . of a given subset S′ ⊆ S of
candidate solutions is returned — the union of these sets is S′. A tree-like data structure, known
as the search tree, is built up by the branch-and-bound method. The nodes of the tree represent
the subsets S′1,S′2, . . . of S′. The maximum value of f(x) over the subset S′ is computed as the
maximum value from the set of solutions {f(x1), f(x2) . . . }, where f(xi) attains a maximum
function value at xi within S′i. Note that a branching procedure should be chosen which is able
to produce non-overlapping subsets. The bounding procedure, on the other hand, is employed
by the algorithm to determine lower and upper bounds on the maximum value of f(x) within
a given subset S′ ⊆ S [168]. A number of methods may be used to achieve this, although no
universal bounding procedure exists in the literature (that is, a specialised bounding procedure
is employed for the specific problem at hand).
During each iteration of the branch-and-bound algorithm, a branch is formed on a subset S′ ⊆ S
of candidate solutions. Suppose, in a maximisation problem, an upper bound on the objective
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function for some node S′i of the search tree is smaller than the lower bound of some other node
S′j (i 6= j). Then the node S′i may be discarded entirely from the search. A global variable is
utilised to keep track of the largest lower bound uncovered, denoted by `b, among all subregions
of the search space explored throughout the execution of the branch-and-bound method — a
node which achieves an upper bound value smaller than the value of `b may safely be discarded
from the tree. Eliminating a node such as S′i from the search tree is known as pruning [151,
168]. A stopping criterion is employed in the branch-and-bound algorithm, indicating when the
algorithm should terminate. Typical stopping criteria include terminating the algorithm once
the current candidate set S reduces to a single element or when the objective function upper
bound of the set S corresponds to any available objective function lower bound — in such a
case, the objective function f(x) attains a maximum within S at any element of S.
The dimensions of the decision spaces of even the simplest WAMs reviewed in Chapter 3 typically
grow dramatically as the numbers of WSs and aerial threats increase. For example, if there are
m distinct WSs that can be assigned to engage n distinct aerial threats under the very simple
assumptions that (a) WSs are assigned to engage threats independently, (b) each WS can be
assigned to at most one aerial threat, and (c) all assignments occur simultaneously (i.e. no
temporal scheduling of WS engagements is required), then there are (n + 1)m distinct possible
WS assignments. This number grows very rapidly as m and/or n increases, as illustrated in
Table 5.1 for m,n ∈ {5, 10, 15, 20}.
m = 5 m = 10 m = 15 m = 20
n = 5 7 776 60 466 176 470 184 984 576 3 656 158 440 062 976
n = 10 161 051 25 937 424 601 4 177 248 169 415 651 672 749 994 932 560 009 201
n = 15 1 048 576 1 099 511 627 776 1 152 921 504 606 846 976 1 208 925 819 614 629 174 706 176
n = 20 4 084 101 16 679 880 978 201 68 122 318 582 951 682 301 278 218 429 446 951 548 637 196 401
Table 5.1: The number of ways in which m distinct WSs can be assigned simultaneously to n distinct
aerial threats under the assumptions that WSs are assigned independently and that each WS can be
assigned to at most one aerial threat.
The kind of growth demonstrated in Table 5.1 clearly rules out an explicit total enumeration
approach towards solving the WAMs of Chapter 6 for all but the tiniest instances. Furthermore,
the growth of the search space of more complicated WAMs requiring temporal scheduling of
WAs is significantly more severe than that demonstrated in Table 5.1. Even implicit enumera-
tion schemes, such as the aforementioned branch-and-bound method, cannot accommodate this
kind of computational burden for realistic values of m and n. Although it is possible to adopt
more sophisticated decomposition or dimensionality reduction approaches, such as Benders de-
composition [15] or column generation [45], such methods often struggle to deal with the peculiar
structures of certain WAMs and the dimensions of realistic instances of these models. For this
reason, researchers have in the past traditionally turned to heuristic solution methodologies for
when solving WAM instances.
5.2 Heuristic optimisation approaches
Heuristic1 solution approaches aim to find near-optimal solutions to optimisation problems which
are too complex to solve exactly [86] — these approaches usually involve the pursuit of high-
1The word heuristic stems from the Greek word heuriskein which means to discover or to find. Perhaps a more
modest choice would have been to choose a word deriving from the Greek for to seek, for what heuristics find
sometimes leave much to be desired.
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quality feasible solutions instead of necessarily optimal solutions. Three well-known classes of
heuristic optimisation approaches that are widely used in the operations research literature are,
iterative algorithms, constructive algorithms (e.g. usually algorithms following a greedy incre-
mental solution construction approach) and local search algorithms (e.g. algorithms following a
hill climbing approach).
Iterative heuristics are simple, rigid procedures that are carried out iteratively as the name
implies [86]. During each iteration, a new, hopefully better solution is considered. This procedure
often incorporates intuitive or expert knowledge rules of thumb and is repeated until some
stopping condition is met. The best solution discovered throughout the process is recorded and
returned as output. Such optimisation methods typically yield solutions of inferior quality.
Constructive heuristics, on the other hand, usually work by iteratively selecting solution compo-
nents that are best possible without consideration of any future consequences of the greedy choice
during each iteration. A constructive heuristic starts with an empty solution and builds the so-
lution iteratively according to a pre-defined set of rules until a complete solution is constructed.
During each iteration, an element to the solution which will yield the best improvement in the
solution is usually chosen for insertion in the solution. Constructive heuristics also typically
yield solutions of inferior quality.
Local search algorithms (such as hill climbing procedures) involve initially generating an arbi-
trary, complete candidate solution to an optimisation problem instance and changing a single
element of the solution in an iterated fashion in a bid to uncover a sequence of improved suc-
cessive solutions. If a change produces an improved solution, this solution is used in the next
iteration of the algorithm to perform another incremental change. If, however, the change pro-
duces a worse solution, an alternative change is made to the solution until an improved solution
is found. The algorithm is typically iterated in this fashion until no further improvements can
be found. Local searches therefore typically yield locally optimal solutions.
In 2008, Potgieter [145] developed a number of greedy algorithms for solving the WAP. One of
these algorithms, called Greedy Weapon Assignment, considers the assignment of every WS in
turn to the threat which achieves the largest threat priority value and assigns the WS achieving
the best effectiveness with respect to that threat. The WS is then removed from the list of
available WSs considered for WA engagements and the algorithm iterates in this fashion until
all the threats have been considered for WA proposals. The other greedy algorithms proposed
by Potgieter [145] are Threshold Greedy Weapon Assignment, Weighted Greedy Weapon As-
signment, Multi-Period Greedy Weapon Assignment and Layered Greedy Weapon Assignment.
These algorithms are all specialised extensions of the Greedy Weapon Assigment algorithm.
It is reiterated that heuristic optimisation approaches are ad hoc in nature, implying that they
are typically designed to fit a specific type of optimisation problem rather than a number of types
of problems [86]. The disadvantage of this characteristic is that a new optimisation procedure
typically has to be developed for each new optimisation problem considered — a tailored heuristic
approach is thus required for each optimisation problem.
Since the aim in this dissertation is to put forward a generic WA subsystem architecture design
framework in the sense that it should be flexible and easily adaptable, heuristic solution ap-
proaches may not be the best choice to solve the WAM prototypes selected for default inclusion
in the system design proposed later in this dissertation. Since such solution approaches are
typically problem specific and unadaptable, new heuristic solution approach may have to be de-
veloped for each new WAM included in the WA subsystem. Furthermore, heuristic approaches
may also exhibit overly greedy behaviour which may result in the search becoming trapped
at locally optimal solutions. Metaheuristic solution approaches are therefore rather considered
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to solve the WAM prototypes selected for default inclusion in the WA subsystem later in this
dissertation, due to their enhanced flexibility.
5.3 Single-objective metaheuristic optimisation approaches
In recent years, the development of metaheuristic2 optimisation approaches has addressed (to
some extent) the known drawbacks associated with heuristic approaches. Hillier and Lieberman
[86] define a metaheuristic as “a general kind of solution method that orchestrates the interaction
between local improvement procedures and higher level strategies to create a process that is
capable of escaping from local optima and performing a robust search of a feasible region.”
Metaheuristics are therefore methods that are able to provide a general structure and guidelines
for developing a tailored solution approach suited to more than one type of problem. They
are frequently used to solve combinatorial optimisation problems approximately in view of the
phenomenon of combinatorial explosion3.
Metaheuristics may be divided into two distinct classes, i.e. trajectory-based methods and popula-
tion-based methods. In trajectory-based methods, a single candidate solution is iteratively main-
tained and improved in search of a globally optimal solution. Popular examples of trajectory-
based metaheuristics include the method of tabu search (due to Glover [77]), the method of
simulated annealing (due to Kirkpatrick et al. [104]), the method of harmony search (due to
Geem et al. [72]) and the method of variable neighbourhood search (due to Hansen and Mlade-
novic [132]). Population-based methods, on the other hand, entail modifying and improving
multiple candidate solutions at once (often employing population characteristics) in an iterative
fashion in order to guide the search towards uncovering a high-quality locally optimal solution.
Popular examples of population-based metaheuristics include the genetic algorithm (due to Hol-
land [88]), particle swarm optimisation (due to Kennedy and Eberhart [102]) and ant colony
optimisation (due to Dorigo [59]).
Simulated
annealing
DBMOSA
Genetic
algorithm
Trajectory-
based
Population-
based
Single-objective Multi-objective
NSGAII
Figure 5.1: Classification scheme for the metaheuristic optimisation approaches together with an ex-
ample methodology in each class that is employed to solve the WAMs later in this dissertation.
Two metaheuristic optimisation methods are employed later in this dissertation to solve the
WAMs proposed for the basis of WA DS. These methods are the method of simulated annealing
originally proposed in 1983 by Kirkpatrick et al. [104] and the genetic algorithm originally
proposed by Holland [88] in 1975. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to detailed discussions
on the general working of these two solution approaches. Specific choices made in terms of
2The prefix meta in the word metaheuristic means beyond, after or higher level implying that metaheuristics
generally perform better than heuristics in view of their superior flexibility.
3The notion of combinatorial explosion is a phenomenon that occurs during the solution of combinatorial
optimisation problems. It is the fundamental problem of experiencing exponential growth in the number of
combinations that have to be considered in a specific combinatorial optimisation problem. This type of growth
typically occurs at such a fast pace that even the fastest computers require a very large amount of computation
time to consider all the combinations if the problem dimensions grows past some finite value.
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algorithmic building blocks and parameter values for implementation of the algorithms within
the context of WA are described in a later chapter. Both the aforementioned solution approaches
were, however, in their original incarnations only able to solve single-objective optimisation
problems (approximately). Since some of the WAMs proposed later in this dissertation involve
the optimisation of multiple objectives simultaneously, multi-objective optimisation extensions
to the algorithms are also described toward the end of the chapter. The first of these extensions
applies to the simulated annealing algorithm and is called the DBMOSA, originally proposed
by Smith et al. [173] in 2008. The second extension is to the genetic algorithm and is called
the NSGA II, originally proposed by Agarwal et al. [2] in 2002. A slight alteration to the latter
extension, due to Bullinaria and Garcia-Najera [26], is also touched upon. The classification of
the metaheuristic solution methodologies discussed in the remainder of this chapter is illustrated
graphically in Figure 5.1.
5.3.1 The method of simulated annealing: A trajectory-based approach
Simulated annealing is a metaheuristic optimisation technique developed by Kirkpatrick et al.
[104] in 1983 which mimics the physical annealing process involved in the strengthening of solids
in metallurgy. During this process, heat treatment is applied to a metal in order to change
its molecular properties. The metal is typically heated above its recrystallization temperature,
after which it is allowed to cool down very slowly. The heating of the material causes its atoms
to become excited and to start vibrating randomly through higher energy states [17]. As the
metal is then allowed to cool down slowly, its atoms vibrate less until they settle down into a
low energy state. This slow cooling process allows for a better chance of the atoms settling into
lower energy states than their initial energy states.
Simulated annealing algorithms are able to control the cycling phenomenon typically induced
by accepting non-improving moves in local searches according to probabilities tested by means
of computer-generated random numbers. The method is a trajectory-based method since it
iteratively considers and performs operations on a single solution at a time. A pseudocode
description of the method of simulated annealing is given in Algorithm 5.14 (for a minimisation
problem).
The simulated annealing algorithm requires as input an initial solution vector x(0), the maximum
number of iterations tmax over which the search may be carried out and an initial temperature q0.
The initial solution vector is taken as the incumbent solution at algorithm initialisation. During
iteration t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, . . . , tmax − 1} of the algorithm, a neighbourhood solution x(t+1) is gener-
ated from x(t) by performing small alterations to x(t) as a result of the application of a so-called
neighbourhood move operator. The move operator typically performs a random perturbation to
x(t) from a set of possible moves. This set of possible moves is typically problem type-specific
with the specific combinatorial context in mind.
A move that results in an improvement upon the objective function value of x(t) is always
accepted, while a move that does not achieve such an improvement is accepted according to the
classical Metropolis rule [29], i.e. with probability
exp(−∆obj/qi),
where ∆obj denotes the change in the objective function when moving from the current solution
4It should be noted that the pseudocode description of the method of simulated annealing in Algorithm 5.1
follows a general outline of the algorithm. The description of the algorithm in the text, however, includes
extensions of the method which may promote diversity and improved search methods which may uncover larger
portions of the search space when employed, for the sake of completeness.
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Algorithm 5.1: Simulated annealing (for a minimisation problem)
Input : An initial candidate solution x(0), a maximum allowable number of iterations
tmax and an initial temperature q0.
Output: An approximately optimal solution vector xˆ to a single-objective minimisation
problem.
t← 01
xˆ← x(0)2
while t < tmax and all feasible moves have not been rejected do3
Randomly choose a feasible move ∆x(t+1)4
Compute the (possibly negative) net objective function improvement ∆obj for moving5
from x(t) to x(t) + ∆x(t+1)
if ∆obj < 0 or with probability e−∆obj/q if ∆obj ≥ 0, then6
x(t+1) ← x(t) + ∆x(t+1)7
if the objective function value of x(t+1) is superior to that of the incumbent solution xˆ8
then
xˆ← x(t+1)9
If a sufficient number of iterations have passed since the last temperature change,10
reduce temperature q
t← t+ 111
return xˆ12
x(t) to the randomly chosen neighbouring solution and qi denotes the temperature during stage
or epoch i of the search, which controls the randomness of the search. If the neighbouring
solution is accepted, it becomes the new current solution x(t+1) during the next iteration of the
algorithm, while if the neighbouring solution is rejected, the move operator is applied to x(t)
once more, repeating this process until acceptance occurs. If x(t+1) performs better than the
current incumbent xˆ, then x(t+1) becomes the new incumbent.
For large values of qi, the majority of new solutions are accepted — this provides a mechanism
for the search to escape when trapped at a local optimum. When qi is small, on the other hand,
only new worsening solutions that result in small degradations of the objective function value
are typically accepted. The algorithm is therefore usually initialised with a large value of q0 in
order to allow for as much exploration of the decision space during the early stages of the search
as possible.
According to Busetti [28], the initial temperature used in the search should be such that ap-
proximately eighty percent of all the non-improving moves are accepted at the beginning of
the search. One way of approximating such an initial temperature value is to conduct a trial
search during which all non-improving moves are accepted. A good estimation of the initial
temperature may then be taken as
q0 =
∆+
ln 0.8
, (5.1)
where ∆+ denotes the average change of the objective function values resulting from accepting
non-improving moves during the trial search.
The temperature is typically kept constant for a number of consecutive iterations. A set of
successive iterations over which the temperature remains constant is known as an epoch. The
length of an epoch is not a fixed parameter value — an epoch rather has a maximum number
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
98 Chapter 5. Solution methodologies for solving WAMs
of iterations associated with it. The lengths of various epochs may therefore differ from one
another. The length of an epoch (i.e. the number of iterations the search spends in temperature
stage i) is typically determined by a Markov chain of length Li. According to Busetti [28], this
value should be customised to the optimisation problem at hand rather than being a function
of i. It seems intuitive to require a pre-specified minimum number of move acceptances during
any temperature stage before lowering the temperature and initiating the next epoch. Let Amin
denote this pre-specified number of move acceptances. As the temperature qi approaches zero as
i→∞, non-improving moves are typically accepted with decreasing probability — this results
in the number of trials expected before accepting Amin moves becoming large (without bound)
as the search progresses, irrespective of the value of Amin. In order to counter this situation, the
epoch may be terminated once L moves have been attempted (by increasing the temperature) or
once Amin moves have been accepted (by lowering the temperature), where L > Amin. According
to Dreo et al. [62], a good rule of thumb is to take L = 100 and Amin = 12N , where N is some
measure of the number of degrees of freedom related to the optimisation problem in question.
Cooling and/or reheating can therefore occur multiple times over the course of the algorithm
according to the scheme oulined above. Whereas cooling is aimed at making it harder to accept
worsening solutions (in a bid to promote exploitation), reheating is aimed at making it easier
to accept worsening solutions (in a bid to promote exploration by facilitating escape from local
optima). The algorithm iterates in this fashion until a stopping criterion is reached. When the
algorithm terminates, the incumbent solution vector xˆ is returned by the algorithm as output.
The aim in simulated annealing is to find a locally optimal solution of high quality with minimal
computational effort. In order to achieve this, a tailor-made set of input parameters (i.e. the
starting temperature, the stopping criterion, the cooling schedule, the heating schedule and an
epoch termination criterion) is required for every optimisation problem instance. A popular
stopping criterion involves the specification of a maximum allowable number of epochs. A
stopping temperature may also be employed in which case the algorithm terminates when the
temperature is close to zero for an extended period of time — this allows for the algorithm to
converge towards a locally optimal solution.
Typical cooling schedules which may be employed in the algorithm include geometric, linear
and adaptive schedules [1, 92, 17, 199]. Of these cooling schedules, the geometric schedule is
the most common. Some of the other schedules have, however, proven to be more efficient than
the geometric schedule in certain contexts [199]. According to the geometric cooling schedule,
the temperature at each epoch is reduced by a fixed factor α (ranging between 0 and 1). The
temperature during epoch i+ 1 is therefore
qi+1 = αqi, i = 0, 1, 2, . . . (5.2)
An analysis by Vigeh [199] on good values of α concluded that the best results are generally
found when α is chosen between 0.8 and 0.99. Note that the computational effort required to
execute the algorithm will be greater for a large value of α, since the total number of temperature
values to explore will typically be greater.
According to the alternative linear cooling schedule, the temperature at the end of an epoch is
lowered by subtracting a constant cooling factor from the current temperature. The temperature
during epoch i+ 1 is therefore
qi+1 = qi − c, i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , (5.3)
where c is a constant cooling factor. In contrast to the geometric cooling schedule, the linear
cooling schedule reduces the temperature by the same amount throughout the execution of the
algorithm.
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An example of an adaptive cooling schedule is that of Huang et al. [92], according to which
qi+1 = qi exp
(
− Λqi
σ(qi)
)
, i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , (5.4)
where Λ ∈ (0, 1] is a parameter whose value has to be determined empirically and σ(qt) denotes
the standard deviation achieved in the changing objective function values since the start of epoch
i. A typical value of Λ is 0.7 [92].
Reheating is implemented in a similar fashion as cooling, except that the temperature is increased
by some factor when reheating. According to a geometric reheating schedule, the temperature
at each epoch is increased by a fixed factor β (chosen larger than one). Following the same
notation as in the cooling schedules (5.2)–(5.4), the temperature during epoch i+ 1 is therefore
qi+1 = βqi, i = 0, 1, 2, . . . . (5.5)
A linear reheating schedule may also be employed in which case the temperature at each epoch
is increased by adding a positive constant reheating factor to the current temperature. The
temperature during epoch i+ 1 in such a case is therefore
qi+1 = qi + h, i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , (5.6)
where h is the reheating factor. As with the linear cooling schedule (5.3), the temperature is
increased by the same amount during the execution of the algorithm.
5.3.2 The genetic algorithm: A population-based approach
A genetic algorithm is an evolutionary algorithm based on Darwin’s theory of evolution by
means of natural selection. According to this algorithm, originally proposed by Holland [88], a
population of candidate solutions, also called chromosomes, are allowed to evolve over a number
of iterations (representing time) within a carefully controlled environment in an attempt at
uncovering near-optimal solutions to an optimisation problem instance. During each iteration,
parent solutions in the population are selected, based on a pre-specified set of criteria collected
into a so-called fitness measure, in order to produce offspring solutions which populate the
next generation of candidate solutions. The fitness of a candidate solution is an indication of
the quality of the solution relative to other solutions with respect to the objective function. A
typical fitness measure employed in genetic algorithms is the objective function value of a solution
itself in the case of a maximisation problem. Offspring solutions are produced by applying a
selection operator to the current generation of solutions in order to select parent solutions and
by then applying recombination operators to the selected parent solutions. The newly generated
offspring solutions populate the next generation of candidate solutions (typically replacing their
parents). This process is iterated over a number of solution generations until significantly fitter
solutions can no longer be found or until a pre-specified number of generations is reached. A
pseudocode description of a generic genetic algorithm is given in Algorithm 5.2 and the working
of the algorithm is described in some detail in the remainder of this section.
The algorithm requires as input the size N of the population, the maximum number of iterations
tmax over which the algorithm has to be executed, the recombination probabilities pc and pm
and the size of a tour St to be employed in the selection procedure. The algorithm is initiated
by generating an initial candidate solution population Pˆ
(0)
of size N which is typically selected
in a random fashion. Next, the fitness of each candidate solution in the population is calculated.
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Algorithm 5.2: Genetic algorithm
Input : A combinatorial optimisation problem and a domain set for each decision
variable, a population size N , the maximum number of iterations tmax, a
mutation probability pm, a crossover probability pc and a tour size St.
Output: A converged population of solutions Pˆ containing an approximation of a
globally optimal solution xˆ to the problem.
Generate an initial population of solutions Pˆ
(0)
of size N randomly1
Calculate the fitness of each solution in P (0)2
t← 03
Pˆ ← P (0)4
while t < tmax do5
Apply a tournament selection operator to P (t) to choose parent solutions for crossover6
based on the fitness values of candidate solutions
Apply with probability pc a crossover operator to the parent solutions selected7
Apply with probability pm a mutation operator to the offspring solutions8
Calculate the fitness of each solution in P (t)9
t← t+ 110
return Pˆ , containing xˆ11
The selection operator and the recombination operators (often called crossover and mutation
operators) are next applied to the population [151].
First, two parent solutions are selected for crossover. A popular selection method is the so-called
tournament selection procedure [61]. In tournament selection, a small subset of solutions, known
as a tour, is chosen randomly, and the number of solutions in the subset is called the tour size.
One solution is then chosen from the tour to include as a parent solution within a so-called
mating pool of solutions. The number of parent solutions included in the mating pool is called
the pool size. Solutions are typically selected for inclusion in the mating pool by adopting their
fitness function values as selection criterion (i.e. a candidate solution achieving a very good
objective function value has a very good chance of being chosen as a parent solution). A simple
way of achieving this is by the popular roulette wheel selection procedure [10]. The method
employs the fitness assigned to chromosomes in order to calculate a probability of being selected
for each chromosome. Let fi denote the fitness value assigned to chromosome i. The probability
of selection for chromosome i is then taken as
pi =
fi∑N
j=1 fj
.
The approach involves normalisation of the fitness values of the chromosomes. Next, a circular
wheel is partitioned into arcs (similar to a roulette wheel in a casino), each arc representing a
chromosome, with these arcs spanning angles that are proportional to the fitness values of the
corresponding chromosomes. A fixed point is then chosen on the wheel and it is rotated. The
chromosome corresponding to the arc of the wheel which coincides with the fixed point is then
chosen as the first parent solution for crossover. The procedure is repeated to find a second
parent solution for crossover, after having removed the first parent from the population.
Once two parent solutions have been selected for recombination, a crossover operator is applied
to the pair in order to produce an offspring solution. The crossover procedure is stochastic and
is associated with a probability pc of occurring. The value pc ∈ (0, 1) is typically chosen large,
since the crossover procedure is considered a central part of introducing variation (diversity) into
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the population of candidate solutions [86, 109, 151]. A number of crossover techniques exist in
the operations research literature, including single-point crossover, two-point crossover, cut-and-
splice crossover and uniform crossover [86, 108, 167]. The method employed typically depends
on the encoding of a solution to the problem under consideration. To illustrate the notion
of crossover, single-point crossover is considered and illustrated in Figure 5.2. This method
entails uniformly selecting a single point along the parent solution encodings and slicing both
the encodings at that point. Two offspring solutions are then obtained by interchanging the
elements in the parent solution encodings beyond this point.
Parent 1
Parent 2
Child 2
Child 1
Crossover point
Next
Population
Current
Population
Figure 5.2: Single-point crossover applied to the encodings of two parent solutions in a genetic algorithm.
A two-point crossover method similarly entails uniformly selecting two points along the parent
solution encodings and slicing both the solution encodings at that point. Two offspring solutions
are then obtained by interchanging the elements in the parent solution encodings in between
these two points.
In uniform crossover, the parent solution encodings are not partitioned into segments — each
element in an encoding is considered individually for inclusion in the offspring solutions. Solution
elements are selected from the parent solutions based on probabilities — bias may therefore be
introduced with respect to one of the parent solutions.
After offspring solutions have been generated, a mutation operator is applied to certain offspring
solutions. Mutation is aimed at further diversifying solutions in an attempt to explore new
regions of the solution space by avoiding premature convergence of the algorithm to poor local
optima and involves altering the value of one or more of the entries in a solution encoding
from its original state [86]. Mutation is typically executed in a random fashion, and is also
a stochastic process (i.e. is associated with a probability pm of occurring). In contrast to the
crossover operator, mutating a solution is typically associated with a very small probability of
occurring since a large value may result in the algorithm reducing to a more random search
[109]. There are a number of mutation operators available in the operations research literature
to choose from, including bit flip mutation, uniform mutation and Gaussian mutation [88, 109,
167]. In order to illustrate the notion of mutation, consider the notion of bit flip mutation
as illustrated in Figure 5.3. This method is typically employed in optimisation problems with
binary-coded solutions and entails inverting the bit (gene) values (i.e. flipping the value of a
gene from 0 to 1 or vice versa).
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0 0 01 1 1 11Child after mutation
Child before mutation 0 0 0 01 1 1 1
Figure 5.3: Bit flip mutation applied to a binary-coded offspring solution.
In a uniform mutation, a gene in an offspring solution is chosen randomly and the value of this
gene is replaced with a uniformly random value (which falls within user-specified upper and
lower bounds for the gene). This method of mutation is only used for problems involving real or
integer-coded genes. Gaussian mutation, on the other hand, entails choosing a gene randomly
from an offspring solution and adding a Gaussian distributed random value to the selected gene.
If the value of the gene falls outside user-specified upper and lower bounds for the gene after
the addition, then the value of the gene is taken as the user-specified upper or lower bound of
the gene, whichever is applicable.
The algorithm terminates once the specified stopping criterion is satisfied. Typical stopping
criteria employed in genetic algorithms involve termination once a pre-determined number of
iterations is reached (as in Algorithm 5.2), a satisfactory level of fitness is achieved or the
algorithm fails to improve on the quality of solutions sufficiently [86, 109, 151]. Once the
algorithm terminates, the solution achieving the best fitness value xˆ in the converged population
of solutions Pˆ , called the incumbent, is returned by the algorithm as output.
5.4 Multi-objective metaheuristic optimisation approaches
The two single-objective metaheuristics described in §5.3 have been extended to solve multi-
objective optimisation problems. Recall, from Chapter 4, that the aim in multi-objective op-
timisation problems is to approximate a good spread of solutions along the Pareto frontier as
close as possible to the true Pareto frontier. A number of multi-objective metaheuristic solution
methodologies in the operations research literature may be employed for this purpose, such as
the NSGA II of Agarwal et al. [2], the multi-objective particle swarm optimisation technique of
Moore and Chapman [133] and the DBMOSA of Smith et al. [173] to name but a few. In this
section, and extension of the general genetic algorithm, namely the NSGA II and an extension of
the general simulated annealing algorithm, namely the DBMOSA are discussed in some detail.
5.4.1 The dominance-based multi-objective method of simulated annealing
The DBMOSA was developed by Smith et al. [173] in 2008 and is an extension of the original
simulated annealing algorithm of Kirkpatrick [104] (described in §5.3.1), making provision for the
solution of multi-objective optimisation problems of the form (4.1)–(4.4). It therefore features
many of the operations of the original simulated annealing algorithm described earlier — the
main difference is that the notion of archiving is introduced in the DBMOSA.
Recall that the simulated annealing algorithm generates only a single solution during each it-
eration in the execution thereof (i.e. it is a trajectory-based metaheuristic). Therefore, the
DBMOSA maintains an external set of solutions known as an archive, denoted here by A, which
contains all the nondominated solutions uncovered by the algorithm during its search progres-
sion. The DBMOSA works in such a way that all the solutions generated during the course
of the search are candidates for becoming members of the archive. New candidate solutions
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are compared for dominance with respect to existing members of the archive when deciding
whether or not to include them in the archive. The notion of archiving is illustrated graphically
in Figure 5.4 for a bi-objective optimisation problem in which both objective functions f1 and
f2 are to be maximised.
46 Chapter 4. Mathematical Model
4.3.2 Multiobjective Simulated Annealing Optimisation
In §4.3.1 above, the working of the method of SA was described for the simple case of SOPs. The
purpose of this section is to describe how the method may be extended so as to be applicable
to MOPs, as proposed by Smith et al. [37, 38].
The notion of archiving
Due to the fact that only a single solution is generated during each iteration of the SA search
process, an external set, called an archive and denoted here by A, is maintained in which all
nondominated solutions found during the search process are recorded in the case of an MOP.
All solutions generated during the search process are candidates for archiving, and are tested for
dominance with respect to each of the solutions already in the archive. The archiving process
for a bi-objective maximisation problem is illustrated graphically in Figure 4.3.
f1
f2
Solutions not archived
Exisiting solutions in the archive
New solution added to the archive
Solution removed from the archive
Figure 4.3: The archiving process for a bi-objective maximisation process with objective functions f1
and f2.
In single-objective maximisation problems, the sign of the difference in energy4f(x′,x) provides
information as to whether the neighbouring solution x′ performs better or worse than the current
solution x, or (very rarely) performs equally well. If the true Pareto front PF were available a
priori, it would be possible to define the energy (i.e. the performance of a solution in objective
space in the context of SA) of a solution x as a measure of the portion of the Pareto front that
dominates x. Let PF (x) represent the portion of PF that dominates x, that is
PF (x) = {y ∈ P | y ≺ x},
where y ≺ x indicates that y dominates x. Then, the energy of x may be defined as
E(x) = µ(PF (x)),
where µ represents a measure defined on PF . In the case where PF is continuous, µ may be
taken as a Lebesgue measure (i.e. the length, area or volume for two, three or four objectives,
respectively). In the case where PF is discrete, however, µ(PF (x)) may simply be taken to be
the cardinality of PF (x) (i.e. the number of solutions forming part of PF which dominate x).
Of course, if x ∈ PF , then E(x) = 0.
Due to the fact that the true Pareto front is typically unavailable during the course of the
optimisation process, Smith et al. [38] instead proposed the use of an energy function defined
in terms of the current estimate of the Pareto front, that is, the set of mutually nondominated
solutions found thus far during the search process (i.e. the solutions in the archiveA). The energy
Figure 5.4: The notion of archiving employed in the DBMOSA in a bi-objective maximisation problem
with objective functions f1 and f2.
Consider the candidate solutions in Figure 5.4. The solutions uncovered during the search
thus far are the solutions represented by the light grey circles (i.e. the existing nondominated
solutions in the archive), the open circle (i.e. a nondominated solution which also forms part
of the archive) and the black triangles (i.e. the solutions found thus far, which are dominated
and do not form part of the archive). Suppose a new candidate solution (represented by the
black circle) is generated by the algorithm. This solution is compared with every solution in
the archive and it is clear from the figure that it only dominates the solution represented by the
open circle — it does not dominate the other solutions in the archive, nor do the other solutions
in the archive dominate it. The solution represented by the black circle is therefore included in
the existing archive and the solution represented by the white open circle is removed from the
archive.
In the simulated annealing algorithm for single-objective optimisation problems, the sign of the
difference in energy denoted by ∆obj in §5.3.1, provided information on the “quality” of the
neighbouring solution x′ with respect to the current solution x — an indication as to whether
the neighbouring solution x′ performs better or worse than the current solution x in terms of
the single objective function. Suppose, in the multi-objective case, that the true Pareto front
PF were avail ble a priori. Then it w uld instead be possible to define the energy f a solution
x as a measure f the portion of the true Pareto front tha dominates x. Let PF (x) denote the
portion of the true Pareto front tha dominates x, hen
PF (x) = {y ∈ P | y ≺ x}.
The energy of x may be defined as
E(x) = µ(PF (x)),
where µ denotes the aforementioned measure defined on PF . Note that PF may be either
discrete or continuous. If PF is discrete, µ(PF (x)) may be taken as the cardinality of PF (x)
— the number of solutions forming part of PF which dominate x. If, on the other hand, PF
is continuous, µ may be taken as a Lebesgue measure — the length, the area or volume in
the cases of two, three or four objectives, respectively, of the portion of the Pareto front which
dominates x.
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Recall, from Chapter 4, that the true Pareto front of solutions is typically unknown during the
optimisation process, which renders use of estimation of the energy function described above
rather difficult. Smith et al. [173] instead proposed that the energy function be defined in terms of
the current estimate of the Pareto front — the set of mutually nondominated solutions uncovered
during the course of the search (i.e. the solutions contained in the archive A). Therefore, the
difference in energy may be estimated by taking the difference between the energy of the solution
in the archive and the neighbouring solution and normalising this difference by the size of the
archive. Smith et al. [173] claimed that the use of this energy measure promotes both coverage
of and convergence towards the true Pareto front.
A pseudocode description of the working of the DBMOSA is provided in Algorithm 5.3 and the
working of the algorithm is briefly discussed in the remainder of this section. The algorithm
is initialised by generating an initial feasible solution x randomly and placing it in the archive
A. Define A˜ = A ∪ {x} ∪ {x′}, where x′ denotes the neighbouring solution generated in the
neighbourhood of the current x. Furthermore, define A˜x = {y ∈ P˜ | y ≺ x}, where µ(A˜x) =
|A˜x|+ 1, i.e. A˜x denotes the subset of solutions in A˜ that dominates x. The difference in energy
between x and x′ may then be estimated as
∆E(x
′,x) =
|A˜x′ | − |A˜x|
|A˜| . (5.7)
In (5.7), division by |A˜| ensures that the estimated energy value ∆E(x′, x) remains below unity.
One advantage of this is that it may provide some degree of robustness against fluctuations in
the number of solutions contained in A during execution of the search. This implies that if A˜
is a nondominated set, then the difference in energy between any two of the elements contained
in A˜ is zero. If x′  x, then ∆E(x′,x) < 0, hence the inclusion of the current as well as
the neighbouring solution in the energy function in (5.7). Furthermore, another advantage of
the energy function in (5.7) is that it encourages the search to explore regions of the estimated
Pareto front in A which are sparsely populated, regardless of the portion of the true Pareto front
that dominates the current solution x and the neighbouring solution x′. This characteristic is
illustrated graphically in Figure 5.5.
It appears as though µ(Px′) > µ(Px) in Figure 5.5, when considering the portion of the true
Pareto front that dominates the neighbouring solution x′ and that which dominates the current
solution x in objective space. This is, however, not the case because |A˜x′ | = 1 and |A˜x| = 3,
from which follows that |A˜x′ | = 1 < 3 = |A˜x|.
Once a neighbouring solution x′ of the current solution x has been generated, its fitness value
is compared to the fitness value of x. If the fitness value of x′ is larger than the fitness value
of x, the neighbouring solution x′ is accepted with probability 1. If, on the other hand, the
fitness value of x′ is not better than that of x, then x′ is accepted according to the Metropolis
acceptance rule [173] which states that x′ should be accepted as the new current solution for the
next iteration with probability exp(−∆E(x′,x)q ), where q denotes the current temperature of the
search. The acceptance probability of x′ may thus be summarised as
P (x′) = min
{
1, exp
(
− ∆E(x
′,x)
q
)}
.
It should be noted that a neighbouring solution which is dominated by fewer elements of the
currently estimated Pareto front in A naturally achieves a lower energy value and is, hence,
automatically accepted as the new current solution — it is an improving move in the search.
If, on the other hand, there is a large energy difference between the current solution and the
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Algorithm 5.3: Dominance-based multi-objective simulated annealing [173]
Input : A multi-objective maximisation problem instance of the form (4.1)–(4.4), the
maximum allowable number of iterations per epoch Imax, the minimum number of
accepted moves Amin per epoch, the cooling function used to determine the
cooling schedule, and a restriction on the maximum number Cmax of epochs which
may pass without the acceptance of any new solutions.
Output: A nondominated set of solutions PS approximating the Pareto front of the given
instance of (4.1)–(4.4).
Generate an initial feasible solution x;1
Initialise the archive A = {x};2
Initialise the cooling schedule epoch c← 1;3
Initialise the number of iterations t← 1;4
Initialise the number of epochs without an accepted solution ξ ← 0;5
while ξ ≤ Cmax do6
A← 0;7
while t ≤ t+ Lc and A < Amin do8
Generate a neighbouring solution x′ from the current solution x;9
Assess the energy difference 4E(x′,x) according to (5.7);10
Generate a random number r ∈ (0, 1);11
if r < min{1, exp
(−4E(x′,x)
qc
)
} then12
x← x′;13
if |Ax| = 0 then14
A ← A ∪ {x};15
for y ∈ A do16
if x ≺ y then17
A ← A\{y};18
A← A+ 1;19
t← t+ 1;20
c← c+ 1;21
Update the system temperature qc;22
if A = 0 then23
ξ = ξ + 1;24
PF ← A;25
neighbouring solution, and the temperature q is low, then the probability P (x′) of accepting x′
will be small. The probability of acceptance therefore does not depend on an a priori weighting
of the objectives — the probability of acceptance will remain unchanged if the objective functions
were to be rescaled. If the neighbouring solution is accepted, it becomes the new current solution
from which a new neighbouring solution is generated.
The DMBOSA is also executed iteratively in stages known as epochs (similar to those incor-
porated in the simulated annealing method for single-objective optimisation problems). The
temperature q of the search remains constant during an epoch. The length of an epoch is again
determined by the success of the search, as described in §5.3.1. An epoch is either terminated
by performing a cooling or reheating operator. Cooling is aimed at making it harder to accept
worsening solutions — this typically happens when too many neighbouring solutions are being
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difference may then be calculated as the difference in their respective energies, normalised by
the size of the archive. According to Smith et al. [38], use of such an energy measure encourages
both coverage of and convergence to the true Pareto front.
Algorithm outline
To initialise the algorithm, a random feasible solution is placed in the archive A. For each
iteration of the algorithm, define A˜ = A ∪ {x} ∪ {x′}, where x′ represents a neighbouring
solution generated from the current solution x, and define A˜x = {y ∈ A˜ | y ≺ x}, where
µ(A˜x) = |A˜x|+ 1. An estimated energy difference between the solutions x and x′ may then be
calculated as
4E(x′,x) = |A˜x
′ | − |A˜x|
|A˜| . (4.9)
Division by |A˜| in (4.9) ensures that the value 4E(x′,x) remains below unity, which provides a
certain degree of robustness against fluctuations in the number of solutions in A over the course
of the search. Whenever A˜ is a nondominated set, the energy difference between any two of its
elements is zero. The reason for the inclusion of the current solution x, as well as the proposed
solution x′ in A˜, is that 4E(x′,x) < 0 if x′ ≺ x. Besides efficiency in the promotion of the
storage of nondominated solutions, a further benefit of the energy measure in (4.9) is that it
encourages the exploration of sparsely populated regions of the estimated Pareto front in A,
regardless of the portion of the true Pareto front that dominates the solutions x and x′. This
principle is illustrated in Figure 4.4, where it appears as though µ(Px′) > µ(Px), but it can
be seen that, in fact, |A˜x′ | = 1 < 3 = |A˜x|. This ensures that the search moves to a more
unexplored region of the nondominated front.
f1
f2 x
x′
True Pareto front (PF )
Archived solutions (A)
Solutions in A˜\A
Figure 4.4: The energy measure for a current solution and its neighbouring solution in a bi-objective
maximisation problem with objective functions f1 and f2. Here |A˜x′ | = 1 < 3 = |A˜x|.
The function used to determine the probability of acceptance of a neighbouring solution x′ is
then given by
P (x′) = min
{
1, exp
(
−4E(x
′,x)
T
)}
, (4.10)
where T represents the current temperature of the search. Naturally, a neighbouring solution
dominated by fewer elements of the current estimate of the Pareto front in A has a lower energy
Figure 5.5: The difference in energy of a current solution x and its neighbouring solution x′ for a
bi-objective optimisation problem in which both objectives f1 and f2 are to be maximised.
accepted. A cooling schedule is employed to achieve this and any one of the cooling schedules
described earlier may be employed in the DBMOSA. On the other hand, reheating is aimed at
making it easier to accept worsening solutions — this typically happens when too few solutions
are being accepted.
The algorithm is iterated in this fashion until a stopping criterion is met. A popular stopping
criterion is to terminate the search when a specified number of successive epochs have elapsed
without accepting a single solution. Once the algorithm terminates, the archive A containing
the approximate Pareto front is returned by the algorithm as output.
5.4.2 The nondominated sorting genetic algorithm II
The NSGA II was put forward in 2002 by Agarwal et al. [2] and aims to find a good approximation
of Pareto optimal solutions to a multi-objective optimisation problem of the form (4.1)–(4.4).
Its working is based on that of the genetic algorithm described in §5.3.2 and therefore shares a
number of features of the genetic algorithm. The main difference between the algorithms is the
way in which fitness values are assigned to solutions and, consequently, the way in which parent
solutions are selected for crossover.
A pseudocode description of the working of the NSGA II is given in Algorithm 5.4 and the
working of the algorithm is discussed briefly in this section. The NSGA II takes as input a
vector z containing values for each of the M objective functions, the size of the population
N of candidate solutions to be maintained during the search, and the maximum number of
generations Gmax for which the algorithm should be executed. An initial population P 0 of
candidate solutions of size N is generated randomly. These solutions are then ranked and
sorted by using the FNSA [51] (discussed in §4.7). For each solution i, a dominance count dci
(the number of solutions that dominate i), and that subset Si of solutions within the current
population dominated by i, are computed. All solutions achieving a dominance count of dci = 0
are placed in a separate set F1, called the first nondominated front, and are assigned rank 1.
For each solution i in F1, the algorithm cycles through each solution j in Si, and decrements its
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
5.4. Multi-objective metaheuristic optimisation approaches 107
dcj -value by one, thus discounting the effect of solution i on solution j ’s dominance count. All
solutions of rank 1 are then removed from the current population of solutions. The solutions
now achieving a dominance count of dci = 0 are placed in another set F2 for the algorithm
to cycle through. These solutions are called the second nondominated front and are assigned
rank 2. The algorithm continues in this fashion until all the solutions have been partitioned into
nondominated fronts and have been assigned ranks.
Algorithm 5.4: Nondominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm II [2].
Input: A multi-objective maximisation problem instance of the form (4.1)–(4.4), the size of
the population N , and the maximum number of generations Gmax.
Output: A set W∗ of approximately Pareto optimal solutions to the instance of (4.1)–(4.4).
Generate an initial solution P 0 of size N randomly1
Rank and sort P 0 by using the FNSA [Algorithm 4.7]2
Calculate the crowding distance for each solution in P 0 by using the crowding distance3
assignment algorithm [Algorithm 5.5]
Create child population Q0 of size N by using binary tournament selection based on the4
crowding distance operator ≺c from P 0, and performing crossover and mutation
t← 0 while t < Gmax do5
Rt ← P t ∪Qt6
Rank and sort Rt into nondominated fronts F1,F2, . . . by using FNSA7
P t+1 ← ∅ and m← 18
while |P t+1| < N do9
if |Fm|+ |P t+1| ≤ N then10
P t+1 ← P t+1 ∪ Fm11
else12
Calculate the crowding distance for each solution in Fm13
Sort the solutions in Fm in descending order, based on crowding distance14
P t+1 ← P t+1∪ [the first (N − |P t+1|) solutions in Fm]15
m← m+ 116
Calculate the crowding distance for each solution in P t+1.17
Create child population Qt+1 by using binary tournament selection based on the18
crowding distance operator ≺c, crossover and mutation.
t← t+ 119
return W∗ = P Gmax20
Next, a crowding distance density measure is calculated for each candidate solution in a non-
dominated front. This measure is used to quantify the solution density in the sense that a higher
value indicates that a solution is more isolated, while a lower value implies that a solution is
more crowded by other solutions. The crowding distance algorithm is given in pseudocode as
Algorithm 5.5.
The crowding distance density measure requires that the solutions in the population be sorted
in ascending order of magnitude along each objective axis. Denote the objective function value
of the ith candidate solution for the hth objective (in the sorted list) by X[i]|h. The crowding
distance of the ith solution for the hth objective is then denoted by idist|h. Furthermore, let k
denote the number of solutions in the population. An infinite crowding distance is assigned to
the boundary solutions, that is the solutions X[1]|h and X[k]|h, so as to ensure that they are
selected for crossover. The crowding distances of the intermediate solutions i are incremented
by the normalised distance between their closest neighbouring solutions. More specifically,
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Algorithm 5.5: Crowding Distance Assignment Algorithm [2].
Input: A population P of candidate solutions to an instance of the multi-objective
maximisation problem (4.1)–(4.4), and a collection of vectors z containing the
objective functions’ values for each solution.
Output: The crowding distance P [i]dist for each solution in P
k = |P |1
forall i ∈ P do2
P [i]dist ← 03
forall M objectives do4
P = sort(P , h)5
P [1]dist|h←∞6
P [k]dist|h←∞7
forall i = 2 to (k − 1) do8
P [i]dist|h← P [i]dist|h+ (P [i+ 1]|h−P [i− 1]|h)/(hmax − hmin)9
return P [i]dist for each solution in P10
the normalised distance value is calculated as (X[i + 1]|h − X[i − 1]|h)/(hmax − hmin), where
hmax and hmin represent the maximum and minimum values of the h
th objective function,
respectively. The overall crowding distance for each objective is taken as the accumulated value
of the crowding distances of the individual solutions. An example of the crowding distance
measure of a solution in objective space for a bi-objective optimisation problem in which both
objective functions f1 and f2 have to be minimised is illustrated in Figure 5.6.3.5. Multiobjective evolutionary lgorithms 53
i
i− 1
i+ 1
f2(x)
f 1
(x
)
Figure 3.24: Illustration of the cuboid formed around a solution which is used in the calculation of its
crowding distance.
3.5.3 Selection
In evolutionary algorithms a process called selection is applied to parent solutions in the popu-
lation. Selection involves selecting parent solutions from the population to form a mating pool
with the aim of choosing solutions which have a better fitness values. The solutions contained
in the mating pool are then used to generate child solutions.
One parameter in the selection process, which may be used to favor better solutions, is the
selection pressure. The selection pressure may be seen as a means of improving the popula-
tion fitness over succeeding generations. Hence, the selection pressure has an impact on the
convergence rate of the algorithm [24]. An increased selection pressure will result in favoring
solutions having higher fitness values, which may result in a higher convergence rate. However,
it should be noted that the value of selection pressure should be chosen carefully as a high se-
lection pressure may result in the algorithm converging prematurely to a sub-optimal solution,
while a low selection pressure may result in unnecessarily slowing down the convergence rate
of the algorithm [24]. Various selection procedures exist which may be used in evolutionary
algorithms, including fitness proportion selection, truncation selection or tournament selection
and the interested reader is referred to [58] for a discussion on the workings of these selection
procedures.
It is important to include some form of elitism in the selection procedure. Incorporating elitism
into the selection procedure ensures that the best solutions in the current generation are trans-
fered to the next generation [16].
The selection procedure employed in the NSGA II is a binary tournament selection. Tournament
selection consists of hosting a tournament among n solutions. The solution having the largest
fitness value in the tournament, is considered the winner, and is included into the mating pool.
The selection pressure in tournament selection is represented by the value of n, called the size
of the tournament. An increased value of n will yield an increase in the selection pressure. The
reason for this is that the fitness of the winner of a larger tournament will, on average, have a
higher fitness than the winner of a smaller tournament [24]. It is recommended in [38] that the
selection pressure in the NSGA II may be varied between a value of two and five.
The selection procedure in the NSGA II works in such a way that parent solutions having lower
ranks are chosen. If two solutions have the same rank value, the solution having the largest
crowding distance is chosen [42]. After child solutions have been created, the parent and child
Figure 5.6: Cuboid formed around a solution in the calculation of its crowding distance in objective
space for bi-objective problem in which both objectives are to be minimised.
The selection procedure in the NSGA II employs two selection criteria. The rank assigned to
a solution serves as the first criterion by which to determine superiority between solutions. A
solution achieving a lower rank value is considered the superior solution, i.e. if rank i < rank j ,
then i ≺ j (denoting that solution i is superior to solution j). If, however, a pair of solutions
achieves the same rank value, then the crowding distance operator, denoted by ≺c, is employed as
a second selection criterion. The solution achieving the highest crowding distance is considered
the superior s lution as a means to br ak the tie, i.e. if rank i = rank j and idist|h > jdist|h,
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then i ≺c j . In this way, more solutions are explored in less crowded regions of the solution
space, which leads to a more uniformly spaced Pareto front approximation.
The population of candidate solutions P t during iteration t of the NSGA II is sorted and ranked
into fronts by applying the FNSA. Crowding distances are computed for each solution in P t and
an intermediate population Qt of offspring is generated by performing the binary tournament
selection procedure described in §5.3.2, as well as the crossover and mutation operators, to the
solutions in P t. The parent population P t and offspring population Qt are combined to form
a larger intermediate population Rt = P t ∪Qt of size 2N . This larger population Rt is then
sorted and ranked into nondominated fronts by again applying the FNSA. The next population
of candidate solutions P t+1 is generated by taking the solutions in the first nondominated front
F1, then the solutions in the second nondominated front F2, and so forth, until the population
size N is reached. If all the solutions in a particular front cannot be included in P t+1, the
solutions in that front are sorted in descending order with respect to their crowding distance
and solutions are added to P t+1 in this order until a population size of N is reached. Once the
initial population P 0 has been generated, the algorithm is iterated in the fashion described above
until a stopping criterion is reached, such as the generation counter t reaching a prespecified
maximum value. Once the stopping criterion has been reached, the set of approximately Pareto
optimal solutions are returned as output by the algorithm. A graphical illustration of the
formation of a new population P t+1 from the current population P t in the NSGA II may be
found in Figure 5.7.
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evolve in a carefully controlled manner over a number of iterations in the hope that they
will eventually approximate the entire set of Pareto optimal solutions closely.
In this paper, a well-known multiobjective volutionary algorithm, known as the Nondom-
inated Sorting Genetic Algorithtm II [1], is employed to solve the bi-objective WA model
(1)–(4). The NSGA II works in the following way. An initial population of candidate
solutions of size N is generated randomly. These solutions are then ranked and sorted by
using the Fas Nondominated Sorting Algorithm (FNSA) [1] which h s a computational
complexity of O(MN2), where M denotes the number of objectives in the multiobjective
optimisation problem. For each solution i, a dominance count dci (th number of solutions
that dominate i), and a set of solutions Si dominated by i, are computed. All solutions
achieving a dominance count value of dci = 0 are placed in a separate set F1, called the
first nondominated front, and are assigned rank 1. For ach s lut on i i F1, th algorithm
cycles through each solution j in Si, and decrements its d
c
j value by one, thus discounting
the effect of solution i on solution j’s dominance count. All t e r nk 2 solutions now
achieve a dominance count value of dci = 0, and are placed in a separate set F2 for the
algorithm to cycle through. The algorithm continues in this fashion until all the solutions
have been part tioned into ranks.
Rejected
Rejected
Pt+1Pt
Qt
Rt
Nondominated sorting sorting
Crowding distance
F1
F2
F3
Figure 1: The crossover procedure of the NSGA II [4].
Next, a crowding distance density measure is calculated for each candidate solution in
the population. This measure quantifies the density of solutions in the objective space
and requires the solutions in the population to be sorted in ascending order of magnitude
along each objective axis. Denote the objective function value of the ith candidate solution
for the hth objective (in the sorted list) by X[i]|h. The crowding distance for the ith
solution of the hth objective is then denoted by idist|h. An infinite crowding distance
is assigned to the boundary solutions, that is the solutions X[1]|h and X[k]|h, so as to
ensure that they are selected for crossover. The crowding distances of the intermediate
solutions i are incremented by the normalised distance between their closest neighboring
solutions. More specifically, the normalised distance value is calculated as (X[i + 1]|h −
X[i − 1]|h)/(hmax − hmin), where hmax and hmin represent the maximum and minimum
values of the hth objective function, respectively. The overall crowding distance for each
objective is taken as the accumulated value of the crowding distances of the individual
solutions. The crowding distances are used to quantify the solution density in the sense
Figure 5.7: High-level schematic of the formation of a new population P t+1 from the current population
P t in the NSGA II [39].
In 2010, Bullinaria and Garcia-Najera [26] developed a multi-objective evolutionary algorithm
that is based on the NSGA II, but is specifically aimed at solving a multi-objective optimisation
problem which is based on the vehicle routing problem with time windows. The reason for
including a discussion on this solution approach here is that it is used to solve one of the WAMs
proposed later in this chapter.
The algorithm developed by Bullinaria and Garcia-Najera [26] follows the same steps as those of
the NSGA II described earlier. The main difference is the way in which solutions are selected for
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recombination. The selection procedure proposed in the algorithm employs two selection criteria.
The first parent is selected based on its fitness value (i.e. the number of the nondominated front
in objective space in which the solution resides) while the second parent is chosen based on
a diversity preservation measure known as a similarity measure. This measure evaluates how
similar a solution is to the rest of the solutions in the current population. Solutions with small
similarity values are preferred to solutions with large similarity values in a bid to explore a more
diverse region of the solution space. The similarity measure adopted in the algorithm is based
on Jaccard’s similarity coefficient [95], which measures the similarity between two sets X and Y
as the ratio
J(X,Y ) =
|X ∩ Y |
|X ∪ Y | . (5.8)
If both the sets X and Y share the same elements, then |X∩Y | = |X∪Y | and so J(X,Y ) = 1. If,
at the other extreme, the sets share no elements, then J(X,Y ) = |X∩Y | = 0. In all other cases,
J(X,Y ) ∈ (0, 1). The similarities of the solutions in the population are similarly calculated
as the ratio of the number of assignments shared by both solutions to the total number of
assignments present in both solutions combined. Hence, if both solutions are exactly the same,
they will achieve a similarity value of 1, whereas if they are distinct in all their assignments,
they will achieve a similarity value of 0. The similarity value of a single solution with respect
to the rest of the solutions in the population is taken as the average of the similarities achieved
by the solution with respect to all the other solutions in the population, considered one at a
time [26].
5.5 Chapter summary
This chapter was dedicated to a discussion on solution methodologies for solving WAMs. The
solution approaches were discussed in three groups. The chapter opened with descriptions
of the working of two exact optimisation approaches in §5.1, i.e. the (explicit) method of total
enumeration and the celebrated (implicit) branch-and-bound method due to Doig and Land [57].
Although exact solution approaches are able to find globally optimal solutions to optimisation
problems, they are typically computationally expensive and are often abandoned in favour of
computationally less expensive solution approaches which are able to find good solutions that
are not necessarily optimal. Such solution approaches fall within the realms of heuristics and
metaheuristics.
In §5.2, the focus shifted to a brief review on heuristics. Iterative and constructive heuristics
were outlined briefly and various greedy algorithms for solving the WAP were also mentioned.
In §5.3, two well-known metaheuristics for solving single-objective optimisation problems were
discussed in general. The first was the trajectory-based method of simulated annealing due
to Kirkpatrick et al. [104] and the second was a population-based solution approach, namely
a genetic algorithm due to Holland [88]. Pseudocode descriptions of the working of all these
algorithms were also provided.
Since some of the WAMs proposed later in this dissertation are multi-objective optimisation
problems, §5.4 was finally devoted to descriptions of multi-objective optimisation incarnations
of the aforementioned two metaheuristics. These algorithmic extensions were the DBMOSA
proposed by Smith et al. [173] and the NSGA II developed by Agarwal et al. [2]. Pseudocode
descriptions of the working of these algorithmic extensions were also provided.
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In this chapter, a generic WA design architecture is put forward for inclusion as a part of an
integrated GBAD TEWA DSS. This architecture is considered the principal contribution of the
research presented in this dissertation.
The chapter opens in §6.1 with a brief discussion on three general methods that may be followed
when developing a DSS. In §6.2, the focus shifts to a brief discussion on the design of a generic
WA subsystem architecture in particular. The proposed architecture contains two smaller sub-
systems, i.e. an EQ subsystem and a WA subsystem. Each of these subsystems comprises two
components which are discussed in detail.
The first component of the EQ subsystem is called the Physical Element Filter (PEF) component
and is described in detail in §6.3. A method for discretising SSHP information and filtering this
information for environmental conditions and terrain obstructions is discussed and illustrated
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by means of worked examples. The second component of the EQ subsystem is called the EEM
component and is described in §6.4. A straight flight path prediction model and a probabilistic
area prediction model are described for predicting the future flight paths of threats. An example
is also provided of how the probabilistic area prediction model may be used to predict the future
SSHP values that WSs can achieve with respect to threats. A brief discussion follows on how
the EEM may be constructed.
The WA subsystem architecture proposed in this chapter requires input from the TE subsystem
as well as information preprocessed in the EQ subsystem. The scope of this dissertation is,
however, limited to the design of a WA subsystem architecture and the assumption is therefore
made that the threats have been identified, classified and evaluated, and that threat values have
been assigned to them accordingly — this value also takes into account the importance of the
DAs. In 2008, Potgieter [145] laid the ground work for methods of discretising SSHP information
and filtering this information for environmental conditions and terrain obstructions. He also
touched upon methods for predicting the future flight paths of threats. Therefore, the methods
and worked examples presented in the early part of this chapter on discretising and filtering
SSHP information follows the general exposition of Potgieter and include descriptions of the
examples used by him, rather than constructing new examples illustrating the working of these
methods.
The principal component of the WA subsystem is called the WAM component and is described
in detail in §6.5. Four classes of WAMs ranging in different levels of complexity are proposed
for inclusion in the WAM component. These classes are single-objective static WAMs, multi-
objective static WAMs, single-objective dynamic WAMs and multi-objective dynamic WAMs.
A prototype from each of these classes is selected and discussed in detail. The four WAM
prototypes are presented in increasing order of complexity. To the best knowledge of the author,
there are no WAMs in the most complex class of WAMs (i.e. the class of multi-objective dynamic
WAMs). A new tri-objective dynamic WAM is therefore formulated for use in the final class of
the WAM component proposed here — this is also considered one of the novel contributions of
this dissertation.
Another WA subsystem component is the WASS component and this component is briefly dis-
cussed in §6.6. It is proposed that a number of solution methodologies be employed concurrently
to solve the WAM configured by the FCO within the WAM component and that the solutions
obtained from all these methodologies be combined and sorted based on the notion of solution
dominance as described in §4.3 so as to obtain a high-quality set of nondominated solutions for
presentation to the FCO as real time DS.
The chronological order of events envisaged to occur within a single TEWA cycle is next discussed
and elucidated in detail in §6.7. The chapter finally closes in §6.8 with a brief summary of the
chapter contents.
6.1 Decision support system design approaches
Doucet [60] and Kimble [103] described the function of a DSS as a tool that is able to support a
decision maker (or a group of decision makers) within an organisation by providing them with
information that would otherwise be difficult to obtain without the help of the system. The aim
in developing an effective DSS is that it should be well designed and constructed by taking the
skill level of the end-user into consideration, since the success of the system is determined by
the way in which the end-user is able to use the system comfortably and understand the results
provided by the system [103]. Doucet [60] defined three essential elements of a DSS.
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These elements are a database, a graphical user interface and a model base. The database of a
DSS allows for the structured storage of all information relevant to the decision making process of
the organisation. It forms a central part of the system and typically provides the link between all
the components contained in the DSS. A well-designed database may lead to a DSS that is able
to perform well [127]. A number of database models exist in the open literature which affect the
way in which data are stored in a DSS. Obbayi [138] mentions five main types of database models,
namely flat file-based (such databases contain binary or human-readable text formats), relational-
based (such databases normalise the data and store the results thereof in tables), hierarchical
(such databases are tree-like in nature and operate in a parent-child way — the relationship
is typically one-to-many), network (such databases are similar to hierarchical databases, but
the relationships are typically of the kind many-to-one) and object-orientated (such databases
are typically constructed with the intention of being linked with object-orientated programming
languages and the data are typically partitioned into objects from where it is accessed). French
[70] explained that although there are a number of database types that can be used in the
development of DSS, it should be noted that each database structure has its own strengths and
limitations and that an appropriate database should be selected and tailored (should the need
occur) to fit the needs of the organisation.
The graphical user interface forms an integral part of a DSS since it may be seen as the link
between the human operating the DSS and the computerised DSS. It also allows for a human
to interact with the DSS (typically via a computer display screen) in terms of providing various
inputs and also viewing results returned by the DSS. Kendall and Kendall [101], as well as
Stone et al. [179], accentuated the fact that a graphical user interface should be usable in the
sense that the human interacting with the system should be able to engage effortlessly with
the system and comfortably perform his duties. Benyon [16] further advocated that the design
of a well-structured graphical user interface should aim to find a good balance between not
overwhelming human operators with information and providing them with an unclear graphical
user face which may cause confusion on the part of the operator. It is therefore important
to understand the needs of the end-user as well as his capabilities when designing a graphical
user interface — the end-user should continually be consulted during the development of a
DSS. Mandel [124] provided three guidelines to be followed during the development stages of a
graphical user interface: (1) give the user adequate authority over the graphical user interface,
(2) decrease the user’s cognitive load and (3) create a consistent graphical user interface so as
to avoid additional confusion.
The model base element constitutes the component of the DSS in which models reside that are
used to solve problems in order to obtain various alternatives during the decision making process
— it forms the heart of the system since it is here where the actual DSS results (presented to
the human operator) are computed. Models employed in the model component may take many
forms such as, for example, a mathematical algorithm or a combination of various mathematical
algorithms. When a combination of such mathematical algorithms is used, it should further
be decided whether the models should be implemented in a competing manner (in which case
the results from the model achieving the best results may be returned as output by the DSS)
or whether the models should be implemented in a complementary manner (in which case the
results from the models may be combined when formulating DS). When choosing to combine the
output from all the models of the system, the problem of how these results should be combined
arises.
In order to develop a well-structured DSS, a systems development methodology may be employed.
Walters et al. [205] defined a systems development methodology as “an array of operations,
tools, techniques and documentation methods that may assist system analysts in the creation
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24 Chapter 2. Information systems and data preparation
Figure 2.5: Seven phases of the systems development life cycle (SDLC), adapted from Kendall and
Kendall [103, p. 36].
2.3.4 The traditional structured waterfall methodology
According to Modha et al. [150], the last few decades have seen a number of new SDMs. The first
development of such methodologies occurred during the so-called pre-methodology era around
the time when computers were introduced to the business world. During this time, systems
for computers were developed without following any defined methodologies — developers rather
relied heavily on experience. In addition, these development projects were seen as short-term
solutions or ad hoc solutions to very specific problems, rather than long-term investments to
improve general decision making in organisations [13], [241].
Despite system analysts of the era having adequate programming skills, Avison and Fitzgerald
[13] argue that they often fell short in respect of having true understanding of the organisations
for which the systems were intended or the contexts within which the systems were to be
employed. This shortcoming arose predominantly from a lack of proper communication between
the system analysts and clients or final users. The lack of proper communication often produced
poorly described user requirements [241] and, in turn, resulted in systems being implemented
that simply did not provide the value to the user’s company they could have [12].
These shortcomings left the market desiring a more structured and concise approach to the
development of ISs, marking the start of the early methodology era, and resulted in the first of
the SDMs, known as structured methodologies [12], [13]. These methodologies are identifiable by
their properly documented processes and systematically arranged phases. One such structured
methodology is the traditional waterfall methodology.
Dennis et al. [53, p. 8] describe the waterfall methodology as a top-down and precise approach
in which the methodology’s phases are completed sequentially as the entire process is properly
documented. Mohammad [151, p. 3–4] adds that with the waterfall methodology it is not an
option to return to a previous phase, but rather that one may only proceed forward as if
descending in phases over a series of cliffs. At each of the phases the approval of the stakeholders
is first required, after they have considered the progress and current documentation, before the
process may proceed to the next phase — hence the name waterfall.
Many variations on this methodology have emerged since Royce’s original model, but the ver-
sion presented by Dennis et al. [53, p. 8] partition the waterfall methodology into four phases.
Figure 6.1: Seven phases in the systems development life cycle of a system development methodology
proposed by Kendall and Kendall [101].
of DSS.” Such systems development metho ologies share a number of core components with
the development process of a DSS. These compo ents are known as the systems development
life cycle and Kendall and Kendall [101] described seven of these phases, which are illustrated
graphi ally in Figure 6.1. These seven phases merely serve as a f undation from which a DSS
may be developed and tailor-made phases may be developed for different types of DS. Three
popular systems development methodologies are the waterfall method, the agile method and the
object-orientated method:
Waterfall method. This met d may be described as a top-dow (and precise) approach in
the sense that the phases in the method are completed sequentially as the method is
documented [55]. Furthermore, the method is structured in such a way that one cannot
return to a previous phase as one progresses through the phases. One is only allowed to
proceed forward — similar to water moving over a series of cliffs. As progression is made
along the various phases, the approval of the organisation (or stakeholders) are sought
first at each stag , before th next stage ay commence — he e the name waterfall.
Advantages of adopting the waterfall method include that it is simpler to manage the
overall development process of a DSS since a number of milestones are typically set for
each phase and are measured against regular development updates. Furthermore, proper
documentation of the phases and system requirements are known in advance [55]. One of
the major disadvantages of the waterfall meth d is that there is not much time t revise
design work which makes the task of designing an entire system the r tically on paper
very challenging. Also, the waterfall method typically involves a long development process
which may lead to a DSS that successfully meets user requirements, but may not be of
much use by the time that it is built due to possible changes in the environment of the
organisation.
Agile method. This method was originally developed to speed up syste development in or-
der to counter the disadvantages associated with more traditional systems development
methodologies. In addition, the agile method is more aimed at identifying and appropri-
ately following user requirements, as well as developing a DSS that is practical to imple-
ment, rather than creating a DSS in theory. Advantages of the agile method include that
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a faster delivery of a DSS is possible and that developers of the DSS are able to amend and
improve the DSS at any stage during the development process. Disadvantages associated
with the agile method typically arise from the incorrect implementation thereof or from
human error, as opposed to flaws in the methodology itself.
Object-orientated method. This method may be described as a bottom-up approach (as
opposed to the top-down waterfall approach). It partitions the DSS into objects con-
taining data, such as locations, events, people or actual components of the DSS. These
objects are then grouped together into classes containing similar objects and share related
characteristics.
The WA process architecture proposed in this chapter is put forward in order to provide a first-
order “blue print” design which may be consulted for practical implementation purposes at a
later stage. The architecture was designed as a theoretical concept in close conjunction with two
military experts [146, 160] and, more importantly, two FCOs [160, 200] (who are the end-users
in the context of GBAD) — the military experts and FCOs were consulted on a continual basis
throughout the development process. They also approved various phases during the development
of the generic WA DSS architecture put forward in this chapter. The working of the components
of the architecture and their characteristics are outlined and carefully documented in this chapter
and the following two chapters in accordance with the waterfall design approach described above.
Although a number of working examples are provided in order to illustrate the working of the
concepts in the proposed theoretical design, the DS which emanates from these concepts may not
be sufficient to use as is in a practical setting at some later stage if the generic WA architecture
were to be considered for implementation. Developers of DSSs would have to be consulted in
order to facilitate an effective practical implementation of the design and such implementation
would require that the developers of the system be able to make changes and suggest improve-
ments to the DSS design during any stage of the practical implementation process. In addition,
the software developers working on a computerised incarnation of the theoretical concept put
forward in this chapter would have to work in close conjunction with military experts and FCOs
who would again have to approve all the various phases during the practical implementation of
the system. The characteristics associated with such an implementation procedure conform to
the characteristics associated with the waterfall and agile design methods. It is therefore advo-
cated that a combination of these two methods be used in any eventual practical implementation
of the WA process architecture design proposed in this chapter.
6.2 A generic WA subsystem architecture
A generic WA process architecture is proposed in this section for use within a larger, integrated
TEWA DSS. It is proposed that the processes involved in WA be subdivided into activities
performed by two smaller subsystems which should be activated consecutively within each cycle
of the TEWA DSS working. The first subsystem is the EQ subsystem. Recall, from §2.5.1, that
each GBAD WS is associated with a measure of effectiveness (an SSHP value) according to which
it can achieve success in respect of the engagement of threats. The aim of the EQ subsystem is
to utilise the SSHP information of WSs (in conjunction with other information) so as to obtain
a single SSHP value for each WS-threat pair for each time stage in the decision period time
continuum under consideration. It is further proposed that the EQ subsystem comprise two
components (which should also be activated consecutively within each cycle of the TEWA DSS
working), known as the PEF component and the EEM component.
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Figure 6.2: The EQ and WA subsystems which form part of the larger WA part of an integrated
TEWA DSS.
The second subsystem of the proposed architecture is the WA subsystem, which forms an essential
part of the real-time DS provided to the FCO, since it is here where proposed assignments of
WSs to threats are determined. It is further proposed that the WA subsystem also contains two
components, known as the WAM component and the Weapon Assignment Solution Selection
(WASS) component.
The EQ and WA subsystems, as well as their components, are illustrated graphically in Fig-
ure 6.2. Each of the four aforementioned components, as well as the interaction between them,
is discussed in detail in the remaining sections of this chapter.
6.3 The physical element filter component
The first component activated within each working cycle of the proposed WA architecture of
Figure 6.2 is the PEF component. The main purpose of the PEF component is to fuse a number
of data sets into a single data set in the format required by the EEM component and other
components of the WA subsystem. This is achieved in two phases within the PEF component.
The first phase involves the discretisation of the estimated effectiveness values achieved by the
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WSs when they are assigned to engage aerial threats, and the second phase involves predicting
the future flight paths of threats by means of a mathematical prediction model. These two
phases are discussed in some detail in this section.
6.3.1 The method of WS effectiveness information discretisation
The SSHP values achievable by WSs with respect to aerial threats are functions of the three-
dimensional volume surrounding the WS. In order for the WA subsystem to utilise these SSHP
values, a method of discretisation of the SSHP information is required. Potgieter [145] proposed
that a three-dimensional grid be superimposed over the SSHP volume of WSs in order to dis-
cretise the information. By superimposing such a grid over the SSHP volume, each cell in the
grid is assigned a single SSHP value which corresponds to the SSHP partition in which the cell
predominantly lies. Care should, however, be taken in selecting the coarseness of this grid which
determines the eventual size of the EQ matrix. Selecting too coarse a grid may result in an
unacceptable loss of valuable SSHP information whereas selecting too fine a grid may result in
an unacceptable increase in the complexity of subsequent computations which have to be carried
out during actual WA. The output of the discretisation procedure is a three-dimensional SSHP
matrix containing an entry in each cell which represents the anticipated hit probability (or the
effectiveness) value of a particular WS with respect to eliminating a threat finding itself in that
cell. Such an SSHP matrix has to be constructed for each WS.
The orientations of GBAD WSs are not necessarily fixed. WS ammunition may be fired in
different directions within a WS’s fire arc, which means that the shape of the SSHP volume
surrounding a WSs is not fixed, but rather differs for each one of the possible orientations of the
WS. This implies that the SSHP matrix is a function of WS orientation. It is therefore advocated
that the SSHP volume of a WS (as specified for a fixed orientation by its manufacturer) be
discretised for each of a finite set of representative orientations that a WS may adopt within its
fire arc. In this way an SSHP matrix is obtained for each of the permissible orientations of the
WS within its fire arc. Furthermore, it is assumed that each of these different orientations are
mutually exclusive — a WS may therefore adopt only one orientation at a given time stage τ .
Let W denote a set of nw GBAD WS types available to the own force, let V denote a set of nv
aircraft available to the opposing force, let E be a set of ne weapons that may be carried by the
aircraft in V, and let A be a set of na attack techniques that can be flown by the aircraft in V.
Furthermore, letM τ (w, v, e, a) denote the resulting SSHP matrix for time stage τ corresponding
to a WS of type w ∈W for the following formative threat combination: an aircraft of type v ∈ V
carrying weapons of type e ∈ E and executing an attack technique a ∈ A. In order to illustrate
the process involved in the discretisation of the SSHP volume in order to populate the matrix
M τ (w, v, e, a), consider the following two-dimensional example taken (in a slightly adapted form)
from Potgieter [145].
Example 6.1 (Discretising SSHPs) Suppose that the opposing force has only two types of
aircraft at its disposal, that these aircraft may be equipped with one of three possible weapon
types, and that these types of weapons may be delivered by executing one of three possible attack
techniques according to the doctrine of the opposing force. Suppose, furthermore, that only one
GBAD WS type is available to the own force for engaging enemy aircraft. Let these GBAD
elements be captured as follows using the set notation introduced above:
W = {1[Man-portable SAM]}, with nw = 1;
V = {1[Hawk], 2[Grippen]}, with nv = 2;
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E = {1[Guns and Cannons], 2[Rockets], 3[Free falling bombs]}, with ne = 3; and
A = {1[Combat hump dive], 2[Toss bomb], 3[Combat turn dive]}, with na = 3.
Assume that an aircraft of the opposing force is of type 2 [Grippen], is carrying type 2 [Rockets]
weapons and is executing a type 1 [Combat hump dive] attack technique. Suppose that an SSHP
matrix is sought for time stage τ0 in respect of a WS of type 1 [Man-portable SAM]. The SSHP
matrix M τ0(1, 2, 2, 1) is therefore sought.4.1. Single Shot Hit Probabilities 35
WS
N
WS Range
Figure 4.5: A two dimensional top view of a WS with a fixed range, a northerly orientation and
SSHP information specified within the fixed range.
Suppose the partitioned SSHP information presented in Example 4.1 is considered for discretisa-
tion. A rather coarse two dimensional grid is placed over the SSHP information for illustrative
purposes (see Figure 4.6).
Each cell in the grid is allocated the colour of the partition in which it predominantly lies. For
instance, the largest part of the cell in row 3 and column 9 is covered by the partition associated
with a 65% SSHP (see Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 (a)) and thus that whole square is related
to the 65% partition and asssigned the colour of that partition (see Figure 4.6(b)). A SSHP
matrix may now be generated in which a cell in the matrix corresponds to a cell in the grid and
where the entry of each cell in the matrix is the probability associated with the colour of the
corresponding cell in the grid.
For the purpose of this and following examples, assume that the enemy has only two types of
aircraft and three types of weapons at his disposal which may be delivered by one of three known
attack techniques of the enemy. The following sets may be populated:
V = {1 [Hawk], 2 [Gripen]}, with nv = 2;
W = {1 [Guns and Cannons], 2 [Rockets], 3 [Free Falling Bombs]}, with nw = 3;
T = {1 [Combat Hump Dive], 2 [Toss Bombing], 3 [Combat Turn Dive]}, with nt = 3.
Assume further that only one type of WS is available with which to engage enemy aircraft and
the following set may be populated:
E = {1 [Man-Portable SAM]}, with ne = 1.
For the puposes of this example, assume that the SSHP matrix is created at time step τ0 cor-
responding to WS type 1 [Man-Portable SAM] for the specific combination of aircraft type 2
[Gripen], weapon type 2 [Rockets] and attack technique 1 [Combat Hump Dive]. This matrix is
given in Figure 4.7. 
CONFIDENTIAL
Figure 6.3: (a) T p view of a WS with a fixed range assuming a northerly orientation and (b) SSHP
values at a fixed height in the surrounding area of the WS, as supplied by the WS manufacturer [145].
Next, suppose the WS of type 1 [Man-p rtable SAM] has a fixed range, assumes a northerly
or e tation and shoots projectiles at an angle. Suppose further that the WS ach eves a maximum
SSHP value of 90% in areas of space above it which lie within close proximity of the WS and
that the SSHP values generally diminish as the distance from the SSHP increases. The SSHP
values may, for example, be distributed in two dimensions as shown in Figure 6.3 for a fixed
aircraft height.
Suppose a coarse, two-dimen ional grid is s perimposed over the SSHP information of Fig-
ure 6.3 as illustrated in Figure 6.4(a). E ch cell in the g d is as igne the colour of the cell i
which it predominantly lies. Consider, for example, row 3 and column 9 in the discretisation
in Figure 6.4. The colour which predominantly covers this cell corresponds to a 65% SSHP in
Figure 6.3 — hence this cell is assigned a SSHP value of 65%. This procedure may be repeated
for each cell in the grid in order to obtain a SSHP value for each cell, resulting in the two-
dimensional SSHP matrix for the specific height in question above the WS shown in Figure 6.5.
This procedure has to be repeated for a range of possible aircraft heights in order to obtain a full
three-dimensional SSHP matrix. It is, however, assumed here that this matrix is invariant as a
function of aircraft height (i.e. that each horizontal slice of the matrix is the same). Although
this assumption is not realistic, it is made for the purposes of simplicity and brevity in all the
numerical examples presented as mere concept demonstrations throughout this chapter. 
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Figure 4.6: (a) A two dimensional top view of a grid placed over the SSHP information and (b)
the cells related to the partition in which it predominantly lies.
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0 15 15 15 15 65 65 65 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 65 65 65 15 15 15 15 0
0 15 15 30 30 30 65 65 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 65 65 30 30 30 15 15 0
0 15 15 30 30 30 65 65 65 90 90 90 90 90 65 65 65 30 30 30 15 15 0
15 15 15 30 30 30 30 45 65 65 90 90 90 65 65 45 30 30 30 30 15 15 15
15 15 15 30 30 30 45 45 45 90 90 90 90 90 45 45 45 30 30 30 15 15 15
0 15 15 15 30 30 45 45 45 90 90 90 90 90 45 45 45 30 30 15 15 15 0
0 15 15 15 15 30 45 45 45 90 90 90 90 90 45 45 45 30 15 15 15 15 0
0 0 15 15 15 15 45 45 45 45 90 90 90 45 45 45 45 15 15 15 15 0 0
0 0 0 15 15 15 15 45 45 45 45 15 45 45 45 45 15 15 15 15 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 15 15 15 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Figure 4.7: The SSHP matrix Mτ0(1, 2, 2, 1).
4.1.2 Filtered Discretised SSHPs
For the purposes of this thesis it is assumed that the SSHP information specification occurs
without consideration of a number of conditions of the tactical environment that may adversely
influence the effectiveness of WSs in real-time. Let U denote the set of environmental conditions
CONFIDENTIAL
Figure 6.4: (a) Top view of a coarse two-dimensional grid placed over the SSHP information of Figure 6.3
and (b) the c rresponding cells relating o the partition in which it predominantly lies [145].

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 15 15 15 15 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 15 15 15 15 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 15 15 15 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 15 15 15 0 0 0
0 0 15 15 15 65 65 65 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 65 65 65 15 15 15 0 0
0 0 15 15 15 65 65 65 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 65 65 65 15 15 15 0 0
0 15 15 15 15 65 65 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 65 65 15 15 15 15 0
0 15 15 15 15 65 65 65 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 65 65 65 15 15 15 15 0
0 15 15 30 30 30 65 65 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 65 65 30 30 30 15 15 0
0 15 15 30 30 30 65 65 65 90 90 90 90 90 65 65 65 30 30 30 15 15 0
15 15 15 30 30 30 30 45 65 65 90 90 90 65 65 45 30 30 30 30 15 15 15
15 15 15 30 30 30 45 45 45 90 90 90 90 90 45 45 45 30 30 30 15 15 15
0 15 15 15 30 30 45 45 45 90 90 90 90 90 45 45 45 30 30 15 15 15 0
0 15 15 15 15 30 45 45 45 90 90 90 90 90 45 45 45 30 15 15 15 15 0
0 0 15 15 15 15 45 45 45 45 90 90 90 45 45 45 45 15 15 15 15 0 0
0 0 0 15 15 15 15 45 45 45 45 15 45 45 45 45 15 15 15 15 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 15 15 15 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Figure 6.5: The SSHP matrix M τ0(1, 2, 2, 1) obtained from Figure 6.4(b) in Example 6.1 [145].
6.3.2 Filtering of discretised single shot hit probabilities
The SSHP values of WSs, estimated by their manufacturers, typically do not take into account
the effects that external elements in the tactical environment have on the effectiveness of WSs
in real time, such as meteorological conditions (e.g. precipitation, wind strength and direction,
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or cloud cover) or terrain obstacles (i.e. line-of-sight restrictions). In order to make provision
for constraints or masking effects imposed by these elements on the battlefield, the SSHP values
supplied by WS manufactures should be filtered appropriately, discounting these values for such
elements.
Furthermore, the aforementioned discounting process should take into account the effects of
different levels of intensities of the external element (e.g. wind may be divided into levels of no
wind, light breeze, moderate breeze, light gale, moderate gale and strong gale, which may have
the following respective effects on the WS: none, little effect, a notable effect, a large effect, a
significant effect, a substantial effect). Let U denote a set of nu environmental conditions which
may affect the effectiveness of WSs and let Lu denote a set of n` intensity levels associated
with environmental condition u. Again, it is assumed here that the various levels involved in
a particular environmental condition are mutually exclusive events in order to ensure that only
one level may be active at a given time stage τ . Furthermore, let M˜
u`
τ (w, v, e, a) denote the
efficiency matrix containing the discounted SSHP value entry at time stage τ for environmental
condition u ∈ U at intensity level (u`) ∈ Lu for a WS of type w ∈W and for the following aircraft
(threat) combination: an aircraft of type v ∈ V, carrying weapons of type e ∈ E and executing
an attack technique a ∈ A. Also, let M˜ u`τ (w, v, e, a)x,y,z denote the entry of the efficiency matrix
M˜
u`
τ (w, v, e, a) at position (x, y, z)
As in the case of the original SSHP values of WSs, information with respect to the effects that
different environmental conditions may have on the SSHP values of WSs should be quantified
during the pre-deployment stages of a mission. A simulation model may, for example, be used
to run a number of simulated replications for each discretised cell in the surrounding area of the
WSs in order to determine the effects that a given environmental condition may have on the
effectiveness of the WSs. The reason for having to run a simulation experiment for each cell
in the surrounding area of the WS is that the SSHP values that WS are able to achieve (see
Figure 6.3) are affected differently by environmental conditions in different regions surrounding
the WS. An estimation of the SSHP values of the WSs may then be made for different levels of
intensities of the environmental condition in question by fitting a regression curve through the
simulation results — the method of least squares may, for example, be used for this purpose.
A regression would therefore have to be executed for each specific cell in the discretised SSHP
volume of Figure 6.3 surrounding the WS. The expected WS SSHP values may be obtained
by mapping the mid-point of the range of the intensity level to the regression curve for the
environmental condition under consideration at the specific intensity level. The discounted
SSHP value M˜ τ (w, v, e, a)
u`
x,y,z may then be obtained by reading out the value of the regression
curve or by calculating it using the regression function obtained. The aforementioned process
of discounting SSHP values for environmental conditions is illustrated by means of a numerical
example.
Example 6.2 (Filtering SSHP information for weather conditions) This example fol-
lows on Example 6.1; the SSHP matrix of Figure 6.5 is assumed as a point of departure. Suppose
that WSs in the battlefield may be subject to one of two environmental conditions in the set:
U = {1[Rain], 2[Wind]}, with nu = 2.
Suppose further that the same configuration of WS type and aircraft type as considered in Exam-
ple 6.1 is again applicable and that a simulation model has been executed subject to environmental
condition 1[Rain]. Assume that the output of the simulation model yielded the results presented
in Table 6.1 for row 3 and column 9 of the SSHP matrix (involving an entry of 65%) in Fig-
ure 6.4. When these results are plotted, the corresponding graph in Figure 6.6 is obtained and it
is clear from the figure that the relation between SSHP and rain may be modelled as an approxi-
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mately linear relationship. The regression function Y = a+ bX+  may therefore be fitted to the
data points of the simulation, where Y denotes the effectiveness of the WS when X amount of
rain is falling. The residual  is a random variable with mean zero, while a and b are parameters
to be estimated. Let yi denote the i
th measured SSHP value when an amount xi of rain falls.
The parameters a and b of the regression function may be estimated by minimising the sum of
the squared errors
R2 =
∑
i
[yi − (a+ bxi)]2. (6.1)
In order to achieve a minimum value for R2, the first partial derivative of R2 with respect to
both the parameters a and b must be zero, i.e.
∂R2
∂a
= −2
n∑
i=1
[yi − (a+ bxi)] = 0 (6.2)
and
∂R2
∂b
= −2
n∑
i=1
[yi − (a+ bxi)]xi = 0. (6.3)
When simplifying (6.2) and (6.3), the equations
na+ b
n∑
i=1
xi =
n∑
i=1
yi (6.4)
and
a
n∑
i=1
xi + b
n∑
i=1
x2i =
n∑
i=1
xiyi (6.5)
are obtained. By solving (6.4) and (6.5) simultaneously for the data in Table 6.1, it is found that
a = 0.6372 and b = −0.0609. Since the value of the parameter a lies very close to the original
SSHP value of 65%, it may be taken as 65% instead of 0.6372 — recall the assumption that the
SSHP is the WS effectiveness without the effect of any external elements.
With a = 0.65, it follows instead that b = −0.0640. The resulting regression function y = 0.65−
0.0640x may be used to calculate the expected WS effectiveness for each level of rainfall. Suppose
that the environmental condition rain may be divided into the levels none, light, moderate and
heavy, and that each of these levels is associated with the following range mid-points: 0mm/h,
1mm/h, 3mm/h and 5mm/h, respectively. The expected SSHP values for each of these levels
may then be taken from the regression graph in Figure 6.6, calculated as illustrated in Table 6.2.
In the examples presented thus far, the effects of physical terrain obstacles on WS efficiency
were ignored. It is, however, possible that a deployment of WSs is required in areas which
Rain (mm/h) 2.32 3.48 0.58 2.90 1.74 1.16 4.64 5.80 0.00 4.06 5.22
Efficiency (%) 48.21 41.67 57.44 52.83 49.95 59.72 43.41 25.54 65.00 28.90 34.06
Table 6.1: Simulated WS efficiencies at different intensities of rainfall.
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Suppose the partitioned SSHP information presented in Example 4.1 is considered. For the
purpose of this example, assume a WS of type 1 [Man-Portable SAM] is simulated subject to
environmental condition 2 [Rain] for the specific combination of aircraft type 2 [Gripen], weapon
type 2 [Rockets] and attack technique 1 [Combat Hump Dive]. Consider the WS efficiency data
set as output of this simulation for the point corresponding to the cell in row 3 and column 9 of
the SSHP matrix (which has an entry of 65%) shown in Table 4.1.
Rain (mm/h) 2.32 3.48 0.58 2.90 1.74 1.16 4.64 5.8 0.00 4.06 5.22
Efficiency (%) 48.21 41.67 57.44 52.83 49.95 59.72 43.41 25.54 65.00 28.90 34.06
Table 4.1: WS efficiency at different levels of rain.
The relation between rain and WS efficiency is assumed to be linear (see Figure 4.8) and the
regression function, given by Y = α + βX + ǫ, may be fitted to the data, where Y denotes the
WS efficiency under X amount of rain (with the residual, ǫ, a random variable with mean zero).
The parameters of the regression line, α and β, may now be determined by minimising the sum
of the squared errors
R2 ≡
∑
i
[yi − (a+ bxi)]2 ,
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Figure 4.8: A visual representation of the data in Table 4.1 and a regression line fitted to it.
where yi, xi, a and b are the i
th measured efficiency, the ith measured amount of rain and the
two estimation parameters respectively. To achieve this minimum, the first partial derivative of
R2 with respect to both parameters a and b must be zero, thus
∂R2
∂a
= −2
n∑
i=1
[yi − (a+ bxi)] = 0,
∂R2
∂b
= −2
n∑
i=1
[yi − (a+ bxi)] xi = 0.
CONFIDENTIAL
Figure 6.6: Graphical representation of the data in Table 6.1 and a regression line fitted to the data [145].
M˜
1,0
τ (1, 2, 2, 1)3,9 = 0.65− (0.0640× 0) = 0.65
M˜
1,1
τ (1, 2, 2, 1)3,9 = 0.65− (0.0640× 1) = 0.5860,
M˜
1,2
τ (1, 2, 2, 1)3,9 = 0.65− (0.0640× 3) = 0.4579,
M˜
1,3
τ (1, 2, 2, 1)3,9 = 0.65− (0.0640× 5) = 0.3299,
Table 6.2: The expected effectiveness values of the WS in Example 6.2 for row 3 and column 9 of the
discounted SSHP matrix M˜
u`
τ (w, v, e, a) for the different levels of rain: none, light, moderate and heavy.
pose restrictions on the effectiveness that WSs are able to achieve due to uneven terrain. These
restrictions typically result in occlusion of certain regions in the tactical environment and WS
efficiencies have to be adjusted for these restrictions accordingly. Examples of such restrictions
include mountain ranges and large hills. A terrain filter matrix having the same dimensions as
the efficiency matrix M˜
u`
τ (w, v, e, a) may be constructed for this purpose which discounts the
SSHP values for terrain restrictions. Let M τ (w, v, e, a) denote a binary terrain filter matrix at
time stage τ for a WS of type w ∈ W and for the following aircraft (threat) combination: an
aircraft of type v ∈ V, carrying weapons of type e ∈ E and executing an attack technique a ∈ A.
The efficiency matrix M˜
u`
τ (w, v, e, a) may the be multiplied in an element-by-element fashion by
the terrain filter matrix M τ (w, v, e, a) to obtain a so-called Weapon System Effectiveness Matrix
(WSEM) used as input to the WA subsystem. Let Mˆ τ (w, v, e, a) denote the resulting WSEM
containing the SSHP values discounted for environmental conditions and terrain restrictions at
time stage τ for a WS of type w ∈ W and for the following aircraft (threat) combination: an
aircraft of type v ∈ V, carrying weapons of type e ∈ E and executing an attack technique a ∈ A.
The filtering process for terrain features is illustrated by means of a numerical example.
Example 6.3 (Filtering SSHP information for terrain obstruction) Suppose that a WS
is deployed in an area with hills to the north east and south west and a small mountain to the
north. Suppose furthermore that these obstacles completely restrict WS operation in certain ar-
eas of a WS fire arc. The deployment of the WS and the aforementioned terrain obstacles are
illustrated graphically in Figure 6.7(a) and the areas in which the WS have restricted efficiencies
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are illustrated in Figure 6.7(b). The shaded region represents the area in which the WS can
achieve positive SSHP values. The efficiency values of the WS now have to be adjusted for the
restriction posed by the obstacles in Figure 6.7.
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mountains and large hills.
Suppose that the discretised SSHP information (as described in Example 4.2) is used and
evaluated on the terrain shown, as seen from above, in Figure 4.11. In this example, the WS
is surrounded by obstacles that are assumed to restrict operation in some sections completely.
These obstacles include hills to the north east and south west and a small mountain to the north.
The SSHP information of the WS in Example 4.2 should be adjusted for the region by filtering
out areas in which the ability of the WS is restricted due to terrain obstacles (see Figure 4.11).
(a) (b)
Figure 4.11: (a) A two-dimensional top view of a WS deployed in a region where topographical
obstacles may interfere with operation in some regions and (b) the region visible to the WS
represented by the shaded area.
The terrain may be discretised, in a manner similar to the discretisation of the SSHP informa-
tion, by placing a grid, with the same coarseness as the one used to discretise the SSHP in the
previous example, over the terrain. Grid cells covering terrain sections where WS operation is
obstructed partially or in full are coloured black while blocks over terrain sections where weapon
operation is not influenced at all are coloured white (see Figure 4.12 (a)).
The colour in each block is replaced by a number — black is replaced by the number zero while
white is replaced by the number one — to provide a terrain filter matrix. For the purpose of
this example, assume that the terrain filter matrix is calculated at time step τ0 for filter type 1
[Terrain] corresponding to WS type 1 [Man-Portable SAM] and for the specific combination of
aircraft type 2 [Gripen], weapon type 2 [Rockets] and attack techniques 1 [Combat Hump Dive].
This matrix is given in Figure 4.13 (Note that each number in the matrix is multiplied by 100
to give the percentage).
Assume that Terrain is the only environmental condition affecting WS operation at time step
τ0. The filter matrix may be applied by multiplying each cell in the SSHP matrix (see Example
4.1.2) by the corresponding cell in the terrain filter matrix, eliminating effectiveness probabilities
in the SSHP matrix corresponding to terrain filter matrix cells containing a zero (see Figure
4.12 (b)). The resulting WSEM for time step τ0 is given in Figure 4.14. 
CONFIDENTIAL
Figure 6.7: (a) A two-dimensional top view of a WS deployed in an area where terrain obstacles pose
an obstruction within the fire arc of the WS in some regions an the region in which he WS can
achieve positive SSHP v lues [145].
The partitioned SSHP information in Figure 6.3 of Example 6.1 have to be adjusted to take into
account the terrain obstacles in Figure 6.7. The terrain features may be discretised in a similar
fashion as the SSHP volume of Example 6.1. A grid (with the same coarseness as that employed
in the SSHP example) may be placed over the terrain features. Cells in the grid which correspond
to areas of the terrain where WS operation is restricted partially or fully may be coloured blue,
while cells which correspond to areas where WS operation is not influenced at all ay be coloured
white. This procedure is illustrated graphically in Figure 6.8.
The colours in the grid placed over the terrain may now be replaced by binary values in order
to populate a terrain filter matrix. Blue cells are replaced by the value zero while white cells are
replaced by the value one. Assume that the terrain filter matrix for time stage τ0 is calculated
for the same configuration of WS type and aircraft type as those considered in Example 6.1. By
using the same grid coarseness as in Figure 6.4, the resulting terrain filter matrix M τ0(1, 2, 2, 1)
in Figure 6.9 is obtained.
This terrain filter matrix may now be used to calculate the WSEM for time stage τ0. The
assumption is made that terrain is the only external element which has an effect on WS efficiency
in this case — no environmental conditions are included. The terrain filter matrix in Figure 6.9
is therefore applied to the SSHP matrix in Figure 6.5 (obtained in Example 6.1) by multiplying
each cell in the terrain filter matrix by the corresponding cell in the SSHP matrix — the values
in the SSHP matrix which lie in areas of restricted WS operation are thus in effect eliminated
by multiplying them by zero. The resulting WSEM Mˆ τ0(1, 2, 2, 1), containing the filtered SSHP
values for time stage τ0, is given in Figure 6.10. 
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.12: (a) A two-dimensional top view of a terrain filter and (b) the SSHP information
adjusted according to terrain obscurations.
100×

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Figure 4.13: The filter matrix M˜τ0(1, 1, 2, 2, 1).
Example 4.6 (Filtering SSHP for Terrain and Weather)
The same principle applied in Example 4.5 may be used to incorporate weather conditions, for
instance rain. It is assumed that the effect of weather conditions are the same over a small
area, like the area within the range of a WS, and therefore all the cells in the SSHP matrix are
scaled with the same factor. Although scaling of the SSHP information does not change a WS’s
preference between any two threats, it may provide a more realistic indication of WS capabilities
to the operator.
CONFIDENTIAL
Figure 6.8: (a) A two-dimensional top view of a terrain filter and (b) the corresponding SSHP infor-
mation adjusted according t terrain bstacles.

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Figure 6.9: The terrain filter matrix M τ0(1, 2, 2, 1) of Example 6.3.
6.4 The engagement efficiency matrix component
The second component in the EQ subsystem of the proposed archit cture in Figure 6.2 is the
EEM compo ent. The main purpose of the EEM component is to predict future flight paths for
aircraft in the defended airspace and to use this information in conjunction with the information
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
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 15 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 15 15 15 0 0 15 15 15 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 15 15 15 15 65 0 0 65 65 65 65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 15 15 15 65 65 65 0 0 65 65 65 65 0 0 0 0 15 0 0 0
0 0 15 15 15 65 65 65 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0 0 0 15 15 15 0 0
0 0 15 15 15 65 65 65 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 65 65 65 15 15 15 0 0
0 15 15 15 15 65 65 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 65 65 15 15 15 15 0
0 15 15 15 15 65 65 65 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 65 65 65 15 15 15 15 0
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Figure 6.10: The resulting WSEM Mˆ τ0(1, 2, 2, 1) after having filtered the SSHP matrix M τ0(1, 2, 2, 1)
for terrain obstruction.
contained in the WSEM generated by the PEF component in order to populate the EEM. The
EEM contains efficiency values of all the WSs deployed with respect to all the threats in the
defended airspace for each time stage in the temporal decision window under consideration. The
models involved in the FPP module and the process of constructing the EEM are discussed in
some detail in this section.
6.4.1 Flight path prediction models
Recall from §2.5 that a FPP module residing within the TM may be used to predict the future
flight paths of enemy threats detected in the defended airspace over a pre-defined number of
future time stages. In this section, two FPP models ranging in different levels of complexity are
described briefly. The first is presented as three different incarnations of a basic straight line
prediction model and the second is a more robust probabilistic prediction model.
A future SSHP prediction of a WS with respect to a hostile aircraft is only possible if the aircraft
is detected within range of the specific WS for the future time stage in question — the SSHP
value may simply be taken from the WSEM corresponding to the specific WS-threat pair for the
future time stage. If an enemy aircraft is detected, but is outside the WSs fire arc range during
the future time stage in question, the SSHP value is simply taken as zero. The estimation of
SSHP values of WS-threat pairs for future time stages therefore depends on the future flight
paths that enemy aircraft will follow.
Perhaps the simplest approach towards predicting the future flight path of an aircraft is to adopt
a so-called straight line prediction model. According to this approach, the kinematic data of
aircraft are extrapolated to form the future flight paths of threats under the strong assumption
that the aircraft will continue to travel at their current velocities in straight lines (e.g. if an
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aircraft is travelling at 150 m/s, then it is assumed that the aircraft will continue travelling at
this speed and in the same direction for any future time stage). The straight line prediction
model is illustrated in Figure 6.11(a) [158].
Threat
Shortest Path to Asset
Achievable
Highest
Turn Rate
(b)
AssetAsset
(a)
Predicted future flight path
Observed past flight path
Figure 6.11: (a) A straight-line FPP model based on current aircraft velocity and (b) an FPP model
based on imminent highest achievable turn rate and a straight path to the asset [158].
A more complex (albeit perhaps overly cautious) method for anticipating the future flight path
is to make the assumption that an aircraft has to face the DA when delivering its weapons — in
a worst-case scenario this will involve the aircraft achieving its highest possible turn rate until it
faces the DA [158]. From there on it may be assumed that the threat will follow a straight-line
path until it reaches the DA. This implies that the aircraft will follow the shortest path to the
DA. This approach is illustrated graphically in Figure 6.11(b).
Another, more realistic, approach may be to assume that the aircraft will follow one of the
attack techniques described in §2.5, rather than just continuing in a straight line. Aircraft
attributes and the position of the aircraft at a given time stage may then be used to assign a
probability to each attack technique that the aircraft can follow, based on its past and present
kinematic data. The predicted position of the aircraft at the next time stage may subsequently
be taken as a projected position along the attack technique that the aircraft is most likely to
follow. The position of an aircraft during the next time stage may alternatively be calculated
by taking a weighted average of the projected positions along each possible attack technique
— the probabilities associated with the various attack techniques are used as weights in the
calculation.
Yet another approach is to predict an area within which an aircraft may likely be during future
time stages, rather than attempting to predict a specific point at which an aircraft may be.
It is envisaged that such a prediction would involve a three-dimensional volume containing
different areas in which the aircraft may find itself. Each of these areas may be associated with
a probability that the aircraft will be in that specific area. A top view of a horizontal slice of
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an aircraft area prediction is illustrated graphically in Figure 6.12. Similar to the way in which
the SSHP volume was discretised in Figure 6.3, the volume of air space may be discretised
by employing a three-dimensional grid (having the same coarseness as the SSHP matrix), thus
facilitating computation of a so-called Predicted Position Matrix (PPM). If a threat is predicted
to be within range of a WS fire arc, a future efficiency value for the WS-threat pair may be
calculated by multiplying each entry in the PPM with the corresponding entry in the SSHP
matrix and adding all these multiplications together [145].
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A more reliable prediction may be construed if the aircraft is expected to follow one of a
number of known attack techniques. Given the position of the aircraft at a specific time step,
probabilities may be associated with the attack techniques, indicating to what extent the aircraft
is expected to follow each of the attack techniques. The predicted position of the aircraft at
the next time step may be projected along the most probable attack technique or taken as
an average of the positions projected along the respective attack techniques, weighted with
their associated probabilities. Alternatively, instead of predicting the exact position (point
prediction) of an enemy aircraft, an area, comprising sections representing different probabilities
of threat location, may be predicted (see Figure 4.18). This (three dimensional) volume may
be discretised using a three dimensional grid with the same coarseness as the one used when
discretising the SSHPs of the WSs and may be presented in a predicted position matrix (PPM).
When the enemy aircraft is predicted to be within range of a WS each cell of the PPM may be
multiplied by the cell in the WSEM corresponding in three dimensional space and the products
summed to produce an efficiency value for the WS with respect to the threat.
Figure 4.18: A two dimensional top view of what a probabilistic prediction model may predict
for two future time steps.
Let Pτ+Tℓ(e, v, w, t) be the PPM at time τ predicted for time τ + Tℓ and let Mˆτ (e, v, w, t) be
the WSEM at time τ , both for WS type e ∈ E and for the specific combination of aircraft type
v ∈ V, weapon type w ∈W and attack techniques t ∈ T. The predicted efficiency at time τ for
WS i with respect to threat j for time τ + Tℓ is now given by
Eτ (i, j, Tℓ) =
∑
x
∑
y
∑
z
(
(Pτ+Tℓ(e, v, w, t))x,y,z ×
(
Mˆτ+Tℓ(e, v, w, t)
)
x,y,z
)
,
subject to ∑
x
∑
y
∑
z
(Pτ+Tℓ(e, v, w, t))x,y,z = 1,
where it is assumed that WS i is of type e ∈ E and threat j is of type v ∈ V, delivering a
weapon of type w ∈W and flying an attack techniques t ∈ T. The workings of the probabilitiy
prediction model is illustrated in the following simple example.
Example 4.7 (Probabilistic Prediction Model for a Singel Time Step)
Consider a WS set up with a current orientation northwards and with SSHP information as
presented in Example 4.1. Assume that the SSHP information is discretised as in Example 4.2
CONFIDENTIAL
Figure 6.12: Prediction of the positions of a threat at two future time steps by means of a probabilistic
area prediction model.
Let P t+T`(w, v, e, a) denote the PPM at time stage τ predicted for ti e τ +T` and let Mˆ τ (w, v,
e, a) be the WSEM at time τ for a WS of type w W and for the following aircraft (threat)
combination: an aircraft of type v ∈ V carrying a weapon of type e ∈ E and executing an attack
technique of type a ∈ A [145]. The efficiency Eτ (i, j, T`) of WS i predicted at time stage τ for
future time stage τ + T` in respect of threat j may then be calculated as
Eτ (i, j, T`) =
∑
x
∑
y
∑
z
(
(P t+T`(w, v, e, a))x,y,z × (Mˆ t+T`(w, v, e, a))x,y,z
)
,
subject to the requirement that∑
x
∑
y
∑
z
(P t+T`(w, v, e, a))x,y,z = 1.
The working of the probabilistic area prediction model described above is illustrated in the
following example.
Example 6.4 (Probabilistic area prediction model for a single time stage) Suppose a
WS is deployed with a northerly orientation. Assume that the WS’s SSHP volume has been
discretised as in Example 6.4 and filtered to produce the WSEM for time stage τ0 presented in
Figure 6.10 — the same WS type and aircraft configuration as in Example 6.1 is assumed.
Assume further that the aircraft approaches from the north and that a probabilistic prediction
model is used to predict the future area of the threat, as illustrated graphically in two dimensions
in Figure 6.13(a). This area may be discretised in a similar fashion as the SSHP information
in Example 6.1 (by employing the same coarseness as that adopted in the discretisation of the
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and filtered as in Examples 4.5 and 4.6, to produce the WSEM in Figure 4.16 at time τ0. For
the purpose of this example, assume that WS 3 is of type 1 [Man-Portable SAM] and threat 4 is
of type 2 [Gripen] delivering a weapon type 2 [Rockets] and flying an attack technique of type 1
[Combat Hump Dive]. Assume furthermore that threat 4 approaches WS 3 from the north and
is predicted by a probabilistic flight path prediction model to be within a two dimensional area
as illustrated in Figure 4.19 (a). The predicted area may be discretised using a grid with the
same coarseness as the one used to discretise the SSHP of the WS (described in Example 4.2)
and the grid cells may be coloured in the same way as the SSHP grid was coloured (see Figure
4.19 (b) and (c)) to enable the generation of a PPM.
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Figure 4.19: Two-dimensional top views of (a) an area prediction from a flight path prediction
model for a threat approaching from the north, (b) a grid placed over the area prediction and
(c) the coloured cells of the grid.
Consider the PPM in Figure 4.20 (a) for time step τ0+T0 as output of the flight path prediciton
model at time τ and assume that these cells corresponds to the cells of rows 1 to 6 and columns
12 to 15 in the WSEM at time τ (see Figure 4.20 (b)).
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2 5 5 2
7 9 9 7
5 7 7 5
3 5 5 3
2 3 3 2
0 2 2 0
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Figure 4.20: (a) The PPM for time step τ0+ T0 and (b) the entries in rows 1 to 6 and columns
12 to 15 in the WSEM at time τ0.
The efficiency of WS 3 with respect to threat 4 at time step τ0 + T0 may be calculated by
weighing each entry in the WSEM with the corresponding entry in the PPM and adding them,
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Figure 6.13: A two-dimensional top view of (a) an area prediction of an aerial threat approaching from
the north, (b) a grid placed over the area prediction and (c) the SSHP values corresponding to cells of
the grid.
SSHP information). The discretised grid is illustrated graphically in Figure 6.13(b). The cells
in each block of the discretised grid may be coloured in the same way as the cells in the grid of
the discretised SSHP information, as illustrated in Figure 6.13(c).
Suppose the PPM matrix in Figure 6.14(a) is predicted for time step τ0 + T0 as output from the
FPP model at time τ0. Suppose further that these cells correspond to the cells of rows 1 to 6 and
columns 12 to 15 of the WSEM at time τ0, as illustrated in Figure 6.14(b).
The efficiency value that WS 3 achieves with respect to the threat at time step τ0 +T0 may there-
fore be calculated by weighing each entry in the WSEM of Figure 6.14(b) with its corresponding
entry in the PPM of Figure 6.14(a) and adding the results together. The efficiency value
Eτ0(3, 4, T0) = 2%× 9% + 5%× 11% + 5%× 9% + 2%× 0%
+ 7%× 50% + 9%× 50% + 9%× 41% + 7%× 0%
...
+ 0%× 80% + 2%× 80% + 2%× 69% + 0%× 69%
= 39%
is thus obtained. 
Although the stochastic prediction approach illustrated above may be computationally more
expensive than a simple straight line prediction model, it may provide a more realistic estimation
of the efficiency of WSs with respect to threats at future time stages [145]. The approach may
also absorb certain deficiencies, including sensor measurement errors and variations in aircraft
dynamics.
Caution should, however, be taken not to attempt to predict too far into the future, as predicting
aircraft positions too far ahead may yield a distorted picture of the efficiency that WSs are able
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(a) (b)
Figure 6.14: (a) The PPM for time stage τ0 + T0 and (b) the entries in rows 1 to 6 and columns 12 to
15 in the WSEM at time τ0.
to achieve with respect to threats, which may behave in an unforseen manner, resulting in the
TEWA system providing misleading results as DS.
6.4.2 Constructing the engagement efficiency component
The resulting WSEM produced by the PEF component may be used in conjunction with the
predicted future flight paths of threats to calculate SSHP values for the WSs with respect to
all the threats over the entire prediction window for a given scenario. If a particular threat is
predicted to be within range of a specific WS during a specific future time stage, the SSHP of
the WS with respect to that threat for the specific time stage may be taken as the value in
the WSEM corresponding to the position of the threat during the specific time stage. This is,
of course, only applicable if the given threat is predicted to be within range of the WS. If the
predicted future position of the threat falls outside of the range of the WS, the efficiency value
of the WS with respect to that threat is taken as zero, as mentioned.
The EEM is therefore a three-dimensional m × n × τ matrix, where m denotes the number of
WSs in the deployment, n denotes the number of threats in the defended airspace, and τ denotes
the pre-determined number of future time stages over which the flight paths of the threats are
predicted. The EEM is illustrated graphically in Figure 6.15. Once the EEM component has
been populated, it is stored in the TEWA database for subsequent use by the WA subsystem.
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Figure 4.1: Visual representation of an EEM component.
deployed WS, will hit a threat with a single shot as a function of position in the area around
the WS. These probabilities are estimated by manufacturers using mathematical models (e.g.
Monte Carlo simulations [27]) and are used to populate a continuous three dimensional volume
(see, for example, the ellipsoidal shape in Figure 4.2), called the SSHP volume. The shape of
this volume is dependent on the characteristics of the specific WS and the related threat.
Figure 4.2: A three dimensional representation of an ellipsoidal shaped SSHP volume.
The effectiveness of a WS is significantly influenced by the speed at which the threat travels.
Hence, the three dimensional SSHP volume for a single WS will typically differ for different
types of threats2. Fixed wing aircraft are capable of travelling at high speeds and may fly
complex profiles3, making it difficult to predict their flight paths. WSs may be ineffective in
some areas due to the capabilities of fixed wing aircraft and these limitations are encapsulated
2The interested reader is referred to [121] for a dicussion on different aircraft platform types.
3Flight profiles depend on a number of factors including meteorological conditions, the specific aircraft type,
CONFIDENTIAL
Figure 6.15: The three-dimensional EEM constructed from terrain altered SSHP information.
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6.5 The weapon assignment model component
The WAM component contains a collection of mathematical assignment models, each responsible
for solving a special variant of the WA problem and proposing assignments of WSs to threats in
real-time. These assignments are typically based on their desirability with respect to some pre-
specified objective function or set of objective functions, as dictated by the relevant WA problem
variant. It is proposed that the WAM component contains four classes of WAMs, as illustrated
in Figure 6.16. The four classes of WAMs are single-objective static WAMs, multi-objective
static WAMs, single-objective dynamic WAMs and finally multi-objective dynamic WAMs. The
four classes of models range in different levels of complexity in terms of the solutions that they
yield as well as the computational time and effort expended to solve the WAMs in each class.
The complexities of the four classes of WAMS are illustrated using a grey-scale shading scheme
in Figure 6.16. The WAMs contained in the lighter coloured quadrants are considered the least
complex while the WAMs contained in the darker coloured quadrants are considered to be more
complex. Furthermore, Figure 6.16 also contains references to authors who have contributed to
the formulations of the four WA prototypes over the years (i.e. the models reviewed in §3).
Static Dynamic
No models
• Hosein & Athans (1989)
• Murphy (2000)
• Du Toit (2006)
• Potgieter (2008b)
• Du Toit (2009)
• Van der Merwe &
• Manne (1957)
• Bradford (1961)
• Day (1966)
• Ahuja et al. (2003)
• Potgieter (2008a)
• Lo¨tter et al. (2013)
Van Vuuren (2014)
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Figure 6.16: Four classes of WAMs together with WAM instances in each class (where applicable).
As of the beginning of 2014, the author was only aware of the multi-objective static WAM
proposed by Lo¨tter et al. [120] in 2013 (i.e. the model in the third quadrant of Figure 6.16).
Later, in 2014, this formulation was extended by the author with the addition of a third objec-
tive function to the bi-objective model [123]. This additional objective aims to maximise the
number of times that the least re-engagable WS in the set of WSs may be considered again for
future assignments after the assignment of the current time stage under consideration has been
completed. These models are, to the best knowledge of the author, the only two multi-objective
static WAMs.
Furthermore, the author is not aware of any model in the final class of Figure 6.16 (i.e. the
multi-objective dynamic WAM class). The author therefore formulated a tri-objective dynamic
WAM in order to complete the four classes of available WAMs in the WA literature [121]. The
development of this model is one of the main contributions of this dissertation and is discussed
in some detail later in this chapter.
In the remainder of this section, a WAM prototype is selected within each of the model classes
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in Figure 6.16 and discussed in detail. These four prototypes are arguably the most realistic
models in each of the four classes of Figure 6.16, and it is advocated that these prototypes should
be included in the WAMS component of Figure 6.2 as default WAMs in case the FCO chooses
not to configure a WAM for inclusion in the WA subsystem. The four prototypes are presented
in increasing order of complexity as indicated by the grey-scale colour scheme in Figure 6.16
and not in the order of their chronology.
6.5.1 Single-objective, static WAM prototype
The first class of WAMs considered is the single-objective, static class which is considered to
be the least complex of the four model classes of Figure 6.16. WAMs in this class are static in
a temporal sense, i.e. they are solved over a single time stage at a time — the WA problem is
typically solved only for the current time stage or over a specified number of time stages in the
future, consecutively and independently, save for updating parametric model information (so as,
for example, to account for threats eliminated). A further characteristic of models in this class
is that they involve single-objective optimisation (i.e. only one objective function is included in
each model within this class, which either has to be minimised or maximised).
The single-objective static WAM chosen for inclusion as default formulation in the WAM com-
ponent is the k-WAP of Potgieter [145]. In this model, a single objective is pursued and the
problem is limited to a single time stage only in a discretisation of the temporal decision period
under consideration. The model functions under the assumption that the events of a threat sur-
viving engagements by two different WSs are independent. Hence, the probability of survival of
a specific threat may be calculated as the product of the probabilities of surviving engagements
by the separate WSs assigned to engage it — the value is therefore a product of the comple-
ments of all the SSHP values of all the WSs assigned to engage it. The survival probability
of the threat is then weighted by the priority of eliminating the threat, as determined by the
TE subsystem. The quality of a feasible solution to the model may therefore be expressed in
terms of the accumulated survival probabilities of all the threats weighted by the priorities of
eliminating the respective threats. Furthermore, it is assumed that the hit probability of a WS
with respect to a specific threat depends only on the WS and the threat involved.
Suppose there are m(τ) WSs available for assignment to engage any of the n(τ) observed aircraft
classified as threats during time stage τ . Let Vj(τ) denote the priority
1 of eliminating threat
j during time stage τ . Also, let pij(τ) denote the probability of eliminating threat j if it is
engaged by WS i during time stage τ (i.e. the SSHP value of WS i with respect to threat j
during time stage τ). Then qij(τ) = 1−pij(τ) denotes the survival probability of threat j if it is
engaged by WS i during time stage τ . In addition, let Ai(τ) denote the number of ammunition
units available to WS i during time stage τ — these units may, for example, be bursts of bullets
when a cannon is used in burst mode or the number of missiles launched by a missile system.
Furthermore, let κ be the maximum number of WSs that may be assigned to any threat. The
decision variables adopted in the formulation are binary in nature and are denoted by xij(τ),
taking a value of 1 if WS i is assigned to engage threat j during time stage τ , or the value 0
otherwise. The objective in the κ-WA problem is to
minimise
n(τ)∑
j=1
Vj(τ)
m(τ)∏
i=1
qij(τ)
xij(τ) (6.6)
1Recall from §6.7 that this value is determined during the process of TE.
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subject to the constraints
n(τ)∑
j=1
xij(τ) ≤ Ai(τ), i = 1, . . . ,m(τ), (6.7)
m(τ)∑
i=1
xij(τ) ≤ κ, j = 1, . . . , n(τ), (6.8)
xij(τ) ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, . . . ,m(τ), (6.9)
j = 1, . . . , n(τ).
Constraint set (6.7) ensures that WS i is considered for assignment at most Ai(τ) times during
time stage τ , while constraint set (6.8) ensures that no more than κ WSs are considered for
assignment to engage any single threat. Finally, constraint set (6.9) enforces the binary nature
of the decision variables.
A detailed description of how the model (6.6)–(6.9) may be solved efficiently (albeit approxi-
mately) is provided in a later chapter of this dissertation where the model is applied in a concept
demonstration to a realistic GBAD scenario.
6.5.2 Multi-objective, static WAM prototype
At the next level of complexity is the class of multi-objective static WAMs. WAMs in this class
are similar to single-objective static WAMs in the sense that they are temporally static in nature.
Multi-objective, static models are, however, distinguished from the previous class in the sense
that they involve multi-objective optimisation (i.e. more than one objective function has to be
minimised or maximised simultaneously). The objectives in such models are typically conflicting
in nature, which requires that suitable trade-offs be sought between objective function values.
Multi-objective optimisation therefore naturally gives rise to the notion of Pareto optimality (as
described in Chapter 4) instead of the simpler and more intuitive notion of optimality.
The multi-objective static WAM selected as the prototype of its class is the tri-objective, static
WAM of the author [123]. This model was formulated by selecting three objectives from the
list of objectives in Table 3.1. Again, the model functions under the assumption that the events
of a threat surviving engagements by two different WSs are independent and hence that the
probability of survival of a specific threat may be calculated as the product of the probabilities
of surviving engagements by the separate WSs assigned to engage it. It is also, again, assumed
that the hit probability of a WS with respect to a specific threat depends only on the WS and
the threat involved. Furthermore, the model is static, implying that it has to be re-solved for
each time stage in the time continuum under consideration.
The first objective in the model is similar to the objective function in the k-WA model (6.6)–
(6.9) which aims to minimise the accumulated survival probabilities of the threats in the system,
weighted by the priorities of eliminating each of these threats, respectively. The second objective
in the model is to minimise the accumulated cost of the WS-threat assignment pairs — the cost
of a WS-threat assignment pair is taken as the monetary (Rand) value of a single burst of the
ammunition used in the assignment. Finally, the third objective in the model is to maximise
the number of times that a WS is available for re-engagement after the proposed assignment
during future time stages — the objective therefore encourages the assignment of WSs having the
largest quantity of ammunition available first, rather than assigning WSs with lower quantities
of available ammunition first in a bid to ensure that all weapons are reusable (in terms of
ammunition availability) after the assignment. Adopting the same notation as in §6.5.1, the
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objectives in the static tri-objective WA model are therefore to
minimise
n(τ)∑
j=1
Vj(τ)
m(τ)∏
i=1
qij(τ)
xij(τ), (6.10)
minimise
m(τ)∑
i=1
Ci
n(τ)∑
j=1
xij(τ), and (6.11)
maximise min
i
Ai(τ)−
n(τ)∑
j=1
xij(τ),
 (6.12)
subject to the constraints (6.7)–(6.9), where Ci denotes the monetary cost (in Rand value) of
firing a single unit of WS i ammunition.
The working of the model (6.10)–(6.12) is also illustrated in detail in a later chapter in this
dissertation where it is solved approximately in the context of a realistic GBAD scenario.
6.5.3 Single-objective, dynamic WAM prototype
The next class of WAMs is the class of single-objective dynamic WAMs. Models in this class
are similar to the single-objective static class of WAMs in that they involve single-objective
optimisation, but they differ from the former class of models in the sense that they take into
account the change in the kinematic behaviour of aircraft over a pre-specified temporal interval
or time horison, which classifies them as dynamic WAMs. The dynamic nature of these models
imply that the WA problem is solved for the current time stage as well as for a number of pre-
specified future time stages (i.e. the number of time stages specified in the FPP model described
in §6.4.1) in the time continuum. These models therefore also involve a scheduling element of
when WSs should engage threats in addition to the desirability or effectiveness of matching WSs
to threats (the assignment element).
The single-objective dynamic WAM selected as prototype within this class is the single-objective,
dynamic WA scheduling model of Van der Merwe and Van Vuuren [196], described in more detail
in §3.5.
As in the VRPTW, a virtual depot is included in the prototype single-objective, dynamic WAM
which may be seen as an artificial construct representing an idle state during which no WS
engages any threats. Let the virtual depot be indexed by threat 0 and threat n+ 1, where n is
the number of threats in the system. The depot has a demand of zero and the system is required
to start from this state and to return to it again after all WS-threat pair engagements have been
carried out. Let di denote the WS setup time of WS i. Define a FTTF eijk and a LTTF `ijk
for WS i when engaging threat j during the pair’s kth FW. Let sijk denote the engagement
time duration2 of threat j by WS i during the pair’s kth FW, where sijk = `ijk − eijk + 1, and
let fij be the number of distinct FWs for WS-threat pair (ij). Furthermore, let pijk denote
2The engagement time duration refers to the number of time stages required by a WS to guide its ammunition
in the direction of the threat from the time stage during which the ammunition is launched (the time stage
during which the trigger is pulled) until the time stage during which the ammunition hits the threat. This is only
applicable to WSs which require operator guidance, such as cannons which are able to fire multiple bursts with
the pull of the trigger, but require manual WS operator assistance to guide the ammunition in the direction of
the threat. In some instances, WSs have on-board guidance systems, such as certain missiles, and hence require
no guidance from the WS operator, in which case the value sijk is assumed to be zero. The value sijk is included
in the model formulation for the sake of flexibility.
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the SSHP value associated with threat j if engaged by WS i during the pair’s kth FW, and let
qijk = 1− pijk.
A fixed mean approach is adopted in the formulation in order to associate a single survival value
with the kth FW of WS-threat pair (i, j)3. The fixed mean approach entails considering a subset
(of fixed, prespecified cardinality) of contiguous time stages within a FW and calculating the
mean of the survival probabilities associated with the time stages in this subset. The time stages
chosen for inclusion in the subset should be consecutive and should also include the time stage
achieving the minimum survival probability in the entire set of time stages. This procedure is
carried out for each such subset in the FW [196]. Finally, the smallest mean obtained over all
the subsets is selected and taken as the “survival probability” of the threat for the FW under
consideration. Let Mijk denote the set of consecutive time stages to be used in calculating the
fixed mean of the kth FW for WS-threat pair (i, j). Then the fixed mean value is
µijk =
1
|Mijk|
∑
τ∈Mijk
qijτ . (6.13)
A binary decision variable xijk is adopted in the formulation which takes the value 1 if WS i
engages threat j during the kth FW associated with the WS-threat pair, or a value of 0 otherwise.
A binary auxilliary variable yihj is also incorporated, which may be interpreted as a flow variable,
and takes a value of 1 if threat h directly precedes threat j in a sequence of engagements by
WS i, or a value of 0 otherwise. Adopting the same notation as used in the previous WAMs
discussed in this section, the objective in the single-objective dynamic WAM is to
minimise
n∑
j=1
Vj
m∏
i=1
fij∏
k=1
(µijk)
xijk (6.14)
subject to the constraints
m∑
i=1
n+1∑
h=0
yihj ≤ κ, j = 1, . . . , n, (6.15)
n+1∑
h=1
yi0h = 1, i = 1, . . . ,m, (6.16)
n+1∑
h=1
yi,h,n+1 = 1, i = 1, . . . ,m, (6.17)
n+1∑
h=0
yihj −
n+1∑
h=0
yijh = 0, i = 1, . . . ,m,
j = 0, . . . , n+ 1, (6.18)
fij∑
k=1
xijk =
n+1∑
h=1
h6=j
yihj , i = 1, . . . ,m,
j = 1, . . . , n, (6.19)
fih∑
k=1
(eihk + sihk)xihk −
fij∑
k=1
eijkxijk + di < (1− yihj)L, i = 1, . . . ,m,
j = 1, . . . , n, (6.20)
h = 1, . . . , n,
3Note that the objective function formulated for inclusion as default WAM in the single-objective dynamic
class of WAMs is formulated in such a way that it conforms to the same objective used in the multi-objective
dynamic WAM formulated later in this section.
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n∑
j=1
fij∑
k=1
xijk ≤ Ai, i = 1, . . . ,m, (6.21)
yihj ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, . . . ,m,
j = 0, . . . , n+ 1, (6.22)
h = 0, . . . , n+ 1,
xijk ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, . . . ,m,
j = 0, . . . , n+ 1, (6.23)
k = 1, . . . , fij .
Constraint set (6.15) ensures that at most κ WSs are assigned to engage any threat over the
scheduling horizon. Constraint set (6.16) ensures that WS i “leaves the depot” (idle state)
exactly once if it is assigned to engage threats at all, while constraint set (6.17) ensures that
WS i “returns to the depot” exactly once after being used to engage threats. Constraint set
(6.18) ensures, if a threat is engaged by WS i, that the WS “leaves the threat” again in order
to “move on” to engage the next threat assigned to it. Constraint set (6.19) ensures, if threat h
precedes threat j for engagement by WS i, that threat h is engaged during exactly one stage. If
threat h is engaged by WS i directly before threat j, constraint set (6.20) ensures that the time
stage during which the engagement of threat h starts plus the time it takes to engage threat h
plus the time it takes for WS i to “travel” from threat h to threat j does not exceed the time
stage during which engagement of threat j starts, where L is a large number. Furthermore,
constraint set (6.20) also ensures that the stage during which WS i engages threat j is within
a FW associated with the (WS, threat)-pair. Constraint set (6.21) ensures that the capacity of
WS i is not exceeded and constraint sets (6.22)–(6.23) finally ensure the binary nature of the
decision and auxilliary variables.
A method for solving the model (6.14)–(6.23) is discussed in detail later in this dissertation
where the model is solved in the context of a realistic GBAD scenario.
6.5.4 Multi-objective dynamic WAM prototype
The final class of WAMs is the class of multi-objective dynamic WAMs which is also considered
to be to most complex of the four classes of WAMs proposed. These models involve solving the
WA problem in a multi-objective context over a number of pre-specified, predicted time stages
and also include a scheduling element similar to models in the class of single-objective, dynamic
WA models (i.e. requiring decisions as to when WSs should engage threats in addition to which
WSs should engage which threats).
After conducting an extensive literature survey on the WAMs available in the operations research
literature, the author could not find any existing multi-objective dynamic WAMs for use in the
fourth quadrant of Figure 6.16. The author therefore formulated a tri-objective dynamic WAM
prototype, published by Lo¨tter and Van Vuuren [121], in order to complete the various classes
of WAMs in the proposed WAM component.
The formulation of this WAM is also based on the classical VRPTW and was formulated in
the same way as its single-objective dynamic WAM counterpart by Van der Merwe and Van
Vuuren [196], described in §6.5.3. Apart from being able to schedule future engagement FWs
during which WS-threat assignment pairs should occur, the tri-objective dynamic WAM also
incorporates three objectives simultaneously. The first objective is to minimise the accumulated
survival probabilities of the threats weighted by their respective elimination priorities as in the
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model of §6.5.3. The second objective is to minimise the accumulated cost of the assignment
proposed and the third objective is to maximise the number of times that the least re-engagable
WS in the set of WSs can be used for future assignments after the current assignments have
occurred, as in the model of §6.5.2. The model functions under the same assumptions as those
of the single-objective, dynamic model (6.14)–(6.23).
Following the same notation as in the single-objective static WAM (6.6)–(6.9), the bi-objective
static WAM (6.10)–(6.12) and the single-objective dynamic WAM (6.14)–(6.23), the objectives
in the tri-objective dynamic WAM are to
minimise
n∑
j=1
Vjτ
m∏
i=1
fij∏
k=1
(µijk)
xijk , (6.24)
minimise
m∑
i=1
Ci
n∑
j=1
fij∑
k=1
xijk, and (6.25)
maximise min
i
Ai −
n∑
j=1
fij∑
k=1
xijk
 (6.26)
subject to the constraints (6.15)–(6.23).
The working of the model (6.24)–(6.26) is also illustrated in the context of a simulated, but
realistic, GBAD test scenario later in this dissertation.
6.5.5 WAM configuration
It is proposed that the FCO configures one WAM from one of the four classes of proposed WAMs
during the pre-deployment stages of a mission for use during the mission. It is further proposed
that for each pre-configured WAM there should be a collection of suitable solution methodolo-
gies available for solving the WA problem. The FCO’s preferred solution methodologies should
also be configurable during the pre-deployment stage. The idea is that when the FCO chooses
a specific WAM, the WA problem should be solved (approximately) by a collection of solution
methodologies simultaneously within the context of that WAM. Existing solution methodolo-
gies from the operations research literature which may be used to solve WAMs in each of the
four classes of WAMs were described in §6.5. The results obtained by the various solution
methodologies should then be relayed to the WASS component for further analysis.
Finally, it is acknowledged that time is a critical factor in providing efficient TEWA DS to the
FCO. It is therefore important that the solution methodologies employed in solving the models
in the WAM component should be able to solve the models almost instantaneously, albeit only
approximately. It is proposed that the solution methodologies employed to solve the WAM
configured by the FCO should run in parallel so as to ensure that they solve the configured
WAM within a pre-specified time budget (e.g. 1 second).
6.6 The weapon assignment solution selection component
The final component in the proposed WA architecture design in Figure 6.2 is the WASS com-
ponent. The purpose of this component is to present the results obtained by solving the WAM
configured by the FCO in the WAM component in an uncluttered fashion as decision support to
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the FCO. This may be achieved by combining the results obtained from all the solution method-
ologies in the WAM component so as to form a possibly large collection of candidate solutions
to the WA problem instance in question. Solutions of poor quality (i.e. those dominated by
other in objective space) should then be filtered out in order to retain only the nondominated
solutions (i.e. to obtain a collection of approximately Pareto optimal solutions only). This may
be achieved by using any of the methods described in §4.6. The front of approximately Pareto
optimal solutions should then be stored in the TEWA database and relayed to the FCO via
the HMI as real-time DS. The FCO may then choose a solution which best corresponds to his
intuition based on his experience and subjective judgement.
6.7 The envisaged chronological order of TEWA events
The components described in the previous sections of this chapter all function as part of a so-
called TEWA cycle of actions or events. It is envisaged that a trigger of such a cycle initiates
consecutive calls to these components in an orderly fashion so as to provide real-time DS to
the FCO. For the purposes of the proposed WA subsystem in this dissertation, it is assumed
that a TEWA cycle is initiated either by a change in any of the data fields4 in the TEWA
database, which is significant enough to justify the termination of a current TEWA cycle and
to start a next TEWA cycle, or by the natural continuation of an implementation clock cycle.
The sequential order in which the components function within a TEWA cycle is illustrated
graphically in Figure 6.17 and is discussed in some detail in this section.
Module internal to TEWA cycle
Module external to TEWA cycle
Action in TEWA cycle
Main cycle of TEWA order of events
Updating of external TEWA modules
AM
TEFM
TEM
TEWA
Database
Database
Snapshot
Database
Snapshot
TEWA
Database
TE Subsystem
WAM
WA Subsystem
HMI
EQ
Trigger
cycle
WA sub
Trigger
TE sub
cycle
WASS
Figure 6.17: Detailed sequential order of events in a TEWA implementation clock cycle.
4This includes changes in any of the entries in the TEWA database (e.g. sensor, target, WS, or DA track
changes).
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Once a TEWA cycle is triggered, a snapshot of the TEWA database is taken at that specific
time stage. This snapshot contains the data to be used during the current TEWA computation
cycle. After the snapshot of the database has been taken, the AM commences operation and
the measured attributes obtained from the sensor systems are fused by the TM, as described in
§2.5.2, after which derived attributes are computed for each of the observed threats.
Upon completion of the computations by the AM, the TEM process is initiated, during which the
TEMs described in §2.5.2 evaluate the perceived level of threat posed by the observed aircraft
with respect to the DAs. Threat lists are computed containing the prioritised threat values and
these lists are fused together by a multi-criteria decision analysis method5 within the TEFM
component to obtain a single prioritised list of threats. This single list is stored in the TEWA
database and presented to the FCO via the HMI. Once the results from the TE subsystem have
been stored in the TEWA database, WA subsystem operation commences.
Another snapshot of the TEWA database is taken to acquire the additional data required by
the WA components. The efficiency values that WSs are expected to achieve with respect to
threats during future time stages are discretised and discounted for meteorological conditions
and terrain obstacles within the EQ component, as described in §6.3. The output (i.e. an EEM)
is stored in the TEWA database for each future time stage. Thereafter, the WAM component
employs the threat list produced by the TEFM component and the EEM produced by the EQ
component to propose assignments of available WSs to engage the aerial threats. The outputs
of the WAM component (i.e. a number of proposed WA lists) are stored in the TEWA database
and presented to the WASS component in which the WA lists are filtered and presented to
the FCO via the HMI in a manner configured by the operator during pre-deployment. The
presentation of these results to the FCO marks the end of a full TEWA cycle.
Although the TEWA system may seem to function as a fully automated software system, it
is important to acknowledge that the FCO should have the authority to override assignment
decisions suggested by the system. He should, for example, be able to configure the TEMs
actually used in the threat evaluation process, alter the prioritised threat list obtained from
the TEFM component, and alter the WA lists proposed by the WAM component, based on his
experience and subjective judgement.
6.8 Chapter summary
A generic WA subsystem architecture was put forward in this chapter for use in a GBAD TEWA
DSS. The chapter opened in §6.1 with a brief discussion on DS design approaches in general. In
§6.2, the design of a novel WA subsystem architecture was proposed and discussed briefly. The
remainder of the chapter was devoted to detailed descriptions of the components contained in
the proposed WA architecture.
The WA architecture comprises two subsystems, i.e. an EQ subsystems and a WA subsystem.
Furthermore, the EQ subsystem contains two components, i.e. the PEF component and the
EEM component. The working of the PEF component was discussed in §6.3 and a method was
reviewed for discretising the effectiveness values that WSs achieve with respect to threats. In
addition, a process for filtering effectiveness values of WSs for constraints posed by extreme
environmental conditions and terrain features was also presented. In §6.4, the working of the
EEM component was discussed. Two methods for predicting the future flight paths of threats
5Typical multi-criteria decision analysis methods which may be used within the TEFM component include the
analytic hierarchy process of Saaty [165], goal-orientated models (such as goal programming and aspiration level
models) or outranking models (such as ELECTRE) [14].
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were discussed and a method for constructing the EEM was presented using the information
returned by the FPP models.
Next, the focus shifted to a discussion on the components contained in the WA subsystem.
The WAM component, which forms the heart of the WA architecture, was considered in §6.5.
Four classes of WAMs ranging in different levels of complexity were proposed for inclusion in
the WAM component. These classes were single-objective static WAMs, multi-objective static
WAMs, single-objective dynamic WAMs and multi-objective dynamic WAMs. A prototype
within each of these classes was selected for default inclusion in the WAM component and
discussed in detail. These prototypes were presented in increasing order of complexity. A novel
multi-objective static WAM was also formulated for inclusion in the second most complex class
of WAM. The author was (to the best of his knowledge) unaware of any WAMs residing within
the most complex class of WAMs (i.e. multi-objective dynamic WAMs). A novel contribution
of this dissertation is therefore the formulation of a tri-objective dynamic WAM for inclusion in
the final, hitherto empty quadrant of Figure 6.2.
In §6.6, the final component of the WA architecture, i.e. the proposed working of the WASS
component, was discussed briefly. It was proposed that a number of solution methodologies be
used concurrently to solve the WAM configured by the FCO and that the candidate solutions
thus obtained be sorted to obtain a set of nondominated solutions for presentation as real-time
DS to the FCO.
The chronological order in which the events within a single TEWA computational cycle occur
was finally described in §6.7.
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In this chapter, eight practical suggestions are put forward which may prove useful when im-
plementing a WA subsystem (such as the one proposed in Chapter 6) in practice. The chapter
opens in §7.1 with a discussion on the automation of TEWA systems. Five levels of automation
are discussed briefly and it is advocated that a TEWA system should not be a fully automated
system. It should aim to assist FCOs in their decisions related to the execution of complex
computations rather than replacing the FCO or contradicting the decisions that the FCO would
have made in the absence of a TEWA DSS. Next, the focus shifts in §7.2 to a discussion on
how the quality and quantity of TEWA-related data may be improved in order to facilitate
high-quality results from a TEWA DSS.
The importance of providing the FCO with only the information that he needs is discussed briefly
in §7.3. Since the HMI serves as the link between the FCO and the results provided by the TEWA
DSS, a number of suggestions are provided for an efficient layout of the HMI. The problem
of providing the FCO with unnecessary information is related to the problem of information
overload. The former problem is discussed in §7.4. It is important not to overwhelm the FCO
with unnecessary information, and this problem is alleviated to some extent by proposing a
decision tree which may aid the operator in configuring WAM models (during the pre-deployment
stages of a mission) for customised use in the TEWA DSS.
Next, the focus shifts in §7.5 towards incorporating FCO preferences and biases. A potential
problem emanating from multi-objective models in the WAM component of §6.16 is that the
operator may be presented with too many Pareto optimal solutions from which he must choose
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one for implementation purposes. Four suggestions for solving this problem are provided and
discussed briefly.
The undesirable phenomenon of switching (which refers to rapid changing of assignment sug-
gestions by the DSS during a small subset of consecutive time stages) is considered in §7.6. It
is suggested that threshold values be implemented in the system in order to allow only changes
in the suggestions from one time stage to another once a variation in the results equivalent to
the specified threshold value is reached.
In §7.7, the importance of properly testing the various components of a DSS before putting it
to use is discussed, with a focus on the importance of testing military DSSs. Although the aim
should be to perform testing in the context of realistic combat scenarios, such testing procedures
are expensive in terms of maintenance and operational costs. Simulation methods are therefore
typically employed for testing purposes and three simulation methods for testing the constituent
parts of a TEWA DSS are mentioned briefly. Furthermore, the importance of evaluating the
performance of a TEWA system as a whole (i.e. in an integrated fashion within the context of
an ADC environment) is discussed in §7.8. A simulation environment is suggested for achieving
this and the performance evaluation framework of Truter [187] is proposed for the evaluation
of a TEWA DSS as part of an integrated ADC environment. The chapter finally closes in §7.9
with a brief summary of its contents.
7.1 Level of automation of the system
The automation of DSSs within the military domain is a widely discussed subject with many
experts arguing that automation is typically employed in the designs of various military DSS
in order to improve performance and reduce FCO workload — in essence, that automation is
employed to achieve a faster OPTEMPO of the FCO’s OODA loop. On the other hand, there
are also experts who argue that when the workload experienced by an FCO is at its highest,
an automated system is often of least assistance, since such systems can typically only handle
routine tasks [67].
There are a number of ways in which a system may be automated. According to Endsley [68],
the five main levels of automation include (1) manual automation (i.e. the task is executed
manually by the FCO), (2) advisory automation (i.e. a computer programme suggests various
alternatives to the FCO from which he may choose one to implement himself), (3) consensual (i.e.
a computer programme suggests the best alternative and implements the option if the FCO gives
consent), (4) monitored (i.e. a computer programme generates alternatives and automatically
implements the best alternative, unless vetoed by the FCO), and (5) fully automated (i.e. a
computer programme executes the entire task automatically without any human interaction).
In the context of a South African GBAD environment, doctrinal rules require that there be an
operator to execute fire control [159]. This implies that a WS-threat assignment proposal by the
TEWA system will only be executed once the FCO manually sends an engagement order to the
WS in question. The FCO will, of course, only send the engagement order if he is satisfied with
the results provided by the TEWA system. The rationale behind the TEWA system providing
real-time DS is that it should not replace the FCO nor should it contradict the decisions that the
FCO would have made in the absence of a TEWA system. The aim is that TEWA results should
rather assist FCOs in their decisions by the execution of complex computations. Furthermore,
it is vital that the FCO should have a high level of confidence in the results presented to him
by the TEWA system, for otherwise he may loose trust in the system, choosing rather to make
his decisions based solely on doctrinal rules, training and knowledge.
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7.2 The quality and quantity of TEWA related input data
A TEWA DSS will only be able to perform to its full potential if sufficient quality and quantity
of input data are available. These data, obtained from sensor systems and intelligence reports
as described in §2.5.1, should be analysed and preprocessed thoroughly in order to provide high-
quality data to the TEWA DSS and ultimately create an enhanced state of SA for the FCO.
A number of ways in which the quantity and quality of these input data may be improved are
outlined in this section.
The scope of this dissertation is limited to only include fixed wing aircraft. It may, however, be
beneficial to expand the scope of the aerial threats considered by the WA subsystem proposed in
this dissertation by additionally including models for other platform types, such as rotary wing
aircraft [162, 198]. By expanding the range of platform types, a more robust TE subsystem
may be obtained, which may, in turn, result in an improvement in the quality and quantity of
TE-related input data.
Furthermore, the identification of influential measured and derived aircraft attributes obtainable
from sensors and intelligence reports may also result in a more accurate and reliable classification
of aircraft, as well as a more appropriate estimation of the level of threat posed by aircraft.
However, the availability and classification of such data are typically restricted [162]. If such
information were available, existing data mining procedures could be employed for extracting
significant measured attributes or discovering derived attributes from the data which influence
aircraft threat values significantly. If the required data were available, discovery-orientated data
mining techniques could be used to identify recurring patterns in the data to achieve this.
7.3 Design of an effective HMI
The objective of a TEWA system is ultimately the provision of high-quality TEWA solution
suggestions at any given time stage. It is, however, important to provide the FCO with only
the information that he needs rather than providing him with excessive amounts of information
which may overwhelm him and may compromise his ability to make effective WA decisions. On
the other hand, a sufficient store of information should be available in case the FCO may wish to
access more detailed information than that provided by the TEWA system in order to motivate
decisions. When designing a TEWA HMI display, careful consideration should therefore be given
as to what information is deemed important to provide to the FCO. Gruhn [79] suggests that an
effective HMI should be based on a user-centered design which integrates information in ways
that fit the tasks and needs of the user. This implies that the FCO should ideally be included
in the design of an effective HMI and that he should be able to configure or customise the HMI
during the pre-deployment stages of a mission (or even during a mission if the need arises).
One way of minimising clutter when designing an HMI is to hide excess information by employing
pop-up windows on the HMI display screen. The FCO may then use a computer mouse to
hover over a particular solution in objective space, resulting in the opening of a pop-up window
which displays the corresponding solution in decision space (i.e. the proposed assignment list
and appropriate first and last times to fire in each case, as well as the various objective function
values). For example, in the case where a list or graph of approximately Pareto optimal solutions
(in multiple-objective space) is presented to the FCO, a pop-up window may display the actual
assignments of WSs to threats (in solution space) when hovering over one of the solutions. When
the FCO then chooses one of these solutions, the progress of unfolding assignments may then
be displayed on the screen over time.
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WS Assignment
T WS FW ASS
T1 V4, V1 15
T2 V3, C2 26
T3 C4, V2 32
ASS
ASS
ASS
Sol1 Sol2
Sol11
Sol3
Sol5
Sol4
Sol10
Sol9Sol8
Sol7
Sol6
Figure 5.5: The HMI WA screen of TEWA HMI Design I displaying the Pareto optimal WA solutions
numerically, as well as graphically. During this time stage threats are identified in the system with low
to high TE values.
numerous possible answers generated by the multi-objective WA algorithm is presented on the
WA screen from which the FCO is required to make his/her single implementation decision.
The relevant WA objectives pursued, as indicated by the FCO, and their respective objective
function values are presented from the left-hand side to the right-hand side above of the radar
screen. The conclusions gathered from the information overload research experiment described
in Chapter 4 informed this design. It was found that when considering three objectives, only
six pieces of information are processable by a operator within a short time-frame, and for this
reason only six WA solutions are presented on the WA screen. In a typical multi-objective WA
instance it is likely that the algorithm would generate more than six solutions. As all of these
WA solutions are equally effective in respect of different combinations of WA objectives, none of
them can be discarded altogether. The entire Pareto front is therefore displayed graphically on
the right-hand side of the screen. The Pareto front facilitates presentation of a large volume of
information in a manner that it can be analysed in a short time period. The FCO may select a
specific WA solution on the graphical presentation, by clicking on the solution in question. The
selected WS-threat assignment, the fire window (counting down to zero) and the implementation
button corresponding to the solution selected are then displayed above the graphical presentation
of the Pareto front.
For the time-frame observed in Figure 5.5, WA solution one (Sol 1, having a survival probability
of 0.0662, a monetary cost of R6 136 000 and four WS re-engagements after deployment of
the proposed WS-threat assignment) has been selected. In the WS Assignment table it is
recommended that WSs V4 and V1 must be assigned to threat one (T1) within 15 time stages,
WSs V3 and C2 must be assigned to threat two (T2) within 26 time stages and WSs C4 and
V2 must be assigned to threat three (T3) within 32 time stages. The proposed WS-threat
assignment is activated by clicking on the assignment button [ASS], indicated on the right-hand
side of the WS Assignment table.
If the FCO were to indicate that he/she prefers a more basic level of detail for the WA process,
Figure 7.1: High-detail WA DS screen of a TEWA HMI design by Heuer [85].
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chart is colour coded, and so are the threats found in the system on the radar screen. Yellow
indicates a low TE value, orange indicates a medium TE value and red indicates a high TE
value. These colours are automatically updated as the different TE values of aircraft vary,
thereby making it easier for the FCO to track the highest threat within the system at any given
time stage.
Specific kinematic data of the different threats are presented directly alongside the threats on
the radar screen. It is at this point in time that the FCO will most likely want to conduct more
detailed TE analyses and therefore navigate to the second page within the page hierarchy, which
is the TE screen shown in Figure 5.10. The flagging models are now activated in order to analyse
suspicious changes in kinematic data of the observed threats. Absolute and relative flagging
possibilities xist, as explained in §2.2.2, dependin on whether or not they were configured by
the FCO during the pre-deployment phase. The results returned by these flagging models are
T1
Altitude [m]
Speed [kmMh]
IFF Response
= 586O
= BDOO
= False
T3
Altitude [m]
Speed [kmMh]
IFF Response
= B5B9
= 648
= False
T2
Altitude [m]
Speed [kmMh]
IFF Response
= BO94
= 7DO
= False
Flagging Alerts
Current Time Stage BO
OV WA DATTE
T1 T2 T3
6O%
BOO%
GO%
Immediate AssignmentImm diate WA
Relative Flagging
T1 Speed [kmMh] BDOO
Altitude [m] 586O
Absolute Flagging
T1 Speed [kmMh] BDOO
T3 Rang [km] DO
Threat List
T2
T1
T3
U Hostile
U Hostile
U Uncertain
MOBIUSB
WARDOGB
GARUDAB
Figure 5.11: The TE screen of TEWA HMI Design II displaying the results returned by flagging models
and a prioritised threat list at time stage ten. Three threats are detected within the system. The FCO
is armed.
presented on the centre right-hand side of the TE screen. During the pre-deployment phase, the
FCO can also decide wh ther or not to activate a prioritised threat list, which is displayed on
the bottom right-hand side of the TE screen, if configured. For demonstrative purposes all of
these options were activated during the pre-deploym nt configuration process (see Figure 5.7)
and can be viewed on the TE screens presented in Figures 5.10 and 5.11.
During time stage ten, higher TE values are recorded for the observed threats, as shown in
Figure 5.11. At this time stage absolute flagging alerts are issued for threats one (T1) and
three (T3). The speed recorded for threat one (T1) (1 200 km/h) has suddenly increased, and
the threat range to the DAs has therefore decreased considerably (20 km). Relative flagging
alerts for speed and altitude are also issued for threat one (T1) (1 200 km/h and 5 860 m,
respectively). Therefore, suspicious behaviour is detected for threats one (T1) and three (T3)
as per the flagging models. The prioritised threat list gives the FCO and additional indication
as to how the threats are ranked according to TE values, as well as indications as to the threat
aircraft types and their hostility classifications (e.g. threat two (T2) being a MOBIUS 1 aircraft
and classified as hostile, is listed as the first priority within the system).
Once the FCO has analysed the TE screen and gathered enough knowledge related to the TE
Figure 7.2: Low-detail TE DS screen of a TEWA HMI design by Heuer [85].
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In 2016, Heuer [85] investigated the design of an effective TEWA HMI as part of a final year
engineering research project under the supervision of the author. He conducted interviews with
a military expert and an expert in the field of TE subsystem design in order to obtain real-life
practical advice on important elements to include in the effective design of a TEWA HMI. He
subsequently put forward a suite of ergonomically suitable and uncluttered HMIs for use in a
TEWA DSS. These HMIs may serve as a first-order stepping stone for further HMI designs
which may be used in the implementation of a TEWA DSS.
One of Heuer’s HMI layout designs for WA DS is presented in Figure 7.1. In this layout, a tri-
objective WAM has been configured for use by the FCO and the Pareto optimal WA solutions
are presented to the FCO graphically in the bottom right-hand portion of the screen. The
majority of the screen is, however, reserved for providing the FCO with an air picture aimed at
enhancing his SA. Figure 7.2 contains a lower level of detail in the same HMI layout design in
which aircraft attribute values, classifications and TEM results are visible.
7.4 Overwhelming the FCO with information
As mentioned, it is important not to overwhelm the FCO with information when providing WA
DS during combat situations, since unnecessary information may cause confusion on the part of
the FCO when important WA engagement decisions have to be made under severely stressful
conditions within very short timeframes. It is therefore proposed that during the pre-deployment
stages of a mission, the FCO uses a decision tree, such as the one shown in Figure 7.3, to configure
the actual WAMs for inclusion in the system, so as to achieve personally customised DS.
Should the models
include a single or
multiple objectives?
Should the models
include a single or
multiple objectives?
objectives
MultipleSingle
objective
Single
objective objectives
Multiple
Select the desired
objective from a list
Select the desired
objective from a list
future time stages
over which models
should be solved
Specify number of
Select a number of
desired objectives
from a list
Select a number of
desired objectives
from a list
future time stages
over which models
should be solved
Specify number of
dynamic models be used
to provide DS?
DynamicStatic
Should static or
Figure 7.3: Decision tree for aiding an FCO in the configuration of WAMs for inclusion in the WAM
component in Figure 6.2.
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In particular, it is proposed that the FCO should be able to decide whether the models to be
included in the WAM component should be of a static or dynamic nature first, after which he
should then be able to pursue a single WA objective or multiple WA objectives in the models.
The FCO should then be able to configure one or more WAMs (from the same class) by choosing
objectives from a list of possible objectives. The objectives available to the FCO to choose from
should be dictated by the availability and quality of system input data. The FCO should be
able to perform (and alter) these configuration decisions easily (e.g. by means of radio buttons
via the HMI). A default WAM should also be specified during the design phase of the DSS in
order to accommodate the case where the FCO does not choose any WAM.
In the event of the FCO choosing to include dynamic WAMs in the WAM component, it is
further proposed that the FCO should be able to specify the number of time stages to include
in the prediction window of the threats. A default number of such time stages should also be
set during the design phase of the DSS so as to accommodate the case where the FCO does
not specify a prediction window length. The implication that the prediction window has on the
WAM component is that, for the static classes of WAMs, the WA problem is solved separately
for each stage in the specified prediction window, taking into account the successful elimination
of threats during previous stages, whereas for the dynamic class of WAMs, the WA problem is
solved once-off over the entire prediction window remainder.
7.5 Incorporating FCO preferences and biases
Another implementation suggestion involves the number of solutions collected by the WASS
component of §6.6 for presentation to the FCO from which he should choose one for implemen-
tation purposes. Care should be taken in respect of the number of solutions to present to the
FCO since presenting too many approximately Pareto optimal solutions may cause indecision on
the part of the FCO when picking one of these solutions. It is suggested that the HMI through
which the WA recommendations are communicated to the FCO should be configured in such
a way that the FCO is presented with only the necessary information actually required — as
mentioned, the FCO should also have the option to view any additional WA-related information,
should he choose to.
One way of reducing the number of solutions presented by the DSS to the FCO is to employ
operator-specified threshold values for each objective function in such a way that the system
automatically filters out solutions that exceed these threshold values. This notion is illustrated
in Figure 7.4 within the context of a bi-objective optimisation problem in which both objectives
are to be minimised. Suppose the FCO specifies the threshold value for objective 2 represented
by the line segment AB and the threshold value for objective 1 represented by the line segment
CD. The TEWA DSS should then only provide Solutions 2, 3 and 4 to the FCO as real-time DS.
Another way of reducing the number of solutions presented to the FCO, is to eliminate some
solutions involving objective function values that are very close to one another in all the ob-
jectives (i.e. solutions lying very close together in solution space, such as Solutions 3 and 4 in
Figure 7.4). The operator may well be indifferent between pairs of solutions that are so close
together in solution space, in which case only one solution of each pair may actually be presented
to the FCO in order to reduce decision support clutter.
This filtering approach may be achieved in an automated fashion by superimposing an indif-
ference grid with an indifference granularity of i in the direction of the i-th objective over the
solutions in objective space, where the values 1, . . . , m are user-specified parameters. Two
solutions residing within the same cell in such a grid may then be considered to be indistin-
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Figure 7.4: An (1, 2)-grid for a bi-objective problem in which both objectives have to be minimised.
guishable in terms of their solution quality, with the result that only one of these solutions may
be presented to the FCO. Consider again the example in Figure 7.4. There are six solutions
in the Pareto optimal front labelled 1, . . . , 6 in the figure, and Solutions 3 and 4 have objective
function values that are very close to one another. Suppose an indifference grid with indifference
granularity values of 1 and 2 has been specified by the FCO during system configuration, as
shown in the figure. Then Solutions 3 and 4 reside within the same grid cell and hence only
one of them may be presented as decision support to the FCO (together with Solutions 1, 2, 5
and 6).
The criteria used in the decision as to which solution of a number of alternatives in the same
indifference grid cell to present to the FCO should be implemented as a default setting in the
TEWA DSS. An example of such a criterion may be to choose the solution which achieves the
smallest accumulated survival probability of the threats. The FCO should be able to configure
these default selection criteria pre-deployment and should also have the option of overriding the
default criteria in real time. Suppose, for the example in Figure 7.4, that the system is configured
in such a way that the solution which achieves the smallest value in objective function 1 should
be chosen. Solution 3 should then be presented to the FCO from the alternative Solutions 3
and 4.
Care should, of course, be taken in selecting appropriate values for the indifference granularities
1, . . . , m since values that are too large may result in unnecessarily discarding solutions, while
values that are too small may result in removing no or very few solutions from the recommended
set and hence, again, overwhelming the FCO with information.
Although the indifference grid procedure may seem to be a good approach in attempting to
avoid overwhelming the FCO with decision support alternatives, it is sensitive to the way in
which the indifference granularity values 1, . . . , m are chosen. Two solutions which lie close to
one another in objective space, but lie in different cells in the grid are not considered as lying
close to one another in the indifference grid method, and hence, both solutions will be presented
to the FCO and, again, may unnecessarily overwhelm him with decision support alternatives.
Another approach that may be considered to resolve this problem is to use an operator-specified
distance measure between solutions to filter away unnecessary solutions. The FCO should spec-
ify an allowable distance for each of the objectives (similar to the indifference granularity values
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1, . . . , m for each objective in the indifference grid method). Solutions should be compared
with one another and if the distance between two solutions exceeds the specified value in all
the objectives, both solutions should remain in the set of (approximately) Pareto optimal so-
lutions presented to the FCO. Otherwise, only one of the two solutions should remain in the
(approximately) Pareto set of solutions. The FCO should specify the objective function that he
prefers and the solution of a pair in close proximity achieving the highest value in this objective
function should be provided to the FCO as DS.
A final suggestion for reducing the number of solutions presented to the FCO is to filter out
approximately Pareto optimal solutions from the suggested list according to the operator’s biases
and preferences, by employing a pre-determined FCO utility function.
7.6 Switching of DSS results between consecutive time stages
An undesirable phenomenon which may occur when WS assignment suggestions are reported
to the FCO during a combat situation is called switching. Switching refers to the excessively
rapid changing of WA suggestions presented to the FCO by the TEWA DSS during a small
subset of consecutive time stages. This kind of behaviour may be ascribed to small changes in
the SSHP-values that WSs are capable of achieving with respect to threats during these time
stages. Switching may, of course, cause confusion and compromise the FCO’s confidence in the
results produced by the TEWA system and may, in turn, lead to the FCO making suboptimal
decisions when choosing to rely on his own judgement rather than trusting the seeming indecision
of the DSS. The problem of switching may be solved by implementing threshold values in the
system in such a way that assignment recommendations are only altered from one time stage to
another once variations in the results equivalent to the threshold value are reached (i.e. if the
two solutions in question are deemed significantly different).
7.7 Testing the components of the system
The importance of properly testing the various components of a system before implementation
is often underestimated. Testing involves testing the successful operation of a system under
controlled conditions, including normal and abnormal conditions. A number of methods exist in
the open literature for testing systems and some of these methods include black box testing (i.e.
testing the functionality of a system without knowing the internal structural design of the system
and without knowing how the system operates internally), white box testing (i.e. testing the
functionality of a system while knowing the internal structure design of the system and knowing
how the system operates internally), unit testing (i.e. testing the smallest testable parts of a
system in an individual and independent fashion — the units are scrutinised individually for
proper operation), failover testing (i.e. validating the ability of a system to allocate additional
resources and to switch operations to a back-up system in the event of a server failure), ad-hoc
testing (i.e. testing the system only once without any planning or documentation related to the
testing procedures), user-acceptance testing (i.e. testing a system in which a user is employed
to ensure that the system can handle required tasks in real-world scenarios) and exploratory
testing (i.e. testing a system in a “hands-on” fashion in which testers have personal freedom to
test the system with minimum planning), to name but a few [90].
Testing the constituent parts of a TEWA system in the military domain is of vital importance
since human lives are at stake when it is implemented in practice. The parts of a TEWA system
should therefore not only be tested in isolation (or at unit level), but rather in conjunction
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with the relevant elements of a fully functional ADC system in the context of diverse combat
scenarios. This makes the aforementioned testing procedures difficult to implement due to the
high operational and maintenance costs (and risks) involved — certain functional elements,
such as fighter aircraft and WS armoury, are typically used in testing, training and maintenance
procedures.
Due to the high cost and risks involved in conventional testing procedures, they are typically
abandoned in favour of testing by means of simulators which are able to imitate ADC physical
elements in controlled military testing environments. According to Mepham [129] there are three
overarching categories of simulation systems which may be used for testing ADC elements in
a military environment. These systems are constructive simulation (i.e. a simulation in which
simulated people are involved in operating simulated systems — in this type of simulation, real
people are involved in providing certain inputs, but they do not determine any outcomes of
the system), virtual simulation (i.e. a simulation in which real people are involved in operating
simulated systems) and live simulation (i.e. a simulation in which real people are involved in
operating real systems in real-world scenarios — these scenarios are called simulations since they
are not conducted against a real enemy).
7.8 Evaluating the performance of the system as a whole
Although the design of the TE subsystem by Roux and Van Vuuren [162] and the WA subsystem
proposed in Chapter 6, seem, in principle, to be able to provide acceptable quality decision
support to FCOs, the combined performance of these subsystems has not yet been tested in an
integrated manner. Such an integrated testing approach is very important in the development
of a TEWA DSS where the various subsystem elements interact with one another to yield the
characteristic emergent properties of the TEWA system as a whole. These emergent properties
cannot be revealed by following a reductionistic evaluation approach only — involving testing
the TE and WA subsystems separately. Adopting such a reductionistic approach may result in
a failure to assess whether the TEWA DSS as a whole will function as expected.
One way of evaluating the performance of the integrated system is to consult a military expert
or a group of military experts (e.g. in the form of a workshop) with a view to evaluate and
analyse the results produced by these subsystems based on doctrinal rules and their knowledge
and experience. An expert validation of the system may be achieved in this way. This method
of evaluating system performance is, however, subjective in nature and may vary if a different
military expert or group of military experts is employed in the evaluation procedure. Therefore,
a more robust, scientific way of evaluating system performance should also be employed.
Roux [159] suggested that a simulation environment be used to test and evaluate a TEWA
system’s performance and that testing procedures be performed in an incremental manner.
First-order examples of evaluating the performance of TEWA systems in this manner were put
forward independently by Kok [107] and by Johansson and Falkman [97]. It is, of course, also
important that this method of evaluation be generic in the sense that should future changes be
made to any of the components in the TEWA subsystems, the method should be easily adaptable
to incorporate these changes and to re-evaluate the overarching system’s performance.
In 2016, Truter [187] developed and demonstrated the working of a performance evaluation
framework for TEWA systems adopting a simulation approach. He embraced a system of sys-
tems1 approach in his design and proposed four metrics for use within the developed simulation
1A system of systems approach involves considering a number of small, dispersed, independent systems together
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paradigm. These metrics are survivability (i.e. a measurement of the ability of WSs to protect
DAs from enemy aircraft attacks — the metric is taken as the ratio between the protection
value of surviving DAs to the total protection value of all DAs), economy (i.e. a measurement
accounting for the cost of WS ammunition used for engagement strategies), engagement effec-
tiveness (i.e. a measurement of the ability of WSs to successfully cause considerable damage to
or destroy high-value threats) and adaptability (i.e. a measurement of the ability of engagement
strategies to be adaptable in terms of future assignments — the metric measures the propen-
sity of an engagement to maximise the number of times that a WS can be available for future
engagements). The framework proposed by Truter [187] may serve as a first-order method for
testing TEWA DSS results in an integrated fashion.
7.9 Chapter summary
This chapter was dedicated to a discussion on practical suggestions for implementing a TEWA
DSS. Eight suggestions were proposed. The chapter opened in §7.1 with a discussion on the
automation of systems in general. Five levels of automation were discussed and the suggestion
was made that a TEWA DSS should aim to support and conform to FCO thought when an
operator has to make difficult decisions in short time frames, rather than pursuing a fully-
automated TEWA DSS. Furthermore, a suggestion was made in §7.2 for improving certain
input data in a bid to facilitate higher quality results from the TEWA DSS.
Next, the importance of providing the FCO with only the necessary information that he needs
was discussed in §7.3. A number of suggestions for an efficient layout of the HMI was also pro-
vided. In §7.4, the focus shifted to a common problem experienced in military combat situations
— that of overwhelming FCOs with unnecessary information. This may cause confusion when
FCOs have to make important WA engagement decisions. A decision tree was proposed which
the FCO may use to configure WAMs during the pre-deployment stages of a mission so as to
alleviate the stress experienced during combat situations. Next, in §7.5, four suggestions for
incorporating FCO preferences and biases into a TEWA system were discussed in detail with
a view to reduce WA alternatives reported as DSS recommendations to an FCO. In §7.6, the
undesirable notion of switching was described and a suggestion of incorporating threshold values
to counter this problem was highlighted.
The importance of testing the various components of the system was briefly discussed in §7.7
and specific mention was made of the vital importance of thoroughly testing the constituent
parts of military DSSs due the high-stake involvement of human lives. In §7.8, the importance
of evaluating a TEWA DSS as a whole before implementation was elaborated upon. It was
suggested that a TEWA DSS should be evaluated as an integrated system within the context of
an ADC environment in order to account for possible emergent behaviour. The use of a simula-
tion environment was suggested for this purpose and the performance evaluation framework of
Truter [187] was suggested for testing a TEWA DSS in such a fashion.
as part of a larger, more complex system.
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In this chapter, the working of the four WAM prototypes selected for default inclusion in the
WAMS component (proposed in §6.5) is illustrated by solving each of the models in the context
of a simulated GBAD scenario according to the solution methodologies described in Chapter 5.
The chapter opens in §8.1 with a detailed description of the hypothetical, yet realistic, GBAD
scenario that forms the context within which the WAMs are solved.
Section 8.2 contains four subsections dedicated to detailed descriptions of the numerical results
obtained by each of the models of §6.5.1–§6.5.4. Each subsection is devoted to one of the four
WAMs and contains a detailed description of the way in which the relevant solution methodology
of §5.2 was implemented to solve the model, as well as a detailed presentation and interpretation
of the numerical results obtained. A conventional genetic algorithm (as described in §5.3.2)
is used to solve the single-objective static WAM (6.6)–(6.9) and the implementation thereof,
as well as the numerical results thus obtained within the aforementioned hypothetical GBAD
scenario, are presented in §8.2.1. This is followed in §8.2.2 by a similarly structured description
of the implementation of the NSGA II (as described in §5.4.2) used to solve the multi-objective
static WAM (6.10)–(6.12) and the numerical results obtained for the same GBAD scenario.
The method of simulated annealing (as described in §5.3.1) is used to solve the single-objective
dynamic WA model (6.14)–(6.23) and the numerical results obtained are presented in §8.2.3.
Finally, an extension of the NSGA II (as discussed in §5.4.2) is used to solve the multi-objective
dynamic WA model (6.24)–(6.26) and the results thus obtained are presented in §8.2.4.
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The results obtained by each of the WAMs are validated in §8.3. Three validation methods are
employed for this purpose. In §8.3.1, a face validation is conducted, resulting in a subjective
opinion on the realism and quality of the results obtained in §8.2. The second method of
validation, applied in §8.3.2, involves a random benchmark validation in which thirty candidate
solutions are generated randomly for each WAM, ascertaining that the results returned by the
algorithms are, in fact, (significantly) superior to or dominate those generated randomly. The
final method of validation is carried out in §8.3.3 and entails an analysis of the feedback obtained
during consultations with two military experts in which they were first asked to solve (by hand)
each of the WAMs in the context of the simulated scenario of §8.1 and then to comment on the
suitability and practicality of the results returned by the algorithms employed to solve each of
the four WAMs. The chapter finally closes in §8.4 with a brief summary of the chapter contents.
8.1 A simulated ground-based air defence scenario
The GBAD test scenario adopted for validation purposes in this chapter was originally designed
by Roux [159] and mimics a real-life GBAD deployment in which two DAs (called DA1 and
DA2) are afforded protection by two sets of GBAD WSs deployed in concentric circles around
DA1. The first set comprises four CIWSs, labelled C1, C2, C3 and C4 in Figure 8.1, which are
spaced evenly and deployed at approximately half the distance of their ranges from DA1 (they
are deployed closest to the DAs). The second set comprises eight VSHORAD WSs, labelled V1,
V2, . . . , V8, which are deployed further away from the DAs in such a way that their primary fire
arcs cross. A top view of the locations of the DAs and the deployment of the two sets of WSs
is shown in Figure 8.1.
VSHORADS WS
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Realised threat flight path
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V7
C4
V1
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V5
V8
C1C3
C2
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DA2
T4
T3
T5
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T2
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m
Location of threat during τ = 23
Location of threat during τ = 39
N
Figure 8.1: Top view of a simulated GBAD scenario [158].
An attack scenario is considered in which five aerial threats, labelled T1, T2, T3, T4 and T5 in
Figure 8.1, are detected in the defended airspace. These threats enter the defended airspace in
three groupings, offset at different time stages. The first group comprises threats T1 and T2,
and they approach from a north-westerly direction at an average speed of 251 km/h and at an
altitude of 430 m. They aim to attack DA1 by executing a combat hump dive attack technique,
as described in §2.5.1. The second group comprises threats T3 and T4, and they approach from a
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
8.1. A simulated ground-based air defence scenario 155
south-westerly direction during a later stage at an average speed of 246 km/h and at an altitude
of 4 400 m. They are considered as fly-overs and act as decoys to the system in the sense that
they do not aim to attack any of the DAs. Finally, the third group consists of threat T5 only
which enters from a southerly direction during the same stage as the second group, but travels
at an average speed of 249 km/h and at an altitude of 90 m. It aims to attack DA2 by executing
a toss bomb attack technique, also described in §2.5.1. A top view of the flight profiles1 executed
by the five threats is also shown in Figure 8.1.
The time continuum of the scenario is partitioned into 120 time stages of four seconds each.
During each of these time stages the future flight path of each threat is predicted for the re-
maining stages by employing a straight line prediction model, as described in §6.4.1 (i.e. it is
predicted that each threat will continue travelling in a straight line, while maintaining its cur-
rent speed, direction and altitude). The efficiency values achievable by the WSs with respect
to engaging the threats during each of these time stages are discretised into a 3-dimensional
EEM (as described in §6.4). The EEM used in the scenario is not filtered for any environmental
conditions such as inclement weather or terrain obstructions (i.e. ideal engagement conditions
and a flat earth are assumed for simplicity). The priority values associated with eliminating
each threat (typically obtained from a TE subsystem) during each of the 120 time stages, as
well as the future predicted EEM values for each time stage, may be found online [119].
Since the static WAMs described in §6.5.1 and §6.5.2 involve WA decisions during a single
time stage at each time instant only, these models are solved here for a single time stage for
the sake of brevity. Time stage 39 is chosen for illustrative purposes during which to solve
the single objective static WAM (6.6)–(6.7) and the multi-objective static WAM (6.10)–(6.12),
because of its diversity and the close proximity of the threat locations to the DAs when τ = 39.
The approximate locations of threats during this time stage are denoted by black triangles in
Figure 8.1. The EEM and the threat list corresponding to this time stage are shown in Table 8.1.
Threat
WS T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 0 0 0.1 0.1 0
V2 0.7 0 0.5 0.5 0
V3 0.1 0 0 0 0
V4 0 0 0 0 0
V5 0 0 0 0 0
V6 0 0 0 0 0.1
V7 0 0 0 0 0.5
V8 0 0 0 0 0
C1 0.2 0.4 0 0 0
C2 0.5 0.9 0 0 0
C3 0 0 0 0 0
C4 0 0 0 0 0
(a)
Threat Vj
T1 0.99
T2 1.00
T3 0.76
T4 0.74
T5 0.50
(b)
Table 8.1: (a) An extract from the EEM and (b) the threat list entries corresponding to time stage
τ = 39 for the hypothetical GBAD scenario depicted in Figure 8.1.
1These flight paths represent the actual locations of the threats as a function of time, as opposed to the
predicted flight paths of the threats estimated by the FPP module from the EEM component. Neither the former
flight paths nor the intended targets of the aerial threats are, of course, known in advance by the ground force
TEWA system.
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Since the dynamic WAMs described in §6.5.3 and §6.5.4 involve WA decisions over a pre-specified
number of future time stages at once, the entire predicted future time continuum in the scenario
is considered in these models. Time stage 23 in the scenario of Figure 8.1 is chosen as the time
stage during which to solve the single-objective dynamic WAM (6.14)–(6.23) and the multi-
objective dynamic WAM (6.24)–(6.26) over the predicted remaining future time stages due to
the diversity in the locations of the threats during this time stage. The approximate locations
of the threats during this time stage are illustrated graphically by open triangles in Figure 8.1.
In addition, priority values associated with eliminating each threat during time stage 23 are
given in Table 8.2. Furthermore, it is assumed that the setup time of each WS is three time
stages, that the minimum length of a FW is four time stages and that the number of time stages
included in the fixed-mean calculation in (6.13) are fixed to the minimum length of a FW. The
earliest and latest times during which a WS may engage a threat (i.e. the values of eij and `ij)
for time stage 23 are given in Table 8.3.
Threat Vj
T1 0.20
T2 0.22
T3 1.00
T4 1.00
T5 0.30
Table 8.2: The threat values corresponding to time stage τ = 23 for the remaining time stages of the
hypothetical GBAD scenario depicted in Figure 8.1.
Threat
WS T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 72 72 32 33 86
V2 0 0 35 33 98
V3 34 36 0 0 0
V4 19 18 0 0 0
V5 0 0 0 0 0
V6 0 0 0 0 0
V7 0 0 0 0 34
V8 83 80 0 0 57
C1 66 64 19 17 85
C2 53 52 0 19 0
C3 0 0 3 1 0
C4 0 0 5 4 0
(a) Earliest engagement stages
Threat
WS T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 102 100 63 60 110
V2 0 0 67 67 116
V3 56 54 0 0 0
V4 50 49 0 0 0
V5 0 0 0 0 0
V6 0 0 0 0 0
V7 0 0 0 0 73
V8 103 105 0 0 85
C1 81 81 40 37 103
C2 70 69 0 28 0
C3 0 0 19 19 0
C4 0 0 24 23 0
(b) Latest engagement stages
Table 8.3: (a) The earliest and (b) the latest time stages during which WSs may engage threats for
engagement decisions when viewed from the perspective of time stage 23 for the remaining time stages
of the hypothetical GBAD scenario depicted in Figure 8.1.
The multi-objective WAMs of §6.5.2 and §6.5.4 also require the levels of ammunition available
to each WS during each time stage of the scenario in Figure 8.1 as well as the unit cost of the
WS ammunition used in the scenario. The levels of ammunition available for use by each WS
during time stage 23 are shown in Table 8.4 and the levels of ammunition available for use by
each WS during time stage 39 are given in Table 8.5.
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WS V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 C1 C2 C3 C4
Ai 7 6 5 5 5 7 8 9 5 6 4 6
Table 8.4: The levels of ammunition available to each WS at time stage 23 of the hypothetical GBAD
scenario depicted in Figure 8.1.
Finally, the cost of the ammunition (in South African Rand value) for a single burst of a CIWS
is assumed to be R 34 000 and the cost of a single missile (in South African Rand value) for a
VSHORAD WS is assumed to be R 1 000 000. These values were realistic approximations of the
costs of a burst of ammunition for a 35 mm cannon and an Umkhonto missile, respectively, at
the time of writing.
WS V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 C1 C2 C3 C4
Ai 4 4 5 5 5 4 3 5 3 4 5 5
Table 8.5: The levels of ammunition available to each WS at time stage 39 of the hypothetical GBAD
scenario depicted in Figure 8.1.
8.2 Numerical results
This section contains detailed descriptions of the way in which each of the WAM prototypes of
Chapter 6 was implemented within the context of the simulated GBAD scenario of Figure 8.1.
Numerical results obtained are also presented and discussed briefly. The section contains four
subsections devoted to discussions on the implementations of the various solution methodologies
for each of the WAMs, respectively, as well as the numerical results returned by these WAMs.
8.2.1 Numerical results for the single-objective static model prototype
Due to the nonconvexity of the models in Chapter 6, it was decided to solve the single-objective
static WAM (6.6)–(6.9) approximately by means of a genetic algorithm, as described in §5.3.2.
Candidate solutions to this model were encoded as binary matrices having dimensions m(τ) ×
n(τ) (recall that m(τ) represents the number of WSs during stage τ and that n(τ) represents
the number of threats in the system during stage τ), where a value of 1 in row i and column
j of the matrix indicates an assignment of WS i to threat j, while a value of 0 indicates no
assignment. The algorithm was initiated by generating an initial population of 200 candidate
solutions randomly. The current population of solutions was then used to populate the next
generation of solutions during each iteration. This was achieved by implementing a tournament
selection procedure, as described in §5.3.2, with pool and tour sizes of 2 and 100, respectively,
in order to select parent solutions in an elitist manner from the current generation and to create
offspring solutions by applying conventional crossover and mutation operators (as described in
§5.3.2) to the selected parent solutions. A mutation probability of 0.025 was employed and the
algorithm was iterated until a stopping criterion of having performed 400 iterations in total was
satisfied. Finally, the value κ = 3 was assumed (that is, each aerial threat may be engaged by
at most three WSs).
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Threat Survival Prioritised
Threat Priority WSs values survival
Vj(τ) assigned qij(τ) probability
T1 0.99 C1, V2, V3 0.8, 0.3, 0.9 0.99× 0.8× 0.3× 0.9
T2 1.00 C2 0.1 1.00× 0.1
T3 0.76 V1 0.9 0.76× 0.9
T4 0.74 None — 0.74× 1
T5 0.50 V6, V7 0.9, 0.5 0.5× 0.9× 0.5
Total: 1.9628
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Position of threat during τ = 39
DA
Realised threat flight path
WS-threat assignment
(b)
Figure 8.2: (a) WS to threat assignment list and (b) top view graphical illustration of the assignments
of WSs to threats proposed by the single-objective static WA model (6.6)–(6.9) during stage τ = 39 of
the simulated GBAD scenario described in §8.1.
The algorithm was implemented on an Intel Core i7-4770 processor with 8GB of random access
memory operating at 3.40 GHz, which was able to solve the model almost instantaneously in
the manner described above. The best solution obtained for the single-objective static WA
model (6.6)–(6.9) is shown in Figure 8.2. In this solution, WSs V2, V3, and C1 are assigned to
threat T1, WS C2 is assigned to threat T2, WS V1 is assigned to threat T3, and WSs V6 and V7
are assigned to threat T5. Note that threat T4 is assigned no WSs. This assignment yields a
threat priority-weighted accumulated survival probability value for the threats of 1.9628 at an
assignment cost of R 5 068 000.
8.2.2 Numerical results for the multi-objective static model prototype
The multi-objective static WA model (6.10)–(6.12) was again solved for κ = 3 and for time stage
τ = 39 of the simulated GBAD scenario depicted in Figure 8.1, but this time using the NSGA II
of Agarwal et al. [2], as described in §5.4.2. Solutions were again encoded as binary matrices, as
with the implementation of the single-objective static WAM (6.6)–(6.9). The current population
of solutions were ranked based on the nondominated statuses of solutions and partitioned into
nondominated fronts of solutions based on their rank values. This was achieved by implementing
the FNSA of Deb et al. [51], as described in §4.7.
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The algorithm was initialised by randomly generating an initial population of 200 candidate
solutions. The current population was used during each iteration to generate an intermediate
population by adopting a tournament selection procedure as described in §5.3.2, again with
pool and tour sizes of 2 and 100, respectively, in order to select parent solutions and performing
conventional crossover and mutation operators on the selected parent solutions, as described in
§5.3.2. The solutions from the current and intermediate populations were then combined to form
a larger population. The larger population was ranked and sorted, again using the FNSA [51],
and the next generation of candidate solutions was populated by first including the solutions
in nondominated front F1, followed by the solutions in nondominated front F2, and so on until
the size of the initial population was reached, as described in §5.4.2. The algorithm was again
executed until a stopping criterion of 400 iterations was reached. The algorithm was able to
solve the model in 13.4 seconds on an Intel Core i7-4770 processor with 8GB of random access
memory operating at 3.40 GHz.
Thirteen approximately Pareto optimal solutions were thus obtained. These solutions are listed
in Table 8.6, which contains the WS-threat pair assignments as well as the corresponding objec-
tive function values of the solutions (the threat priority-weighted accumulated survival proba-
bility, the ammunition cost incurred by the assignments and the number of units of ammunition
available at the least re-engagable WS after the assignment). The assignment for each WS-threat
pair is given as the WS(s), followed by a right-arrow and the threat to which it is assigned (e.g.
V3, C1 → T1 implies that WSs V3 and C1 should engage threat T1).
Sol WS-threat pair assignments Obj 1 Obj 2 Obj 3
1 C1, V2, V3 → T1; C2 → T2; V1 → T3; V6, V7 → T5 1.9628 R 5 068 000 2
2 C1, V2, V3 → T1; C2 → T2; V1 → T3; V7 → T5 1.9878 R 4 068 000 2
3 C1, V2 → T1; C2 → T2; V1 → T3; V7 → T5 2.0116 R 3 068 000 2
4 V2 → T1; C2 → T2; V1 → T3; V7 → T5 2.0710 R 3 034 000 2
5 V2 → T1; C1, C2 → T2; V7 → T5 2.1070 R 2 068 000 2
6 V2 → T1; C2 → T2; V7 → T5 2.1470 R 2 034 000 2
7 C1, V2 → T1; C2 → T2; 2.3376 R 1 068 000 2
8 C1 → T1; C2 → T2 2.8920 R 68 000 2
9 V2, V3 → T1; C2 → T2; V1 → T3; V6 → T5 2.2413 R 4 034 000 3
10 V2 → T1; C2 → T2; V1 → T3; V6 → T5 2.2710 R 3 034 000 3
11 V2 → T1; C2 → T2; V1 → T3 2.3210 R 2 034 000 3
12 V2 → T1; C2 → T2; 2.3970 R 1 034 000 3
13 C2 → T2 3.0900 R 34 000 3
Table 8.6: The set of approximately Pareto optimal solutions together with their WS-threat pair
assignments and their respective objective function values for the multi-objective static WAM (6.10)–
(6.12) at time stage τ = 39 within the context of the GBAD scenario depicted in Figure 8.1. Obj 1
represents the accumulated threat-priority weighted survival objective function values, Obj 2 represents
the ammunition cost objective function values and Obj 3 represents the least re-engagable WS objective
function values. The assignment pairs are given as the WS, followed by a right-arrow indicating to which
threat the WS should be assigned.
The thirteen approximately Pareto optimal solutions are also presented graphically in objective
function space in Figure 8.3. These solutions achieve objective function values in the priority-
weighted accumulated survival probabilities objective (6.10) and assignment cost objective (6.11)
as indicated on the horizontal and vertical axes of the figure, respectively. The objective func-
tion values achieved for the re-engagability objective (6.12) may be interpreted as follows. The
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solutions are numbered 1, . . . , 13. For solutions 1, . . . , 8 (represented by solid triangles) the least
re-engagable WS can engage twice after the assignment, while for solutions 9, . . . , 13 (repre-
sented by solid squares) the least re-engagable WS can engage three times after the assignment.
Figure 8.3 clearly illustrates how much of one objective is compromised for a gain in another
— the trade-offs between the objective function values may be observed when moving from one
solution to an adjacent solution.
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Figure 8.3: Approximately Pareto optimal solutions to the multi-objective static WA model (6.10)–
(6.12) in objective function space within the context of the GBAD scenario of §8.1.
The solutions in Table 8.6 and Figure 8.3 may be presented to the FCO after which he may choose
one of them for implementation (based on his subjective preference and expertise). Suppose, for
illustrative purposes, that an assignment is sought in which the least re-engagable WS can engage
at least three times after the engagement and that a restriction of R 2 500 000 is placed on the
accumulated assignment cost (as illustrated by the horizontal line labelled A in Figure 8.3). The
best solution satisfying both these criteria is Solution 11 in the figure. In this solution, WS V2 is
assigned to threat T1, WS C2 is assigned to threat T2, and WS V1 is assigned to threat T3. No
WSs are assigned to threats T4 or T5. These assignments yield a priority-weighted accumulated
survival probability value for the threats of 2.321 at an assignment cost of R 2 034 000. A
graphical illustration of the assignments embodied in Solution 11 is shown in Figure 8.4.
Note that the solution to the single-objective static WA model obtained in the previous section
(see Figure 8.2) is also (approximately) Pareto-optimal for the multi-objective, static WA model;
this is Solution 1 in Figure 8.3.
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Threat Survival Prioritised
Threat Priority WSs values survival Accumulated
Vj(τ) assigned qij(τ) probability cost in Rand
T1 0.99 V2 0.3 0.99× 0.3 1 000 000
T2 1.00 C2 0.1 1.00× 0.1 34 000
T3 0.76 V1 0.9 0.76× 0.9 1 000 000
T4 0.74 None — 0.74× 1 —
T5 0.50 None — 0.5× 1 —
Totals: 2.321 2 034 000
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Figure 8.4: (a) WS to threat assignment list and (b) top view graphical illustration of the assignments
of WSs to threats in Solution 11 in Figure 8.3 to the multi-objective static WA model (6.10)–(6.12).
8.2.3 Numerical results for the single-objective dynamic model prototype
Van der Merwe and Van Vuuren [196] experimented with solving the single-objective dynamic
WAM (6.14)–(6.23) by means of a conventional simulated annealing algorithm, as described
in §5.3.1. The model requires the survival probability values of the threats for the FWs in
Figure 8.3 and these values were calculated using the fixed-mean approach described in §6.5.3.
The calculated fixed-mean values for each FW are shown in Table 8.7. A value κ = 2 was
assumed when solving the model. Solutions to the single-objective, dynamic WA model (6.14)–
(6.23) were encoded as integer matrices of dimensions m(τ)×n(τ) this time. If a WS is assigned
to a threat, the corresponding entry in the solution matrix is an integer value representing the
FTTF for the WS-threat pair in question. Otherwise, the entry is zero, indicating that the
WS-threat pair is not assigned. The algorithm was initiated by generating an initial feasible
solution in a greedy fashion. This solution was stored as the incumbent solution. During each
iteration of the algorithm, a neighbourhood move operator performed a number of intelligent,
random perturbations in respect of the current solution in order to obtain neighbouring solutions.
The temperature which controls the randomness of the search in the algorithm was lowered by
implementing a geometric cooling schedule (as described §5.3.1) with an initial temperature
of 0.1 and a cooling factor of 0.01. The algorithm was iterated for nine iterations and the
incumbent solution was reported as an approximate solution to the single-objective dynamic
WAM (6.14)–(6.23).
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Threat
WS T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
V1 0.451 0.451 0.367 0.369 0.481
V2 1.000 1.000 0.374 0.369 0.435
V3 0.371 0.376 1.000 1.000 1.000
V4 0.340 0.338 1.000 1.000 1.000
V5 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
V6 1.000 1.000 0.701 1.000 1.000
V7 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.371
V8 0.474 0.468 1.000 1.000 0.420
C1 0.328 0.201 0.057 0.052 0.460
C2 0.192 0.156 1.000 0.560 1.000
C3 1.000 1.000 0.390 0.238 1.000
C4 1.000 1.000 0.075 0.207 1.000
Table 8.7: Fixed-mean survival values of threats for FWs in Table 8.3
The algorithm was also implemented on an Intel Core i7-4770 processor with 8GB of random
access memory operating at 3.40 GHz and was able to solve the model (approximately) in 0.002
seconds. The best solution obtained for the WA model (6.14)–(6.23) is given in Table 8.8. The
following assignments are proposed: WSs V3 and C2 are assigned to Threat T1 during time stages
34 and 66, respectively, while WSs C1 and C2 are assigned to threat T2 during time stages 64
and 52, respectively. Similarly, WSs V1 and C1 are assigned to threat T3 during time stages 32
and 19, respectively, while WSs C3 and C4 are assigned to threat T4 during time stages 1 and
4, respectively. Finally, WSs V8 and C1 are assigned to threat T5 during time stages 57 and
85, respectively. These assignments yield a priority-weighted accumulated survival probability
value for the threats of 0.1493 (at an accumulated assignment cost of R 3 238 000). The proposed
assignments are also illustrated graphically in Figure 8.5. The dotted lines in the figure represent
the predicted flight paths of the threats, the bold lines represent the FWs for each threat and
the thin solid lines represent WS-threat assignments. The underlying SSHP values of each WS
are denoted by means of a grey-scaled colour scheme.
WSs Accumulated
Threat assigned FTTF LTTF cost in Rand
T1 V3 34 56 R 1 000 000
C2 66 70 R 34 000
T2 C1 64 81 R 34 000
C2 52 61 R 34 000
T3 V1 32 63 R 1 000 000
C1 19 40 R 34 000
T4 C3 1 19 R 34 000
C4 4 23 R 34 000
T5 V8 57 85 R 1 000 000
C1 85 103 R 34 000
Total: R 3 238 000
Table 8.8: WS to threat assignment list as well as the FTTF and LTTF values proposed by the
single-objective dynamic WA model (6.14)–(6.23).
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Figure 8.5: Top view graphical illustration of the assignments of WSs to threats proposed by the single-
objective, dynamic WA model (6.14)–(6.23) for the future predicted time stages from time stage τ = 23
and onwards involving a straight line prediction period of 120 seconds.
8.2.4 Numerical results for the multi-objective dynamic model prototype
The multi-objective dynamic WA model (6.24)–(6.26) was again solved for κ = 2 in the context
of the simulated scenario depicted in Figure 8.1 by implementing the variation of the NSGA II
described in §5.4.2. A population size of 100 was selected and a tour size of 2 was implemented
in the tournament selection procedure. A further diversity preservation measure, known as a
multistart procedure, was also implemented in the algorithm. This procedure allows for the
algorithm to be executed in a pre-specifed number of parallel runs in order to obtain a number
of approximately Pareto optimal sets of solutions. These sets are then combined to form a larger
set of solutions and the FNSA of Agarwal et al. [2] is again used to filter out the dominated
solutions so as to obtain a single new, approximately Pareto optimal set of solutions. The idea
is that the procedure allows for a better and more diverse set of approximately Pareto optimal
sets of solutions emanating from different randomly generated initial solutions. In this way a
wider exploration of the solution space is promoted. A multistart procedure of 20 runs was
implemented.
Furthermore, a WS was allowed to be assigned to a specific threat at most once during the
scheduling window. A mutation probability of 0.07 and a stopping criterion of 100 generations
were implemented. This set of parameter values was decided upon after extensive experimen-
tation since they produce an acceptable spread of solutions along the approximate Pareto front
in objective function space. The algorithm was able to solve the model instance in 139 seconds
on an Intel Core i7-4770 processor with 8GB of random access memory operating at 3.40 GHz.
Twelve approximately Pareto optimal solutions were thus obtained. These solutions are listed
in Table 8.9. The table contains the various WS-threat pair assignment schedules (i.e. the FWs
during which WA assignments may occur) as well their corresponding objective function values
(the priority-weighted accumulated survival probability, the ammunition costs incurred by the
assignments and the numbers of units of ammunition available at the least re-engagable WSs
after the assignments). The assignment schedules for each WS-threat pair is given as the WS,
followed by the FW during which the assignment should occur in brackets, followed by a right-
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Sol WS-threat pair assignment schedules Obj 1 Obj 2 Obj 3
1 V3 [40,55], C2 [58,64] → T1; V4 [21,40], V1 [78,88] → T2; 0.0662 R 6 136 000 4
C4 [14,20], V2 [39,67] → T3; C4 [6,10], C1 [22,33] → T4;
V7 [38,61], V8 [60,85] → T5
2 V3 [35,53], C2 [58,64] → T1; V4 [22,28], V8 [81,103] → T2; 0.0666 R 6 102 000 4
C4 [8,19], V2 [39,47] → T3; C1 [22,33] → T4; V7 [37,55],
V8 [57,67] → T5
3 V3 [35,53], C2 [58,64] → T1; V4 [23,40] → T2; C4 [9,19], 0.1120 R 5 102 000 4
V2 [39,47] → T3; C1 [22,33]→ T4 ; V7 [35,47],
V8 [60,85] → T5
4 C2 [56,64], V8 [83,101] → T1; V4 [20,27], C1 [69,76] → T2; 0.0388 R 5 170 000 3
C4 [13,23], V2 [38,45] → T3; C3 [8,12], C1 [20,34]→ T4;
V8 [61,74],V2 [98,112] → T5
5 C1 [71,76], V8 [85,100] → T1; C2 [63,67], V1 [78,92] → T2; 0.0552 R 4 204 000 3
C3 [7,16], C4 [9,21] → T3; C1 [21,33], C2 [22,28] → T4;
V8 [61,71], V2 [107,113] → T5
6 C1 [66,77], V8 [85,100] → T1; C2 [63,67] → T2; C3 [7,16], 0.0656 R 3 204 000 3
C4 [10,23] → T3; C1 [20,32], C2 [22,28]→ T4; V8 [61,71],
V2 [103,113] → T5
7 V3 [42,55], C2 [57,69] → T1; C1 [71,81], V1 [75,86] → T2; 0.0378 R 5 170 000 2
C4 [6,17], V2 [39,64] → T3; C1 [23,34], V1 [35,38] → T4;
C1 [90,99], V2 [100,116] → T5
8 V3 [42,55], C2 [57,69] → T1; C1 [71,81], V8 [93,101] → T2; 0.0395 R 4 170 000 2
C4 [6,17], V2 [39,64] → T3; C1 [23,34] → T4; C1 [90,99],
V2 [100,116] → T5
9 V3 [42,55], C2 [57,66] → T1; C1 [71,81] → T2; C4 [6,17], 0.0396 R 3 204 000 2
V2 [39,64] → T3; C2 [19,27], C1 [23,34] → T4; C1 [90,99],
V2 [100,116] → T5
10 V3 [42,55], C2 [57,69] → T1; C1 [71,81] → T2; C4 [6,17], 0.0405 R 3 170 000 2
V2 [38,65] → T3; C1 [23,34]→ T4; C1 [90,99],
V2 [104,114] → T5
11 C2 [64,67], C1 [66,75] → T1; C2 [54,59], V8 [86,102] → T2; 0.0573 R 2 272 000 2
C3 [4,14], C4 [13,24] → T3; C2 [19,24], C1 [21,36] → T4;
V8 [58,64],C1 [85,98] → T5
12 C2 [63,68], C1 [67,76] → T1; C2 [53,57], V8 [83,101] → T2; 0.0665 R 2 238 000 2
C4 [6,18], C3 [7,18] → T3; C1 [23,36] → T4; V8 [57,77],
C1 [90,101] → T5
Table 8.9: The set of approximately Pareto optimal solutions obtained when solving the multi-objective
dynamic WAM (6.24)–(6.26) within the context of the GBAD scenario §8.1, WS-threat pair assignment
schedules are given, together with their respective objective function values as illustrated in Figure 8.6.
Obj 1 represents the priority-weighted accumulated survival objective function values, Obj 2 represents
the ammunition cost objective function values and Obj 3 represents the least re-engagable WS objective
function values. The assignment schedules are given as the WS, followed by the FW in brackets, followed
by a right-arrow indicating to which threat the WS should be assigned.
arrow and the threat to which it is assigned (e.g. V3 [40,55] → T1 means that WS V3 should
engage threat T1 during any time stage from time stage 40 to time stage 55, inclusive).
The twelve approximately Pareto optimal solutions are also presented graphically in objective
function space in Figure 8.6. These solutions again achieve objective function values in the
priority-weighted accumulated survival probabilities objective (6.24) and assignment cost ob-
jective (6.25) as indicated on the horizontal and vertical axes of the figure, respectively. The
objective function values achieved for the re-engagability objective (6.26) may be interpreted as
follows. The solutions are numbered 1, . . . , 12. For solutions 1, 2 and 3 (represented by solid
circles) the least re-engagable WS can engage four times after the assignment, for solutions 4, 5
and 6 (represented by solid squares) the least re-engagable WS can engage three times after the
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Figure 8.6: The approximately Pareto optimal front in objective function space obtained when solving
the solving the multi-objective dynamic WAM (6.24)–(6.26) within the context of the GBAD scenario
of §8.1.
assignment, and for solutions 7, . . . , 12 (represented by solid triangles) the least re-engagable
WS can engage twice after the assignment. Figure 8.6 again clearly illustrates how much of
one objective is compromised for a gain in another. These solutions may again be presented to
the FCO after which he may choose one of them for implementation (based on his subjective
preference and expertise).
In order to illustrate the WS-threat pair assignment schedules in Table 8.9, consider Solution2 10.
This solution contains eight WS-threat assignment pairs with an accumulated survival proba-
bility of 0.0405 at an assignment cost of R 3 170 000. The least re-engagable WS in this solution
(WS C1) can re-engage twice after the assignment. WS V3 should engage Threat T1 during
time stages 42 to 55 (inclusive). The same threat should again be engaged by WS C2 during
time stages 57 to 69 (inclusive). WS C1 should engage Threat T2 during time stages 71 to 81
(inclusive). WS C4 should engage Threat T3 during time stages 6 to 17 (inclusive) and the
threat should again be engaged by WS V2 during time stages 38 to 65 (inclusive). WS C1 should
furthermore engage Threat T4 during time stages 23 to 34 (inclusive). Finally, WS C1 should
engage Threat T5 during time stages 90 to 99 (inclusive), and the threat should again be engaged
by WS V2 during time stages 104 to 114 (inclusive). A graphical representation of this assign-
ment schedule is shown in Figure 8.7. The predicted threat flight paths are denoted by dotted
lines, the fire windows are denoted by thick solid lines and the WS-threat pair assignments are
denoted by thin solid lines.
2Only Solution 10 is discussed in detail here in order to avoid undue repetition.
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Figure 8.7: Top view graphical illustration of the assignment schedule corresponding to Solution 10 in
Table 8.9.
8.3 Validation of model results
In this section, three methods are employed to validate the numerical results obtained in §8.2
for each of the WAM prototypes of §6.5. The first method is a face validation, which involves
a subjective evaluation of the quality and realism of the WA proposals obtained for each WAM
prototype. The second method is a random benchmark validation procedure and the third
method involves consulting two military experts for validations of the results obtained.
8.3.1 Face validation
Face validations are carried out in this section for each of the four models of §6.5 separately for
which results were reported in §8.2.
The single-objective static WAM (6.6)–(6.9)
The results returned by the genetic algorithm for the single-objective static WAM (6.6)–(6.9),
presented in Figure 8.2, seem plausible in the sense that high-quality WS-threat assignment
pairs are proposed. The solution proposes engagements of the two most threatening aircraft, T1
and T2, which have threat priority values of 0.99 and 1.00, respectively. Upon assigning WSs C1,
V2 and V3 (with respective SSHP values of 0.2, 0.7 and 0.1) to threat T1, its priority-weighted
survival probability drops from 0.9900 to 0.99 × (1 − 0.2) × (1 − 0.7) × (1 − 0.1) = 0.2138.
Similarly, upon assigning WS C2 (with an SSHP value of 0.9) to threat T2, its priority-weighted
survival probability drops from 1.0000 to 1.00× (1− 0.9) = 0.1000. These survival probabilities
are suitably low for threats with such large elimination priorities. Note that no further WSs
could have been assigned to these two threats during time stage 39 — the closest unassigned3
WSs (WSs C3, C4, V4 and V8) are all out of range of threats T1 and T2 during time stage 39
(i.e. their SSHP values with respect to these threats are smaller than 0.1).
3Recall that each WS can be assigned at most once to engage aerial threats single-objective static WAM
(6.6)–(6.9).
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The next most urgent threats are T3 and T4, with elimination priorities of 0.76 and 0.74, re-
spectively. Upon assigning the only WS within range of threat T3 to this threat (namely WS
V1 with an SSHP value of 0.1), its priority-weighted survival probability drops from 0.7600 to
0.76 × (1 − 0.1) = 0.6840. Although this large value is a concern, there are no further WSs in
range of T3 during time stage 39 by which this value could have been lowered. Furthermore,
since there are no unassigned WSs within range of threat T4 during time stage 39, no WSs are
assigned to this threat. This means that its priority-weighted survival probability remains at a
very high value of 0.7400, but again the WS deployment is such that no assignment could have
remedied this situation during time stage 39.
Moreover, threat T5 has a threat or elimination priority of 0.5000. The only two WSs within
range of T5 during time stage 39 are WSs V6 and V7. Upon assigning these WSs (with respective
SSHP values of 0.1 and 0.5) to threat T5, its priority-weighted survival probability drops to
0.50× (1− 0.1)× (1− 0.5) = 0.2250, which is acceptably low.
The accumulated priority-weighted survival probability of the solution is therefore 0.2138 +
0.1000 + 0.6840 + 0.7400 + 0.2250 = 1.9628. It is concluded that those threats with the largest
elimination priority values are assigned WSs which achieve relatively large SSHP values with
respect to these threats when, in fact, there are WSs within range to justify such assignments.
Although the solution returned by the genetic algorithm seems plausible, the disadvantage of
employing a static WAM is abundantly clear: There seem to be much better times at which to
engage the threats than during time stage 39. For instance, it would be beneficial to engage
threats T1 and T2 much earlier than at time τ = 39 in view of the locations of WSs C2, V3 and
V4. Similar conclusions may be drawn for the remaining three threats.
Finally, the genetic algorithm employed to solve the model is computationally efficient, being
able to solve the model almost instantaneously (in less than 0.01 second).
The multi-objective static WAM (6.10)–(6.12)
A total of thirteen approximately Pareto optimal solutions were returned by the NSGA II for the
multi-objective static WAM (6.10)–(6.12), as reported in Table 8.6 and illustrated in objective
space in Figure 8.3. For the sake of brevity, only one of these solutions is subjected to detailed
face validation in this section. Solution 11, highlighted in Figure 8.4, is selected for this purpose.
Solution 11 is the best alternative amongst the thirteen approximately Pareto optimal solutions
under a budgetary constraint of R 2 500 000 on ammunition cost incurred by the WA. Note that
this budget allows for at most two VSHORADS WSs to engage threats. From among the eight
available VSHORADS WSs, the two most effective in terms of engaging threats are indeed the
two assigned in the solution, namely WS V2 to threat T1 and WS V1 to threat T3. Upon assigning
WS V2 (with an SSHP value of 0.7) to threat T1, its priority-weighted survival probability drops
to 0.99 × (1 − 0.7) = 0.2970, which is small compared to the value of 0.9900 that would have
resulted if no WS were assigned to T1. Similarly, upon assigning WS V1 (with an SSHP value of
0.1) to threat T3, its priority-weighted survival probability drops to 0.76 × (1 − 0.1) = 0.6840.
This value is not particularly small compared to the value of 0.7600 that would have resulted
if no WS were assigned to T3. Other assignments, which would seem intuitively to be good
alternatives are, however, not more effective than the solution returned by the NSGA II. WS V2
cannot, for example, be assigned to threat T2 during time step 39, because T2 is out of range
of V1 when τ = 39 (from Table 8.1 it may be seen that the WS achieves an SSHP value of less
than 0.1 with respect to this threat). Furthermore, assigning WS V2 to threat T4 instead of to
threat T1 would also yield a worse result, because V2 achieves a smaller SSHP value (of 0.5) with
respect to T4 than with respect to T1 (a value of 0.7).
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It would seem that the assignment of WS V3 to threat T1 represents a viable alternative to the
solution returned by the NSGA II, but this is not the case. If WS V3 were to be assigned to threat
T1 (achieving an SSHP value of 0.1) instead of assigning WS V2 to the threat (achieving an SSHP
value of 0.7), it would have resulted in a priority-weighted survival probability 0.99× (1−0.1) =
0.8910 for T1 instead of the current value of 0.99× (1− 0.7) = 0.2970 in view of the particular
orientation of the WSs (both orientated in an easterly direction).
The budget of R500 000 that remains after having assigned two VSHORADS WSs to en-
gage threats is used to assign CIWS C2 to threat T2 (with an SSHP value of 0.9). This as-
signment results in the priority-weighted survival probability of T2 dropping to 1.00 × (1 −
0.9) = 0.1000, which is very small compared to the value of 1.0000 that would have re-
sulted if no WS were to be assigned to T2. No other CIWSs are within range of any threat
at time stage 39. The solution therefore yields an accumulated priority-weighted survival
probability of 0.2970 + 0.1000 + 0.6840 + 0.7400 + 0.5000 = 2.2310 at an assignment cost of
(1 × R34 000) + (2 × R1 000 000) = R2 034 000. The least re-engageable WSs after the assign-
ment are WSs C2, V1 and V2, which all have three units of ammunition available.
It is again concluded that threats with the largest threat priority values are assigned WSs that
are relatively effective in terms of their SSHP values. Better assignments would, of course,
have been possible under more generous budgetary constraints, as illustrated in Figure 8.3. It
is particularly heartening to note that the solution returned by the genetic algorithm for the
single-objective static WAM (6.6)–(6.9) in Figure 8.2 is indeed also returned by the NSGA II
for the multi-objective static WAM (6.10)–(6.12).
Finally, the NSGA II employed to solve the model does not seem to be sufficiently computa-
tionally efficient. It required a computation time of 13.4 seconds to produce the solutions in
Figure 8.3, while solutions would realistically be required in under one second, because radar
refresh rates are typically between one and four seconds, resulting in updated air pictures.
The single-objective dynamic WAM (6.14)–(6.23)
When considering the results retuned by the simulated annealing algorithm (implemented by
Van der Merwe and Van Vuuren [196]), the following analysis may be made in respect of the
solution. Upon assigning WS V3 (with a fixed-mean SSHP
4 value of 0.629 during the window
[34, 56]) and WS C2 (with a fixed-mean SSHP value of 0.808 during the window [66, 70]) to threat
T1, its priority-weighted survival probability drops to 0.2 × (1 − 0.629) × (1 − 0.808) = 0.0142,
which is quite small compared to the value of 0.2 that would have resulted had no WSs been
assigned to the threat. In a similar fashion, upon assigning WS C1 (with a fixed-mean SSHP
value of 0.799 during the window [64, 81]) and WS C2 (with a fixed-mean SSHP value of 0.844
during the window [52, 61]) to threat T2, its priority-weighted survival probability drops from
0.2200 to 0.22 × (1 − 0.799) × (1 − 0.844) = 0.0068, which is suitably small. Similarly, upon
assigning WS V1 (with a fixed-mean SSHP value of 0.633 during the window [32, 63]) and WS
C1 (with a fixed-mean SSHP value of 0.943 during the window [19, 40]) to threat T3, its priority-
weighted survival probability drops from 1.000 to 1× (1− 0.633)× (1− 0.943) = 0.0209, which
is again very small. Furthermore, upon assigning WS C3 (with a fixed-mean SSHP value of
0.762 during the window [1, 19]) and WS C4 (with a fixed-mean SSHP value of 0.793 during
the window [4, 23]) to threat T4, its priority-weighted survival probability drops to 1 × (1 −
0.762) × (1 − 0.793) = 0.0495, which is very small compared to the value of 1 that would have
resulted from assigning no WSs to the threat. Finally, upon assigning WS V8 (with a fixed-mean
SSHP value of 0.580 during the window [57, 85]) and WS C1 (with a fixed-mean SSHP value
4Note that the fixed-mean values are obtained from Figure 8.7.
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of 0.540 during the window [85, 103]) to threat T5, its priority-weighted survival probability
drops from 0.3000 to 0.3 × (1 − 0.580) × (1 − 0.540) = 0.0579, which is again comparatively
small. The accumulated priority-weighted survival probability of the assignment is therefore
0.0142 + 0.0068 + 0.0209 + 0.0495 + 0.0579 = 0.1493.
When analysing the results described above, it seems that the single-objective dynamic WAM
(6.14)–(6.23) is able to propose very good WS-threat assignment pair proposals. The dynamic
complexity of the WAM, however, makes it difficult to comment on the quality of the solution
relative to other alternatives. A significant disadvantage of the model is that it does not take into
consideration the possibility that a threat may be destroyed before coming up for engagement
by a WS scheduled later. It is therefore proposed that the model be solved for each time stage
in the time continuum of a given GBAD scenario in order to make provision for the possibility
that a threat may be eliminated from the scenario at some stage. In such a case, the threat
should be removed from the threat list and the remainder of the threats should be considered
for future engagements.
Finally, the simulated annealing algorithm employed to solve the model is computationally
efficient, being able to solve the model almost instantaneously (in under 0.01 seconds). Although
the model is able to schedule FWs for its assignment proposals, it considers only a single objective
within a single computation run of the model.
The multi-objective dynamic WAM (6.24)–(6.26)
A total of twelve approximately Pareto optimal solutions were returned by the NSGA II for
the multi-objective dynamic WAM (6.24)–(6.26), as reported in Table 8.9 and illustrated in
objective space in Figure 8.6. For the sake of brevity, only one solution is subjected to detailed
face validation in this section. Solution 10, highlighted towards the end of §8.2.4, is selected for
this purpose.
Upon assigning WSs V3 and C2 (with respective fixed-mean SSHP values of 0.65 over the win-
dow [42, 55] and 0.96085 over the window [57, 69]) to threat T1, its priority-weighted survival
probability drops to 0.2 × (1 − 0.65) × (1 − 0.96085) = 0.0027, which is small compared to
the value of 0.2000 that would have resulted had no WS been assigned to T1. Similarly, upon
assigning WS C1 (with a fixed-mean SSHP value of 0.9883 over the window [71, 81]) to threat
T2, its priority-weighted survival probability drops to 0.2200 × (1 − 0.9883) = 0.0026, which
is also small compared to the value of 0.2200 that would have resulted had no WS been as-
signed to T2. In a similar vein, the priority-weighted survival probability of threat T3 drops to
1× (1− 0.9393)× (1− 0.7) = 0.0182 upon assigning WSs C4 (with a fixed-mean SSHP value of
0.9393 over the window [6, 17]) and V2 (with a fixed-mean SSHP value of 0.7 over the window
[38, 65]) to threat T3. This value is again small compared to the value of 1 that would have re-
sulted had no WS been assigned to T3. Furthermore, the priority-weighted survival probability
of threat T4 drops to 1× (1−0.9994) = 0.0006 upon assigning WSs C1 (with a fixed-mean SSHP
value of 0.9994 over the window [23, 34]) to the threat — this is again small compared to the
value of 1 that would have resulted had no WS been assigned to the threat. Finally, the priority-
weighted survival probability of threat T5 drops to 0.3 × (1 − 0.7253) × (1 − 0.8001) = 0.0164
upon assigning WS C1 (with a fixed-mean SSHP value of 0.7253 over the window [90, 99]) and
WS V2 (with a fixed-mean SSHP value of 0.8001 during the window [104, 114]) to threat T5.
This is also small compared to the value of 0.3 had no WS been assigned to threat T5.
The accumulated priority-weighted survival probability of the assignment is therefore 0.0027 +
0.0026 + 0.0182 + 0.0006 + 0.0164 = 0.0405. Since this WA schedule involves five CIWS assign-
ments and three VSHORADS assignments, the total ammunition cost incurred by the schedule is
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(5×R 34 000)+(3×R 1 000 000) = R 3 170 000. The least re-engageable WS after the assignment
is WS C1, which has two units of ammunition available.
While the aforementioned model solution seems good, it is difficult to comment on the relative
quality of alternative assignments in view of the complexity of the dynamic WA situation. It
is noted, with satisfaction however, that there is a clear trade-off between the three conflicting
objectives of the model, as demonstrated in Figure 8.6.
As with the single-objective dynamic WAM (6.14)–(6.23), the multi-objective dynamic WAM
(6.24)–(6.26) exhibits the disadvantage of not taking into consideration the possibility that
a threat might be destroyed during an earlier scheduled FW before it can come up for re-
engagement during a later FW. It is therefore again proposed that the model be solved during
each time stage in the time continuum for all future time stages of a given GBAD scenario in
order to be able to take cognisance of the temporal unfolding of the air picture.
Finally, the NSGA II employed to solve the model does not seem to be computationally efficient.
It required a computation time of 139 seconds to produce the twelve approximately Pareto
optimal solutions in Table 8.9, while an approximate Pareto front would realistically be required
in under one second, because of the radar refresh rates typically available, as explained above.
8.3.2 Random benchmark validation
Random benchmark validations are carried out separately in this section for each of the four
WAMs for which results were reported in §8.2. This involves generating thirty random feasible
solutions for each WAM prototype and comparing these solutions with the results returned by
the relevant algorithms used in §8.2 in to solve the WAMs.
Single-objective static random benchmark validation
The thirty random solutions generated for the single-objective static WAM (6.6)–(6.9) are given
in Table 8.10. Since these random solutions may, in fact, also be used to validate the multi-
objective static WAM (6.10)–(6.12), the table therefore contains columns for all three objective
function values considered in the multi-objective static WAM (6.10)–(6.12).
In order to validate the solution returned by the genetic algorithm for the single-objective static
WAM (6.6)–(6.9) within the context of the GBAD scenario of §8.1, the solutions are plotted
in objective function space in Figure 8.8 together with the solution returned by the algorithm.
From the figure it is clear that the solution returned by the algorithm performs better than the
best solution in the set of random solutions. The random solution closest in objective space to
the solution returned by the algorithm is Solution 16 of Table 8.10, which achieves a priority-
weighted accumulated survival probability of 2.1448. The genetic algorithm is therefore able to
achieve a solution that is approximately 8% better than the best random solution found. This
may seem a small difference percentage. The low level of complexity of the single-objective
static WAM (6.6)–(6.9) (when compared to the WAM prototypes in the other three classes),
however, makes it relatively easy to solve for small problem instances (such as the one in §8.1).
Solution 16 involves assigning WSs C1 and V3 to threat T1, WS C2 to threat T2, WSs V1 and V2
to threat T3 and WS V7 to threat T5. This assignment is similar to the assignment proposed by
the algorithm (see Figure 8.2), except that the random solution rather assigns WS V2 to threat
T3 than to threat T2 and only assigns WS V6 to threat T5.
Furthermore, the average priority-weighted accumulated survival probability of the thirty ran-
dom solutions (the column labelled Obj 1 in Table 8.10) is 2.6279. When comparing this value
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
8.3. Validation of model results 171
with that of the solution obtained in §8.2.1 (i.e. 1.9628) it is found that the genetic algorithm
is able to achieve an improvement of approximately 25% in the objective function value of
the single-objective static WAM (6.6)–(6.9) over the average of the set of random benchmark
solutions. Based on these findings it may be concluded that the genetic algorithm is able to pro-
vide significantly better solutions to the single-objective static WAM (6.6)–(6.9) than proposing
random feasible assignments of WSs to threats.
Sol WS-threat pair assignments Obj 1 Obj 2 Obj 3
1 C1, C2, V2 → T1; V1 → T3; V6 → T5 2.9928 R 3 068 000 2
2 C2 → T1; C1 → T2; V1 → T3; V2 → T4; V6, V7 → T5 2.3740 R 4 068 000 2
3 V3 → T1; C2 → T2; V2 → T3; V1 → T4 V6 → T5 2.4870 R 4 034 000 3
4 C2, V3 → T1; C1 → T2; V2 → T3; V1 → T4; V7 → T5 2.3415 R 4 068 000 2
5 V2, V3 → T1; C1 → T2; V1 → T3; V6, V7 → T5 2.5163 R 5 034 000 2
6 C1 → T1; C2 → T2; V1, V2 → T3; V6, V7 → T5 2.1990 R 4 068 000 2
7 V3 → T1; V1 → T3; V6 → T5 3.7650 R 3 000 000 3
8 C1 → T1; C2 → T2; V1, V2 → T4; V7 → T5 2.2350 R 3 068 000 2
9 V3 → T1; C1, C2 → T2; V1, V2 → T3; V6, V7 → T5 2.2580 R 5 068 000 2
10 V2, V3 → T1; C1 → T2; V1 → T3; V7 → T5 2.5413 R 4 034 000 2
11 V3 → T1; C2 → T2; V1 → T4; V6 → T5 2.8670 R 3 034 000 3
12 C1 → T1; C2 → T2; V2 → T3; V1 → T4; V7 → T5 2.1880 R 3 068 000 2
13 C1, C2 → T1; V1, V2 → T4; V6, V7 → T5 2.7140 R 4 068 000 2
14 V3 → T1; C1 → T2; V1 → T3; V2 → T4; V6 → T5 2.9950 R 4 034 000 2
15 V2 → T1; C1 → T2; V1 → T3; V6 → T5 2.7710 R 3 034 000 2
16 C1, V3 → T1; C2 → T2; V1, V2 → T3; V7 → T5 2.1448 R 4 068 000 2
17 C1,V3 → T1; C2 → T2; V2 → T4; V6 → T5 2.7928 R 3 068 000 2
18 V3 → T1; C1, C2 → T2; V1, V2 → T4; V7 → T5 2.2940 R 4 068 000 2
19 C1, C2, V3 → T1; V1, V2 → T3; V6, V7 → T5 2.6634 R 5 068 000 2
20 C1, V2, V3 → T1; C2 → T2; V1 → T3 2.2379 R 4 064 000 2
21 C1, C2, V2 → T1; V1 → T4; V6, V7 → T5 2.7698 R 4 068 000 2
22 C1, V2, V3 → T1; C2 → T2; V1 → T3; V6 → T5 2.1878 R 4 068 000 2
23 C1, C2 → T2; V2 → T3; V1 → T4; V6 → T5 2.5460 R 3 068 000 2
24 V1, V2 → T3; V6, V7 → T5 3.2970 R 4 000 000 2
25 C2, V2 → T1; C1 → T2; V1 → T3 2.6725 R 2 068 000 2
26 C2, V2, V3 → T1; V1 → T3; V6, V7 → T5 2.7827 R 5 034 000 2
27 C2 → T1; C1 → T2; V1, V2 → T3; V6, V7 → T5 2.4020 R 4 068 000 2
28 V3 → T1; V1, V2 → T4 3.4840 R 3 000 000 3
29 C1, C2 → T2; V1 → T3; V2 → T4 2.6040 R 2 068 000 2
30 C1, C2 → T1; V1, V2 → T4; V6, V7 → T5 2.7140 R 4 068 000 2
Mean: 2.6279 R 3 752 133 2.1
Table 8.10: Thirty randomly generated solutions to the single-objective static WAM (6.6)–(6.9) and the
multi-objective static WAM (6.10)–(6.12) for time stage 39 of the GBAD scenario of Figure 8.1. Obj 1
represents the priority-weighted accumulated survival probability objective function values for the single-
objective static WAM (6.6)–(6.9) and the multi-objective static WAM (6.10)–(6.12). Obj 2 furthermore
represents the cost objective function values of the multi-objective static WAM (6.10)–(6.12) and Obj 3
represents the least re-engagable WS objective function values of the multi-objective static WAM (6.10)–
(6.12). The assignment pairs are given as WSs, followed by a right-arrow indicating to which threat the
WSs should be assigned.
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1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
Solution found by algorithm
Random solution
Priority-weighted accumulated survival probabilities of threats
Figure 8.8: The objective function value of the solution to the single-objective static WAM prototype
(6.6)–(6.9) returned by the genetic algorithm, together with the objective function values of the thirty
random solutions in Table 8.10.
Multi-objective static random benchmark validation
The same thirty random solutions in Table 8.10 are used to validate the numerical results re-
turned by the NSGA II for the multi-objective static WAM (6.10)–(6.12) in §8.2.2. The objective
function values of each solution are presented in Table 8.10. Sorting the thirty random solutions
in Table 8.10 by means of the FNSA (described in §4.6), in order to obtain the nondominated
solutions among the set of random solutions, yields six nondominated solutions. These solu-
tions together with the remaining 24 randomly generated solutions are illustrated graphically
in objective function space in Figure 8.9. Solutions in which the least re-engageable WSs can
re-engage twice after the assignment are denoted by open triangles, while the solutions in which
the least re-engageable WS can re-engage three times after the assignment are denoted by open
squares — the nondominated randomly generated solutions are joined by broken line segments.
The approximately Pareto optimal solutions returned by the NSGA II are also plotted in objec-
tive function space in Figure 8.9. Solutions in which the least re-engageable WSs can re-engage
twice after the assignment are denoted by solid triangles (they are joined by solid line seg-
ments), while solutions in which the least re-engageable WSs can re-engage three times after the
assignment are denoted by solid squares (again joined by solid line segments).
When comparing the approximately Pareto optimal front achieved by the NSGA II with the
nondominated front of randomly generated solutions, it is clear that the NSGA II is able to
achieve a much better and wide-spread nondominated front than that formed by the randomly
generated solutions. It may seem worrying that the nondominated front of the randomly gener-
ated solutions does not seem to be very far removed from the approximate Pareto front achieved
by the NSGA II — there is a small gap between these fronts of solutions in Figure 8.9. Although
the multi-objective static WAM (6.10)–(6.12) may be considered more complex than the single-
objective static WAM (6.6)–(6.9) due to the presence of multiple objectives in the former, the
model is still static in nature which makes it considerably easier to find solutions lying close to
the approximate Pareto optimal solutions for small problem instances (such as the one in §8.1).
The hypervolume technique discussed in §4.4 was used to calculate the hypervolume of the ap-
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proximately Pareto optimal solutions achieved by the NSGA II in Table 8.4 and the hypervolume
of the nondominated front of randomly generated solutions in Table 8.10 — a larger hypervolume
measure value is better than a smaller value. A reference point for the hypervolume calculation
was chosen to contain a value of 3.5 in the priority-weighted accumulated survival probability
objective, a value of R 5 100 000 in the cost objective and a value of 1 in the re-engageability
objective was used. A hypervolume measure of 1.1514×107 was obtained for the approximately
Pareto optimal solutions achieved by the NSGA II in Table 8.4, while a hypervolume measure
of 5.2754 × 106 was obtained for the nondominated front of randomly generated solutions in
Table 8.10. This confirms that the solutions returned by the NSGA II dominate a significantly
larger portion of the solution space than the thirty randomly generated solutions.
Based on the discussion above, it may be concluded that the multi-objective static WAM (6.10)–
(6.12) is able to provide a good spread of high-quality nondominated solutions in objective
function space compared to a randomly generated set of solutions.
Single-objective dynamic random benchmark validation
The thirty random solutions generated for the single-objective dynamic WAM (6.14)–(6.23) are
given in Table 8.11.
In order to validate the solution returned by the simulated annealing algorithm for the single-
objective dynamic WAM (6.14)–(6.23) within the context of the GBAD scenario of §8.1, the
random solutions are again plotted in objective function space in Figure 8.10 together with the
solution returned by the algorithm. From the figure it is again clear that the solution returned by
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
Solution found by algorithm
Random solution
Priority-weighted accumulated survival probabilities of threats
Figure 8.10: The objective function value returned by the simulated annealing algorithm in solving the
single-objective dynamic WAM prototype (6.14)–(6.23) in conjunction with the objective function values
of the thirty random solutions in Table 8.12.
the algorithm outperforms the randomly generated solutions. The solution closest in objective
space to the solution returned by the algorithm is Solution 26 in Table 8.11, which achieves
a priority-weighted accumulated survival probability of 0.2974. The solution returned by the
simulated annealing algorithm is therefore able to achieve a solution that is approximately 50%
better than the best randomly generated solution. This is a significant improvement.
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Sol WS-threat pair assignment schedules Objective
1 V3 [34,56]→ T1; C3 [3,19] → T3; V1 [33,60] → T4; V8 [57,80] → T5 1.1592
2 V8 [80,105]→ T2; C1 [19,40] → T3; V2 [33,67] → T4; V7 [34,73] → T5 0.8406
3 C1 [66,81]→ T1; V1 [72,100] → T2; C2 [19,28] → T4; V8 [57,85] → T5 1.8508
4 V1 [72,102]→ T1; V8 [80,105] → T2; C3 [3,19] → T3; C2 [19,28] → T4; C1 [85,103] → T5 1.2812
5 V8 [83,103]→ T1; V4 [18,49] → T2; C4 [5,24] → T3; C1 [17,37] → T4; V1 [86,110] → T5 0.4405
6 C1 [66,81]→ T1; V1 [72,100] → T2; C3 [3,19] → T3; C2 [19,28] → T4; V7 [34,73] → T5 1.2261
7 V4 [19,50]→ T1; V3 [36,54] → T2; C1 [19,81] → T3; C2 [19,28] → T4; V2 [98,116] → T5 0.8982
8 V1 [72,102]→ T1; V2 [36,54] → T2; C4 [5,24] → T3; C1 [17,37] → T4; V8 [57,85] → T5 0.4259
9 C2 [53,70]→ T1; V8 [80,105] → T2; C3 [3,19] → T3; V2 [33,67] → T4; V7 [34,73] → T5 1.0117
10 C2 [53,70]→ T1; C1 [64,81] → T2; C4 [5,24] → T3; C3 [4,19] → T4; V7 [34,73] → T5 0.5069
11 V1 [72,102], V8 [83,103] → T1; V3 [36,54], C1 [64,81] → T2; C3 [3,19], V1 [32,63] → T3;
C2 [19,28]→ T4; V7 [34,73], V8 [57,85] → T5 0.8137
12 C1 [66,81], C2 [53,70] → T1; V1 [72,100], V4 [18,49] → T2; C3 [3,19] → T3;
V2 [33,67], C2 [19,28] → T4; V8 [57,85] → T5 0.7688
13 V1 [72,102] → T1; V3 [36,54], V4 [18,49] → T2; V1 [32,63], C1 [19,40] → T3;
V2 [33,67], C2 [19,28] → T4; V7 [34,73], V8 [57,85] → T5 0.3925
14 V1 [72,102], V3 [34,56] → T1; C2 [52,69], C1 [64,81] → T2; C3 [3,19], C4 [5,24] → T3;
C2 [19,28] → T4; V7 [34,73] → T5 0.7409
15 V3 [36,54], V4 [18,49] → T2; V1 [32,63], V2 [35,67] → T3; C1 [17,37], C2 [19,28] → T4;
V7 [57,85], V8 [85,103] → T5 0.4414
16 V1 [73,102], C2 [53,70] → T1; V4 [18,49], C1 [64,81] → T2; V2 [35,67] → T3;
C3 [3,19], C4 [5,24] → T4; V7 [57,85], V8 [85,103] → T5 0.4822
17 V8 [83,103], C1 [66,81] → T1; V3 [36,54], C2 [52,69] → T2; V1 [32,63], V2 [35,67] → T3;
C4 [4,23] → T4; V7 [57,85], V8 [85,103] → T5 0.4350
18 V3 [34,56], V8 [83,103] → T1; V4 [18,49], C1 [64,81] → T2; V1 [32,63], V2 [35,67] → T3;
C3 [33,19], C4 [4,23] → T4 0.5366
19 C1 [66,81], C2 [53,70] → T1; V3 [36,54], V4 [18,49] → T2; C3 [3,19], C4 [5,24] → T3;
C2 [19,28] → T4; V1 [86,110] → T5 0.7741
20 V8 [83,103], C1 [66,81] → T1; V1 [72,100], C2 [52,69] → T2; C3 [3,19], V2 [35,67] → T3;
C2 [19,28], C1 [17,37] → T4; V7 [34,73]→ T5 0.3335
21 V3 [34,56] → T1; V1 [72,100] → T2; C1 [19,40] → T3; C2 [19,28] → T4; V7 [34,73] → T5 0.9017
22 V1 [72,102] → T1; C2 [52,69] → T2; C4 [5,24] → T3; C1 [17,37] → T4; V2 [98,116] → T5 0.3820
23 V4 [19,50] → T1; V3 [36,54] → T2; V2 [35,67] → T3; V1 [33,60] → T4; V8 [57,85] → T5 1.0197
24 C1 [66,81] → T1; C2 [52,69] → T2; V2 [65,67] → T3; V1 [33,60] → T4; V7 [37,73] → T5 0.9542
25 V3 [34,56] → T1; V4 [18,49] → T2; V2 [65,67] → T3; C2 [19,28] → T4; V1 [86,110] → T5 1.2269
26 V3 [34,56], V4 [19,50] → T1; V1 [72,100] → T2; C1 [19,40] → T3; C2 [19,28],
C4 [4,23] → T4; V8 [57,85] → T5 0.2974
27 V8 [83,85] → T1; V1 [72,100], V4 [18,49] → T2; V2 [35,67] → T3; C1 [17,37] → T4; 0.6656
V7 [34,73] → T5
28 C1 [66,81], C2 [53,70] → T1; V3 [36,54], V4 [18,49] → T2; V1 [32,63] → T3;
V2 [33,67] → T4; V8 [57,85] → T5 0.9026
29 V1 [72,102], V3 [34,56] → T1; V4 [18,49] → T2; C1 [19,40], C4 [5,24] → T3;
C2 [19,28] → T4; V7 [34,73] → T5 0.7834
30 V8 [83,103], C2 [53,70] → T1; V3 [36,54], V4 [18,49] → T2; V2 [35,67] → T3; V1 [33,60],
C1 [17,37] → T4; V7 [34,73] → T5 0.5506
Mean: 0.2974
Table 8.11: Thirty randomly generated solutions employed to validate the results returned by the
simulated annealing algorithm for the single-objective dynamic WAM (6.14)–(6.23) during time stage
23 and onwards of the GBAD scenario of Figure 8.1. The objective represents the priority-weighted
accumulated survival probability of threats in each solution. The assignment schedules are given as the
WSs, followed by the FW in brackets, followed by a right-arrow indicating to which threat the WSs
should be assigned.
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Furthermore, the average priority-weighted accumulated survival probability over the thirty
random solutions is 0.7681. When comparing this value to the value of 0.1493 returned by the
solution obtained in §8.2.3, it is found that the simulated annealing algorithm is able to achieve
an improvement of approximately 81% over the randomly generated set of solutions. Based on
these findings it may be concluded that the simulated annealing algorithm is able to provide
significantly better solutions to the single-objective dynamic WAM (6.14)–(6.23) than proposing
random feasible assignments.
Multi-objective dynamic random benchmark validation
The thirty random solutions generated for the multi-objective dynamic WAM (6.24)–(6.26) are
given in Table 8.12. The objective function values for each solution are also given in the table.
Sol WS-threat pair assignment schedules Obj 1 Obj 2 Obj 3
1 C1 [67,74], C2 [55,59] → T1; V1 [72,84], C2 [63,69] → T2; 0.3449 R 4 204 000 3
V2 [35,65], C4 [5,8] → T3; C2 [20,24], C4 [15,20] → T4;
V1 [98,102], V7 [48,69] → T5
2 C4 [23,48], V8 [86,90] → T1; V1 [88,97], V8 [96,100] → T2; 0.4165 R 8 068 000 3
C1 [19,27], V1 [45,58] → T3; C2 [19,24], V1 [34,41] → T4; V1 [102,106],
V7 [45,51] → T5
3 C2 [60,69], V8 [83,101] → T1; V3 [37,54], V4 [29,38] → T2; V1 [48,61], 0.3021 R 6 136 000 3
V2 [35,54] → T3; C2 [23,33],C4 [11,21] → T4 ; C1 [93,100],
V2 [103,108] → T5
4 C1 [69,78], V4 [30,33] → T1; V4 [18,25], V8 [98,102] → T2; 0.7674 R 7 102 000 3
C1 [36,39], V2 [54,57] → T3; C2 [19,27], V1 [53,58]→ T4;
V1 [89,99] → T5
5 V1 [90,93], V3 [35,41] → T1; C1 [69,81], C2 [66,69] → T2; 0.2573 R 5 170 000 2
C3 [14,19], V1 [34,50] → T3; C1 [18,26], V1 [57,60] → T4;
C1 [93,98], V1 [100,107] → T5
6 V1 [73,83], V8 [88,94] → T1; V3 [44,53], V8 [80,83] → T2; C3 [6,13], 0.3017 R 7 102 000 3
C4 [10,16] → T3; C4 [20,23], V2 [35,39]→ T4; V1 [87,107],
V2 [101,105] → T5
7 C2 [57,68], V3 [36,55] → T1; V4 [28,45], V8 [82,92] → T2; 0.5393 R 5 170 000 4
C4 [21,24], V1 [51,54] → T3; C2 [20,23], C4 [7,17] → T4;
C1 [88,96], V2 [102,110] → T5
8 C2 [53,68], V1 [84,88] → T1; V1 [92,95], V8 [84,101] → T2; 0.2162 R 6 136 000 3
C1 [21,26], C3 [5,14] → T3; C4 [9,13], V2 [44,55] → T4; V7 [51,71],
V8 [58,68] → T5
9 C2 [62,68], V4 [34,42] → T1; V1 [77,91], V8 [90,98] → T2; C4 [8,19], 0.2666 R 6 136 000 3
V1 [42,46] → T3; C3 [12,15], V1 [56,60] → T4; C1 [88,102],
V2 [98,108] → T5
10 V3 [34,55], V4 [28,38] → T1; V4 [43,47], V8 [82,94] → T2; V1 [35,48], 0.2782 R 8 068 000 3
V2 [48,60] → T3; C2 [29,34], V2 [37,42] → T4; C1 [95,101],
V1 [86,93] → T5
11 C2 [54,64], V3 [49,54] → T1; V1 [72,99], V4 [36,47] → T2; 0.2900 R 7 102 000 4
C1 [32,39], C4 [10,21] → T3; V1 [50,54], V2 [43,62] → T4;
V7 [60,70],V8 [67,73] → T5
12 C2 [59,63], V1 [79,90] → T1; V1 [72,75], V4 [42,47] → T2; 0.1892 R 6 136 000 3
C1 [20,24], V1 [33,58] → T3; C1 [29,37], C2 [22,27] → T4; V2 [99,115],
V8 [69,85] → T5
13 C1 [66,71], C2 [57,63] → T1; V3 [45,54], V4 [19,26] → T2; 0.1699 R 5 170 000 2
C3 [8,12], V1 [36,41] → T3; C1 [25,34], V1 [46,53] → T4; C1 [86,99],
V2 [111,116] → T5
14 C1 [72,77], V3 [44,50] → T1; V4 [40,49], V8 [82,105] → T2; 0.3941 R 7 102 000 2
C1 [19,24], V2 [35,42] → T3; V1 [100,104], V2 [47,62] → T4;
C1 [92,97] → T5
15 V1 [77,94], V4 [35,44] → T1; C1 [65,69], C2 [52,56] → T2; 0.2188 R 4 204 000 2
C3 [6,12], C4 [6,10] → T3; C1 [20,36], V2 [56,59] → T4; C1 [90,95],
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Sol WS-threat pair assignment schedules Obj 1 Obj 2 Obj 3
V2 [100,107] → T5
16 C1 [68,73], V8 [99,102] → T1; V1 [82,97], V8 [91,95] → T2; 0.3515 R 7 102 000 3
V1 [33,50], V2 [52,66] → T3; C1 [31,36], C4 [14,21] → T4; V7 [40,46],
V8 [64,78] → T5
17 C2 [53,67], V8 [90,93] → T1; V3 [36,46], V4 [19,36] → T2; 0.3309 R 7 102 000 3
V1 [38,57], V2 [57,60] → T3; C1 [19,34], C3 [6,19] → T4; V7 [51,70],
V8 [57,78] → T5
18 C2 [61,69], V4 [23,32] → T1; C1 [64,74], V8 [86,96] → T2; 0.3133 R 5 170 000 3
C3 [6,15], C4 [12,18] → T3; C4 [4,8], V2 [45,55] → T4; V7 [54,65],
V8 [64,72] → T5
19 C2 [56,62], V1 [80,93] → T1; V3 [42,45], V8 [89,101] → T2; 0.1184 R 6 136 000 3
C1 [34,38], C3 [7,11] → T3; C1 [27,30], V1 [36,56] → T4;
V7 [40,51], V8 [64,79] → T5
20 V1 [77,93], V3 [38,45] → T1; C1 [64,77], V4 [27,33] → T2; 0.1012 R 5 170 000 1
C1 [23,27], V1 [41,59] → T3; C1 [32,35], C3 [8,17] → T4;
C1 [92,103], V8 [64,79] → T5
21 V1 [20,28], V8 [84,101] → T1; C1 [68,71], V4 [36,41] → T2; 0.2747 R 5 170 000 3
C3 [6,17], C4 [19,24] → T3; C2 [19,25], C12 [11,15] → T4;
V2 [104,112], V8 [65,76] → T5
22 V4 [20,28], V8 [86,100] → T1; C1 [66,74], V1 [76,98] → T2; 0.1727 R 7 102 000 2
C1 [34,37], V1 [56,59] → T3; C1 [21,30], V2 [44,58] → T4;
V2 [109,116], V8 [61,68] → T5
23 C2 [63,66], V4 [26,48] → T1; V3 [38,44], V8 [80,102] → T2; 0.1757 R 6 136 000 4
C1 [22,26], V1 [42,50] → T3; C2 [20,27], C4 [9,19] → T4;
V1 [90,104], V2 [99,112] → T5
24 C2 [57,67], V4 [33,43] → T1; V1 [78,83], V4 [25,28] → T2; 0.2709 R 5 170 000 3
C3 [5,12], V2 [42,60] → T3; C2 [20,27], C4 [12,23] → T4;
C1 [89,96], V1 [88,102] → T5
25 C2 [64,67], V3 [34,47] → T1; C1 [66,73], C2 [52,59] → T2; 0.0642 R 3 238 000 2
C1 [20,27], C4 [18,23] → T3; C1 [31,37], C4 [4,14] → T4;
V2 [109,113], V7 [36,47] → T5
26 V3 [39,51], V4 [23,43] → T1; C2 [64,67], V1 [76,97] → T2; 0.4167 R 6 136 000 3
C3 [9,16], V1 [48,55] → T3; C1 [31,36], C2 [23,28] → T4;
V2 [108,111], V7 [42,71] → T5
27 V3 [48,52], V8 [86,99] → T1; C1 [69,76], V1 [93,98] → T2; 0.5724 R 7 102 000 4
C4 [12,22], V2 [36,46] → T3; C4 [4,8], V2 [52,62] → T4;
V1 [105,108], V7 [49,68] → T5
28 C1 [68,72], V4 [20,24] → T1; V3 [36,46], V4 [34,39] → T2; 0.2336 R 6 136 000 3
C1 [35,38], C4 [8,13] → T3; C3 [2,8], V2 [42,52] → T4;
V1 [87,110], V2 [100,107] → T5
29 C4 [27,35], V3 [49,56] → T1; C2 [52,59], V8 [88,99] → T2; 0.0901 R 5 170 000 3
C4 [14,17], V2 [37,43] → T3; C2 [24,27], C4 [20,25] → T4;
V1 [96,100], C1 [90,100] → T5
30 V8 [85,93], C2 [53,66] → T1; V1 [78,81], V8 [100,104] → T2; 0.2778 R 5 170 000 4
C4 [7,11], V2 [42,62] → T3; C2 [20,25], C4 [15,21] → T4;
C1 [90,100], V7 [37,68] → T5
Mean: 0.2906 R 5 534 207 2.9
Table 8.12: Thirty randomly generated solutions employed to validate the results obtained by the
NSGA II (described in §5.4.2) for the multi-objective dynamic WAM (6.24)–(6.26) during time stage 23
of the GBAD scenario of Figure 8.1. Obj 1 represents the threat-priority weighted accumulated survival
probability objective function values, Obj 2 represents the cost objective function values and Obj 3
represents the least re-engagable WS objective function values. The assignment schedules are given as
the WS, followed by the FW in brackets, followed by a right-arrow indicating to which threat the WSs
should be assigned.
Upon sorting the thirty solutions in Table 8.12 by means of the FNSA described in §4.4, five
nondominated solutions are obtained. These solutions, together with the remaining 25 randomly
generated solutions, are illustrated graphically in objective function space in Figure 8.11. In
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addition to the notations described in legend used in the validation of the multi-objective static
WAM (6.10)–(6.12), solutions in which the least re-engageable WSs can re-engage once after the
assignment are denoted by open diamonds, while solutions in which the least re-engageable WSs
can re-engage four times after the assignment are denoted by open circles — the nondominated
randomly generated solutions are joined by broken line segments.
The approximately Pareto optimal solutions returned by the evolutionary algorithm are also
plotted in objective function space in Figure 8.11. The same symbol conventions defined in the
legend used during the validation of the multi-objective static WAM (6.10)–(6.12) are again
adopted here. In addition, solutions in which the least re-engageable WSs can re-engage once
after the assignment are denoted by solid diamonds, while solutions in which the least re-
engageable WSs can re-engage four times after the assignment are denoted by solid circles
(again joined by solid lines).
When comparing the approximately Pareto front achieved by the evolutionary algorithm with the
nondominated front of randomly generated solutions, it is clear that the evolutionary algorithm
is able to provide a much better and wide-spread Pareto front than the nondominated front of the
randomly generated solutions. The gap achieved between the two fronts also seems satisfactorily
wide.
The hypervolume technique described in §4.4 was also used to compare the hypervolume of
the approximately Pareto optimal solutions obtained in Figure 8.6 with the hypervolume of
the set of nondominated randomly generated solutions. A reference point involving a 0.35
value in the priority-weighted accumulated survival probability, a value of R6 150 000 in the
cost objective and a value of 1 in the re-engageability objective was adopted for hypervolume
calculation purposes. A hypervolume measure of 2.3251×106 was obtained for the approximately
Pareto optimal solutions in Table 8.9 (the solutions returned by the evolutionary algorithm for
the WAM (6.24)–(6.26)) and a corresponding measure of 1.1641 × 106 was obtained for the
nondominated set of randomly generated solutions. This indicates that the solutions returned by
the evolutionary algorithm again dominate a significantly larger portion of the objective function
space than the nondominated set of randomly generated solutions. It may therefore again be
concluded that the evolutionary algorithm is able to provide significantly better solutions to the
multi-objective dynamic WAM (6.24)–(6.26) than proposing random feasible assignments.
8.3.3 Military expert validation
The final method of validation involved having individual consultations with two military experts
who were asked to solve (by hand) each of the four WAM prototypes of §6.5 in the context of the
simulated GBAD scenario described in §8.1. The results of their solutions were then compared
with the results returned by the algorithms used in §8.2 to solve the WAM prototypes.
The first military expert is Dr Jaco Roux [160] who worked for Reutech Radar Systems at the
time when this project was started. Dr Roux is a software engineer who was part of the team
responsible for developing a South African-based GBAD DSS for the South African National
Defence Force. In 2010, Dr Roux obtained his PhD in which he proposed the design of a TE
subsystem for use in a GBAD environment — the counterpart of the subsystem proposed in
this dissertation. Since he started working at Reutech Radar Systems, Dr Roux worked on the
South African GBAD DSS programme for eight years and was involved in the integration and
testing of the TEWA DSS of the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company, configuring
this DSS for the South African National Defence Force and developing a South African GBAD
TEWA system as a concept demonstrator. He also collaborated with the Council for Scientific
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and Industrial Research by integrating the TEWA system into their military simulator, con-
ducted various workshops with military experts and advised the AD user doctrine development
committee in Kimberley — he also studied all the air defence artillery doctrinal notes and docu-
mentation for GBADS. Furthermore, he completed an FCO training course and attended various
military exercises at Roodewal Bombaan (in Polokwane), at the airforce base in Bredasdorp,
and at the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research headquarters (in Pretoria).
The second military expert is Lieutenant Colonel Bob Visser [200], a former FCO within the
South African National Defence force, who currently leads the Cape Garrison Artillery, a reserve
force regiment of the South African Army AD artillery formation. In addition to leading the
regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Visser is also employed at Reutech Radar Systems in the capacity
of systems engineer.
During the period in which Dr Roux worked at Reutech Radar systems, Lieutenant Colonel
Visser also worked at the same institution. He worked in conjunction with Dr Roux on the
integration and testing of the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company’s TEWA DSS
within a South African GBAD context. In addition, he provided valuable input in the design
of the South African GBAD DSS programme. During the development of the South African
GBAD programme, Lieutenant Colonel Visser also assisted Dr Roux in setting up and attending
workshops with other military experts.
During each of the consultations, the hypothetical GBAD scenario was described to a military
expert in detail. This included the layout of the WS and DA deployment, the groupings of the
incoming threats as well as the attack techniques that the threats are anticipated to execute.
Furthermore, all the data involved in the scenario were provided to the expert. These data
included the threat priority values of the threats during time stages τ = 23 and 39, the EEMs
for these time stages, the cost of a single burst of ammunition for CIWSs and VSHORADs, as
well as the ammunition available at each WS in the deployment. It was also mentioned that
for the dynamic WAMs, a straight-line flight path prediction model is assumed and the EEMs
for the 120 future time stages from time stage τ = 23 onwards were shown to the military
expert. Each of the four WAM prototypes was finally described to the military expert in detail,
including the rationale behind each of the objective functions as well as the constraints of each
model.
Single-objective static military expert validation
For the single-objective static WAM (6.6)–(6.9), military expert Dr Roux explained that he
would assign the WS achieving the highest SSHP value with respect to the threat involving the
highest priority value first, followed by assigning the WS achieving the second highest SSHP
with respect to the threat involving the second highest priority value, and so forth. He also
added that in this modelling paradigm, he would assign the maximum number of WSs in order
to inflict as much damage to the threats as possible — in order to achieve the maximum accu-
mulated priority-weigthed survival probability. He therefore proposed the following WS-threat
assignment pairs: WS C1 to threat T1, WS C2 to threat T2, WS V1 to threat T3, WS V2 to threat
T4, and WSs V6 and V7 to threat T5. This assignment yields an accumulated priority-weighted
survival probability of 2.171, as shown in Figure 8.13. When comparing this result with the
results returned by the genetic algorithm in §8.2.1 (i.e. an accumulated priority-weighted sur-
vival probability of 1.9628), it may be concluded that the genetic algorithm is able to achieve
an approximately 9.5% improvement over the solution proposed by the military expert.
Dr Roux was also asked to comment on the results returned by the genetic algorithm in §8.2.1.
He concluded that the results are good in terms of the quality of the WS-threat assignment pairs
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Threat Survival Prioritised
Threat Priority WSs values survival
Vj(τ) assigned qij(τ) probability
T1 0.99 C1 0.8 0.99× 0.8
T2 1.00 C2 0.1 1.00× 0.1
T3 0.76 V1 0.9 0.76× 0.9
T4 0.74 V2 0.5 0.74× 0.5
T5 0.50 V6, V7 0.9, 0.5 0.5× 0.9× 0.5
Total: 2.171
Table 8.13: WS to threat assignment list proposed by military expert Roux [160] during a consultation
session in which he was asked to solve the single-objective WAM prototype (6.6)–(6.9) by hand within
the context of the GBAD scenario presented in Figure 8.1 for time stage τ = 39.
proposed by the algorithm. He noticed that a number of solutions proposed by the algorithm
coincided exactly with his own assignment proposals. Furthermore, he was not surprised that
the algorithm was able to outperform him. He added that this should be the case and that the
aim of using a WAM is to provide an FCO with DS rather than taking over the role of the FCO
— the results returned by the WAM should confirm operator judgement and be able to improve
upon it.
Next, Lieutenant Colonel Bob Visser was consulted to perform the same exercise. He commented
on the hypothetical scenario of §8.1 and highlighted that from a practical point of view, threats
T3, T4 and T5 have already advanced to such a stage in the GBAD scenario at time stage τ = 39
that they would already have executed their attack manoeuvres in order to release their weapons
towards the DAs — the threats had already passed the DAs at that point in time. He therefore
did not consider these aircraft as threats any more. According to him, the only threats remaining
in the system at that point were threats T1 and T2 — they are at the point of readying themselves
to attack the DAs. He noted that he would assign WS V3 to threat T1 and WS C1 to threat
T2. The reason for assigning WS V3 to threat T1 is that the threat may then be attacked from
behind (should a fire order be sent) and the reason for assigning WS C1 to threat T2 is that
it is further away from threat T2 than WS C2 at τ = 39, which will give the operator enough
time to react to the situation. The assignment proposal of Lieutenant Colonel Bob Visser is
summarised in Table 8.14.
Threat Survival Prioritised
Threat Priority WSs values survival
Vj(τ) assigned qij(τ) probability
T1 0.99 V3 0.9 0.99× 0.9
T2 1.00 C1 0.6 1.00× 0.6
T3 0.76 None 1 0.76× 1
T4 0.74 None 1 0.74× 1
T5 0.50 None 1 0.5× 1
Total: 3.491
Table 8.14: WS to threat assignment list proposed by military expert Visser [200] during a consultation
session in which he was asked to solve the single-objective WAM prototype (6.6)–(6.9) by hand within
the context of the GBAD scenario presented in Figure 8.1 for time stage τ = 39.
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When comparing the solution in Table 8.14 with the solution returned by the genetic algorithm
in §8.2.1, it is found that the algorithmic solution is significantly better than the solution of
Lieutenant Colonel Visser. The reason for this finding is that Lieutenant Colonel Visser did not
consider aircraft T3, T4 and T5 as threats and hence their accumulated priority-weighted survival
probabilities are rather high (no WSs are assigned to them). Lieutenant Colonel Visser was also
asked to comment on the results returned by the genetic algorithm. He was quite impressed
with the small accumulated priority-weighted survival probability achieved by the algorithm
and understood why the algorithm was able to outperform him — the model takes into account
the threat priority values and EEM for the time stage, ignoring the fact that the threats had
already passed the DAs at time stage τ = 39. Lieutenant Colonel Visser also commented that
the WS-threat assignment pairs proposed by the algorithm are of a high quality.
Multi-objective static military expert validation
After the working of the multi-objective static WAM was explained to the military experts
during their individual consultation sessions, they found the concept of multiple simultaneous
objectives in a WAM rather strange. Their first reaction was that in a combat situation, an
FCO would typically not consider the cost of an assignment important at all — FCOs are
typically trained to assign WSs so as to inflict the maximum damage (i.e. minimising survival
probability). They did, however, acknowledge the importance of including the re-engageability
objective — a WS that runs out of ammunition during a combat situation can result in a gap in
the own force’s defence which may have disastrous consequences should a WS not be available
for later assignments due to such a lack of ammunition. Both the military experts mentioned
that they deem the accumulated priority-weighted survival probability objective as the most
important, followed by the re-engageability as the second-most important and lastly (if a must),
the cost objective. The author then explained to the military experts that the aim in multi-
objective optimisation problems is to find a number of Pareto optimal solutions, illustrating the
trade-offs between the various solutions. These solutions may then be presented to the FCO
from which he may choose one, based on subjective judgement, for implementation purposes.
It was also explained to the experts that no weights are associated with the objective functions
and that the multi-objective WAMs are able to illustrate the trade-offs between the objective
functions clearly. They remained sceptical about the multi-objective WAM prototypes, but they
nevertheless proceeded to solve the multi-objective static WAM prototype.
Dr Roux proposed similar assignments for the multi-objective static WAM prototype (6.10)–
(6.12) as for the single-objective static WAM prototype (6.6)–(6.9). The WS-threat assignment
pairs he selected are as follows: WS C1 should be assigned to engage threat T1, WS C2 should be
assigned to engage threat T2, WS V1 should be assigned to threat T3, WS V2 should be assigned
to threat T4 and only WS V7 should be assigned to threat T5 (not WS V6 as was the case in the
single-objective static WAM prototype (6.6)–(6.9)). His assignment yielded a priority-weighted
accumulated survival probability of 2.196 at an assignment cost of R 3 068 000, as illustrated in
Table 8.15. The least re-engageable WSs after the assignment are WSs C1 and V7, which each
has 2 units of ammunition left after the assignment. This solution (labelled A) is illustrated
graphically in objective function space in Figure 8.9. From the figure it may be deduced that
the solution does not lie on the Pareto front approximated by the NSGA II, implying that the
solution is dominated.
Dr Roux explained that he would follow the same procedure in assigning WSs to threats as in
the single-objective static WAM prototype (6.6)–(6.9), i.e. assigning WS achieving high SSHP
to high priority threats first, and that he would then consider WS re-engageability when making
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Threat Survival Prioritised Re-engage-
Threat Priority WSs values survival Accumulated ability after
Vj(τ) assigned qij(τ) probability cost in Rand the assignment
T1 0.99 C1 0.8 0.99× 0.8 34 000 2
T2 1.00 C2 0.1 1.00× 0.1 34 000 3
T3 0.76 V1 0.9 0.76× 0.9 1 000 000 3
T4 0.74 V2 0.5 0.74× 0.5 1 000 000 3
T5 0.50 V7 0.5 0.50× 0.5 1 000 000 2
Totals: 2.196 3 068 000 2
Table 8.15: WS to threat assignment list proposed by military expert Roux [160] during a consultation
session in which he was asked to solve the multi-objective static WAM prototype (6.10)–(6.12) by hand
within the context of the GBAD scenario presented in Figure 8.1 for time stage τ = 39.
assignments (i.e. assigning WSs with more ammunition first). He would consider the cost of
assignments last.
When asked to comment on the results returned by the algorithm, Dr Roux was very impressed
by the way in which the model is able to illustrate the trade-offs between the objective functions.
He liked the idea that small decreases in one objective may lead to large improvements in another
objective function. Consider, for example, Solution 2 in Table 8.6 achieving an accumulated
priority-weighted survival probability objective value of 1.9878 at a cost of R 4 068 000 and
Solution 3 achieving an accumulated priority-weighted survival probability value of 2.0116 at a
cost of R 3 068 000 in Figure 8.4. An approximately 1% decrease in the accumulated priority-
weighted survival probability leads to an approximately 25% decrease in the cost objective. In
this way more cost-effective decisions may be made.
Although Dr Roux genuinely seemed to be impressed by the results returned by the NSGA II, he
did, however, question the practicality of the implementation of the multi-objective static WAM
prototype (6.10)–(6.12), explaining that he was worried the operator may be overwhelmed by
all the solutions from which he was required to choose one. It was then explained to him that
sufficient implementation suggestions (as discussed in Chapter 7) had, in fact, been proposed
to counter this concern and that, if implemented correctly, would not have a negative effect on
operator judgement.
Lieutenant Colonel Visser proposed the exact same assignments for the multi-objective static
WAM prototype (6.10)–(6.12) as for the single-objective static WAM prototype (6.6)–(6.9). He
therefore proposed that WS V3 should be assigned to threat T1 and that WS C1 be assigned to
threat T2. His assignment again yielded an accumulated priority-weighted survival probability
value of 3.4910 at an assignment cost of R1 034 000. The least re-engageable WS after the assign-
ment is WS C1, which can engage twice after the assignment. This assignment is summarised
in Table 8.16. Lieutenant Colonel Visser again reiterated that he does not consider cost to be
important in assigning WSs to threats. He did, however, mention that he would not use WS
C1, unless he absolutely had to, because WS C1 only has three bursts of ammunition left. In
this case, however, he felt it necessary to assign the WS to the threat since the WS would still
have two bursts of ammunition left over after the assignment. Furthermore, Lieutenant Colonel
Visser mentioned again that he did not consider aircraft T3, T4 and T5 as threats since at time
stage τ = 39 they would have already attacked the DAs if they had in the first place intended
to do so.
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Threat Survival Prioritised Re-engage-
Threat Priority WSs values survival Accumulated ability after
Vj(τ) assigned qij(τ) probability cost in Rand the assignment
T1 0.99 V3 0.9 0.99× 0.9 1 000 000 4
T2 1.00 C1 0.6 1.00× 0.6 34 000 2
T3 0.76 None — 0.76× 1 — —
T4 0.74 None — 0.74× 1 — —
T5 0.50 None — 0.50× 1 — —
Totals: 3.4910 1 034 000 2
Table 8.16: WS to threat assignment list proposed by military expert Visser [200] during a consultation
session in which he was asked to solve the multi-objective static WAM prototype (6.10)–(6.12) by hand
within the context of the GBAD scenario presented in Figure 8.1 by hand for time stage τ = 39.
Lieutenant Colonel Visser’s solution (labelled B) is also plotted in objective function space in
Figure 8.9. When comparing his solution with the remaining solutions returned by the NSGA II,
it is clear that Lieutenant Colonel Visser’s solution also does not lie on the approximate Pareto
front — this is again due to the fact that he did not consider aircraft T3, T4 and T5 as threats,
resulting in a higher accumulated priority-weighted survival probability for these threats.
Upon showing the results returned by the NSGA II to Lieutenant Colonel Visser, he also liked
the idea of being able to quantify the trade-offs between the objective functions as one moves
along the approximate Pareto front. He also raised the concern of not overwhelming the FCO
with information. The implementation suggestions (as discussed in §7) to counter this concern
were explained to Mr Visser and he seemed satisfied with this.
Single-objective dynamic military expert validation
Upon explaining the working of the dynamic WAMs to the military experts, they both com-
mented that it is nearly impossible for a human simply to look at the EEMs (there are 120 EEMs
from time stage τ = 23 onwards in the GBAD scenario of Figure 8.1) and to propose WS-threat
assignment pairs — the combinations of WS-threat pairs in conjunction with the future time
stage during which these assignments should occur are too many for a human to consider in the
short time frames available to an FCO.
Dr Roux explained that rather than having to work through 120 EEMs for the predicted future
time continuum from time stage τ = 23 onwards, he would give the author a clear strategy that
he would have followed. He explained that for a specific WS-threat pair, he would wait until the
WS achieves an SSHP value of at least 0.6 with respect to the threat before he assigns the WS
to the threat. Once the threat is assigned a WS, he would keep the assignment until the SSHP
value drops to 0.2. The author therefore analysed the 120 EEMs produced for time stage τ = 23
in order to find WS-threat assignment pairs based on the information provided by Dr Roux.
The following WS-threat assignment pairs were thus constructed (summarised in Table 8.17):
WS C2 should be assigned to threat T1 during the FW [57, 69], while WS C1 should be assigned
to threat T2 during the FW [68, 80]. WSs V1 and C4 should be assigned to threat T3 during the
FWs [37, 45] and [9, 24], respectively. Furthermore, WSs C1 and C3 should be assigned to threat
T4 during the FWs [21, 28] and [7, 19], respectively. Finally, WSs V2 and V8 should be assigned
to threat T5 during the FWs [103, 144] and [61, 73], respectively. Utilising the threat priority
values in Table 8.2 and the fixed-mean values in Table 8.7, an accumulated weighted-priority
survival probability value of 0.1773 was calculated for this assignment. This yielded a worse
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objective function value than the value 0.1493 returned by the simulated annealing algorithm.
The improvement achieved by the algorithm seems to be small in view of the complexity of the
problem at hand. The solution constructed on the advice of a military expert, however, had the
advantage of fixed mean values which had already been computed. In a real-life scenario, these
values would have to be computed by the FCO.
WS-threat pair Prioritised survival
Threat assignement schedules probability
T1 C2[57, 69] 0.2× 0.192
T2 C1[68, 80] 0.22× 0.201
T3 V1[37, 45],C4[9, 24] 1× 0.367× 0.075
T4 C1[21, 28],C3[7, 19] 1× 0.052× 0.238
T5 V2[103, 114],V8[61, 73] 0.3× 0.435× 0.420
Total: 0.1773
Table 8.17: WS-to-threat assignment list proposed by military expert Roux [160] during a consultation
session in which he was asked to solve the single-objective dynamic WAM prototype (6.14)–(6.23) by hand
within the context of the GBAD scenario presented in Figure 8.1 for time stage τ = 23. The assignment
pairs are given as the threat, followed by the WS and the time stages during which the assignment should
occur.
When asked to comment on the results returned by the simulated annealing algorithm for the
single-objective dynamic WAM (6.14)–(6.23), Dr Roux commented that the results seem to be
of a high quality and that he expected the model to provide a better solution than the one
he proposed. Furthermore, he liked the idea of the scheduling element involved in the model,
mentioning that this is a considerable advantage over the static WAMs.
In a similar fashion, Lieutenant Colonel Visser also gave the author a strategy that he would
have followed rather than proposing actual WS-threat assignment schedules. He explained that,
in addition to using SSHP values for proposing WS-threat assignment pairs, he would also have
considered the distance between the WS and the threat. If a threat is too close to a WS, he
would not assign it to the threat, since the FCO may typically not have enough time to engage
the threat. He appreciated the choice of time stage τ = 23 for the dynamic models since all
the aircraft may now be considered as threats to the DAs. He concluded that he would have
proposed assignments in such a way that once a threat is in range of a WS, the WS should be
assigned to the threat, keeping the assignment until the threat is out of range of the WS. Based
on this information, the following WS-threat assignment schedule was constructed: WSs C1
and V3 should be assigned to threat T1 during the FWs [66, 81] and [34, 56], respectively. WSs
C2 and V4 should be assigned to threat T2 during the FWs [52, 69] and [18, 49], respectively.
Furthermore, WS C1 should be assigned to threat T3 during the FW [19, 40] and WS C3 should
be assigned to threat T4 during the FW [5, 19]. Finally, WS V8 should be assigned to threat T5
during the FW [57, 85]. This assignment schedule is summarised in Table 8.18. Again utilising
the threat priority values in Table 8.2 and the fixed-mean values in Table 8.7, an accumulated
weighted-priority survival probability value of 0.4569 was calculated for the assignment. This
solution yielded a considerably worse objective function value than the value of 0.1493 returned
by the simulated annealing algorithm.
When asked to comment on the solution returned by the simulated annealing algorithm, Lieu-
tenant Colonel Visser commented that the solution returned by the algorithm is of a good quality
and that he was not at all surprised that the algorithm outperformed him — he expected this
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WS-threat pair Prioritised survival
Threat assignement schedules probability
T1 V3[34, 56],C1[66, 81] 0.2× 0.328× 0.371
T2 C2[52, 69],V4[18, 49] 0.22× 0.156× 0.338
T3 C1[19, 40] 1× 0.057
T4 C3[5, 19] 1× 0.238
T5 V8[57, 85] 0.3× 0.420
Total: 0.4569
Table 8.18: WS-to-threat assignment list proposed by military expert Visser [200] during a consultation
session in which he was asked to solve the single-objective dynamic WAM prototype (6.14)–(6.23) by hand
within the context of the GBAD scenario presented in Figure 8.1 for time stage τ = 23. The assignment
pairs are given as the threat, followed by the WS and the time stages during which the assignment should
occur.
due to the complexity of the WAM. He was particularly impressed by the fact that the algorithm
was able to solve the model instance almost instantaneously.
Multi-objective dynamic military expert validation
The same procedure was followed in validating multi-objective dynamic WAM (6.24)–(6.26) as
for the single-objective dynamic WAM (6.14)–(6.23). The military experts again raised their
concerns about the multi-objective optimisation involved in the problem, as well as the antici-
pated difficulty of solving the model due to the complexity introduced by the dynamic element.
Both military experts again provided strategies by which they would have found assignment
schedules, rather than having to work through the EEMs from time stage τ = 23 onwards.
Dr Roux stated that he would follow nearly the same strategy as for solving the single-objective
dynamic WAM (6.14)–(6.23). In solving the multi-objective dynamic WAM (6.24)–(6.26), he
would, however, first consider the survival probabilities of the threats. If two WSs achieve SSHP
values that are very close to one another with respect to the same threat, he would rather assign
the WS involving the largest ammunition ration. Then only would he consider the cost of the
assignment (that is, if two WSs were to achieve SSHP values that are very close to one another
with respect to the same threat and they have the same amount of ammunition available to
them, he would assign the WS incurring the lowest cost).
In view of the strategy provided above, the following assignment schedule was constructed for
the multi-objective dynamic WAM (6.24)–(6.26): WS C2 should be assigned to threat T1 during
the FW [59, 69], followed by the assignment of WS C1 to threat T2 during the FW [68, 80]. WS
C4 should be assigned to threat T3 during the FW [9, 24] and WS C1 should be assigned to
threat T4 during the FW [21, 28]. Finally, WS V8 should be assigned to threat T5 during the
FW [61, 73]. This assignment schedule is summarised in Table 8.19. The schedule yielded an
accumulated priority-weighted survival probability of 0.1645 at a cost of R1 136 000. The least
re-engageable WS after the assignment was WS C1, which can re-engage three times after the
assignment. This solution (labelled C) is illustrated graphically in objective function space in
Figure 8.11. From the figure, it is clear that the solution is dominated by the solutions returned
by the NSGA II.
Lieutenant Colonel Visser proposed almost exactly the same strategy as Dr Roux, resulting in the
following WS-threat assignment schedule for the multi-objective dynamic WAM (6.24)–(6.26):
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WS-threat pair Prioritised Accumulated Re-engage-
Threat assignement survival cost in ability after
schedules probability Rand value the assignment
T1 C2[57, 69] 0.0078 R 34 000 5
T2 C1[68, 80] 0.0026 R 34 000 4
T3 C4[9, 24] 0.0606 R 34 000 5
T4 C1[21, 28] 0.0035 R 34 000 3
T5 V8[61, 73] 0.0900 R 1 000 000 8
Total: 0.1645 R 1 136 000 3
Table 8.19: WS to threat assignment list proposed by military expert Roux [160] during a consultation
session in which he was asked to solve the multi-objective dynamic WAM prototype (6.24)–(6.26) by
hand within the context of the GBAD scenario presented in Figure 8.1 for time stage τ = 23.
WS C2 should be assigned to threat T1 during the FW [58, 64], followed by the assignment of
WS C1 to threat T2 during the FW [69, 78]. WS C1 should again be assigned to threat T3
during the FW [23, 27] and WS C4 should be assigned to threat T4 during the FW [13, 18].
Finally, WS V8 should be assigned to threat T5 during the FW [61, 69]. These assignments are
summarised in Table 8.20. The assignments yielded an accumulated priority-weighted survival
probability of 0.3396 at a cost of R1 136 000. The least re-engageable WS after the assignment
is WS C1, which can re-engage three times after the assignment. This solution (labelled D) is
also illustrated graphically in Figure 8.11. From the figure, it is clear that the solution is also
dominated by the solutions returned by the evolutionary algorithm.
WS-threat pair Prioritised Accumulated Re-engage-
Threat assignement survival cost in ability after
schedules probability Rand value the assignment
T1 C2[58, 64] 0.0078 R 34 000 5
T2 C1[69, 78] 0.0026 R 34 000 4
T3 C1[23, 27] 0.0419 R 34 000 3
T4 C4[13, 18] 0.1973 R 34 000 5
T5 V8[61, 69] 0.0900 R 1 000 000 8
Total: 0.3396 R 1 136 000 3
Table 8.20: WS to threat assignment list proposed by military expert Visser [200] during a consultation
session in which he was asked to solve the multi-objective dynamic WAM prototype (6.24)–(6.26) by hand
within the context of the GBAD scenario presented in Figure 8.1 for time stage τ = 23.
Both the military experts reiterated that the aim of the DS provided to FCOs should be to
confirm operator judgement, and not to replace the operator. They both also acknowledged the
significance of the four WAM prototypes — especially the dynamic WAM prototypes, which are
able to consider future time stages for WS-threat assignment proposals. If the WAM prototypes
proposed in this dissertation can be implemented efficiently, they should be able to provide
time for the FCOs to focus on other important WA-related decisions rather than having to
solve incarnations of the WAP. The military experts also seemed to be more at ease with the
multi-objective WAMs after the consultations, stating that the trade-offs between the objective
functions that these WAMs are able to demonstrate may lead to more cost-effective WA deci-
sions, since it has been shown that a small portion of the accumulated priority-weighted survival
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probability objective is sometimes given up for a large saving in the cost objective. Based on
the findings above, it may be concluded that the military experts were relatively satisfied with
the way in which the models work and the results produced by these models.
8.4 Chapter summary
This chapter was devoted to illustrations of the working of the WAM prototypes chosen for
default inclusion in the WA design architecture proposed in Chapter 6. The chapter opened
with a detailed description of a simulated GBAD scenario in §8.1. This scenario was adopted as
the context within which each of the four WAM prototypes of §6.5 was solved by appropriate
solution methodologies, as described in §5. Section 8.2 was dedicated to a presentation of the
numerical results returned by the various algorithms used to solve the four WAM prototypes.
The algorithmic parameter values employed in each case were also documented in this section.
First, the numerical results obtained for the single-objective static WAM prototype were pro-
vided in §8.2.1, and this was followed by a presentation of the the numerical results obtained
for the multi-objective static WAM prototype in §8.2.2. Next, the results obtained for the
single-objective dynamic WAM prototype were provided in §8.2.3, and this was followed by a
presentation of the numerical results obtained for the multi-objective dynamic WAM prototype
in §8.2.4.
The remainder of the chapter was concerned with a validation of the numerical results reported
in §8.2. Three methods of validation were employed for this purpose in §8.3. First, a face
validation was carried out in §8.3.1 with a view to commenting on the quality and realism of the
results obtained for each WAM prototype. Next, a random benchmark validation was performed
in §8.3.2 by generating a series of random solutions for each WAM prototype and comparing
the quality of the randomly generated solutions with that of the results returned by the various
algorithms for the WAM prototypes. The final validation process involved a consultation with
two military experts in which they were asked to solve each of the WAMs within the context
of the simulated scenario in Figure 8.1. Their WA proposals were compared in §8.3.3 with the
results obtained by the algorithms for the WAM prototypes.
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This summative chapter comprises two sections. A detailed summary of the contents of the
dissertation is provided in a chapter-by-chapter overview fashion in §9.1, while the various novel
contributions of the dissertation are highlighted in §9.2, which also contains an appraisal of the
value and significance of these contributions.
9.1 Dissertation contents
Apart from the last part, Part IV, this dissertation comprises a total of eight chapters, the
last seven of which have been partitioned into three parts. The exception is the stand-alone
introductory chapter, Chapter 1, which was devoted to providing the reader with a background
context for the work to follow in the document. After an opening background section in this
first chapter, highlighting the need for carefully designed and tested TEWA DSSs from a naval
perspective, an informal description was given of the problem to be considered throughout the
dissertation, namely the design and application of a practical, generic WA subsystem which can
function as part of such an integrated TEWA DSS. This was followed by a presentation of the
nine research objectives to be pursued in the dissertation and a delimitation of the dissertation
scope to a GBAD surface domain in which own force assets are assumed to have fixed positions
and opposing force threats are assumed to be fixed-wing aircraft. The research methodology to
be adopted was also discussed in detail and the chapter closed with an explanation of how the
material presented later in the dissertation is organised into various chapters forming coherent
dissertation parts.
The first part of the dissertation, entitled Literature review, comprised two chapters. The first
of these, Chapter 2, was devoted to a comprehensive discussion on the basic elements of and
factors related to GBAD in general, in fulfilment of Dissertation Objectives I(a) and I(b) §1.3.
The chapter opened with a brief review of TEWA DS within a GBAD context, which included
a description of IPB (which is central to the TE process), a coherent definition of TE, as well as
various approaches that opposing force aerial threats may adopt when attacking own force assets,
in fulfilment of Dissertation Objective I(d). The different platforms from which the process of
WA may be approached were also discussed in some detail. It was furthermore described how
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three important fundamental theories of warfare, as well as the physical, functional and cognitive
GBAD elements, inform or form a central part of an effective TEWA DSS. In particular, a
description was given of the notion of C2 (which included a review of the well-known C2 model
of Boyd [20]). Variations on this model by other authors were also touched upon. The importance
of speed in terms of increasing the OPTEMPO of C2 was also briefly discussed before the review
focus shifted to a discussion on SA. The importance of SA in military missions and a three-tiered
hierarchy for achieving SA, due to Endsley [66], was highlighted. A three-level framework by
Wallenius [204] for achieving complete SA in the context of C2 was also reviewed. The notion
of NCW was considered next and its importance in the context of integrating sensors, WSs,
decision makers and information was briefly discussed. This was followed by a detailed discussion
on the social, cognitive, information and physical domains of NCW, as well as their interactions,
culminating in the logical framework for NCW by Cebrowski [31]. The focus of the review then
turned to the physical, functional and cognitive elements of a typical TEWA DSS, in fulfilment
of Dissertation Objective I(c). It was explained how the physical (hardware) elements include
DAs and how they may be prioritised. Sensor systems and their various capabilities with respect
to detecting and tracking aerial threats were also discussed, as were various aircraft alternatives
and their manoeuvring capabilities (including possible WS armament carried by them and attack
profiles that they may execute) when attacking DAs. Ground-based WSs employed by the own
force to counter aerial threats were also reviewed. The discussion on the functional (software)
elements of an effective TEWA DSS was focussed on those functional elements pertaining to
operator DS, testing and training, effecting and sensing, TM, data management, maintenance
and testing, remote system processing, map processing, AM, and TE. The chapter finally closed
with a discussion on the cognitive elements of a typical TEWA system, focussing on the roles
and responsibilities of the commander and FCO.
The second chapter of Part I, Chapter 3, contained a review of existing WAMs in the military
operations research literature since the inception of WA modelling during the early 1950s until
the current state of the art of WAMs during the early 21st century, in fulfilment of Dissertation
Objective I(e). These WAMs were presented in chronological order. The account of the evolution
of WA modelling was, however, preceded by a brief review of the notion of NP-completeness
since even the simplest WAMs in the literature are NP-complete. It was described how the
starting point for WA modelling was the classical assignment problem of Votaw and Orden [202],
formulated in 1952. This model formed the cornerstone for Manne [125] on which he built the
first WAM in 1958. A detailed description of this first WAM was given and it was described
how it paved the way for many authors to contribute towards the formulation of WAMs in
many different incarnations. The ensuing history of WA modelling was partitioned into three
parts representing natural WA modelling epochs. The first of these epochs was the period from
the early 1960s to the mid 1980s during which various static WAMs were put forward. The
second epoch was ushered in by Hosein et al. [89], who formulated the first dynamic WAM, and
continued to the late 1990s. The last epoch was the early 21st century up to the current day,
which saw the introduction of multi-objective WAMs.
The second part of the dissertation, entitled Mathematical prerequisites, also comprised two chap-
ters. The first of these, Chapter 4, was devoted to a discussion on the basic principles involved
in multi-objective optimisation, in fulfilment of Dissertation Objective I(f). The chapter opened
with an introduction to the subject of multi-objective optimisation and this was followed by the
presentation of a mathematical formulation for the general form of a multi-objective optimisa-
tion problem. The reader was also familiarised with the fundamental notions of decision space
and objective space. The importance of the notion of convexity in multi-objective optimisation
problems was discussed and it was pointed out that nonconvex multi-objective optimisation
problems are considerably harder to solve than their convex counterparts. The review focus
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then shifted to the notions of solution dominance and of Pareto optimality. The notion of hy-
pervolume was also described as a performance measure capable of measuring the quality of a
nondominated set of solutions as an estimate of the true Pareto front of a multi-objective optimi-
sation problem. Two sets of theoretical conditions for Pareto optimality were reviewed — a set
of necessary conditions for a solution to be Pareto optimal and a set of sufficient conditions for
a solution to be Pareto optimal. Three methods for identifying a nondominated set of solutions
from among a given, finite set of candidate solutions to a multi-objective optimisation problem
were reviewed and illustrated next, namely a naive and slow approach, a continuously updat-
ing approach and a more robust method due to Kung et al. [111]. Since many multi-objective
optimisation techniques in the operations research literature require candidate solutions to be
sorted into different classes based on their respective degrees of dominance, a description was
given of the well-known fast nondominated sorting algorithm developed by Deb [51], designed
for this purpose. The chapter finally closed with a discussion on problems that can arise when
adopting the classical multi-objective optimisation method of weighting objective functions into
a single objective instead of adopting a truly multi-objective trade-off paradigm.
The second chapter of Part II, Chapter 5, contained a review of three classes of solution method-
ologies that have been adopted in the literature for solving WAMs, in fulfilment of Dissertation
Objective I(g). The first of these classes was exact solution approaches (in which the method of
total enumeration and the celebrated branch-and-bound method by Doig and Land [57] were held
up as examples). Although exact solution approaches are able to find globally optimal solutions
to optimisation problems, they are typically computationally expensive and are often abandoned
in favour of computationally less expensive solution approaches which are typically only able to
find locally optimal solutions. Such solution approaches fall within the realm of heuristics (the
second class of solution methodologies reviewed) and metaheuristics (the third class of solution
methodologies). Within the class of metaheuristics, two optimisation paradigms were consid-
ered: trajectory-based solution approaches and population-based approaches. An example of a
metaheuristic solution methodology was reviewed within each of these paradigms. These exam-
ples within the former paradigm were the method of simulated annealing due to Kirkpatrick et
al. [104] (in the case of single-objective optimisation) and the DBMOSA developed by Smith et
al. [173] (in the case of multi-objective optimisation). Within the latter paradigm, the example
methodologies were the genetic algorithm due to Holland [88] (in the case of single-objective
optimisation) and the NSGA II developed by Agarwal et al. [2] (in the case of multi-objective
optimisation).
The third part of the dissertation, entitled Proposed decision support subsystem, was the heart
of the dissertation and contained a number of novel contributions. This part comprised three
chapters. The first of these, Chapter 6, contained a newly proposed WA subsystem architecture
for use in a GBAD TEWA DSS, in fulfilment of Dissertation Objective II. After a brief discussion
on DS design approaches in general, in fulfilment of Dissertation Objective I(h), the design of
the WA subsystem architecture was put forward and discussed. The remainder of the chapter
was devoted to detailed descriptions of the main components contained in the proposed WA
subsystem architecture, as well as the working of another, prerequisite subsystem called the
EQ subsystem. The EQ subsystem contains two components, a PEF component and an EEM
component. The working of the PEF component was discussed in general and a method was
reviewed for discretising the effectiveness values that WSs can achieve with respect to threats. In
addition, a process for filtering the effectiveness values of WSs so as to respect constraints posed
by extreme environmental conditions and terrain features was also described. Two constituent
EEM-component methods for predicting the future flight paths of threats were furthermore
described and a method for constructing the EEM was presented, using the information returned
by the FPP models. The focus next shifted to a discussion on the components contained in
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the WA subsystem proper. The envisaged working of a WAM component, which forms the
heart of the WA subsystem architecture, was described, and four classes of WAMs, ranging in
different levels of complexity, were proposed for inclusion in the WAM component, in fulfilment
of Dissertation Objective III. These classes were single-objective static WAMs, multi-objective
static WAMs, single-objective dynamic WAMs and multi-objective dynamic WAMs. A model
prototype within each of these classes was proposed for default inclusion in the WAM component.
These model prototypes were presented in increasing order of complexity and each was discussed
in detail. A novel multi-objective static WAM and a novel multi-objective dynamic WAM
were also formulated for inclusion in the two most complex classes of WAMs, in fulfilment of
Dissertation Objective IV. The final component of the WA subsystem architecture, a WASS
component, was also discussed and it was proposed that a number of solution methodologies
be used to solve a particular, preferred WAM configured by the FCO and that the candidate
solutions thus obtained be sorted to obtain a set of high-quality nondominated solutions to
present as real-time DS to the FCO. The chapter closed with an elucidation of the chronological
order in which the events within a single TEWA computational cycle are envisaged to occur.
The second chapter of Part III, Chapter 7, was dedicated to a discussion on practical suggestions
for implementing a TEWA DSS, in fulfilment of Dissertation Objective V. Eight suggestions were
proposed in total. The chapter opened with a brief review on the five levels of automation of
DSSs in general. It was advocated that a TEWA DSS should aim to support and conform to
FCO thought when an operator has to make difficult decisions in short time frames, rather
than pursuing a fully-automated TEWA DSS. A suggestion was also made for improving certain
input data in a bid to facilitate higher quality results obtainable from a TEWA DSS. Next,
the importance of providing the FCO with only the necessary information was discussed. A
number of suggestions were made for efficient layouts of the HMI. Thereafter, the focus shifted
to a common problem experienced in military combat situations — that of overwhelming FCOs
with excessively many decision alternatives as DS. This may cause confusion when FCOs have
to make important WA engagement decisions. A decision tree was proposed for use when the
FCO configures WAMs during the pre-deployment stages of a mission so as to alleviate this
kind of stress experienced during combat situations. This was followed by four suggestions for
incorporating FCO preferences and biases into a TEWA system with a view to reduce the number
of WA alternatives reported as DSS recommendations to an FCO. The undesirable notion of
switching was described next and a suggestion was made to incorporate threshold values in
order to counter this problem. The importance of testing the various components of a TEWA
system was finally considered. Specific mention was made of the vital importance of thoroughly
testing the constituent parts of military DSSs due the high-stake involvement of human lives in
decisions supported by TEWA DSSs. The importance of evaluating a TEWA DSS as a whole
before implementation was also elaborated upon. It was suggested that a TEWA DSS should be
evaluated as an integrated system within the context of an ADC environment in order to account
for possible emergent subsystem behaviour. The use of a simulation environment was proposed
for this purpose and the performance evaluation framework of Truter [187] was suggested as a
possible platform for such TEWA DSS testing.
The third chapter of Part III, Chapter 8, was devoted to providing an illustration and validation
of the working of the various WAM prototypes chosen for default inclusion in the WA design
architecture (as described in Chapter 6), in fulfilment of Dissertation Objective VII. The chapter
opened with a detailed description of a simulated GBAD scenario adopted as context when
solving each of the four WAM prototypes by means of the appropriate solution methodologies (as
described in Chapter 5), in fulfilment of Dissertation Objective V. The numerical results returned
for each model prototype by the various algorithms within the context of the aforementioned
scenario were presented and interpreted. The algorithmic parameter values employed within
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each case were also given. Thereafter, a comprehensive validation followed of the numerical
results obtained, in fulfilment of Dissertation Objective VIII. Three methods of validation were
employed. First, a face validation was conducted in terms of the (subjectively judged) quality,
realism and practicality of the WA recommendations returned by each WAM prototype. Next,
a random benchmark validation was performed by generating a sequence of random solutions
for each WAM prototype and ascertaining that these results were of considerably poorer quality
than the approximately (Pareto) optimal solutions uncovered by the various algorithms. The
final validation process involved a consultation with two military experts during which they were
asked (i) to comment on the suitability of the WA alternatives produced by each model, and (ii)
to solve each of the four WAMs in the context of the simulated scenario by hand. Their results
were then compared to the results obtained via the WAM prototypes.
9.2 Appraisal of dissertation contributions
This section contains a brief appraisal of the contributions of this dissertation. The dissertation
contains a total of eight novel contributions. In each case the contribution is noted formally and
then discussed in terms of its value and significance.
Contribution 9.1 A documentation of the history of WA modelling evolution from the 1950s
up to the early years of the 21st century.
An account was given in Chapter 3 of the development of WAMs in the military operations
research literature. The various WAMs were presented chronologically since the inception of
WA modelling during the 1950s and the discussion spanned the entire period of time up to the
present. The exposition was partitioned into three parts representing natural WA modelling
epochs. To the best knowledge of the author this review is the first historical account of the
temporal evolution of WA modelling.
Contribution 9.2 The formulation of a novel, tri-objective static WAM seeking to achieve
Pareto optimal trade-offs between minimising accumulated threat survivability, minimising WS
ammunition expenditure and maximising the ammunition stockpile of the least re-engagable WS
after the WA decision.
The tri-objective static WAM formulated in §6.5.2 is, to the best knowledge of the author,
only the second multi-objective WAM to have been proposed to date in the literature [123],
after an earlier bi-objective WAM put forward by the author during his masters study [118,
120] (which may be considered a forerunner study to the work contained in this dissertation).
The expansion of WA modelling into the realm of multi-objective optimisation is considered a
significant contribution which has the potential of changing the course of WA modelling efforts
in the short to medium term.
Contribution 9.3 The formulation, for the first time, of a multi-objective dynamic WAM seek-
ing to schedule earliest and latest engagements of aerial threats by WSs in pursuit of Pareto
optimal trade-offs between the same three scheduling objectives as the model of Contribution 9.2.
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The tri-objective dynamic WAM proposed in §6.5.4 was inspired by a combination of the single-
objective dynamic WAM of Van der Merwe [195] and the tri-objective static WAM of Contribu-
tion 9.2. To the best knowledge of the author, this is the first model in the class of multi-objective
dynamic WAMs to appear in the literature [121].
Contribution 9.4 The proposal of a generic, practicable WA subsystem architecture that can
function as part of an integrated TEWA DSS.
The major contribution of this dissertation is the generic WA subsystem design put forward in
Chapter 6. As mentioned in §1.2, the main aim in this dissertation was to fill the void in exist-
ing design attempts at a fully-fledged South African TEWA DSS, by designing a WA subsystem
counterpart to the TE subsystem previously put forward by Roux and Van Vuuren [162]. The
purpose of the WA subsystem proposed in this Dissertation is to provide real-time DS to FCOs
with respect to high-quality WS-threat assignment alternatives. The WA subsystem design of
Chapter 6 is generic in the sense that it facilitates population of the various subsystem com-
ponents by customised models and other subcomponents. It is envisaged that this contribution
may provide new momentum to current, local and international research efforts aimed at the
design and establishment of effective TEWA DSSs, just as the TE subsystem design of Roux and
Van Vuuren did directly after 2007 (that paper has been cited 79 times in the open literature).
Contribution 9.5 A demonstration of the practical working of a concept demonstrator con-
forming to the WA subsystem architecture of Contribution 9.4 within the context of a realistic,
but hypothetical, GBAD scenario.
It was an express aim in this dissertation to put forward a WA subsystem design that is prac-
ticable instead of being merely of academic value. The above-mentioned demonstration of the
possible practical working of a concept demonstrator of the WA subsystem design advocated
in Chapter 6 (in the form of a series of worked numerical examples in Chapter 8) is therefore
considered an important contribution of this dissertation. These numerical examples contained
solutions to a number of WAM prototypes within the context of an existing, realistic GBAD
scenario. Upon subjecting the solutions to these WAM prototypes to a face validation, it was
found that the solutions are capable of forming a basis for WA DSS that makes sense from a
logical point of view.
Contribution 9.6 An expert validation of the WA recommendation results obtained in the
worked examples of Contribution 9.5.
The potential value of Contribution 9.5 was underlined by subjecting the numerical example
results of Chapter 8 to expert validation. Two military experts [160, 200] confirmed the practical
plausibility of the WA recommendations embodied in these numerical results and expressed
appreciation for the potential benefit of having access to a TEWA DSS capable of generating
such results.
Contribution 9.7 The documentation of a number of practical suggestions with respect to the
possible embedding of the WA subsystem architecture of Contribution 9.4 within a real TEWA
DSS.
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Upon consultation with experts in the use and design of DSSs, the practical TEWA system
implementation suggestions contained in Chapter 7 and published in [122] are considered to
be potentially valuable guidelines for research consultants tasked with possible future end-user
TEWA implementations.
Contribution 9.8 The suggestion of a number of ideas for possible future work following on
the contributions of this dissertation.
The last contribution of this dissertation is proffered in the next chapter, Chapter 10. These
suggestions are made in an effort to help orientate TEWA-related research in the immediate
short term by documenting suitable avenues of investigation as possible follow-up work to the
contributions of this dissertation.
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This final chapter contains suggestions for nine avenues of further investigation as possible follow-
up work on the contributions of this dissertation. In each case the suggestion is stated formally
and then elucidated and motivated briefly.
10.1 Scope enlargement suggestions
This section contains two suggestions for future work related to natural scope enlargements of
the work contained in this dissertation.
Suggestion 10.1 Enlarge the scope of aerial threats accommodated in the TEWA system.
The scope of aerial threats accommodated in both the TE and WA subsystems considered in this
dissertation was limited to fixed-wing aircraft that are capable of attacking DAs according to a
pre-defined set of attack profiles only (as described in §2.5.1). It is suggested that this scope be
enlarged to consider additional attack techniques and even other classes of aerial threats (such
as rotary-wing aircraft or long-range ballistic missiles). Such additional attack techniques may
render the TEWA system more realistic and robust in the sense of being able to accommodate
a larger variety of hostile behaviour. The inclusion of other classes of threats is furthermore
expected to result in the exhibition of very different attack profiles and/or induce very different
computation timescales. For example, a helicopter is capable of vertical ducking behind terrain
features and emergence from outside line of sight, which renders successful engagement of such
a threat by fixed ground WS difficult. The possibility of rapid changes in flight direction and/or
elevation by a helicopter is furthermore expected to complicate the process of TE for such
a threat class. Moreover, the speeds at which inter-continental ballistic missiles are capable
of flying is such that faster TE and WA algorithms may be required and/or simpler model
customisation configurations may be required.
Suggestion 10.2 Enlarge the scope of ground-based WSs accommodated in the TEWA system.
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CIWSs and VSHORADS were the only types of WSs considered within the scope of GBAD
systems in this dissertation. It is suggested that this scope be enlarged to consider additional
WS types, such as long-range WSs, for example. This scope enlargement will be especially
beneficial if additional threat classes, such as long-range ballistic missiles, are considered within
the TEWA system, but is expected to have a dramatic effect on the required accuracy with
which future hostile aircraft behaviour can be predicted. If accurate flightpath predictions are
not available over long windows into the future, the inclusion of the possibility of long-range
WSs in TE and WA models may be of limited benefit.
10.2 Modelling generalisation suggestions
This section contains a further three suggestions for future work related to natural paradigm
generalisations of the models considered in this dissertation.
Suggestion 10.3 Allow for the possibility of dynamism in the deployment of own-force GBAD
elements.
It was assumed in this dissertation that all own-force elements have fixed positions within the
GBAD system. It is suggested that this limitation be removed, so that GBAD elements such
as sensors, WSs and DAs, may be modelled as objects capable of movement within the area
of responsibility. It may, for example, be beneficial to consider sensors with variable positions,
so that they can be moved in order to be able to observe air volumes within current blind
spots induced by terrain features. It may similarly be beneficial to move WSs so as to enhance
their efficacy or DAs in order to afford them better terrain protection. Such an introduction of
dynamism into the TEWA modelling paradigm will, of course, require modelling extensions of
both TE and WA models into the realm of relative motion kinematics.
Suggestion 10.4 Allow for the possibility of stochastic area-based WA modelling.
A single-trajectory flight path prediction modelling approach was assumed in this dissertation.
This gave rise to the consideration of WAMs that are essentially deterministic in terms presumed,
single attack paths or scenarios adopted by threats once the EEM has been populated. It is
suggested, however, that the flight path prediction modelling approach be generalised to a
multi-trajectory paradigm in which probabilities are attached to multiple future flight path
scenarios for each threat (related to the model described in §6.4.1). This generalisation may
result in models capable of predicting future aircraft positions more robustly, but will require
the simultaneous generalisation of the WA modelling approach to within the realm of stochastic
attack paths or scenarios.
Suggestion 10.5 Identify additional objectives for inclusion in multi-objective WA models.
Only three WA criteria were included in the default multi-objective, dynamic model (6.24)–
(6.26) proposed in Chapter 6. Although these WAM objectives are considered to be of practical
relevance, as confirmed by two military experts [160, 200], it may be beneficial to engage with
other military exerts to ascertain whether the inclusion of additional WA criteria in the model
is expected to contribute to the model’s realism.
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10.3 Model solution suggestions
This section contains four final suggestions for future work related to WA model solution method-
ology, implementation and validation.
Suggestion 10.6 Apply the WAM prototypes selected for default inclusion in the WAMS com-
ponent in the contexts of other realistic simulated GBAD scenarios.
A single hypothetical, albeit realistic, GBAD scenario was considered in the numerical WA model
demonstration and validation process of Chapter 8. Although such GBAD scenarios are hard
to come by (they typically have to be designed in careful consultation with military experts),
it is obvious that an extended WA model demonstration and validation process, such as that
in Chapter 8 but carried out within the contexts of other hypothetical GBAD scenarios, will
contribute to the perceived practical plausibility and credibility of the WA modelling approach
proposed in this dissertation.
Suggestion 10.7 Reduce the computational time required to solve the multi-objective, dynamic
model proposed in Chapter 6.
It was found in §8.2.4 that an unrealistically long time is required in order to find a high-quality
(approximate) Pareto front of trade-off solutions to the novel multi-objective, dynamic model
(6.24)–(6.26); it required 139 seconds to solve the instance of this model related to the GBAD
scenario considered in Chapter 8. This computational burden may be attributed, in part, to
the high-level model solution implementation in Oracle’s Java [141]. It is suggested that a
lower-level implementation of the NSGA-II and the DBMOSA is pursued (in a programming
language such as C++ [40], for example). It has been reported that high-level implementations
of combinatorial algorithms in environments, such as Java or Wolfram’s Mathematica [211], may
run up to one hundred times longer than when implemented in low-level programming languages,
such as C++ [27]. If a run time reduction of this order of magnitude is achievable in the case
of the two algorithms mentioned above, then implementation of this suggestion may render the
multi-objective, dynamic model (6.24)–(6.26) a more viable WAM from a realistic point of view.
Suggestion 10.8 Increase the sophistication of the current WAM solution methodologies.
Since the design of sophisticated WAM solution procedures was not the aim in this dissertation,
rather rudimentary incarnations of the method of simulated annealing and a genetic algorithm
were employed to solve the WAMs of Chapter 6 in the context of the GBAD scenario of Chap-
ter 8, as described in some detail in Chapter 5. There is indeed considerable room for improve-
ment of these implementations. Other simulated annealing move operators and other genetic
algorithmic crossover procedures may, for example, be considered. Furthermore, only feasible
solutions were considered in the methods described in Chapter 5 — perhaps the metaheuristic
optimisation techniques may benefit (even significantly) from being allowed to search through
infeasible regions of the decision space under suitable constraint violation penalty schemes (thus
being able to reach disjoint pockets of the feasible domain). Also, very limited parameter opti-
misations were carried out in order to select suitable parameter values for the various algorithms
(such as the cooling and reheating rates for the method of simulated annealing implementations,
or the mutation and crossover rates of the genetic algorithm implementations); more thorough
parameter evaluations may perhaps yield improved WAM solutions.
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Suggestion 10.9 Explore other WAM solution methodologies for possible inclusion in the WAMS
component.
Only two WAM solution methodologies were included in the Chapter 8 concept demonstration
of the DSS architecture put forward in Chapter 6. These methods were the trajectory-based
method of simulated annealing and the population-based genetic algorithm. It is suggested that
other trajectory-based methods, such as tabu search or variable neighbourhood search, and other
population-based methods such as particle swarm optimisation or ant colony optimisation, also
be considered as possible WAM solution methodologies and included in an enhanced concept
demonstration of the WASS proposed in §6.6.
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